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Abstract..
With the emergence of the theories and doctrines of the mode of combat commonly referred to as 
network-centric warfare, it is becoming increasingly obvious that global militaries, and 
particularly the US military and defence establishment, have begun to perceive a shift in the 
emerging ‘strategic’ environment. The hitherto rationally predictable security calculus - like the 
now fading Cold War strategic paradigm -  is fast becoming redundant. Among other things, this 
shift is being increasingly understood as a movement from nation-state threats to decentralised 
network threats. What is significant about this is that perhaps for the first time in the history of 
the modem military, the military machine -  a state-owned and run apparatus -  is thinking of and, 
in some cases, even operating outside the orbit of the State. This would suggest that either the 
connection between war and the political is becoming increasingly tenuous, or perhaps war, 
considered in its originary terms, was and is not really an instrument of any kind, least of all a 
political one. Thus, this thesis asks: what if war in its most extravagant, uninhibited and 
originary sense does not serve the State? Pursuant to this, the thesis traces the 
philosophical backdrop against which the more common theorizations of war and its 
conduct take place. Taking its investigative analysis further, it demonstrates that, when 
considered in philosophical terms, though the emergence of the net-centric theories and 
practices of war potentially carry with them the possibility to render our imagination of
war into a state of ‘suspended animation’, they also carry with/in them a profound
r 1 ' ' '■
\
‘performative contradiction’ that necessarily fractures the state-centric concept of war. 
This thesis’ investigations reveal that such a fracturing far from paralyzing the project of 
re-problematizating war, affords us an opportunity to rethink war in inhuman, that is to 
say, in machinic terms.
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Chapter One
On How to Read this Thesis or,
...there is another side to heaven...1
In Difference and Repetition...with War
The dramatic rise in computing power and the viral spread of high-speed 
information networks - spurred on by the Internet - has heralded the emergence of 
what is popularly known as the Information Age. Among other things, it is 
marked by an increasing ability to create/ acquire, organize/ re-arrange, distribute/ 
disseminate ‘information/ knowledge’ using sophisticated binary-digital computer 
systems. As a consequence, these highly advanced digital and ‘digitized’ 
technologies - beneficiaries of the positive effects of Moore’s Law' - are also 
proliferating as infrastructures, or more precisely, as ‘dependency-structures’ 
across a wide variety o f ecologies which increasingly complement (and under 
some circumstances, contradict) the more traditional and commonplace 
experience of the Real.4 This has led, as some suggest, to the progressive
1 Black Sabbath, “Computer G od” from Dehumanizer, 1992
2 See, for exam ple, Mark Dery, E scape Velocity: Cyberculture at the encl o f  the Centuiy, (London: Hodder 
& Stoughton, 1996)
3 M oore’s Law states: “The com plexity for minimum component costs has increased at a rate o f  roughly a 
factor o f  two per year ...” in "Cramming more components onto integrated circuits", Gordon E. Moore, 
E lectron ics M agazine, 19 April, 1965
4 "In the Digital D ecade, you'll no longer think o f  the PC as a tool you use only to carry out specific tasks it 
w ill becom e som ething you com e to rely on all the time. The power o f  the PC w ill be as ubiquitous and 
reliable as electricity, and vastly more useful than any single device w e use today." - B ill Gates, Chairman 
and C hief Software Architect, M icrosoft Corp., in “M oving into the Digital D ecade”. Oct, 29, 2001.
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compromise of the classical Laws of Thought - the Law of Identity, the Law of 
Contradiction, and the Law of the Excluded Middle.5 The Real, it is contended, 
has become more complex than ever before.6 Thus, it is argued, the Age of 
Information “should be labeled a ‘knowledge revolution’ since it encompasses 
advances in information technologies that significantly alter the politics, 
economics, sociology, and culture of knowledge creation and distribution.”7 This, 
in brief, is the backdrop against which the mode of combat commonly referred to
o
as Network-centric Warfare (NCW) has emerged.
NCW’s technological signature, if one looks for it, is writ large. Note, for 
example, the transformation of air fleets of the Second World War and Cold War 
vintage. Today, increasingly, the ‘intended’ force-posture is overtly curving
A vailable at http://ww w.inicrosoft.com /presspass/ofiiote/10-29digitaldecade.m spx. Last accessed on Jan, 
2006.
5 Tom M cE villey, The Shape o f  Ancient Thought [Comparative Studies in Greek and Indian Philosophies], 
(N ew  York: Allworth Press, 2002), pp 36-37.
6 See W illiam s, Linda, “Mirrors Without Memories: Truth, History and the N ew  Documentary.” Film 
Q uarterly. Vol. 46, N o. 3, Spring 1993: 12. In this connection, the recent debates in the wake o f  the launch 
o f  M icrosoft’s V ista OS, centering on Digital Rights Management (DRM ) are informative. See “W indows 
V ista Content Protection - Twenty Questions (and A nswers)” available at
http://w indowsvistablog.com /blogs/windowsvista/archive/2007/01/20/w indow s-vista-content-protection- 
twenty-questions-and-answers.aspx The matter at stake is a critical one, for the DRM-related debate 
stripped o ff  its short-term profiteering vestige, is about asking - What is software? What does owning, 
making, com m odifying mean in the context o f  information-based software? How does one assign value to 
that what actually exists, but which, in real material terms, also does not exist?
7 Papp, Alberts, Tuyahov, “Historical Impacts o f  Information Technologies: An O verview ” in A lbeits & 
Papp, The Information Age: An Anthology> on its Im pact and C onsequences , (W ashington, DC: INSS, 
National D efence University Press, 1998), A vailable at http://www.ndu.edu/inss/books/Books% 20- 
% 201998/Information% 20Age% 20Anthology% 20-% 20Sept% 2098/ch02a.html
8 Network-Centric War(fare) (NCW ) is most com m only defined as “an information-superiority-enabled  
concept o f  operations that generates increased combat power by networking sensors, decision-makers, and 
shooters to achieve shared awareness, increased speed o f  command, higher tempo o f  operations...and a 
degree o f  self-sufficiency. In essence, NCW  translates information superiority into combat power by 
effectively linking knowledgable entities in the battlespace.” See Alberts, Gartska, Stein, N etw ork Centric  
W arfare -  D evelop ing  and L everaging Information Superiority, (W ashington, DC: US D oD, CCRP, 2003), 
p2. See also, “Net-centric goal: a different military”, Dawn S. Onley, GCN Staff, 11/10/03. Government 
C om puter N ew s  (G CN), A vailable at http://www.gcn.com /print/22 32/24048-1 .htm l?topic=interview. Last 
accessed on July 27, 2007.
2
towards the development/ acquisition and integration of sophisticated aerospace 
weapons/ sensor-platforms and suites that create fine grids and meshes of 
information-flows.9 These are meant to contribute to the production and 
dissemination of a diverse array of transient cartographic images and perspectives 
-  battlespaces - with complexly interwoven and inter-dependent intensities, and 
are most commonly identified in terms of states, or conditions, of alert/ 
emergency, where/in ‘the enemy’ of the moment is framed and neutralized -  
physically and otherwise.10 US Navy carrier fleets have repeatedly demonstrated 
over the past decade that regardless of terrain (accessibility) and weather 
(visibility) conditions, they can create a remarkably diverse and mobile array of 
weapon-clusters -  battle-nodes - from where a variety of surveillance operations - 
passive and active - take place -  manned or/ and otherwise.11 Displaying the most 
flexibility in testing the emergent concept(s) of NCW, the US Navy is in the 
process o f transforming itself into a capability-based modular expression of force 
that can stretch/ extend battlespace into the gaps, cracks and faultlines of the 
familiar dimensions of space and time.12 In a complementary fashion, ground
9 See, for example, the progressive ‘m odernization’ o f  the Indian Air Force - upgrading airframes, 
im proving/ updating radar, weapon, sensor suites, integration with AW ACS and M id-Air Refuellers and 
real-time linkage with aero-space sensor and communication platforms.
10For battlespace, see Thomas Blackmore, War X: Human Extensions in B attlespace. (Toronto: University  
o f  Toronto Press, 2005). See also W. Owens, D om inant B attlespace K now ledge. (Hawaii: University Press 
o f  the Pacific, 2002).
11 See, for example, “Military: The U AV  Revolution - Up in the Sky, An Unblinking Eye”, John Barry and 
Evan Thomas, N ewsweek, June 9, 2008 Issue. A vailable at http://w w w .new sw eek.eom /id/l 39432 . Last 
accessed on June 9, 2008.
12 For an account o f  ‘gaps’ and ‘cores’ see Thomas, P. M. Barnett, The P en ta g o n ’s N ew  M ap -  War and  
P eace in the Twentieth Century, (N ew  York: Putnam, 2004). For an official account o f  the ‘modular’ 
stance, see Ronald O ’ Rourke, “N avy Littoral Combat Ship (LCS): Background and Issues for Congress, 
CRS R eport (21305) fo r  the US C ongress, (W ashington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Library o f  
Congress, 2005). See also the updated version (2008) Ronald O ’ Rourke, “N avy Littoral Combat Ship 
(LCS) Program: Background, Oversight Issues, and Options for Congress”, May 23, 2008. Available at 
http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RL33741 20080523.pdf. Last accessed on June, 2008.
3
formations are also being re-equipped with ‘smart technologies’, which ‘plug’ 
into the virtual maps that the ‘air-breathing’ and ‘hydro-capable’ platforms 
create.13 Not surprisingly, these ground formations are able to create and project 
smaller, but highly calibrated, nets and meshes that give their wider - more 
‘global’ -  counterparts a finer resolution. ‘Digitized formations’ -  across the geo­
physical-sensorial spectrum -  thus are no longer expected to ‘troop’ onto the 
battlefield, rather, they ‘surge’, ‘swarm’, and quilt in battlespace - their primary 
task being to contribute to the ‘sense and response’ of the ‘full-spectrum’ 
military-machine to the ever-fluid demands of ‘battle’.14
A general survey of the current literature on war and its conduct shows 
that there are two primary views regarding NCW. For the more conservatively 
inclined, NCW -  as the above-mentioned examples illustrate - is simply the 
‘mode of operability’ that accompanies the digitization of the conduct of war.15 
This point of view holds that while strategy, operations, and tactics may be 
executed more efficiently -  perhaps even differently -  with the help of high-speed 
ICTs (that is to say, if they are digitized), war -  the martial context in which these
13 “The Soldier as a System  -  R eflections from Soldier Technology, 2 0 0 8 ’, A vailable at 
http://www.defense-update.com /events/2Q 08/sum m arv/soldiertech08.htm . Last accessed on May 2008. See 
also, US Training and Doctrine Command (U STRA DO C), “Soldier as a System Overview (SaaS)”, 
prepared for The National D efence Industry A ssociation, May, 2003. Available at 
w w w .dtic.m il/ndia/2003sm allam is/cam p.ppt. Last accessed on M ay 2007.
14 See, for example, Blackmore, War X , 2005A lso, The US A rm y’s 4 th Infantry D ivision is a self-confessed  
exam ple o f  a ‘digitized d ivision’. See the 4 th ID website at http://www.hood.arm v.m il/4id/. Last accessed  
on Aug. 12, 2006. The classic theoretical works on Swarming as a battle tactic remain the two texts on 
Swarm Theory in War by Edwards and Arquilla and Ronfeldt. For an exam ple o f  the ‘surge tactic’ see 
http://www.spacewar.com /reports/The_Strategy_Of_Surge_In_Iraq_999.html
15 David Lonsdale, The N ature o f  War in the Information Age, (London: Frank Cass, 2006), p 232
4
actions take place - remains axiomatic, immutable and a priori}6 In other words, 
it is suggested, “[T]here appears to be a unity to all strategic experience, 
regardless of period, polity, or technology”17 and ‘history’, from this point of 
view, is the reservoir of approximate-precedents attesting to the claim that while 
the character of war is subject to change, its nature must be, indeed is, eternal.18 
For the conservative theorists, NCW thus represents merely one such change in 
the character of war.19
The more radical proponents of the theories of NCW, however, assert that 
“[A] cursory look into the development of some of the most time-honoured ideas
that comprise the principles [of war] will find historical contexts that are
00completely foreign to us today.” Buoyed by the productive (which, in some 
cases, turn out to be debilitative) capabilities offered by emerging ICTs, the 
proponents of NCW suggest that an awareness, that is to say, the experience, of 
these changes “ .. .will, in the coming decade.. .unfetter us from the requirement to 
be synchronous in time and space...”21 They insist that the “time we live in [is] 
unlike any other, a time when the pace of change demands that we change. . .it is a
16 Lonsdale, The N ature o f  War in the Information Age, 2006, pp 40-43
17 Colin S. Gray, M odern Strategy?, (Oxford: OUP, 1999), p 8
18 See, for example, George Tanham, Kanti Bajpai, Amitabh Mattoo Ed. Securing India -  Strategic  
Thought and P ractice  in an Em erging Pow er, (N ew  Delhi: Manohar Publishers, 1996) p 16
19 Significantly, this trend was also apparent in the works o f  Hans Delbruck. See, for example Hans 
Delbruck, The D aw n o f  M odern Warfare: H istory o f  the A rt o f  War, V olum e IV, Trans. Walter J. Renfroe 
Jr., (Lincoln: Univ. O f Nebraska Press, 1990)
20 Robert R. Leonhard, The P rinciples o f  War fo r  the Information Age, (N ew  York, N Y : Presido Press, 
1998), p 9.
21 Though one w ould not normally associate Paul V irilio with N CW , his book P ure War is a penetrative 
investigation o f  the question o f  speed and war. See Paul V irilio & Sylvere Lotringer, P ure War, Trans. M. 
Polizzotti, (N ew  York: Sem iotext(e), 1997). See also Power to the Edge, p. xiii
5
time when our analysis methods are becoming less and less able to shed light on 
the choices we face.”22 (my emphasis)
Discussing these ‘new dynamics and attributes of conflict’, or simply, of 
‘war’, in the Information Age, Arquilla and Ronfeldt note...
[T]he information revolution is altering the nature of conflict across the 
spectrum...First, this revolution is favouring and strengthening network fonns of 
organization, often giving them an advantage over hierarchical fonns...Second, 
as the information revolution deepens, the conduct and outcome of conflicts 
increasingly.. .revolve around ‘knowledge’... Adversaries are learning to 
emphasize ‘infonnation operations’ and perception management... These 
propositions cut across the entire conflict spectrum (and thus) Infonnation-age 
threats are likely to be more diffuse, dispersed, multi-dimensional, non-linear, 
and ambiguous...23
Thus, they conclude...
.. .for myriad of reasons, the world is entering -  indeed, it has already entered -  a 
new epoch of conflict (and crime). This epoch will be defined not so much by 
whether there is more or less conflict than before, but by new dynamics and 
attributes of conflict...(C)hanges will involve high-tech sensors and weapons that 
can enable both stand-off and close-in swarming attacks...The protagonists... will
22 Alberts, Gartska, Stein, Signouri, U nderstanding Information W arfare, (W ashington, DC: US DoD, 
CCRP, 2002), p xiii. See also V ice Admiral Cebrowski, “N ew  Rules, N ew  Era -  Pentagon Must Embrace 
Information A ge”, D efence News, Oct. 21-27, 2002, p 28. The admiral writes, “With the dramatic change in 
warfare being unleashed by the transition to the information age, future military capabilities must be judged  
using new  criteria.. .Y et the deeper more profound debate is about how  the changing military rule sets that 
indicate new er sources o f  power and how they are brought to bear.. .A new  American way o f  war has 
em erged -  network-centric operations.” A vailable at
http://www.oft.osd.mil/librarv/librarv files/article 27 Defense% 20News% 20-% 20New% 20Rules- 
N ew% 20Era% 20-% 2021 -27% 20Q ct% 202002.htm . Last accessed on July 28, 2004.
23Arquilla and Ronfeldt, “The Advent o f  Netwar (R evisited)” in N etw orks and N etw ars, (Santa Monica,
CA: R A N D , 2001), pp 1-2
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be more widely dispersed...more decentralized...and more surreptitious. Offence 
and defence will be blended. The temporal and spatial dimensions of conflict will 
be compressed.24
Given this ‘operational spread’ - unlike in the Post-Industrial Age when war and 
‘the battlefield’ were primarily located at the site of the Physical and the 
Ideological - in the Information Age - spanning across three domains indentified 
as the Physical, the Cognitive and the Informational25 - War, it is contended, has 
taken on a richer, deeper, wider and omni-dimensional meaning.26 Thus, when, 
among others, Arquilla and Ronfeldt discuss this ‘new epoch of conflict’ - in
27terms of cyberwar and netwar - there is no mistaking the fact that for them War 
- in the Digital-Info Age -  is less about the political or the technological, rather it
9 ois a matter o f  ‘in-formation This suggests a subtle, but significant, shift in the 
understanding of ‘war’. It is also an intellectual project that is often suspected and 
accused of attempting to distort and, in the more extreme cases, even make 
irrelevant the canonical sanctity of the Clausewitzian, sub-political, understanding 
of war.
24 Arquilla & Ronfeldt, “A N ew  Epoch -  and Spectrum -  o f  C onflict”, in In A thena's Camp: P reparing  fo r  
Conflict in the Information Age, (Santa Monica: RAND, National D efence Research Institute, 1997), p3. 
Parenthesis in original.
25 Arthur L. M oney, Asst. Sec. o f  D efence (C3I), US D oD , “Report on Network-Centric Warfare -  Sense o f  
Report”, Submitted to the US Congress in partial fulfillm ent o f  Sec. 934 o f  the D efence Authorization Act 
for FY 01 (Public Law 106-398), March 2001, p 5. Available at 
http://ww w.dod.m il/nii/N CW /ncw  sense.pdf. Last accessed on July 28, 2004.
26 The operational stance o f  ‘full spectrum dom inance’ is a case in point. See, for example, Jim Garamone, 
“Joint V ision 2020 em phasizes Full Spectrum D om inance”, D efence Link, June 2000. A vailable at 
http://w w w .defenselink.m il/new s/Jun2000/n06022000_20006025.htm l. Last accessed on Jan, 2008
27 Arquilla and Ronfeldt, “The Advent o f  Netwar (R evisited)” in N etw orks an d  N etw ars, 2001, p 6
28 This, in NCW  terms, is understood and described in terms o f  Effects-based Operations (EBOs), which  
are defined as: “coordinated sets o f  actions on objectives defined in terms o f  human behavior in multiple 
dim ensions and on muyltiple levels, and measures their successes in terms o f  the behavior produced.” 
Edward Smith, Effects B ased  O perations -  A pplying N etw ork Centric W arfare in Peace, Crisis, and War, 
(W ashington, DC: U S D oD , CCRP, 2003), p xv.
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War, the more radical theorists of NCW suggest, is battlespace and we are 
increasingly becoming familiarized with it in terms of exponentially proliferating 
ensembles of networked computers processing data at petaflop speed.29 These, 
often seamlessly - when coupled with a myriad of cross-spectrum data/ 
information-acquisition sensors - act as receptacles and transmitters of 
information operating at the speed of light.30 In such ‘technological valhallas’, the 
traditional indicators of ‘speed’ and ‘time’ tend to collapse onto each other thus 
rendering the more familiar ‘gaps’ between the strategist’s projections, the 
general’s map table, and ‘the battle’ increasingly obsolete. In-battlespace, the 
‘hunter’ and the ‘hunted’, the ‘here’ and the ‘there’ and, the ‘actual’ and the 
‘virtual’ are experienced and projected as complex-becomings, that is to say, they 
are always becoming in-distinguishable.31 This goes some way to explain why 
some military theorists and scholars of strategy and war are urging for the 
abandoning of the paradigm in which “...we still persist in studying a type of
32
warfare that no longer exists and that we shall never fight again.” Indeed, others 
- like Szafranski - when discussing ‘war’ in the Age of Information, even call for
29 Petaflop speed is the point where time is measured at fem toseconds, the shortest possible events known 
to science. At petaflop speeds, a computer would be able to process enciphered/ encrypted data with a 
quadrillion solutions in the proverbial ‘wink o f  an eye’. See James Bamford, B ody o f  Secrets -  H ow  
A m erica ’s NSA and B rita in ’s GCH Q E avesdrop on the World, (London, UK: Arrow Books, 2002) p 607- 
608.
30 See, for example, the Global Information Grid Project residing within the US National Security Agency. 
See http://www.nsa.gov/ia/industry/gig.cfm
31This is the hallmark o f  COIN or Counter-Insurgency Operations as a ‘condition o f  war’. See, for 
exam ple, Col. Thomas X. Hammes, USM C, The Sling and The Stone: On War in the 21s' Centuiy, (St. 
Paul, MN: Zenith Press, 2006). See also Rod Thornton, A sym m etric Warfare: Threat and R esponse in the 
T wenty-First Century, (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2007)
32 Attributed to Roger Trinquier, M odern Warfare (1961), quoted in Robert L. Leonard, The P rinciples o f  
War fo r  the Information Age, (N ew  York, NY: Presido Press, 1998), p 1. See also Alberts, Gartska, Stein, 
N etw ork C entric W arfare -  D eveloping and Leveraging Information Superiority, (W ashington, DC: US 
D oD , CCRP, 2003), p i;  Edward A. Smith, Effects based  O perations -  A pplying N etw ork C entric Warfare 
in Peace, Crisis, and  War, (W ashington, DC: US D oD , CCRP, 2003), p xiii.
different ‘modes of response’ to what he suggests are the emerging 
‘epistemological challenges’ that modern-day governments and societies have to 
contend with.33 It is, therefore, not uncommon to hear reiterated that War - 
battlespace - is the most complex phenomenon of the 21st Century and, as such, it 
points to the emergence/ production of a new ‘strategic commons’.34
In the literature on modem war and strategy it is common to find these two 
views generally opposing each other. It is worth pointing out, however, that this 
opposition is also rather deceptive at a couple of interesting levels. Thus, for 
example, a closer look tells us that despite the sometimes caustic and animated 
debates that rage between them, these supposedly differing views actually share a 
common imagination wherein war, as a phenomenon, remains an affair of the 
State and is necessarily conceived of, contextualized within, and expressed as a 
political event.35 In this, the martial imagination of the proponents of the NCW
33 M entioned in Arquilla and Ronfeldt, “The Advent o f  Netwar (R evisited)” in N etworks and N etwars,
2 0 0 1 ,p 14
34 Arthur L. M oney, Asst. Sec. o f  D efence (C3I), US D oD , “Report on Network-Centric Warfare -  Sense o f  
Report”, Submitted to the US Congress in partial fulfillm ent o f  Sec. 934 o f  the D efence Authorization Act 
for FY 01 (Public Law 106-398), March 2001, p 7. A vailable at 
http://ww w.dod.m il/nii/N CW /ncw  sense.pdf. Last accessed on July 28, 2004
35 Note: There is a large body o f  literature that has problematized war in terms o f  when, why, and how war 
originated in humans. This problematization, as Gat points out, “draw s.. .information and insight from a 
w ide range o f  scholarly disciplines and branches o f  knowledge, most notably: animal behaviour (ethology), 
evolutionary theory, evolutionary psychology, anthropology, archaeology, history, historical sociology, and 
political science.” Azar Gat, War in Human C iviliza tion , (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 2006), p ix. The 
present study acknow ledges this eclectic spread o f  interests as is reflected by the number o f  theories o f  war. 
On another, but related note, it should also be flagged that som e Clausewitzian scholars, like Bassford, for 
exam ple, may accuse this study o f  mis-reading, indeed often conflating, the nuances involved between the 
words ‘p ob cy’ and ‘politics’, and even o f  the word ‘continuation’, which is how the German word 
C lausew itz used, F ortsetzung, is generally translated as. Yet we find that Bassford, for example, after 
informing us that Fortsetzung  is literally translated as ‘setting forth’ (the Heideggerian overtones in this 
translation w ill not be m issed), claim ing that “War remains politics in all its com plexity, with the added 
elem ent o f  violence. The non-rational and com pletely irrational forces that affect and often drive politics 
have the same im pact on war. V iolence is not just another ingredient in the political stew, however. Like a 
powerful spice, it affects the flavor o f  every other com ponent.” See Christopher Bassford, “John Keegan
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thesis, and that of their conservative counterparts, remains captive to the State’s 
ability (in the context of the political) to imagine, articulate, own, control, and 
manage, being m artial36 And, secondly, these two points of view also agree on 
the experience of martial corporeality -  that is to say, they share the same 
experience of war. Thus, it could be said, when considered in the context of the 
ubiquitous emergence of ICTs in the domain of war and its conduct, that if there 
is indeed an epistemic shift - as some of the NCW theorists suggest is the case - 
then it is at best limited to one that points to a transformation in the understanding 
of the conduct o f  war in terms of mass, force and speed, to one that prioritizes 
information-flows, grids and meshes, and effects-based operations.
Even a cursory glance at a sample of the (open-source) literature dealing 
with war, strategy, military theory, the network-centric approach to war, and the 
RMA thesis confirms this. It suggests that despite acknowledging the influence of 
ICTs on what we have traditionally understood as war, we remain beholden to a 
‘human, all too human’ understanding of war-as-such.37 Thus, like much of the 
prevailing post-human discourse in which man has remained “at the center of its
38narratives [as] the one who becomes and the one who owns these becomings...
and the Grand Tradition o f  Trashing Clausewitz: A Polem ic”, War and H istory, v. l ,  no.3 (Novem ber 
1994). If Bassford had used ‘war’ and ‘politics’ interchangeably, one w ould tend to agree, but perhaps not 
exactly in the way Bassford may have intended it. As w e will see, like Clausewitz, Bassford is also in 
proxim ity with an im manence, which -  unlike Clausewitz - Bassford, chooses to express as ‘v io len ce’.
36 N ote that the State or ‘the political’, are mere proxies o f  Reason -  as w e w ill see below.
37 See, for example, Quincy Wright, A Study o f  War, (Chicago: Univ. o f  Chicago Press, 1964); Azar Gat, 
War in Human C ivilization, 2006; Colin S. Gray, A nother B loody Century: Future War, (London: 
W eidenfeld & N icholson , 2005); Geoffrey Blainey, The C auses o f  War, 3 ld Ed., (N ew  York: The Free 
Press, 1988)
38 A m y W einstone, A vatar Bodies: A Tantra for Posthum anism, (M inneapolis: Univ. o f  M innesota Press, 
2004), p i 7
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‘war’, from at least the 17th Century onwards, has essentially remained within a 
particular philosophico-political architectonic despite the recent ‘turn’ (K ehref9 to 
the inhuman, that is to say, to the digital, to the networked, and to the 
information-led.
Given this, therefore, we should not be surprised when we read that as...
...The First Company of the 12th Armored Cavalry Regiment prepared for 
virtual battle...[A]t the Combined Anns and Tactical Training Center (CATTC) 
in Fort Knox, KY., the troops prepared to enter SIMNET - a virtual war delivered 
via network links. With the almost Disney-like mimicry typical of SIMNET 
operations, the warriors were briefed in an actual field command-post...The 
attacking enemy would advance from west...But the exact enemy tactics were 
obscured by the fog of war... Bravo Platoon was the first to spot the approaching 
enemy scouts...Bravo Platoon saw red and yellow impacts spike their hillside 
landscape, and a vicious crump of high explosives burst from the Perceptronics 
audio simulators. As the engagement proceeded, dead men began to show up in 
the CATTC video classroom. Inside the simulators, their vision blocks had gone 
suddenly blank with the onset of virtual death. Here in CATTC's virtual Valhalla, 
however, a large Electrohome video display unit showed a comprehensive 
overhead map of the entire battlefield...[T]he dead tank crews filed into the 
classroom and gazed upon the battlefield from a heavenly perspective. [T]hey 
began to talk. They weren't talking about pixels, polygons, baud-rates, Ethernet 
lines, or network architecture. They were talking exclusively about fields of fire, 
and fall-back positions, and radio traffic and indirect artillery strikes. They 
weren't discussing "virtual reality" or anything akin to it. These soldiers were 
talking war.40
39 Gregory Fried, H eid eg g er’s  P olem os  -  From B eing to P olitics, (Yale: Y ale Univ. Press, 2000), p 75
40 “War is Virtual H ell”, Bruce Sterling, in W ired M agazine, Issue 1.01, March-April 1993. Available at 
http://ww w.w ired.eom /w ired/archive/l .01 /virthell pr.html. Last A ccessed  on April 02, 2004.
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This ‘war’ that the soldiers at the CATTC were engaging in, albeit ‘virtually’, and 
the conduct (i.e., military theory as a ‘concept of operations’) of which that they 
were discussing has a lineage that Gat summarizes well. He says...
,..[T]he very idea that something called military theory existed -  or rather was 
very much lacking -  was the product of the intellectual gospel of the 
Enlightenment... [M]odem views on the nature of military theory originated from 
the most intensely philosophical period in European history. They were formed 
in response to the all-pervasive, epoch-making, and bitterly conflicting 
intellectual climates of the Enlightenment on the one hand, and the Counter- 
Enlightenment or Romanticism on the other.41
Others, like Victor Hanson Davis - though he traces this lineage back to Ancient
Greece - agree. Thus, it is asserted,
the West has achieved military dominance in a variety of ways that transcend 
mere superiority in weapons...the Western way o f war is so lethal precisely 
because...Western armies often fight with and for a sense o f legal 
freedom.... Because free inquiry and rationalism are Western 
trademarks.. \  which allowed]...over time...the resiliency of the Western system 
of war [to] prevail.. .42 (my emphasis)
Further, Davis suggests...
...throughout the long evolution of Western warfare there has existed a more or 
less common core of practices that reappears generation after generation,
41 Azar Gat, A H istory  o f  M ilita ry  Thought — From the Enlightenm ent to the C o ld  War, (Oxford, UK:
Oxford U niversity Press, 2001), p269.
42 V ictor Hanson D avis, Culture an d  C arnage -  Landm ark B attles in the R ise o f  Western P ow er, (N ew  
York, NY: Anchor B ooks, 2001) p21-23
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sometimes piece-meal, at other times in a nearly holistic fashion, which explains 
why the history of warfare is so often the brutal history of Western victory -  and 
why today deadly Western armies have little to fear from any force other than 
themselves.43
It should, therefore, not be surprising that despite the progressive 
technologization of the conduct of war (digitization of war) and the pre­
occupation with uncertainty (the efforts to address the ‘friction’ and ‘fog’ of war 
by incorporating the complexity and non-linear sciences, chaos theory, etc., 
collectively the ‘new sciences’),44 the so-called radical transformations in military 
affairs described by the visionaries of the NCW project also betray a strong fealty 
to an a priori organizing principle. This principle, in light of Davis’ observations 
as quoted above, is suggestive of nothing less than a ‘turn’ to Reason (in extremis 
to a universal mathesis)45 and, in this sense, it faithfully follows the lineage of 
martial thought since the Age of Enlightenment.
43 Ibid p 24.
44 See, for exam ple, James M offat, C om plexity Theoiy and N etw ork Centric Warfare, (W ashington, DC: 
CCRP, D oD , 2003); Tom Czerwinski, C oping with the Bounds: Speculations on N onlinearity in M ilita iy  
Affairs, (W ashington, DC: CCRP, DoD, 1998); Edward Smith, Complexity, Networking, and Effects B ased  
A pproaches to O perations, (W ashington, DC: CCRP, DoD, 2006)
45 W itold M arciszewski, "The principle o f  comprehension as a present-day contribution to mathesis 
universalis," Philosophia N aturalis 21: 523-537 (1984). pp. 525-526.. See also, Stephen Gaukroger, 
D escartes ’ System  o f  natural Philosophy, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), p 8. N ote that 
Descartes specifically  referred to ‘algebra’ as a ‘universal m athesis’ (universal mathematics) for it underlay 
both arithmetic and geometry. More fundamentally, Descartes was able to recognize a ‘universal m ethod’ 
that underwrote such a ‘universal m athem atics’. Descartes described this ‘m ethod’ in his Regulae. In this 
study, ‘universal m athesis’ is invoked not in the sense o f  a particular universal mathematics, but as the 
‘m ethodology’ by which an as com plete as possible account o f  the natural and physical world can be given 
expression. See also Paul D avies, E ffects-based O perations: A G rand Challenge f o r  the A nalytical 
Community, (Santa M onica, CA: RAND, 2001), M R-1477-USJFCOM /AF. P 7 (Online version) Available 
at http://•w ww.rand.org/pubs/monouraph reports/M R1477/. Last accessed on August 28, 2006. It is 
interesting to note that D avies acknow ledges the ‘philosophical’ discussions that surround the EBO debate 
and recognizes the reasons for this. However, he is equally determined to reduce the philosophical 
challenges presented by the EBO concept into analytical m odels, which is amply reflected in the title o f  his 
work.
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NCW: So, where is the ‘beef?
What distinguishes the more far-thinking NCW theorists -  some o f  whom 
we will encounter during the course o f  this study - from their traditional counter­
parts, however, is their insistence on recognizing and responding to a 
transformation in the strategic object o f war, which has ramifications on not 
simply the ‘conduct ’ o f war, but on the phenomenon o f war itself Thus, when 
Admiral Cebrowski (USN), Libicki, Edwards, Arquilla and Ronfeldt46 - who are 
among the leading theorists of Information Age warfare - claim that ‘war’ has 
suddenly gone ‘digital’, ‘post-modern’, ‘post-human’ or simply, ‘new’, we should 
be alert to the fact -  without needing to contradict the ‘realist’ theorists of war in 
the Information Age and the more conservative geo-politically bound strategists 
and thinkers - that they may not simply be referring to a ‘technological f i x ’ - the 
deployment o f  advanced technologies in the conduct o f  war.47 They may be 
pointing to, in Dillon’s words, “a profound transformation of the very military 
phenomenality of our civilization.”48
Consider, for example, what the former US Secretary of Defence, Donald 
Rumsfeld, had to say. In the context of (military) ‘force transformation’, he 
observed: “ ...one...not only anticipates the future, but also seeks to create it.”49
46 On a lighter note the resulting acronym is eye-catching, CLEAR
47 See, for example, James Der Derian, Virtuous War- M apping the M ilitary-Industrial-M eclia-
E ntertainm ent N etw ork, (Boulder, CO: W estview  Press, 2001), p xix.
48 M ichael D illon, “Intelligence Incarnate: Martial Corporeality in the Digital A ge”, B ody & Society, 2003
49 O ffice o f  Force Transformation (w w w .oft.osd.m il), Elem ents o f  D efence Transformation, ‘Foreword’, p
2 o f  PDF file. A vailable at
http://www.oft.osd.mil/librarv/library files/docum ent 383 ElementsOfTransformation LR.pdf
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Admiral Cebrowski, the former Director of the Office of Force Transformation 
(OFT) within the US Department of Defence, provides us with the context to 
Secretary Rumsfeld’s words. He notes...
...Transformation is foremost a continuing process. It does not have an end 
point. Transformation is meant to create or anticipate the future. Transformation 
is meant to deal with the co-evolution of concepts, processes, organizations and 
technology. Change in any one o f these areas necessitates change in all. 
Transformation is meant to create new competitive areas and new competencies. 
Transformation is meant to identify, leverage and even create new underlying 
principles for the way things are done. Transformation is meant to identify and 
leverage new sources of power. The overall objective of these changes is 
simply—sustained.. .advantage in warfare...50 (my emphasis)
In this way, while Secretary Rumsfeld refers to the strategic ambition of the state
-  ‘to create futures’ - the Admiral, observing that “  [Transformation is
foremost a continuing process...It does not have an end point....”,51 provides the 
context -  transformation -  within which such strategic decisions are imagined 
and executed. It is worth quoting the Admiral in some detail:
...[TJhese are big jumps. These are the things that will change a military service, 
change the Department of Defense and maybe even change the world. Some 
might argue that this is not what the DoD does, but they are wrong because the 
organization has already done this in the past. Global Positioning System 
satellites are a prime example. Its advent changed the military, changed the
50 “What is Transformation?”, V A D M  (Ret.) Arthur Cebrowski, O ffice o f  Force Transformation webpage 
available at http://ww w.oft.osd.m il/what is transformation.cfm. Last accessed on Sept. 07, 2006
51 Ibid.
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department and changed civil society. Another is the American military’s ability, 
led by the U.S. Army, to “own the night.52 (my emphasis)
Of course, even prior to this the US Secretary of Defence had publicly noted:
We need to change not only the capabilities at our disposal, but also how we think 
about war. All the hi-tech weapons in the world will not transform the US Armed 
Forces unless we transform the way we think, the way we train, the way we 
exercise and the way we fight.52 (my emphasis)
Pursuant to this, as is well known, the Secretary of Defence created the Office of 
Force Transformation (OFT) -  a strategic ensemble -  which fulfills its charter by 
engaging in the ‘transformation’ of ‘force’ from a platform-centric mode to a 
network-centric one and in ‘devising’ the conditions and methods of its 
application.54
A closer look at the words of the Secretary and the Admiral indicates that 
the strategic object of war identified by them reveals itself as a composite of two 
‘lines of flight’ that are of interest to this study. First - the one that lends itself to 
some semblance of instrumentalization by the State -  is the production, 
maintenance and expansion of strategic ensembles (‘futures’, the State, the
52 “What is Transformation?”, V A D M  (Ret.) Cebrowski, O ffice o f  Force Transformation webpage 
available at http://ww w.oft.osd.m il/what is transformation.cfm. Last accessed on Sept. 07, 2006
53 Donald Rumsfeld, "Transforming the Military," F oreign Affairs, vol.
81, no. 3 (May/June 2002), p. 29; Elem ents o f  D efence Transformation, O ffice o f  Primary Responsibility, 
Director, O ffice o f  Force Transformation, O ffice o f  the Secretary o f  D efence, W ashington, DC, 2004
54 “Five G oals”, O ffice o f  Force Transformation, U .S. Dept, o f  D efence, 
http://www.oft.osd.m il/top five goals.cfm
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political, NCW) or, as the diagram below suggests, o f a potentially unstable 
matrix that links people, processes, organizations and technologies.
Figure 1: T he People, P rocesses, O rganizations, T echn olog ies M atrix  
Source: John J. G artska, A sst. D irector: C oncepts and O perations, “W arfigh ting  and 
Innovation: Past, Present and Future”, Ju ly  ZOOT”
This, to all intents and purposes, constitutes the political object of war.
The second, however, is a more problematic one for it premises itself on 
what can best be described as a textural understanding o f war,56 which the 
Admiral, cryptically, expresses by noting that “relocating the human on the
S7battlefield could change everything.” The NCW theorists are themselves often at
55 Available at
http://www.ort.osd.mil/initiatives/ncw/docs/lnnovation and Experimentation Presentation.pdf. See Slides 
2 & 6. Last Accessed on June 23, 2007
56 The etymology o f the word ‘texture’ is instructive, “ ...c.1425, "network, structure," from M.Fr., from L. 
textura "web, texture, structure, "from  stem o f  textere "to weave, "from  PIE base *tek- "to make" (c f Skt. 
taksati "he fashions, constructs," taksan "carpenter;" Avestan tasa "ax, hatchet," thwaxs- "be busy;" O.Pers. 
taxs- "be active;" Gk. tekton "carpenter," tekhne "art;" O.C.S. tesla "ax, hatchet;" Lith. tasau "to carve;" 
O.Ir. tal "cooper's ax;" O.H.G. dahs, Ger. Dachs "badger," lit. "builder;" Hittite taksh- "to join, unite, 
build"). Meaning "structural character" is recorded from 1660. See
http://www.etvmon line, com/index. php?term=texture.
57 “W hat is Transform ation?”, VADM (Ret.) Cebrowski, Office of Force Transformation webpage 
available at http://www.oft.osd.mil/what is transformation.cfm. Last accessed on Sept. 07, 2006 (emphasis 
mine). Note: The Admiral specifically refers to information energy. Etymologically, the A dm iral’s choice 
o f the word ‘energy’ is revealing. “ 1599, from M.Fr. energie, from L.L. energia, from Gk. energeia 
"activity, operation," from energos "active, working," from en- "at" + ergon "work”. See 
http://www.etvmonline.com/index.php?search:=enerRv&searchmode=none
h i novation
tech n o U»f$y • con te.x f
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pains to express this (and in some cases to even come to grips with it). Thus we 
find leading NCW theorists such as Alberts, Gartska and Stein - invoking The 
Santa Fe Institute’s research into complex adaptive systems -  attempting to 
articulate their understanding of war and its conduct in terms of ‘coevolution’.58 
In their words, they “apply this logical construct [coevolution] to the domain of 
warfare where concepts o f operation coevolve in response to changes in their 
ecosystem.”59 Admiral Cebrowski, expanding on this, further adds: “...combining 
new technology with new operational concepts can have [a] profound impact on 
how information energy can be applied on the battlefield...”60 The Admiral’s 
cryptic words would thus suggest that war (battlespace), wherein politico- 
strategic ambitions and object(ive)s take a form and shape is an environment-in- 
transformation or an environment that is always becoming. Taken together, the 
Secretary of Defence and the Admiral thus paint a landscape of war that while 
accounting for the famed Clausewitzian trinity of war -  blind hatred, chance and 
politics -  does not remain hostage to it.
58 M itchell Waldrop, Com plexity: The Em erging Science a t the E dge o f  Chaos, (N ew  York: Simon and 
Schuster, 1992), pp 259-260. A potent example o f  the operationalization o f  this is the planning for and 
developm ent o f ‘robotic bugs’. See “Robotic Bugs to invade battlefield”, in Times o f  India, May 05, 2008. 
A vailable at
http://tim esofindia.indiatim es.com /H ealthSci/Robotic bugs to invade battlefield/articleshow /3010227.cm  
s. Last accessed on May 05, 2008. See also, “$160 B illion Robotic Army Network Passes First B ig Test. 
Kinda.”, in Wired, M ay 04, 2008. A vailable at 
http://ww w.w ired.com /politics/security/new s/2008/04/robots_arm y
59 Alberts, Gartska Stein, N etw ork-C entric Warfare: D evelop ing  and L everaging Information Superiority), 
(W ashington, DC: U S Dept, o f  Defence, CCRP, 2003), pp 21-22. M y emphasis.
60 “What is Transformation?”, V A D M  (Ret.) Cebrowski, O ffice o f  Force Transformation webpage 
available at http://www.oft.osd.m il/what is transformation.efm. Last accessed on Sept. 07, 2006 (emphasis 
m ine). Note: The Admiral specifically refers to information energy. Etym ologically, the A dm iral’s choice  
o f ‘energy’ is revealing. “ 1599, from M.Fr. energie, from L.L. energia, from Gk. energeia "activity, 
operation," from energos "active, working," from en- "at" + ergon "work”. See 
http://www.etvm online.com /index.php?search=energy& searchm ode=none
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In the case of NCW, as we have seen, war (battlespace) manifests itself in 
and as, among other things, the exponential growth of low-cost, COTS/ open- 
source-ware-based, multi-cored parallel processor-driven, neural and AI- 
networked computer systems, which rapidly, unexpectedly, subtly, abruptly 
infiltrate/ embed/ assimilate themselves with/in the ‘machinery of war’. In this 
way, the argument runs, not only do they evolve as ‘dependency-structures’, they 
also transform the traditional modes of war by introducing newer considerations 
in battle which, more often than not, contradict and supplant the ways by which 
war has hitherto been conducted. Thus, if we are to take the theorizations of the 
NCW proponents seriously, we would have to accept their claim that the 
exponential evolution and proliferation of technical instruments -  like the ones 
mentioned above - must also contribute to a trans-formation of and ‘in’ our 
thinking of War-as-such. In this context, recall that in around 2002, Secretary 
Rumsfeld had already cautioned that perhaps we may ‘need to change not only 
the capabilities at our disposal, but also how we think about w ar’.
By emphasizing on, among other things, transformation and on the need 
to be transformational, Admiral Cebrowski thus reveals that the strategic object 
o f war within the NCW context is not simply about creating futures - by 
fabricating and deploying strategic ensembles within a specific context - it is also 
about (re)producing, commanding, controlling and managing the context 
where/in such fabrications and deployments take place. Thus the significance of 
the Admiral’s words: ‘ ...create new underlying principles fo r  the way things are
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done’. It is in this sense that the claims made by the enthusiasts of NCW - that 
war in the Information Age is ‘new’ - is, to some extent, justified for - since 
Clausewitz - this is arguably the first such attempt to transform the very 
understanding of war.61 Quite overtly then, these NCW thinkers are not simply 
predicting ‘future war’, but are also engaged in the designing and fashioning of 
our very imagination, understanding, and experience of war. In this way, it could 
be said, that the theorists of NCW are -  inadvertently or otherwise -  sketching 
out, that is to say, drawing a moving and morphing diagram of their notion of a 
post-human martial corporeality not simply for and in the Digital Age, but as the 
new and inescapable paradigm of martial corporeality in the emerging network 
societies of the Information Age. It is, therefore, not surprising that the NCW 
literature attests to the strategy of the OFT -  a technological, hence, strategic 
ensemble -  as one that will implement NCW as ‘the theory of war for the 
Information Age’ and as the organizing principle of being martial.62
As we will see, however, this apparently startling transformation that is 
unfolding in the concept and experience of war has a lineage and, in this sense, is 
not strictly ‘new’ or even that revolutionary. To appreciate this, however, we will
61 It is possible to argue, as has been done, that technological developm ents, such as the introduction o f  the 
stirrup, the conoidal bullet, long-range air power, maneuver warfare theory, W M D, spacepower, precision- 
guided munitions, stealth capability, modular w eapons-design, realtime sensing capability etc., have 
brought about radical changes, i f  only in retrospect to war. To a certain extent this point o f  view  is valid, 
though we should note that the developm ents being emphasized on are more relevant to warfare, or the 
conduct o f  war.
62 For an interesting perspective o f  the OFT -  in light o f  the recent rumours about its closure -  see 
Christopher P. Cavas, “Pentagon may close Transformation O ffice -  Helped establish innovative outlook to 
D oD  challenges”, D efence N ews, Aug. 28, 2006. A vailable at http://www.oft.osd.mi 1 / . A lso see G eoff 
Kein, “O ffice o f  Force Transformation Taking N ew  Shape Inside D oD ”, D efense D aily, September 5,
2006. A vailable at w ww .oft.osd.m il/library/library_files/
article_519_DEFENSE% 20DAILY% 20Septem ber% 205% 202006.doc. Last accessed on Jan., 2007.
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have to look back at the influence of the Enlightenment-inspired ‘turn’ to Reason 
and to Kant and his Critiques of Reason and Judgment. Thus, for example, we 
could point to how Kant addressed the problem of Reason facing the challenge of 
its own legitimacy, particularly, in the form of Religion. Taking recourse to the 
argument of the antinomies and other such maneuvers, Kant’s critical attempt was 
to bring Religion to Reason. In this sense, Kant’s valiant effort was defensive, 
which succeeded but only in terms of keeping this antinomy of Reason at bay.63 
In the case of the NCW theorists, however, a viable argument is made which 
suggests that Reason - organizing around ICT-based dependency-structures - 
addresses the question of its own genesis successfully, albeit technologically. For 
the NCW theorists, as we will see, Reason points to its empirical materiality in 
technological terms, that is to say ‘recursively’, thereby pre-empting (by making 
irrelevant) the question of its genesis.64 But there is a significant catch to this. 
While the assessments and pronouncements regarding NCW may appear as being 
radical and sometimes even ‘out of this world’, paradoxically, they also share a 
curious affinity to those espoused by the more conservative (some would say 
sober) assessments of theorists like Colin Gray - especially in their affirmation of
63 Kant had identified a set o f  four antinomies: (1) the limitation o f  the universe in respect o f  space and time 
(2) the theory that the w hole consists o f  indivisible atoms (whereas, in fact, none such exist) (3) the 
problem o f  freedom in relation to universal causality, and (4) the existence o f  a necessary being. His 
struggle with bringing religion with the limits o f  Reason was his attempt to solve the last antinomy, nam ely  
‘the existence o f  a necessary being’.
64 Recursion, in mathematics and computer science, is a method o f  defining functions in which the function 
being defined is applied within its own definition. The term is also used more generally to describe a 
process o f  repeating objects in a self-sim ilar way. See Douglas R. Hofstadter, Godel, Escher, Bach: An 
E ternal Golden B raid , (N ew  York, NY: Basic B ooks, 1999), particularly, Chapter 5. An early and more 
technical discussion on ‘recursion theory’ may be found in Kurt Godel, On F orm ally U ndecidable 
P ropositions o f  P rincipia M athem atica and R elated  System s, (London, UK: D over Publications, 1992)
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the etemal-ness of the phenomenality of war.65 Thus, one is prompted to ask -  is 
the very phenomenality of war indeed exhausted? Does NCW strategize the last 
of that what may have been ‘standing reserve’ in War?
Without denying any of the above - indeed by taking much of it quite 
seriously - this study will argue that while the transformation underway -  
understood at its best as a not-so-speculative account of martial corporeality (that 
is to say, of war) in the age of modem technics - may seem to some to be 
frightfully in excess of our thanato-political imaginations, it is actually far more 
excessive than that - albeit differently. As we will see, the phenomenality of war, 
far from being exhausted, retains its vitality. It retains its intensiveness.66
On what is at stake
The US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Peter Pace, USMC, 
in his assessment of the QDR 2006, remarked that -  “[A]ny attempt to predict the 
future security environment of 2025 is inherently difficult...Given the dynamics 
of change over time, we must develop a mix of agile and flexible capabilities to
65 See, for example, Colin Gray, M odern Strategy, (1999J; A nother B loody Century: Future War, (2005); 
M ichael Howard, Causes o f  War, (Harvard, MA: Harvard Univ. Press, 1983); H ew  Strachan & Andreas 
Herberg-Rothe Ed. Clausew itz in the Twenty-First Century, (Oxford: OUP, 2007), pp 1-13
66 “Intensive: in basic scientific terms, the characteristic o f  properties o f  thermodynamics sy stem s.. .which  
when driven past a critical threshold trigger a change in the quality o f  the sy stem .. .[OJne can call 
‘in tensive’ any linked set o f  rates o f  changes in assem blages or ‘rhizomatic m ultiplicities’ . . Bonta & 
Protevi, D eleuze an d  G eophilosophy: A G uide and G lossary, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh Univ. Press, 2004), p 
101
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mitigate uncertainty.”67 He also noted that the QDR acknowledges that “victory in 
this long war depends on information, perception, and how and what we 
communicate as much as [the] application of kinetic effects.”68 While General 
Pace’s immediate reference is to the ‘war on terrorism’, the invocation of 
‘uncertainty and indeterminacy’ that permeates his ‘assessment’ points to the 
increasing recognition that ‘victory’ is as ‘transient’ as the other elements that co- 
constitute this emerging condition. This is a distinct shift in how global militaries, 
particularly the US military and defence establishment, have begun to perceive 
the emerging ‘strategic’ environment as compared to the hitherto notion of a Tong 
peace’ and a rationally predictable security calculus like the now fading Cold War 
strategic paradigm. The 2006 QDR describes this shift in the following terms:
• From a peacetime tempo - to a wartime sense of urgency
• From a time of reasonable predictability - to an era of surprise and uncertainty
• From single-focused threats - to complex challenges
• From nation-state threats - to decentralised network threats
• From conducting war against nations - to conducting war in countries we are not at
war with (safe havens)
• From large institutional forces (tail) - to more powerful operational capabilities 
(teeth).69
67 U S Department o f  D efence, Q uadrennial D efense R eview  Report, 2006, Chairman’s A ssessm ent, p A4 o f  
PDF version. Available at http://www.defenselink.mil/qdr/report/Report2006Q203.pdf. Last accessed on 
Jan 2007.
68 Ibid
69 Ibid. N ote that this assessm ent in the QDR is not sim ply som e intellectual construct. Thus, for example,
W. James W oolsey, President C linton’s nom inee for the CIA Directorship, in his Senate confirmation 
hearing said: “Y es, w e have slain a dragon...but now  w e live in a jungle filled with poisonous snakes. And 
in many ways, the dragon was easier to keep track o f.” See N eil A . Lewis, “Bigger Battle Expected on Spy 
B udget,” N ew  York Times, Feb 0 1 ,1 9 9 3 . Further, the attacks on the CIA HQ at Langley and the World
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This resonates powerfully with Arquilla and Ronfeldt’s propositions 
regarding ‘the new epoch of conflict’ in the Information Age. But what is 
significant about this summary presented in the QDR 2006, however, is that 
perhaps fo r  the first time in the history o f the modern military, the militaiy 
machine -  a state-owned and run apparatus -  is thinking o f  and, in some cases, 
even operating outside the orbit o f the State. Thus, the QDR 2006 speaks o f  
among other things, the shift “from nation-state threats — to decentralized 
network threats”. This would suggest at least one of two things: (1) either the 
connection between war and the political is becoming increasingly tenuous, or (2) 
perhaps, when considered in originary terms, war “ ...is not an instrument of any
70kind, least of all a political one.”
It is in this context that this study asks -  in tandem with Nietzsche (and 
Land) - ‘what if war in its most extravagant, uninhibited and originary sense does 
not serve the State’? What if the otherness “of war to the political” is like that “of 
the uncircumscribed to the field of its potential circumscription”?71 What if, like 
the uncircumscribed, war is ‘absolutely’ immanent, which is to say that not only 
is it immanent to particular circumscriptions but, more importantly, it is immanent
Trade Center in N ew  York City, in Jan and Feb 1993 respectively were very quickly understood by the 
Counterterrorism Security Group (CSG) as not fitting “the traditional pattern o f  terrorist activity. The Sunni 
radicals behind them could not be tied to any specific country...the freelancers did not seem to have a 
political agenda. They also did not need any states to sponsor them .” See Timothy Naftali, B lind Spot: The 
Secret H istory o f  Am erican Terrorism , (N ew  York: B asic Books, 2006), pp 235, 239.




* 72to itself? And lastly, what if, unlike the more common extensive, that is to say, 
Clausewitzian notions of war, whose ‘energy’ - as Land points out in the context 
o f ‘civilization’ — is Thanatos, war - Intensive War - is characterized by ‘a 
metamorphosis of forces; their relative decomposition from strategic ensembles 
and purposes, towards tactical fragments and initiatives’?
Secondarily, though they are not addressed in a specific and detailed 
manner in this study, interesting questions such as the following may also be 
posed: Under such conditions of assembling/ disassembling, where the mode of 
operability is purely tactical and fragmentary, what does ‘to organize’ and ‘to be 
organized’ mean? Further, specifically in the context of applied military theory, 
by drawing a diagram of the battlespace in terms of tactical and fragmentary 
initiatives, what is the ‘face of battle’ and, by extension, of war that emerges as a 
consequence?
It should also be mentioned that by posing these questions, this study 
remains cognizant of the implications of the responses that they may elicit for 
these would pertain to nothing less than - “How do we conceive of being [and 
more importantly, becoming] when the differential-space between the organic and 
the machinic [in a limited sense, the technological] dissolves and when reality is
72 In his final essay entitled Immanence: A Life, D eleuze wrote: "It is only when im manence is no longer 
im m anence to anything other than itse lf that w e can speak o f  a plane o f  im manence [ p.27]." A lso,
"Absolute im m anence is in itself: it is not in something, to something; it does not depend on an object or 
belong to a subject. [ . . .]  When the subject or the object falling outside the plane o f  im manence is taken as a 
universal subject or as any object to which immanence is attributed, [••■] im manence is distorted, for it then 
finds itse lf enclosed in the transcendent." See G illes D eleuze, Pure Im manence -  E ssays on A Life, Trans. 
Anne Boym an, Intro, John Rajchman, (N ew  York: Zone Books, 2001), pp 26-27
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folded into virtuality, when the body morphs, and computer networks suck 
knowledge into a digital monad? How do we think if thinking is chaotic at its 
core?”73
Locating the Study
In the context of the rapid and multifarious expansion of the NCW project, 
questions like these are, at the very least, disturbing. The extent of this 
disturbance is potently evident when, for example, we consider the notion of 
‘evil-ness’ traditionally ascribed to war. Thus, for example, Land graphically 
describes war as a “ ... loathsome vampire trailing hideous carnage, the swamp 
breeding ground of vermin and plague. Whatever its terrible allure, there is 
nothing more profoundly degrading than war. It alone is truly base... ”14
When considered in the context of Intensive War, however, the validity of 
these judgments is conditional on the fact that ‘War’ is ‘evil’ or ‘terrifying’ only 
when understood as a ge-stell, that is to say as an ‘enframing’/ circumcription - an 
instrument(ation) - crafted and wielded, ultimately, by or in the name of 
Thanatos. This involves limiting the uncircumscribed-ness of Intensive War not 
simply to a circumscription by the political but, at a fundamental level, to a 
circumscription by Thanatos (or a specific understanding of him). For, let us not
73 Erik D avis, The Witch's Flight, A R eview  o f  D eleuze & Guattari's What Is P hilosophy?  Available at 
http://w w w .techgnosis.com /dg.htm l. Last accessed on Aug. 08, 2006. A version o f  this piece appeared in 
the VLS, Summer, 1994 .
74 Land, The Thirst F or Annihilation, p 150
26
forget, it is his (Thanatos ’) intervention that allows for the contextualization of 
‘evilness ’ in the form of vampires (un-dead), carnage (death and destruction), 
vermin and plague (‘death-threats’). Even in the more esoteric literature of NCW, 
which claim a maximally digitized and coded world, the ultimate challenge is to 
hold Thanatos at bay. Thus, it is not surprising that the proponents of NCW would 
insist on ge-stelling (enframe-ing)75 ‘Intensive War’ extensively - that is to say, as 
a thanato-political instrument, where the political is not simply the ultimate 
guarantee against Thanatos, but also an expression of an optimal organization of 
the technical. By these standards, however, Intensive War remains ‘beyond good 
and evil.’
Nevertheless, it would be foolhardy for this study to pretend or even 
suggest that the ‘base’ notion traditionally associated with extensive war -  the 
one that Land refers to as being ‘evil’ -  has not and is not well recognized by the 
philosophers and theorists of war and the military -  past and present. What this 
study notes, however, is that the NCW project, at least theoretically, by subjecting 
change to ‘calculative reason’ promises to progressively ‘re-grade’ the de-grading 
baseness of extensive war.16 Again, the evidence is not hard to find -  note the rise 
and, increasingly ubiquitous, use of precision-guided weapons, mobil e-pro file 
targeting, bio-metric surveillance techniques/ technologies etc, which are geared
75 Bernard Stiegler, Technics and T im e.l -  The Fault o f  Epim etheus, Trans. Beardsworth & C ollins, 
(Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press, 1998), pp 6-7
76 Coker refers to this as the ‘re-enchantment’ o f  war. See, Christopher Coker, The Future o f  War -  The Re- 
Enchantm ent o f  War in the Twenty-First Century, (Oxford: B lackw ell Publishing, 2004). See also his 
W aging War Without W arriors? The Changing Culture o f  M ilitary Conflict, IISS Studies in International 
Security, (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002).
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to, at least in theory, reduce the ‘collateral damage’ -  Land’s ‘base-ness’ - of
77war. Seen in this light, the ‘tendency to excess’ evident in the unfolding of the 
NCW-project should not be startling for, as suggested above, it is nothing less 
than an ‘eternally recurring’ seduction of Thanatos by the technological.
This ambition/ desire - to deliver on the ‘promise’ of ‘re-grading’ the de­
grading baseness of extensive war with/in a mesh of calculative and computable 
reason -  results in a ‘striving’ to irrevocably break free from ‘the (thanato)- 
political’78 by establishing a condition of ‘suspended animation’79 wherein, to 
paraphrase Libicki’s words, ‘a fine enough mesh can catch everything.’80 NCW, 
in this emerging form, may thus be described in D&G’s eerie words as a ...
...worldwide war machine, which in a way reissues from the States, displays two 
successive figures...the first that of fascism, which makes war an unlimited 
movement with no other aim than itself, and the second...the war machine 
reforms smooth space that now claims to control, to surround the entire earth. 
Total war is surpassed, toward a form of peace more terrifying still.81
77 UK Identity Schem e and the US Immigration System are relevant examples. A lso the recent w ave o f  
precision-guided weapons, fine resolution sensors mounted on platforms such as the Global Hawk (the 
nam e o f  the platform is in itse lf instructive) all point to the desire to reduce the ‘collateral dam age’ in war..
78 For an account o f  the ‘thanato-political’ and o f  biopolitics, see M ichel Foucault, Society Must be  
D efended, (London: Allen Lane, 2003). See also Michel Foucault, The Will to K nowledge: H istory o f  
Sexuality Vol /., (London: Penguin Books, 1998). See also, Razac and Kneight, B arbed W ir e -A  P olitica l 
H isto iy , (London: W. W. Norton & Company, 2003), who offers a corrective to Foucault, for it show s that 
m odem  biopolitics is often intricately tied to a thanatopolitics, the politics o f  extermination and death. The 
metric, o f  course, has morphed from that o f  ‘race’ to that o f  ‘productivity’. For a theoretically intensive 
account o f  ‘the barbed w ire’, see Reviel Netz, B arbed  W ir e -A n  E cology o f  M odernity, (W esleyan  
U niversity Press, 2004)
79 D iscussions with Dr. Paolo Palladino (Dept, o f  History, Lancaster University) in the context o f  a thesis 
centering on “Life and War in the A ge o f  Information” (2006)
80 Martin Libicki, The Mesh and the Net: Speculations on A rm ed Conflict in a Time o f  Free Silicon, 
(W ashington, DC: National D efence University), pp 30-31
81 D eleuze & Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: C apitalism  and Schizophrenia, (London: Continuum, 2003), 
p 421 (hereafter A TP)
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While D&G’s reference to ‘the unlimited movement’ of war to fascism is a cause 
for concern, and one which we will address later in the study, it will, for the 
moment, suffice for us to note that these twin Deleuzian figures -  unlimited 
movement (animation) and the reformation of smooth space (suspension) - in 
NCW terms, co-constitute the self-organizing ‘battlespace’ and as such may be 
considered as being an extensive actualization of ‘modem technics’ as War.82 It 
should not, therefore, come as a surprise to us -  given the increased focus on 
Clausewitz’s ‘fog of war’ and on ‘friction and complexity’ by the NCW
83theorists - that the conduct of war, in NCW terms, is less geared to direct 
command and control operations; rather, it is to sense and respond to the localized 
pressures and reliefs o f a fluid environment ,84 In this way, arguably, NCW -  as a 
concept of operations -  directs our attention to the apparently distributive and 
dissipative nature of the net-centric machine of war which, in its benign condition,
85remains a state-owned and controlled apparatus.
82 This, o f  course, is premised on the assessment which, in Ansell Pearson’s words, can be summarized as 
follow s: “ ...[a] collapsing o f  bios and technos into each other is not only politically naive, producing a 
com pletely reified grand narrative o f  technology as the true agent and telos o f  natural and (in)human 
history; it also restricts technics to anthropos...” See Keith Ansell Pearson, “Viroid Life: On M achines, 
Technics and Evolution”, in D eleuze and Philosophy: The D ifference Engineer , Ed. Keith Ansell-Pearson, 
(London: Routledge, 1977), p 180.
83See, for example, James Moffat, Com plexity Theory and N etw ork Centric W arfare, (W ashington, DC: 
CCRP, D oD , 2003); For a discussion on ‘chaos’ in strategy and war in the historical context, see Colin S. 
Gray, S tra tegy for Chaos -  Revolutions in M ilitary Affairs and The E vidence o f  H istory, (London: Frank 
Cass, 2003)
84 For an account o f  the various ‘collective consciousness’ models in the battlespace o f  NCW , see Alberts, 
Gartska, Stein, N etw ork Centric Warfare -  D eveloping and Leveraging Information Superiority, 
(W ashington, DC: CCRP, D oD , 2003), particularly the chapter on “Information A ge Organizations”.
85 Related to this is the recent round o f  discussions between the Government o f  India (GOI) and Research 
in Motion (RIM ), the Canadian provider o f  the popular Blackberry service. In brief, the discussions 
centered on the ability o f  the GOI to access the Canada-based servers o f  RIM. The GO I’s argument is that 
information in these servers -  when applicable to traffic originating and ending in India on the Blackberry 
network -  is a matter o f  national security and thus it needs continual, unlimited, and unrestricted access to 
them. Naturally, RIM has objected and the matter even escalated to the level where the GOI made an overt 
threat to shut down RIM ’s Blackberry service in India. What this unfolding situation may be read as is the
Equally, we should also not fail to recognize that the NCW project - which 
is being lent a consistency by an evolving set of common-standards regimes86 - 
displays a countervailing ‘tendency to organize’ - that is to say, to contingently 
strategize - in terms of ‘capability’ and ‘efficiency’. In this latter form, 
‘battlespace’ produced by and for NCW, in Buchanan’s words, “effectively 
subsumes the state, making it just one of its many moving parts.”87 Thus, it can 
argued that NCW is nothing less than a Deleuzian ‘war-machine’ that has run 
amuck and one “that takes peace as its object”88 which, as the more astute readers 
of Clausewitz will have no trouble in recognizing as the post-modern avatar of 
Absolute War. In this way, the ‘ideal’ NCW project -  as a global war-machine -
o n
reveals its potential as a post-political phenomenon.
Given this, the theories and doctrines of NCW - especially when 
considered in terms of their actualization, operationalization and deployment -  
understandably reflect an unbearable tension caused by the ‘tendency to excess’
p
and the ‘tendency to organize’. NCW’s relation to the political thus imposes on it 
a tension, which manifests itself as a performative contradiction. We should be 
careful to note that this fate of NCW is underwritten by its being associated with 
and as a strategy of the State and, as such, is more of an insight into the strategy
attempt o f  a ‘strategic ensem ble’ represented by the GOI to exercise control over a ‘technology’ in the 
nam e o f ‘national security’.
86 See, for exam ple, Martin Libicki, Standards -  The Rough R oad to the Common Byte, The Center For 
A dvanced Concepts and Technologies, (Washington, DC: National D efence University, 1995)
87 Ian Buchanan, “Treatise on Militarism”, in D eleuze and the C ontem porary World, Ed, Buchanan & Parr, 
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh Univ. Press, 2006), p 31
88 D& G, ATP, 1987, p 421.
89 In D & G ’s terms, this is when the ‘war-machine’ eludes the capture o f  the State-apparatus and makes the 
state just one o f  its m oving parts. For a fuller discussion o f  this see, Ian Buchanan, “Treatise on Militarism” 
in D eleuze and the C ontem porary World, pp21-41.
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of the State, rather than into the nature of NCW -  ‘the thing-in-itself. NCW, as a 
war-machine issuing from the State, thus attempts the impossible -  to retain its 
structure as a strategic ensemble and to be a fragmentary mode of operability. 
While this upsets the operational (epistemological) strategy of the State in its 
issuance of NCW as a war-machine it does not, however, influence or change in 
anyway the transformational (ontological) strategy of NCW-as-such. Critically, 
the strategic object of NCW as war-machine - or, at least, o f NCW as a mode of 
(martial) operability, in the ‘new epoch of conflict’ -  while remaining in a state of 
‘suspended animation’ - seeks to maintain its operational space in a condition of 
suspended animation.
From the above, it will be appreciated that our options for (re) considering 
war have now reached a fork. It is, as Ansell Pearson puts it, a ‘weird point in 
history’ where - when considered in the context of ICT-based dependency 
structures - the onto-thanato-politico architectonic of war (as we know of it) is 
increasingly proving insufficient to deal with the ‘unknown unknowns’. Simply 
put, it could be said that our imagination of war is falling short. One way to 
address this situation has been to increasingly focus on a biological, that is to say, 
the genetic, rationalization of war. Yet, this approach keeps at the center bios (in 
the form of genesis/ growth) and invites us to enframe war with the help of 
Thanatos. But this only serves to bring us back to the proverbial ‘square one’ of 
an anthropocentric, or at least a bio-centric, understanding of war-as-such. 
Similarly, it is suggested, when war is discussed in purely technological terms -
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which involves among other things the collapsing of bios and technos into and 
onto each other -  the outcome is generally ‘politically naive, producing a 
completely reified grand narrative of technology as the true agent and telos of 
natural and (in)human history.’ The matter does not end there. As Ansell-Pearson 
points out, ‘it also restricts technics to anthropos’, which brings us back to a 
techno-centric understanding of war that is only conceivable within an 
anthropocentric framework.90
The question, of course, remains: How can such a program which purports 
to renegotiate the very imagination of war be initiated, let alone fulfilled? Would 
not such a re-articulation of war, indeed a re-conceptualization of war, lead us to 
the very edge of speculative theorizing -  a seemingly abysmal portal into that 
which Hallward, as we shall soon see, refers to as a space ‘out of this world’? 
Furthermore, would it not invite the rancorous arguments against it such as the 
ones that had, by way of an example, ensued between Heidegger and 
Schopenhauer in the context of the discussion on the role and standing of the 
academy and its strategic importance to the State? While we will take up and 
examine in some detail some of the specific charges - which are also applicable to 
this study - originally laid by Hallward against Deleuze’s immanent philosophy in 
short order, a brief look at the pertinence and applicability of Land’s presentation 
of the Heidegger’s dismissal of Schopenhauer to this study is rewarding. It helps
90 Keith A nsell Pearson, “Viroid Life: On Machines, Technics and Evolution”, in D eleuze and  Philosophy: 
The D ifference E ngineer, p 180.
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highlight at least some of the imperatives that have guided this study’s approach 
to the ‘problematization of war’.
Land informs us that what is interesting about the...
...crass dismissal of Schopenhauer’s aesthetics in the first volume of Heidegger’s 
Nietzsche Lectures....and...[those]...found in Introduction to Metaphysics, his 
Leibniz lectures...is not [the] argument, however rancorous, but the relation of 
mutual revulsion between the academy and small defiant fragment of its outside. 
Neither recognizes the legitimacy of the other’s discourse; for the university 
considers its other to be incompetent, whilst the past of this other -  admittedly a 
very small part -  that has seized and leamt to manipulate the weaponry of 
philosophical strife, considers the voice of the university to be irremediably 
tainted by servility.91
Indeed, Schopenhauer himself, as Land points out, made mention of this servile 
nature of the university. He noted:
...the State has at all times interfered in the philosophical disputations of the 
universities and has taken sides, no matter whether it was a question of Realists 
or Nominalists, or Aristotelians and Ramists, Cartesians or Aristotelians, of 
Christian Wolff, Kant, Fichte, Hegel, or anything else.92
This, when considered in light of the central point of interest to this study, which 
is war, makes the matter not simply relevant, but also imparts to it a sense of 
critical urgency.
91 Land, The Thirst f o r  Annihilation, p 10-11
92 Arthur Schopenhaur, Parerga and Paralipom ena: Short Philosophical Essays, Trans. E. J. Payne, 
(London: Oxford University Press, 2000), p 168.
33
The signature of the university’s beholden-ness to the State is nowhere 
more evident than in those departments wherein, allegedly, a study and 
interrogation of ‘war’ takes place. Across continents, nested securely within the 
confines of the departments of Political Science (the irony of the term is not to be 
missed), institutes that pretend to engage in ‘defence analysis’, and programs that 
seemingly dedicate themselves to ‘war studies’, universities have done their best 
to stifle any dissent -  any challenge -  that seeks to reproblematize war. The 
matter is also not simply limited to this. Indeed, the university, bending to the will 
of the State, has further instituted the precise methodology by which such studies 
are encouraged. The procedure is fairly simple. A simplistic linear account of 
history, statistics, applied science, ‘real-life accounts’ (including manned and 
unmanned media footage) and third-person narratives form the raw materials of 
the ‘war’ that the university teaches. The State’s heavy hand in this will not be 
missed. Thus, what is left to the student is the task of reading and re-reading 
canonical accounts of war, which are far removed from any possibility of being 
re-problematized/ refreshed. The iron walls that gird this bastion of the State’s 
ultimate preserve -  to make/ wage war - keep out any interrogation of war in 
fundamental conceptual terms, that is to say, they preclude any form of 
philosophically speculative activity with regard to ‘war’. This is not simply an 
empty accusation being hurled at the State and its servant, the university. Even a 
cursory glance at the curriculum confirms this.
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This tendency is even more evident in the study of NCW. Even in the 
realm of those arcane institutions like the RAND Corp. and the Command and 
Control Research Program (CCRP) the discourse of NCW has been largely 
technologized. But then again, this should not be surprising for both these 
institutions are very overtly State-sponsored entities. Thus, the study of NCW 
comes to us garbed (and, more often than not, garbled) in technicalities of radio 
frequency rates, baud rates, satellite transmission rates, kill-ratios, and the rapid 
commodification of ‘information theory’, and other such banal technical 
discussions. Whatever little that emerges in the form of speculative and 
philosophical investigations of war (and, by extension, of what it means to be 
secure) is ruthlessly dismissed and starved of any kind of support -  material and/ 
or otherwise. And, why are matters so dismal when relating to the speculative 
interrogation of war? Simply put, though the matter will be more fully dealt with, 
albeit as a sub-text, throughout this essay, the State is being defensive. As we will 
see, given that the State’s strategic object is to bring ‘war’ to Reason, which is a 
very Kantian project, any form of speculative activity (in Deleuzian terms, ‘a 
minor activity’) poses a threat to this dominance that the State wishes to exercise 
over ‘war’. Facing such a resistance, this study has sought to deploy a number of 
‘other’ minor tactics to engage with that what lies outside the pale of state- 
sponsored intellectual activities centering on ‘war’.
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A minoritarian tactic
This study, invoking the Bhagavad-Gita, some sections of the Principal 
Upanishads, while unreservedly acknowledging its indebtedness to the Deleuzian 
oeuvre, is an attempt to offer the outlines of an account of an ‘originary mode of 
becoming-operable’ -  a becoming - understood in terms of a decomposition of 
‘strategic ensembles’, masquerading as ‘force’, into a landscape of tactical 
fragments and initiatives. This study suggests that from the Bhagavad-Gita, the 
discussion between Krishna and Arjuna, is a classic example that highlights an 
event exhibiting such a decomposition of force and, in this sense, may be 
understood as being not simply an exegesis on war - extensive and intensive - but 
also as a signature of the in-folding and in-forming of the ‘intensive-ness’ of war 
in its more commonly perceived extensive forms. Thus, for example, while 
Arjuna, operating in classic Clausewitzian mode, is hesitant to engage in what 
promises to be (in so far as he thinks is) a war of annihilation the success of which 
is determined in terms of victory and defeat,93 Krishna, on the other hand, labours 
to explain to Arjuna a more ‘originary’ condition that he is already/ always 
embedded in and which in-forms Aijuna’s immediate or extensive ‘war’ - the 
Battle of Kurukshetra. Thus he says...
93 W hat do ‘victory’ and ‘defeat’ mean? See Stephen Biddle, M ilitary P ow er -  Explaining Victory and  
D efea t in M odern B attle, (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 2006), pp 1-13
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I am the mighty world-destroying Time, here made manifest for the purpose of 
infolding the world, Even without thee, none of the warriors arrayed in the 
hostile armies shall live.94
As Krishna describes it, therefore, the battle of Kurushketra - for Arjuna - is a 
battle that takes place at a number of levels -  the most obvious one being the 
fearful and annihilistic physical battle that forms the backdrop to the Bhagavad- 
Gita. By the time one reaches the end of the section within which the Bhagavad- 
Gita resides in the Mahabharata, however, one begins to get a sense of its 
pervasiveness...its immanence within the larger epic. Thus, as we become 
familiar with Krishna’s Universal Form, we also become aware of the short­
sightedness of the strategic imperatives that seemingly brought about the physical 
battle of Kurushketra. We now begin to recognize Dhritarashtra’s guilt-ridden 
desire; the Kaurava clan’s political object; the powerplay between Arjuna and 
Kama; the battle of wits between Yudhistira and Shakuni; the Bhim- 
Dushshyasana duel; the public insulting of Draupadi, and the numerous other 
incidents which are considered as being contributory constituents of the ultimate 
conflagration that took place on the field of Kuruksh'etra as nothing more that 
reiterations and expressions of the Universal Form -  as merely instants and events 
in “ ...the whole universe centered in one -  including the moving and the 
unmoving...”95 What invites our attention to Krishna’s and Arjuna’s seemingly 
out-of-place discussion walled in by the two opposing armies is that in addition to 
it being the first and most vivid reference to the Universal Form, it is also a
94 Srim ad-B hagavad-G ita, Trans. Swami Swarupanada, (Mayawati, India: Advaita Ashrama, 1998), Chap.
XI, #32 , p 259  (Hereafter, BG)
95 BG, Chap. XI, #7, p 244
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discussion that centers around what it means to be operable in and as the flux that 
characterizes Universal Form. This flux that is vividly described as being 
“boundless...in every side with manifold arms, stomachs, mouths, and eyes...” of 
which “neither the end nor the middle, nor also the beginning...”96 can be seen is 
another battlespace where-in the collapse of Aijuna and his resurgence -  guided 
by Krishna - as an enlightened ‘captain of war’ enables him to not simply do 
battle at the physical level, but to also (re)establish an immersive relationship with 
the unfolding events of Intensive War.
The Upanishads, while not as personable as the Bhagavad-Gita, reiterate 
precisely this. More importantly, when considered from a ‘methodological’ point 
of view, if we agree with Sri Aurobindo that the Upanishads...
...are not philosophical speculations of the intellectual kind, a metaphysical 
analysis which labours to define notions, to select ideas and discriminate those 
that are true, to logicise [one is tempted to add technologize] truth or else to 
support the mind in its intellectual preferences by dialectical reasoning...content 
to put forward an exclusive solution...in the light of this or that idea of reason 
and see all things from that viewpoint, in that focus and determining 
perspective...9' (text in emphasis is mine)
...then our choice of the Upanishads -  as a methodological guide - is dictated by 
the very key at which these ancient texts operate, which is to say, in a minor key. 
At the minimum, the Upanishads, read carefully, are disruptive texts that break up
96 BG, Chapter XI, #16, p 249
97 Sri A urobindo Ghosh, The U panishads, (Pondicherry: Sri Aurobindo Ashram Pub. D ept., 2000), p 3
that most revered of strategic ensembles, the (disciplined) mind, for the ‘separate 
phrases, single couplets, brief passages’ which comprise the Upanishads are 
thrown out as a side, an aspect, a portion’ which, as Sri Aurobindo puts it, do not 
‘follow the tardy, careful and diffuse development of the logical intelligence.’ 
These fragments are more like ‘becoming-thoughts’ or, as Deleuze puts it, ‘lines 
of flight’, whose trajectories are as vast as ‘the paces of a Titan’98 They are 
instances of tacticities that throw out of joint our familiar instruments of 
orientation thus making response a matter of sensibility - seamlessly, without any 
surface tension of any kind over and along ‘smooth space’.
In a similar fashion, Deleuze’s attempt to devise a ‘process ontology’, 
driven by the primal engine of a creative production, without ‘paying the heavy 
ontological price for a dualism or the unacceptable phenomenal price of the denial 
of creativity as illusory, as in the God’s eye view” of spiritual transcendent 
determinism, allows this study to devise an account of Intensive War that while 
accommodating the real and material notions of Clausewitzian war, remains in 
excess of it.99 In other words, what Deleuze lends to this study, especially given 
its focus on NCW, is the possibility of re-drawing an account of martial 
operability that stands outside the usual realist, analytic, and ultimately, 
anthropocentric accounts of martial phenomenality that we are most familiar with 
till date.
98 Ibid, p 5
99 D eleuzian Interrogations: A Conversation with Manual DeLanda, John Protevi and Torkild Thanem, 
published on The D ifference Site (by kind permission o f  Tamara: Journal o f  C ritical Post-M odern  
O rganization  Science, www.tamaraioumal.com), p 3 (o f  pdf file). Last accessed on March 12, 2008.
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It is important to again remind ourselves that not only is Intensive War the 
de-composing of force, but as such, it is ‘force’ itself. In this condition, as Field 
Marshal Moltke said, ‘no plan survives contact’ and radical indeterminacy — 
constancy of change - is an imperative that is eternally undermining itself in 
creative and productive ways, that is to say, in ‘new’ ways.100 As we will see 
when we examine the Bhagavad-Gita, for the more strategically-minded Arjuna, 
this condition is simply incomprehensible. His /e/as-ridden/ driven ‘world’ will 
not allow for this ‘texture’ of ‘mobile-dis-assembling/ de-composing’ o f force. 
Thus, when his best-laid plans - despite the best of his intentions - do not ‘survive 
contact’, he is baffled. The best that he can do is to ‘sense101 and respond102’. 
Indeed, this marks his genesis as an ‘enlightened’ captain of war. And this, as we 
shall see, is precisely where NCW’s current ‘beef lies’!103 For the NCW theorists, 
like Aijuna, ‘response’ is the key -  response to not simply the overt strategic 
object of war -  to create and deploy strategic ensembles -  but also to the 
rhizomatic movement that the emerging face of war displays. It is important to 
carefully note the precise meaning and implication of the ‘response’ that is in 
question here. Strategically speaking, ‘Response’, in the context of the NCW 
project, is the ‘bringing-forth’ or ‘revealing’ of the world as ‘sensing’. In this
100 B y this I mean that Intensive War always ‘produces’ or ‘brings-forth’ but this is not the ‘bringing-forth’ 
that H eidegger refers to in the sense o f ‘disclosing’, ‘unconcealm ent’, ‘revealing’. M y deviation from 
H eidegger in this context is slight but worth pointing out. Production or bringing-forth, in the context o f  
Intensive War, is a ‘becom ing’ - a genesis -  o f  that which has ‘never been’ rather than the unconcealment, 
revelation or disclosing o f  that which is (a) ‘standing reserve
101 Sense: From PIE base *sent- "to go"
(http://www.etvm online.com /index.php ?search= sense& searchmode—none),
102 Response: From PIE base *spend- "to make , '  to engage
(http://www.etvm online.com /index.php?term=spondee)
103 Dr. Edward A. Smith, Jr “ NCW  -  Where is the beef?” Submission to the Naval War C ollege Review. 
A vailable at http://www.iwar.org.uk/rma/resources/ncw/smith.htm._Last accessed on Jan 2007.
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sense, sensing and ‘response’ are co-constitutive of each other and of the 
woild , where the world is — in originary terms - ‘standing-reserve’.
Now, Heidegger informs us that ‘modem technology’, among other things, 
“is a revealing”, but one which is more of a ‘challenging’ or a ‘setting-upon’ of 
nature to “supply energy which can be extracted and stored as such.”104 This 
extraction and storage of ‘energy’ is the ge-stelling of force - by exhausting its 
energy -  its intensity - thereby enabling its ‘extraction and storage’. The 
interesting thing to note is that that what is ‘extracted and stored’, which 
Heidegger refers to as ‘standing-reserve’, is possible when ‘change/ nature/ 
phusis’ is already subjected to calculative reason for it is only then that ‘change/ 
nature/ phusis’ can respond to such a challenge.105 Thus, in Heidegger’s ternlfc, for 
‘modem technology’ to set-upon nature to supply energy, nature would itself have 
to stand-reserve and allow energy to be extracted from it. For the emerging 
theories of NCW, fabricated on the premise of being strategic ensembles and the 
means of achieving the promise of Calculative Reason, therefore, the most 
essential network is the one that enmeshes the three domains of the cognitive,
informational and physical. This is the ‘center of gravity’ of the NCW project and
it is in this way that the metaphysics that informs the NCW project attempts to, as 
Stiegler puts it, “constitute the Gestell (frame) of nature and of humanity through 
calculation.”106 Given this, the criticality of ‘sense and respond’ operations that
104 Martin Heidegger, The Question R egarding Technology and O ther E ssays, Trans & Intro., W illiam
Lovitt, (N ew  York: Harpen Torchbooks, 1977), pp 14-19
105 Stiegler, Technics an d  Time I, p 9, 24
106 Stiegler, Technics and Time I, p 10
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form the bulwark ol NCW theories is understandable. To Sense and Respond, 
within the NCW construct, is to ‘bring(ing)-forth’ that what is ‘standing-reserve’. 
That what is ‘brought-forth’ is force sans force-intensity. This is the ‘force’ of the 
state-apparatus -  be it a State or a war-machine, and extensive war is an 
expression of this ‘force’.
Admittedly, this already marks a significant departure from how, and in 
what way, war and its conduct were (and in most cases continue to be) thought of 
and engaged in. But the significance of this departure -  in the NCW context - is 
more often than not (mis)understood, primarily, in terms of its ‘instrumental 
technicity’ -  ‘the technological’. This has led to the perception that NCW may be 
an expression of how the ‘technological’ is the ‘sensing-as-response’ that delivers 
the promise of ‘calculative reason’. In other words, as we have seen, for the NCW 
theories, ‘sensing’ (understood as ‘bringing-forth’) as a ‘response’, serves not 
only as the event-horizon of ‘sensing-as-such’ but also of ‘re^gonse-as-suclv. 
Thus, for the NCW theorists, the question of the ‘manageability’ of ‘bringing- 
forth’ - in the form of a response to ‘Sensing’ - is of critical importance. In this 
sense, the understanding of ‘technology’ is not only instrumental but also 
managerial. This perspective gains credence when considered in light of de 
Landa’s assertion that the central theme of modem warfare was and remains 
logistics and not strategy or tactics.107 Interestingly, this does not mark a departure 
from how warfare since the Enlightenment has been conducted - it is merely a
107 M anuel D e Landa, Warfare in the Age o f  Intelligent M achines, (N ew  York: Zone Books, 2003), pp 105- 
125.
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technologically different mode of being martial. The net-centric-warrior — like 
his predecessors — essentially remains a ‘technological and manageable being’.
Further, as we have seen, the co-incidental confluence of ICTs, bio­
technologies and war-as-such, can be said to, albeit indirectly, reflect a map-less 
space, wherein the rhizomatic movements of NCW are first discemable and which
the NCW war-machine is increasingly strategizing to code - Deleuze would say,
• • 108to striate or to grid - technologically. These are expressions or a response to a 
concern that, however faint, when considered in the context of the history of 
military thought, has always been in evidence - thus, for example, the 
Clauswitzian discussions on the ‘fog and friction’ of war and Moltke’s insistence 
on the fact that ‘no plan survives contact’ are cases in point. In today’s emerging 
informationalized battlespace, these concerns - these eruptions, interruptions and 
interventions -  and their management are assuming a very material and, in this 
sense, different expression.109 In keeping with this, as the literature indicates, one 
finds the NCW project revolving around concepts such as Dominant Battlespace 
Knowledge (DBK), Shared Awareness (SA), and other such “collective
108 “The GIG Vision -  Enabled by Information Assurance”, National Security A gency -  Central Security 
Service, A vailable at http://www.nsa.gov/ia/industry/gig.cfm. As the NSA  website puts it, [T]he 
overarching objective o f  the GIG vision is to provide the National Command Authority (N CA ), 
warfighters, D oD  personnel, Intelligence Community, business, policy-m akeis, and non-D oD  users with 
information superiority, decision superiority, and full-spectrum dominance. See also, Smith, Effects B ased  
O perations, pp 157-192.
109 This refrain is constant as is evidenced by the mention it gets in most texts relating to war, strategy and 
military theory. See, for example, Gray, M odem  Strategy, (1999); V ice Admiral Arthur K. Cebrowski, U.S. 
N avy, and John J. Garstka, “Network-Centric Warfare: Its Origin and Future” in the N aval Institute 
P roceed in g  M agazine, Vol. 124/1/1/139, Jan. 1998. Available at
http://w w w .usni.org/Proceedings/Articles98/PROcebrowski.htm. Last accessed on July 28, 2006.
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consciousness constructs in and of the battlespace.110 This is symptomatic of the 
fact that sensing as response’, in the context of the calculative framework of 
NCW s center of gravity, is predicated on and by an ‘enframing’ (Ge-stell), 
which is limited/ bound by the calculative framework of reason and within which 
‘Sensing as response’ takes place. The key point to note is that the ‘challenging’ 
that we referred to earlier takes place within this Ge-stell which is responded to 
and by that what is ‘standing-reserve’ which, as we have seen, is force without 
intensity. In this sense, ‘sensing as response’ is the ‘eternally recurring’ 
production -  bringing-forth - of the Same. As long as the center of gravity of the 
NCW project -  as a war-machine - is the Ge-stell where force bereft of intensity is 
‘standing-reserve ’, this works.
However, as Nietzsche informs us, force is...
...a monster of energy, without beginning, without end...increasing here and at 
the same time decreasing there...flowing and rushing together, eternally 
changing, eternally flooding back...most turbulent...most contradictory...a 
becoming that knows no satiety (for it has no desire), no disgust, no 
weariness....without goal...without will.111
In the face of such energy, the Ge-stell - the center of gravity - of the NCW 
project, which presumes to exhaust force of its intensity is constantly disturbed, 
dis-placed, de-centered, shattered and, in this sense, is always on - but also past -
110 See, for exam ple, Alberts et al, N etwork Centric Warfare, pp 133-156; Smith, Effects B ased O perations, 
296 362
Friedrich N ietzsche, Will to Pow er, Trans. Kauffmann & Hollingdale, Ed. Kauffinann, (N ew  York: 
Vintage Books, 1968), #  1067, p 550
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the biink of Disaster for, if we remain with Clausewitz's turn of phrase, we 
could say that the fog and friction’ of war that continually make their presence 
felt in the digital battlespace’, are instances of ‘eruptions’, which are not simply 
mis-calculations but aspects of Disaster... intimations of non-gridded or map-less 
space. Critically, for the NCW project, ‘Sense’ and ‘Response’ in map-less or 
non-gridded space lose their traction and symmetry. They appear riddled with 
contradictions. Nietzsche’s ‘monster of energy’ that roils this grid-less space 
ensures that ‘Response’ in such an “ebb and flood” of force is not merely a 
response to ‘Sensing’. Nor are sensing and response co-constitutive of each other. 
Rather, ‘Response’ is in-difference to and with ‘Sensing-as-such’.
In the Clausewitzian terms of Real War, this is the Limit-condition of 
NCW-as-War. Thus the extensive understanding of war invoked by NCW, or the 
mode of being martial in the Age of Information, may be described as being a 
defensive posture organized around its center of gravity (mapped or gridded 
space) and, as such, while its ethic is that of ‘standing-resen e its strategic object 
lies in the mapping or gridding of space thereby attempting to gestell force by the 
fabrication of strategic ensembles. In this sense, the strategic object of NCW is to
112 See Rene Thom, Structural Stability a n d  M orphogenesis, Trans. D. Fowler. (Boulder, CO: West v iew  
Press, 1989). See also, Tim Clark, “D eleuze and Structuralism: Towards a Geometry o f  Sufficient Reason" 
in D eleuze and Philosophy: The D ifference Engineer, Ed. Keith Ansell-Pearson. (London: Routiedge, 
1997), p 60. Note: The sense in which the word ‘disaster’ is used here is drawn from Rene Thom 's 
Structural S tability  and M orphogenesis, in which he distinguishes between a set ot regular points (which  
do not differ in kind  from either each other or from points neighbouring them) and ‘catastrophe points' 
(w hich display som e discontinuity, that is to say, a difference in kind). In these terms. Disaster is thus a 
qualification that is intrinsic to points. Thus, despite the revolutionary difference that is discem able  
betw een points that are ‘regular’ and ‘catastrophic , there are, in the first instance, intensive differences, 
w hich co-constitutes the potential o f  the points. Blanchot, o f  course, makes a similar argum ent albeit in 
poetic terms. See Maurice Blanchot, The Writing o f  The D isaster , (New Edition), Trans. Ann Smock, 
(Lincoln: Univ. O f Nebraska Press, 1995)
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contend with the uncertain, the map-less, the grid-less and to bring them to 
Reason. Krishna s discussion with Arjuna suggests to us that this is the condition 
which bedevils Arjuna on the eve of the Battle of Kurukshetra. The Krishna- 
Arjuna discussion, textually bound as the Bhagavad-Gita, thus emerges as an 
exposition of not only the fraying and collapse of Aijuna’s essentially 
Clauswitzian architectonic of extensive war, but also as an account of Intensive 
War.
Counter-intuitively, in the Bhagavad-Gita, Krishna suggests a mode of 
operability -  one that is best described as ‘sense and evolve’ (SAE).113 One way 
to approach SAE - as a ‘mode of operability’ - is in terms of ‘originary
• • 114technicity’, but one which is bereft of any anthropic hues, and which, in 
Krishna’s words, is “impartible, yet It exists as if divided in beings: It is known as 
sustaining beings; and devouring, as well as generating [them].”115 In Krishna’s 
terms this operational mode is marked by “seeing in-action in action and action in 
in-action”116 where “undertakings are all devoid of plan and desire for 
results...content with what comes without effort, unaffected by the pairs of 
opposites, even-minded in success and failure, though acting...not bound”,117 
where “there is no waste...nor is there production of contrary results”118, and 
when “intellect crosses beyond the taint of illusion...regarding things heard and
113 The term ‘sense and evo lve’ is coined by me - though one can find recent references to a similar concept
in operational doctrines, particularly those pertaining to COIN operations.
114 See Keith A nsell Pearson, “Viroid Life: On Machines, Technics and Evolution” in D eleuze and
P hilosophy: The D ifference Engineer, pp 180-181
115 BG  #16 , p 297
116 Ibid., #18, p 106
117 Ibid., #19 , p 107; #22, p i 08
118 Ibid., #40, p 52
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things yet to be heard...in-difference.”119 This is nothing less than a becoming - 
an ebb and flood of force - always de-composing strategic ensembles and 
structures (such as the Human, the State, or the MIME complex) - an in-difference 
that makes a mockery of the instrumentality and the managerial functionality that 
is the hallmark of the extensivity of not simply the NCW project, but also of the 
Clausewitzian understanding of war. This is a becoming that Intensive War 
entails. SAE operations, thus, are operable modes in which the theory of material, 
formal, final, and efficient causes is subverted and, as such, are expressions of 
pure tacticity, that is to say, pure becomings which, while being independent of 
the forms and substances, expressions and contents that becomes, nevertheless, 
co-responds to and with them thereby breaking up strategic ensembles into more 
local and transient tactical initiatives. As can be expected, the primary accounts of 
NCW - as a war-machine - where NCW is the technical, instrumental, 
manageable and thus strategic mode of being-martial, only serves to distract us 
from the mode of pure tacticity in the wider, deeper, richer and more complex 
‘battlespace’ that is Intensive War.
Given its focus on Intensive War and pure tacticity, this study, therefore, 
is designed around three basic themes. First, it provides a historical, but also a 
philosophical, overview of military theory. The objective of this initial exercise is 
to reveal the ‘force’ of “a properly conceptual geometry which might be called
119 Ibid., #52, p 60
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that of rationalism in general”120 and which, in progressively lesser degrees of 
abstractness, takes the form of the Political and the State thereby underpinning 
and thus presuming to exhaust the phenomenon of ‘war’. Second, this study 
describes the project of NCW with the aim to highlight that despite its genesis 
from a space circumscribed by the political, what is philosophically interesting in 
the NCW project cannot be reduced to the specificity of the conduct of (extensive) 
war — something that the more vociferous of NCW theorists and much of the 
policy-making community have either ignored or missed. Rather, as this study 
demonstrates, the NCW project’s greatest conceptual and philosophical challenge 
is to intimate us of Intensive War that is ‘always-already’ uninhibited and 
extravagant and which ‘originally’ in-forms and is always in excess of the more 
commonplace Clausewitzian notion of war that we are familiar with. Finally, this 
study undertakes a discussion of Intensive War which is, in Deleuze’s words, “a 
differential geometry which tends to ground solutions in the conditions of 
problems.”121 It is important to note that the ‘ground’ of this ‘differential 
geometry’, which is ‘sufficient reason’, is “strangely bent: on the one hand it 
leans towards what it grounds, towards forms of representation; on the other hand, 
it plunges into groundlessness which resists all forms.”122 In this sense, SAE 
operations, i.e. pure tacticities, are moving and morphing ‘differential intensities 
of force’.
120 T im  Clark, “D eleuze and Structuralism -  Towards a Geometry o f  Sufficient Reason”, in Ansell-Pearson  
ed. D eleu ze  and Philosophy -  The Difference Engineer, p 58
121 G illes D eleuze, D ifference and R epetition , Trans. Paul Patton, (N ew  York: Columbia Univ. Press,
1994), p 162
122 D eleuze, D ifference and R epetition , p 275
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It is impoi tant to bear in mind that such an exercise, following a 
Nietzschean refrain, is dangerous’. This is because not only would we be creating 
and appropriating concepts and their associated vocabulary, but also because to 
do so we would have to ‘become’ something ‘other’ than what we already are. 
This condition, as we have noted, is one of ‘'pure becoming’ and our identification 
with it immediately renders the links between this emerging understanding of 
ourselves and the traditional understanding of the Human more tenuous and 
distant. Under these conditions, it will be appreciated, the commonplace 
Clauswitzian understanding of ‘war’, which is subordinated to ‘the political’ and 
which, in this sense, is dependent on a particular understanding of ‘the human’, 
undergoes a change.123 The mode of operability applicable to such a condition is 
best described in terms of a ‘wandering’ that takes “the hereness and nowness of
174.place (and time) with it as unstill reference point[s].” This is the ‘nomadic’ 
condition that characterizes Intensive War and pure tacticity. In this connection, it 
is also necessary to bear in mind the Deleuzian proposition which affirms that not 
only are ‘becomings’ dynamic conditions but that they are also repetitively 
different.125
123 N ote what Bassford has to say in this context: “Within the Trinity discussion itself, because the third 
elem ent is war’s subordination to rationality, it may be entirely appropriate to use the word policy in 
translating that particular clause. But we must always bear in mind the awkward fact that, w hile Clausewitz 
seem s in this discussion to be speaking from the perspective o f  one side in a war [e.g., the people 
(singular), the government (singular), and the commander and his army (singulars)], his topic in this 
chapter is the nature o f  war, which must by definition be multilateral. The clash o f  tw o or more rational, 
opposing, unilateral policies brings us into the realm o f  multilateral politics. Thus there really is no reason 
to avoid translating the Trinity's politischen Werkzeuges literally, i.e., as political instrument. See, 
Christopher Bassford, “Tip-Toe through the Trinity or the Strange persistence o f  Trinitarian Warfare”, 
W orking Draft, Oct. 2007 (Working Draft), Available at
http://www.claiisewitz.com/CWZHOME/Trinitv/Trinitv8.htm. Last accessed on May 20, 2008.
124 Sean Cubitt, D ig ita l Aesthetics, (London: Sage Publications, 1998), p 6
125 See G illes D eleuze, Difference and Repetition, Trans. Paul Patton (N ew  York: Columbia University  
Press, 1994), pp 70-128.
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A cautionary note is warranted here. As Deleuze advises us in the context 
of ‘pure differences’...
...the greatest danger is that of lapsing into the representations of a beautiful 
soul...the beautiful soul says: we are different, but not opposed... . The notion of 
a problem, which we see linked to that of difference, also seems to nurture the 
sentiments of the beautiful soul: only problems and questions matter...when 
difference becomes the object of a corresponding affirmation, they release a 
power of aggression and selection which destroys the beautiful soul by depriving 
it of its very identity and breaking its good will.. .I26
It is not surprising, therefore, that notions pertaining to ‘individuality’ that 
underpin our traditional understandings of ‘the human’, “cannot be taken as a
1 97given... it is [merely] a function...” ~ in the formation of the emergent condition. 
This also calls into question the notion of ‘causality’ which, under this emergent 
condition, loses its familiarity. In the words of Dillon,
[H]ow to understand that ‘causality’ and its allied notions of prediction and 
premonition, is a key issue closely related to the ways in which...[the emerging 
theories of war]...not only understand processes of fomiation and change but 
also those of creativity; how things happen, how they can be made to happen, and 
how matters can be construed so that certain kinds of happenings are encouraged 
or discouraged.128
126 D eleuze, D ifference and R epetition , p xx
127 Cubitt, D ig ita l A esthetics, p 6
128 M ichael D illon, “Poststructuralism, Complexity and Poetics”, in Theory, Culture and  Society, (London, 
UK: Sage Publication, 2000), Vol 17:5, 1-26.
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It is under these radically different and emergent conditions that the theories of 
NCW, as a strategic ensemble, de-construct.
Given this, it is suggested that the reader approach the present study as an 
extended experiment which is geared to interrogate the singularly ‘thanato- 
political’ premise of the prevailing mainstream philosophies and doctrines of war 
and its conduct, which continue to subtly, but unmistakably, inform the theory 
and doctrines of NCW. This exercise should not be misunderstood as being a case 
of propounding an alternate ‘theory of war’. Rather, it is a response to the 
emergent conditions that have resulted as war and its conduct find their 
expression in the Information Age. In keeping with the turbulent conditions that 
are, in many ways, the focus of this study, it will necessarily be a poly-vocal 
performance that is disruptive and subversive to the dominant philosophies and 
doctrines of war and its conduct (and by implication, to the underlying anthropic 
principle). In the same vein, however, by premising itself on the notion that the 
‘emergent condition’ is ‘regenerative’ in nature, the thesis itself is subject to 
disruption and subversion which are endemic to an emergent condition, and in 
this sense, can lay claim to being, in part, regenerative.
Within this essentially de-constructive experiment, however, a careful 
reader will be able to discern a fundamental methodological orientation that this 
study adopts. As Richardson notes while reading Nietzsche, “the evidence lies at 
the periphery to the system and runs in from there through decreasingly specific
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accounts of the data to the central ontology -  rather than from an ontology proven 
fust, up to the detailed implications it supports.”129 In this sense, this thesis ‘keeps 
[a] traditional metaphysical priority: it supplies [by, as mentioned above, re- 
appropriating and/ or re-creating]...concepts...for all...concrete efforts to 
describe evidentiary and experimental data; indeed it even helps to determine 
what that data will be.’130 It is for this reason that this study, in part, focuses on an 
investigation of the ‘performative contradiction’ of the NCW project and notes 
how such a contradiction serves as a portal that allows us to consider the 
condition of Intensive War in which we are always-already becoming martial..
Possible Critiques
This methodological stance may invite the criticism that this study is 
simply invoking the principle of perspectivism in a back-handed manner. The 
charge may be levied that the present exercise makes a virtue of perspectivism 
and that, as a net assessment, a vulgar form of ‘intellectual mobocracy’ is being 
upheld. Contrarily, it is suggested that ‘perspectivism’ is, in the context of this 
study’s ‘originary’ ontology, an ‘epi-phenomenon’. In other words, 
‘perspectivism’ is not central to the ontology. The ontology presumed and 
described by this study is one which accounts for ‘perspectivism’, rather than 
being driven by it. In this sense, it could be said that the ontological premise of
129 John Richardson, N ie tzsch e’s System, (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1996), p 7
130 Ibid.
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this study presumes an ontology of perspectives rather than affirming a banal 
ontological perspectivism.
Secondly, in the context of this study and the ‘changes’ and 
transformations that it purports to take seriously, it may be argued -  as May does 
-  that...
...there is less to these changes than tales of transformation suggest. Simply put, 
while we may be living through a period in which the form and practices of our 
lives are changing in many ways, the underlying substance of our socioeconomic 
system remains largely the same...when we strip away the shiny new products 
and services which are available to us in increasing quantities, much about the 
world has not changed.131
In many ways, this is reminiscent of those military theorists and philosophers of 
war who - from the perspective of the State-apparatus - hold that ‘war is 
eternal’.132 The bottom-line of this view does not question the fact that changes 
are occurring -  for how can that be denied -  rather, it is the profundity of the 
changes that is contested.133 The ‘blind insight’ of such criticisms is that the 
exponential growth and increasingly ubiquitous use of ICTs have not shown that 
“...[the] hard-won knowledge of modem life developed in the past is now 
outmoded or useless.”134
131 Chris May, The Information Society — A Skeptical View, (London: Polity Press, 2002), pp 1-2
132 See, for example, Gray, M odern Strategy, pi
133 May, The Information Society  -  A Skeptical View, p 2
134 Ibid. (my emphasis)
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Though the proponents of the above view, that is to say, those who 
express a healthy and / or otherwise skepticism vis-a-vis the ‘tales of 
transformation’, do not quite so explicitly mention it, nevertheless, their blind 
insights do lead us to the observation that ‘Knowledge’ - in the Past - is static, that 
is to say, it is immobile. It is an artifact, rather than ‘art’. The ‘ge-stelV (en­
framing) of Knowledge, under these circumstances, is the Past -  that is to say, 
within a particular ontology of ‘limits’ — a boundary condition. In it, Knowledge - 
like the net-centric warrior - is standing-reserve...
1. ...as something which does not itself appear but which acts as the most 
immediate constraint on what does appear;
2. As itself as a phenomenon which somehow encompasses and constrains all other 
phenomena;
3. As something neither strictly a phenomenon nor something which does itself 
appear but something intermediate between the two that constrains phenomena 
(or mediates the relations between what appears and what does not);
4. As a double limit...one on each side of the boundary between phenomena and 
what does not appear.135
Naturally, it is not unexpected that there is an insistence that ‘much about the 
world has not changed’. Indeed we again find, that like the majority of the post­
modern/ post-human discourse in which ‘man owns his becomings’, ‘insights’
135 Philip Turetzkey, Time, (N ew  York: Routledge, 2000), p 3
54
such as these also insist on ‘man’ owning not simply ‘knowledge’, but more 
critically, its ‘becoming’.
While this study would not summarily reject the above view, for it is 
undeniably an ‘insight’, it would, however, point out that there could be another 
account of the transformation underway -  one that could possibly neutralize the 
overbearing anthropocentric elements that taint these ‘tales of transformation’. 
Thus, for example, it could be argued that far from ‘the hard-won knowledge of 
modem life’ being rendered useless, it is a vital and intensive co-constituent (but 
also expression) of Becoming-knowledge. Knowledge, thus, escapes the 
instrumental confines of the human (anthropos). Of course, this would mean that 
Knowledge is from  the Past, rather than being in it -  which, in turn, would suggest 
that when Knowledge is from  the Past then, rather than its mobility being 
predicated by a ‘challenging’ - as would be the case if Knowledge were standing- 
reserve - Knowledge is always already mobile. In this sense. Knowledge is not a 
painful accumulation of building-blocks -  a condition that is perhaps more 
applicable to a becoming of the Canon. Surely this would offer a radically 
different diagram of Knowledge as a line of flight as compared to that offered by 
skeptical observers and commentators. Moreover, it would also allow for a partial, 
if not complete, revisiting of how a ‘history of knowledge’ could be written136 
which in turn would compel us to re-visit our staid understanding of 
transformation as simply change. This is but one example of how some of the
136 See, for example, D e Landa, Warfare in the A ge o f  Intelligent M achines (particularly the Introduction)
55
skepticism that is expressed against the ‘tales of transformation’ can be responded 
to.
Further, given this study’s focus on ‘martial’ literature, particularly those 
pertaining to the NCW project which, as we have seen, is almost always 
contextualized in the space of extensive war, its propositions and tentative 
conclusions may seem ‘out of this world’.137 Thus, as Hallward puts it in the 
context of his assessment of Deleuze’s philosophy, “those of us who still seek to 
change our world and to empower its inhabitants will need to look for our
• • • 5? 138inspiration elsewhere.” Contrarily, it is suggested that the question of whether 
this (or, for that matter, any) study is, or will be, an ‘inspiration’ is not of 
importance, or even of relevance, rather what matters is the depth and the 
provocative power of a/ the study as a problematization.139 Given that Hallward 
levies precisely this charge, among others, against Deleuze’s philosophy, and the 
fact the present study is indebted to, among others, Deleuze’s work, Hallward’s 
critique of Deleuze is not only relevant but also worth considering in some detail.
While comparing and contrasting Deleuze’s philosophical contribution to 
that of Foucault’s, Hallward says,
137 See, for exam ple, Peter Hallward, Out o f  this World: D eleuze and the P hilosophy o f  C reation, (London: 
V erso, 2006). His criticism o f  D eleuze’s philosophy is summed up in the title o f  the book. He considers 
D eleu ze ’s philosophy as being *out o f  this world and thus not, in essence, practical, that is to say, 
instrumental.
138 Hallward, Out o f  this World, p 164.
139 See, for exam ple, G illes D eleuze, Empiricism and Subjectivity -  An E ssay on H u m e’s  Theory o f  Human 
N ature, Trans. & Ed. Constantin Boundas, (N ew  York: Columbia University Press, 1991), p 107.
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Even Foucault’s early essays...in which he is no doubt closest to Deleuzian 
concerns, what is mainly at issue is not the liberation of a singular creative 
energy so much as the absence of determination that confronts a de-specified 
subject. In all the limit experiences that Foucault gamers from Bataille, Roussel, 
Artaud and others, the void which defines their limit remains precisely that: 
void...It is the ‘absolute void’ or ‘essential emptiness’ left by the dissolution of 
the classical subject...So...Foucault carefully distinguishes his outside from any 
mystical intuition.140
Hallward’s objective in drawing this comparison with Foucault is, of course, to 
highlight “what Deleuze ‘didn’t say but is nonetheless present in what he did 
say.”’141 Further, in his brief comparison between Deleuze’s and Heidegger’s 
philosophies, Hallward says...
No less than Deleuze, Heidegger [also] affirms a dynamic conception of being 
that has more to do with the verb than the noun -  being as creative process or 
event. But he does so, at least to begin with, by framing it precisely in terms of 
being-in-the world, on the one hand, and being within creatural or mortal time on 
the other.142
Hallward thus points out that “[T]here is nothing specifically contemporary about 
such a logic... On the contrary, the basic parameters of a philosophy that seeks to 
align itself with a singular principle of absolute creativity are very ancient.”143 
Indeed, aside from pointing out the inspirational debt that Deleuze owes Bergson 
and Spinoza, Hallward also directs our attention to the presence of “the essential
140 Hallward, Out o f  this World, p 161
141 Ibid., p 2
142 Ibid., p 160
143 Ibid., p 4
distinctions at issue...in the work of a radical theophanist like John Scottus 
Eriugena , and even before him, to Plotinus, thereby attempting to delineate 
Deleuze’s philosophical lineage and what Hallward considers the essentially 
‘theophanic’ nature of his philosophy. Hallward marshals an impressive array of 
thinkers ranging from the Sufi philosopher, Ibn-al-‘Arabi, to Meister Eckhart to 
emphasize that the Deleuzian philosophical project is nothing more than the fact 
that “we are and have always been creation, and our awareness of being this 
relies, in the end, on nothing more (or less) than an original or pre-original 
affirmation, an affirmation which opens the field of its subsequent effects as a 
series of immediate implications.”145 From this, Hallward concludes that for 
Deleuze, “[Pjreoccupation with the world as such, let alone a concern with the 
orderly representation of the things in the world, serves only to inhibit any such 
affirmation.”146 In other words, Hallward’s principle concern about the ‘out-of- 
this-world’ or ‘extra-worldly’ tonality of Deleuzian philosophy, which is equally 
applicable to this study, is that “[A] creature’s own interests, actions or decisions 
are of minimal or preliminary significance at best: the renewal of creation always 
requires the paralysis and dissolution of the creature per se.”147 Thus, for 
Hallward, the “paralysis of the subject or actor”148 and loss of a strategic 
apparatus -  indeed, of the whole notion of strategy149 - is “a neutral space in
144 Ibid., p 5
145 Ibid., pp 5-6 -  emphasis in original
146 Ibid., p 6
i  A n  . . .  _ . _ _




which no existence can take root.”150 In this way, Hallward fears an ‘indifference 
to the politics of this world.’151
Given this and noting, en passant, that Hallward does not attempt to 
extend Deleuze’s philosophical lineage to ‘other-world’ philosophies such as, for 
example, Advaita, it is not surprising to find that he prescribes a ‘future’, quite 
like how Secretary of Defence Rumsfeld suggests in the context of ‘force 
transformation’. Hallward’s prescription is worth noting in detail. He writes:
The politics of the future are likely to depend less on virtual mobility than on 
more resilient forms of cohesion, on more principled forms of commitment, on 
more integrated fonns of coordination, 011 more resistant forms of defence. 
Rather than align ourselves with the nomadic war-machine, our first task should 
be to develop appropriate ways of responding to the newly aggressive techniques 
of invasion, penetration and occupation which serve to police the embattled 
margins of empire.152
Note, however, that the ‘effort’ that Hallward calls for is as much of a ‘war 
machine run amuck’ as the one that he purports to rally against. Hallward’s 
specific prescriptions -  ‘sustained cohesion, principled forms of commitment, 
integrated forms of coordination and more resistant forms of defence’ -  are no 
more than the affirmation of a particular Ge-stell, or the bringing-forth of a world. 
Hallward is, thus, content with this world and not its becoming. In this sense, as 
we have seen, Hallward remains as ‘technological’ as the NCW project and as
150 Ibid., p 161
151 Ibid., p 162
152 Ibid., pp 162-163
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such faces the prospect of the same performative contradiction as the NCW 
project in the condition of extensive war.
Also, like Hallward’s critique of Deleuze’s philosophy, which he contends 
amounts to little more than [an] utopian distraction”153, it could be charged that 
this study is equally ‘utopian’ and “can offer only the most immaterial and 
evanescent grip on the mechanisms of exploitation and domination that continue 
to condition so much of what happens in this world.”154 The logic that drives such 
a critique is simple enough. In Hallward’s words, it is one that “disables action, in 
favour of contemplation.”155 It is interesting to note that Hallward omits to 
mention that ‘contemplation’, which is ‘thinking’, is not in/ non-action, rather it is 
what the Bhagavad-Gita notes as being ‘action in in-action’, which is just as 
material and as ‘forceful’ as any of the more ‘material’ and ‘permanent’ actions 
that Hallward may have in mind. For Hallward, labouring under an Adorno- 
inspired Kantian regime, ‘separating the constituens from the constitutum -  the 
purely transcendental consciousness from ‘the world’ in the broadest of senses -  
only results in the rendering of the constituens indeterminate and abstract, perhaps 
even unimaginable’. Following through with Adorno’s reading of Kant, for 
Hallward and for the out-of-the world critique, there are only two alternatives -
(1) encompass both the constituting and the constituted as a ‘monstrous, gigantic, 
absolute term’ or, (2) adopt a dialectical mode that ‘realizes that there is neither a
153 Ibid., p 162
154 Ibid., p 162
155 Ibid., p 163
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constituens nor a constitutum, instead these two mutually produce one another’.156 
In this light, this study s focus of interest — Intensive War — could then be shown 
to be the monstrous absolute’ that encompasses the ‘constituting and the 
constituted.’
Contrarily, this study asserts that not only is Intensive War not ‘the 
monstrous absolute’ that Hallward suggests, it is the imperative that fractures the 
absolute, that is to say the Ge-stell, with and in which the ‘absolute difference’ 
that Hallward presumes between the constituens and the constitutum assumes a 
tangible materiality. What Hallward misses is that like for Deleuze, so also for 
this study, the constituens and the constitutum are not different, rather they are in­
difference, and it is the Becoming-different of the constituens and the constitutum 
-  understood as a creative and productive Becoming - not as a Ge-stell - that 
enables Hallward to levy, what one presumes, is his very material and action-full 
critique in the first place. Hallward thus misses the point that such in-difference 
cannot but be very action-full, very material, very real and very transient for, 
among other things, it is this in-difference that not only creates the possibility of 
‘the mechanisms of exploitation and domination that continue to condition so 
much of what happens in this world’ but also tears them down. As we will see, 
this in-difference is an empirical signature o f Intensive War.
It is also expected that military historians, strategists, policy makers and 
state-sponsored academicians mandated to perpetuate ‘the canon of war’ will look
156 Ibid., p 185-6, fn# 15.
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at this study with amusement -  perhaps even with severe disdain. In particular, 
following Hallward, they would contest the ‘other-worldly’ posture that this study 
insists on. They would say - given that war is ultimately not simply about power 
but also about life - that is to say, human life - organized politically, and given 
that, more often than not, the ferociousness of war in the ‘real’ world is more than 
adequately demonstrated by bloody and painful losses, it surely is not a matter to 
be either wished away or to be trifled with - especially in the manner in which this 
study does by selectively reading and interpreting the history of military thought. 
This study responds to such objections by pointing to the premise on which they 
are based. Thus, this study interrogates the privilege that this ‘life’ is accorded, 
which such objections purport to take seriously. Further, it notes how objections 
like these, which take a privileged life as their core rationale, begin to deconstruct 
in the face of the virtual realities that the Age of Information is heralding.
Moreover, given some of the names invoked by this study - Deleuze, 
Nietzsche, Kant, Krishna, the Bhagavad-Gita, the Upanishads but also 
Clausewitz, Jomini, Guibert and, from more recent times, Admiral Cebrowski, 
Andrew Marshall, Martin Libicki, John Arquilla and David Rondfeldt - it may 
also be the case that this study would face questions such as -  what do Deleuze 
and Clausewitz have in common? What possible effect could the epistemological 
theories of Kant have on the study of war? In what way does the introduction of 
Advaitic philosophies assist in understanding network-centric warfare differently? 
WTiat light does a discussion on the Cartesian construction of the Self throw on
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military theory? How and why does the Romantic notion of the genius prefigure 
in discussions focusing on ‘the great captains of war’ and on the ambitious 
attempt to ‘tame chance’, particularly in the context of NCW? This study 
acknowledges the force of these questions, in particular, and of the argument, in 
general. What it offers are not answers but a mode of questioning, which as a 
mode is nothing new. In tact, as we will see, the transformation of (western) 
society from the Age of Religion to that of Reason also brought in its wake a 
reevaluation of all values, including those pertaining to war. In a similar manner, 
this study argues that with the advent of the Age of Information we, not unlike our 
predecessors, find ourselves situated at a cusp, that is to say, at the moment of a 
transformation. Among other things, this transformation is also about how we 
think about and relate to war.
Not surprisingly, therefore, this study insists on addressing the theories of 
war, past and present, as primarily philosophical encounters rather than as merely 
tactical or strategic works on war. Thus, in the same manner in which this study 
sketches out an intellectual genealogy between Clausewitz’s theory of war (here 
representing the zenith of the history of military thought) and the Project of 
Reason, a similar economy of relations between Deleuze’s philosophy of the 
virtual, sense and immanence and the emerging theories and practices of NCW is 
drawn. The significant difference in this exercise being, however, that in the latter 
case, especially given the fast-paced emergence of ICTs and their increasingly 
ubiquitous use in Real War, we are quickly approaching a point that veers
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dangerously close to what can be labeled as a technologization of Deleuze’s plane 
of immanance.
Working from the premise of Deleuze’s notion of a ‘terrible peace’ this 
study suggests that a marriage between the Clausewitzian theories of war and 
information technology (as a ‘dependency-structure’) spawns a logic of war that 
tends to establish a condition of suspended animation — a condition of maximal 
security - by creating and deploying, in Libicki’s words, ‘a fine enough mesh that 
can catch everything’. While some would say that this is a too broad, dismal, 
apocalyptic, techno-driven understanding of war and of human society, yet, some 
of the evidence that we have seen thus far, and those that we will examine in 
some greater detail during the course of this study, seems to point in this 
direction. This, while being the more common way by which the problematization 
of war in the Age of Information is taking place, in extremis, succeeds in sapping 
‘war’ of its conceptual potency. Yet, as this study will attempt to demonstrate, 
there may be an alternative. By taking the changes being brought in by our 
proliferating use of advanced information technologies seriously and by casting 
the intellectual efforts of some of the key military theorists and strategists 
mentioned above against a broader, possibly even against a more non- 
philosophical framework, it is possible to discover other more latent potencies in 
war as a concept. In keeping with this, this study argues that the marriage of these 
past and present theories of war with the digitally-driven dependency structures of 
the Information Age, while undoubtedly effecting a transformation in, among
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other things, fundamental concepts such as ‘the Real’, may not necessarily lead to 
the condition of ‘suspended animation’. Instead, this study suggests, as war and 
society move from an era of mechanization to one of information, an opportunity 
exists to re-cover an other war that while accounting for the political, nevertheless 
remains unaccountable to it.
Outline o f  the study
It should be emphasized that this study is neither an intellectual history of 
the evolution of the theories of war and combat culminating in the emerging 
theories of NCW, nor is it a comprehensive account of the mode o f  combat 
commonly known as NCW. Worthy accounts that deal with such areas of interest 
already (over)populate the shelves of our libraries. Contrarily, this study is, in its 
essence, a critical engagement with the concept of ‘war’ that, in its traditional 
Clauswitzian mode, can be and, in some quarters, are being radically 
problematized by the dramatic developments in the dawn of the Information Age. 
The mode of this engagement is to read the ‘shadows’ cast by the patently 
Enlightenment project that theories of war and combat, including the NCW 
project, ‘desire’ to actualize under conditions of what Clausewitz described as 
Real War. This study hopes that some sense of what Intensive War and pure 
tacticity involves will become apparent by our engagement with and as the 
polemical condition that is always-already erupting with-in the ‘striations’ of the
NCW project.
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Thus, to give a brief overview of the contents of this study. Chapter Two 
piovides a historico-philosophical overview of the evolution of military theory 
with the aim to expose what I refer to as the ‘architectonic of war’. This is the 
framework — conceptual and material — within which we commonly understand 
war and engage in it. One pattern that emerges from this ‘framework’ (ge-stell), 
which this study focuses on, is that of ‘suspended animation’. But, as we will see, 
this is no simple suspension of animation. Chapter Three begins by describing the 
theories of NCW. Then, co-opting segments of the Deleuzian oeuvre, it confronts 
the theories of NCW subversively. This allows us not only to engage with the 
vitality of NCW, it also allows us to confront the ‘always-already’ presence-ing of 
Intensive War, which, as we will see, is notionally labeled in past and present 
theories of war as the Disaster (because it is the dis-orienting, de-centering, de­
constructing, shattering) that confronts and undermines not only the ‘desire’ of the 
NCW project, but of ‘extensive war ’ itself. By co-relating past developments in 
(traditional) military theory with the emerging theorizations of NCW, we will 
investigate how the problem posed by Thanatos is contained within a patently 
martial flavour of a universal mathesis. Among other things, this will allow us to 
‘portal’ through and go beyond the ‘shadows’ of the mesh of nets that NCW -  as 
a concept - seeks to cast thereby ‘constituting the Gestell (frame) of nature and of 
humanity through calculation’. Chapter Four, presents an account of Intensive 
War drawing not only from the works of Deleuze and Heidegger which, 
influenced by the fragments of Heraclitus, have at their root polemos,157 but also 
from the Bhagavad-Gita, which insist on an originary account of Becoming as
157 Gregory Fried, H eid eg g er’s Polem os -  From Being to P o litics , p l4 .
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war . It also looks at the modes of operability that Intensive War necessitates. 
Having thus far presented the reader with an account of Intensive War, in a 
Postscript, this study returns to the question of war-as-such and reiterates how by 
problematizating war in terms of Intensive War, we are able to recover a more 
originary mode of martial bearing.
So much for an outline of how this study is presented. The reader may also 
find helpful a thematic sketch of this study’s engagement with Intensive War, the 
contribution by which it is believed that this work departs from other scholarship 
on war and its conduct, particularly in the Information Age. While this sketch 
may provide some of the critical ‘lines of flight’ that this study pursues, it is not 
meant as a comprehensive description.
The main thesis of this study centers, of course, on Intensive War and 
pure tacticity, by which at least two things are meant: (1) an ‘originary’ condition 
which, Krishna -  in the Bhagavad-Gita - refers to as Lila - the highly dynamic and 
fluid condition of the ‘play of forces’; and (2) an eruption, which is both a 
condition and a mode o f operability -  thus, a ‘serious play-fullness’ - that 
relentlessly tears apart NCW’s project -  indeed that of all the theories of war and 
the military that we will consider in this study - of establishing a universal 
mathesis by reducing change/ nature/ phusis to calculative reason (note that it is 
possible to read ‘maya’, as this study does, in the Bhagavad-Gita, as the
158 W hile the Upanishads speak o f  ‘war’, that is to say, o f  ‘intensive war’, in elliptical terms, the centrality 
o f  ‘intensive war’ is unmistakable. Various commentators have noted this. See for example, Sri Aurobindo, 
E ssays on The G ita , First series, Chapter V - Kurukshetra , (in ’Arya', Decem ber 1916)
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MetaMesh of the mesh and networks that sustain the condition of universal 
mathesis).
Now, Fried shows us that...
Heidegger’s preferred translation for the Greek word p o le m o s  is...commonly 
rendered in English as ‘co n fro n ta tio n  ’. . .[which].. .is both a struggle [kam pf] over 
and an account [thus a communication or m itte ilu n g ] of the sense of things, but 
not a naked attempt to impose meaning or dominion; confrontation expects and 
indeed demands resistance...This sense of confrontation...this confrontmg 
constitutes the fundamental condition of our existence, but not in the Darwinian 
sense of a struggle for existence as the survival of the fittest or in a Hobbesian 
sense of a war of all against all (although such things may subsist as aspects of 
polemos).159
At first glance, the similarity between this Heideggerian understanding of 
polemos and ‘Intensive War/pure tacticity’ may seem strikingly obvious. Indeed, 
as Fried also points out, given the scope of Heidegger’s polemos, which is both 
broad and deep, for Heidegger, “Polemos is a name of Being”160 and in this sense, 
polemos, for Heidegger, is an ontological concept. Seen in this ‘frame’, yes, there 
is a similarity between Heidegger’s polemos -  as interpreted by Fried -  and 
Intensive War/ pure tacticity. However, the point on which this study parts 
company with Heidegger is on the nature of the implicit confrontation (struggle 
(kampf) + communication (mitteilung)) that Heidegger’s polemos entails. 
Contrary to Heidegger, this study argues for an understanding of Intensive War
159 Gregory Fried, H eidegger "s Polem os -  From Being to Politics, p 15.
160 Ibid, p 16
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(and pure tacticity), where the very notion of ‘confrontation’ is obviated by the 
fluidity of the ‘play of forces’ (Lila). Even a sophisticated account of the 
polemical nature of Being, as offered by Heidegger, ultimately, by positing 
‘confrontation’ or, more precisely, “ confront-/«g’ as being constitutive of the 
fundamental condition of existence, ultimately relies on an ‘external’ 
distinguishing between sides from one another by the taking up of confronting 
positions in everything from respectful, vigorous debate to trench warfare.’161 The 
question that must be posed to Heidegger here is whether this confront-ing is 
solely in terms of Being or also of Dasein. If we go by Fried’s reading, 
Heidedgger’s polemos “describes not only our own Being, what he calls Dasein, 
but also of Being itself.”162 But repeatedly we find that the access to Being as 
polemos is mediated by the polemical nature of Dasein, which detracts from the 
in-human aspect of Heidegger’s polemos and returns it to an anthropic plane. 
Thus, Being is always being thrown-in-the-world. But this also means that 
Heidegger’s polemos is also tainted by anthropos - even if this tainting is 
inestimable. Thus, at the least, and as a direct cause of this tainting, polemos is 
polemical, but anthropically. In this sense, Intensive War, within the 
Heideggerian construct, cannot help but always become-extensive. As we will see, 
even the Deleuzian construct falters at this very point.
161 Ibid, p 15
162 Ibid, p 16
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This study suggests that war, that is to say, Intensive War, is better 
approached in in-human, that is to say, in machinic terms.163 This allows us to not 
only observe Lila at play, but also to be the player in, of, and as, Lila without 
succumbing to the debilitating distance and unidirectional movement associated 
with any form o f transcendent locus. Among other things, this involves a de­
attachment from Heidegger’s Dasein and the abandoning of the anthropic plane. It 
will also involve us in movements that are immanently nomadic that break down 
walls - the flimsiest (as constructed by the most loosely arranged of assemblages) 
to the most chalky and rigidly rock-like ones (as presented by the most densely 
packed apparatuses and structures) -  by re-arranging them. Thus, Intensive War is 
not simply polemos - it is, in an even more originary sense, in excess of polemos, 
that which Krishna refers to as Lila. The task on hand, therefore, is to engage with 
the operative condition of Intensive War/pure tacticity as the ‘ebb and flow of 
forces’.
163 M achinic, Bonta and Protevi inform us, is  the “Adjectival form for the operation o f  the machinic 
assem blage or m achine.. .the ‘cutting edge o f  deterritotrialization’ that draws variations and mutations o f  an 
assem blage...” See Bonta & Protevi, D eleuze and G eophilosophy: A Guide and G lossary, p 107.
Chapter Two
The Architectonic of War or,
... this way to technical paradise...7
SECTION I 
A Historico-Philosophical Background
“No medieval thinker, no matter how adventurous, could have undertaken 
Kant’s construction of a religion within the limits of reason alone -  he could have 
hardly imagined it.” But this does not imply that medieval philosophers were any 
less partial to Reason. As Gay points out, “ ...there were many subjects, especially 
in logic and ontology, which (the medieval) philosophers treated philosophically 
-  that is by the sole right of reason.” What distinguished them, however, from 
their Enlightenment successors was their conviction that, as Gay puts it, “nothing 
but the divine could penetrate everywhere.”4 For those who dared to deny the 
absolute permeability of the divine, Dante’s Inferno - particularly the sixth circle 
of hell - awaited them. Thus, not many could keep the divine in abeyance for too 
long. Indeed, as Gay suggests, “Dante’s journey from the Convivio to the Divine
1 B lack Sabbath, “Computer God” from Dehumanizer, 1991
2 Peter Gay, The Enlightenment: The Rise o f  M odern Paganism , (London: W.W. Norton & Co., 1995), p 
235. Gay points to Thomas Aquinas’ stance which allowed for the co-existence o f  reason and revelation, a 
point which was recently made by the current Pope.
* Ibid, p 234
4 Ibid, 236-7
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Comedy mirrors the retreat from critical thinking...”5 that marked the Age of 
Religion. This hierarchy of values -  this subordination of Reason to the Divine - 
was inconceivable to the Enlightenment philosophers for, as Gay highlights, 
‘philosophy (for the Age of Enlightenment) was autonomous and omnipotent, or 
it was nothing.’6
The Age of Enlightenment was thus characterized by “a decline in 
mysticism, of growing hope for life and trust in effort, in commitment to inquiry 
and criticism, of interest in social reform, of increased secularism, and a growing
n
willingness to take risks.” This, which Gay suggests was a ‘recovery of nerve’ of 
sorts, also marked the clear ambition of the Age of Enlightenment -  an ambition 
which, in Descartes’ words, was nothing less than to make men the “masters and 
possessors of Nature.”
The decisive break between the medieval philosophers and those of the 
Enlightenment was not centered on the role and criticality of Reason-as-such. 
Rather, it was on the extent and scope of Reason. While for the medieval 
philosophers the limit-horizon of Reason was the divine, for the Enlightenment 
philosophers, Reason was the “tribunal before which all disputes, all differences, 
were to be resolved.”9 Thus,
5 Ibid, p 236
6 Ibid, p 236
7 Peter Gay, The Enlightenment: The Science o f  Freedom , (London: W.W. Norton & Co., 1996), p 6
8 Quoted inGay, The Enlightenment: The Science o f  Freedom , p 6
9 Ibid, p2
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...[T]he advance of knowledge...meant the advance of reason. In the course of 
the eighteenth century, the world...was being emptied of mystery. Pseudo 
science was giving way to science, credence in the miraculous intervention of 
divine forces was being corroded by the acid of skepticism and overpowered by 
scientific cosmology. The sacred was being hollowed out from within by the 
drying up of religious fervor, the call for good sense, the retreat from 
Augustinian theology.. .and the advance of rationalism...10
In this sense, the Age of Enlightenment fractured, in more ways than one, 
the divine-based reality that the discourse of the Age of Religion had etched out. 
Yet, despite this ‘fracturing’, the Reality that Reason itself constructed began to 
assume a universal nature and character and, in this sense, displayed an uncanny 
resemblance to the ‘condition of the divine’ of the Age of Religion. Thus, for 
example, Brinton models the Enlightenment (though with a number of caveats) by 
pointing to “an optimistic, this-worldly belief in the power of human beings, 
brought up rationally from infancy on as nature meant them to be, to achieve 
steady and unlimited progress...[which results in]...persons free from prejudice 
and compelled by reason -  a compulsion to which they freely submit.. 1
Now, Gay, in his interpretation of the Enlightenment, suggests that “the 
Enlightenment was not an Age of Reason but a Revolt against Rationalism... [and 
that the Enlightenment’s claim]...was in no way a claim for the omnipotence of 
reason...[contrarily, it was]...a political demand for the right to question 
everything, rather than the assertion that all could be known or mastered by
10 Peter Gay, The Enlightenment: The Science o f  F reedom , p 6
11 Crane Brinton, “Enlightenment,” in The E ncyclopaedia o f  Philosophy. Ed. Paul Edwards, (N ew  York: 
M acM illan Publishing Company, 1967), 4 Vols. Vol 2. pp 519-25
rationality. ,I2 Schoules, however, points out, given the well-known antipathy that 
thq philosophes had towards Descartes’ ‘style of metaphysics’, that while there is 
‘a grain of truth’ in Gay’s assessment,13 Gay’s assessment “fails to recognize that 
the talk of “omnicompetence of criticism” is itself a manifestation of the 
“omnipotence of reason”, at least in its analytic function.”14 As evidence, 
Schoules points to, among others, Condorcet who, referring to Descartes, said: 
“...he had understood that it [‘the right method’] must be derived entirely from 
those primary and evident truths which we can discover by observing the 
operations of the human mind.”15 In the context of this study what is important to 
note is that this “metaphysical method” was a “universal method” and was 
therefore “applied to all the various undertakings of the human understanding” so 
that “every branch of knowledge” was “subjected to analysis”.16
The Cartesian methodology -  premised on the Cartesian Self - was 
essentially schematic in nature in so far as it enabled the creation, maintenance 
and expansion of a tabular form of representation - a universal mathesis. While it 
may not have been as dogmatic as the mechanistic rationalists -  as Descartes’ 
provision for a God and other ‘innate truths’ seems to indicate - it did construct, 
or at least lay out, the conditions in which ‘an ordering of things’ took place. In 
this sense, it was also a critical co-constitutive of not simply a rationale, or a
12 Peter Gay, The Enlightenm ent I: The R ise o f  M odern Paganism , p 141
13 Peter A. Schoules, D escartes and the Enlightenment, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1989), p
69
14 Ibid, p 67
15 Condorcet, Sketch fo r  a H istorical P icture o f  the P rogress o f  the Human M ind, Trans. June Barraclough,
(N ew  York: N oonday Press, 1955), p 132
16 Peter A. Schoules, D escartes and the Enlightenment, p 67
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reason, but also of the Real.17 This notion gathered increasing strength as the 
Enlightenment matured and its impact may be gauged by recognizing that, as 
Sallis puts it, “[Rjecourse to reason in the face of crisis...is a strategy deeply 
embedded in the Western tradition. More precisely, it defines the turning by 
which this tradition was founded and constituted.”18
Post the French Revolution - in the wake of the Reign of Terror and the 
Napoleonic Empire - this Reason-centric Cartesian discourse lost much of its 
sheen due to the increasing inability of Reason to explain and account for the 
slippages that were perceived in Reality. The trajectory of this development -  the 
recognition of the slippages occurring within the overarching schema of a 
universal mathesis and its disciplinary sub-sets to represent Reality - is most 
discemable in the development and growing maturity of the natural sciences. 
Thus, for example, it was widely held that “[T]he [new] privileges accorded to 
observation...provided a model of rationality; since it had proved possible, by 
means of experimentation and theory, to analyze the laws of movement or those 
governing the reflection of light beams...”19 This optimism also spurred the 
attempts to understand the more complex realm of living beings by the methods 
of experimentation, calculation and observations. The hope was to abstract out of 
this scientific methodology, the laws that governed this realm of living beings. 
Yet, as Foucault brilliantly demonstrates, matters were not so simple. While
17 M ichel Foucault, The O rder o f  Things -  An A rcheology o f  the Human Sciences, (London, UK: Routledge
C lassics, 2003) (especially  the section on Classification)
18 John Sallis, The G athering o f  Reason, 2nd Ed., (N ew  York: SU N Y  Press, 2005), p 1
19 Foucault, The O rder o f  Things, p 136.
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method and structure -  both subsets of a universal mathesis and the veritable tools 
of the rapidly growing disciplines - were able to answer many questions they were 
found to be rather inadequate, especially in the field of natural history, while 
attempting to deal with issues like the ‘character’ of species and the case of 
‘catastrophe’.20
The critical issue, in this context, was language. It will be appreciated that
in the context of the universal mathesis and the emergence of disciplines, the
thread that bound the unity of the disciplines was a ‘universal language’, more
accurately, a discourse, that could represent the reality that the universal mathesis 
21claimed to represent. Yet, issues like ‘character’ and ‘catastrophe’ generated 
increasing concerns about the ability of the signifier-signified structure of 
language to represent aspects of Reality. To be able to contend with this situation, 
it was found that there was an increasing tendency to modify the representational 
character/ nature of Reality by appealing to the Imagination. This was, according 
to Foucault, addressed by highlighting the phenomenon of ‘continuity’. Thus we 
find, “in the eighteenth century, the continuity of nature is a requirement of all 
natural history, that is, of any effort to establish an order in nature and to discover 
general categories within it, whether they be real and prescribed by obvious
distinctions or a matter of convenience and quite simply a pattern produced by our
22imagination.”
20 Foucault, The O rder o f  Things, pp 139-164.
21 Peter A. Schoules, D escartes and the Enlightenment, p 70
22 M ichel Foucault, The O rder o f  Things, p 160.
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While the explicit faith in the efficacy of Reason seemed to have been 
tempered -  this happening by the eighteenth century - there always remained an 
implicit confidence in the foundations that had been originally constructed on 
Reason. It remained constant even during the Romantic Age. Thus, for example, 
post 1840, with the dramatic advances in the natural sciences, there was a 
reversion to the mode of disciplinarity. This movement was underpinned by not 
only the resurgence of the natural sciences, but more importantly, and as Foucault 
shows, by the emergence of institutions which codified these disciplines and 
which thereafter rigidly controlled the production of knowledge. Thus, this was 
not simply, as Gat characterizes it, the ‘return to the culture of the sciences’. It 
was much more than a mere return -  it was a (re) discovery of ‘discipline not 
simply marked by a renewed interest in science, but also by the emergence of 
networks of institutions, which invested the word ‘discipline’ with a more 
profound meaning.23
It is important to note that in the context of the above discussion, the 
central element that empowered the rationalistic Cartesian discourse was the 
Cartesian conception of the Self and the implicit but radical reflexivity that was 
operative within it. This reflexivity was based on a dualism which was very 
distinct from the dualism proposed by Plato.24 It worked by taking a 
‘disenchanted’/ ’a-enchanted’ or ‘objective’ view of the ‘body’ by affirming the
23 See, M ichel Foucault, D iscipline and Punish: The Birth o f  the Prison, (London: Penguin Books, 1991).
Particularly see, pp 135-228
24 Charles Taylor, Sources o f  the S e l f -  The M aking o f  the M odern Identity, (Cambridge, UK: Cambndge
U niversity Press), p 145.
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immaterial nature of the soul.25 Thus, as Taylor puts it, by repudiating a Cosmic 
ordei of things, as Plato had done, which enabled the realization that an 
individual’s “true nature was a supersensible soul... [by turning
to].. .supersensible, eternal, immutable things...[thus] seeing and understanding 
the things which surround [the individual] as participating in the Ideas which give 
them being”26, the Cartesian conception began from the premise that there was no 
pre-ordained a priori ‘order of Ideas’ and maintained that “understanding physical 
reality in terms of such is precisely the...confusion between the soul and the 
material...” Postulating in this way the ‘separateness’ of the body from the soul 
also enabled Descartes to provide a radically new and different understanding of 
Reason and its hegemony over (bodily) passions.28
This understanding of Reason - premised on a particular conception of the 
Self - which enabled seeing the world from a ‘disenchanted’ stance, in turn, 
allowed for an understanding of the world as a domain of potential instrumental 
control.29 It is at this point that Reason also began to be understood procedurally
25 Ibid., p 146.
26 Ibid., p 145.
27 Ibid.
28 See, for example, Rene Descartes, D iscourse on M ethod and M editations on F irst Philosophy, Trans. 
D onald A. Cress, (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 1980), pp 89-100
29 It is interesting to note here that Taylor attributes the m ode o f  ‘disenchanted engagem ent’ to Descartes. 
He quotes a letter from Descartes to Elizabeth in this context, w hile offering the follow ing explanation -  
“The proper stance is a detached engagem ent.. .w e try to attain the best, but that w e be satisfied with what 
w e get.” (Taylor, Sources o f  the Self, p 151) It is important to note Taylor’s interpretation o f  D escartes’ 
letter and his understanding o f  it. Taylor’s presentation o f  D escartes’ alleged ‘disenchanted engagem ent’ is 
not akin to ‘desire-less action’ as presented in the Bhagavad-Gita. Descartes, according to Taylor, suggests 
that D esire is under the control o f  Reason, which is kept in check by Reason — this being a signatuie o f  
R eason’s instrumental function. Thus, i f  what Desire desires is not achieved by rational action or action 
guided by Reason, then another aspect o f  Reason com es into play which keeps Desire in check. (Taylor, 
Sources o f  the Self, p 151) This is very different, among other things, from an ontological point o f  view  o f
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and in terms of the standards by which the orders of science and life were, 
constructed/ Taylor makes the point well when he says, “For Plato, to be rational 
we have to be right about the order of things. For Descartes rationality means 
thinking according to certain canons. The judgment now turns on properties of the 
activity of thinking rather than on substantive beliefs which emerge from it.”31 By 
the eighteenth century, however, there was another transformation and this 
involved extending the concept of truth and philosophy and “[T]he attempt to 
solve the central problem of [the] philosophic method” which, according to 
Cassirer, “...[involved] recourse to Newton’s ‘Rules of Philosophizing...”32 
Contra the Cartesian method of beginning with a set of principles, the Newtonian 
method relied heavily on, what Cassirer calls, “the data of experience”.33 Then, by 
following the method of rigorous analysis, a set of principles would be arrived at 
whose applicability would be universal. It is curious to note that while Cassirer 
marks the difference in orientation between the Cartesian and the Newtonian 
models of methodology, he also points to the commonality of the goals and basic 
presuppositions of the Cartesian and Newtonian methods, namely, the presence of 
universal order and law in the world. This universality of order -  both as a 
premise and the goal of the Cartesian and Newtonian systems -  also implied that 
facts were not merely a ‘jumble of discrete elements’, contrarily, they exhibited
the ‘desire-less actions’ suggested by the Bhagavad-Gita. For a fuller discussion on the desire-less action as 
presented in the Bhagavad-Gita, see below.
30 Taylor, Sources o f  the Self, p 156.
31 Ibid.
32 Ernst Cassirer, The Philosophy o f  the Enlightenment, Trans. F. C. A . K oelin, Ed. B y  J. P. Pettegrove, 
(Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1968), p 7.
33 Ibid.
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an all pervasive form.' Thus, between the Cartesian and the Newtonian systems, 
the coie difference was one of methodology, though the aim remained the same. 
While the Cartesian system took as its premise a universal order and proceeded to 
reinforce that premise by the methods of rigorous induction, the Newtonian 
system began by examining phenomena and then proceeded to establish the 
general principles which, like the a priori stance of the Cartesian method, also 
resulted in the affirmation of a universal order.35 This methodological shift was 
critical in the sense that it based the notion of a universal order within a 
framework which, while being critical of the implied dogmatism of the Cartesian 
system and sharply distinguishing between the Cartesian Tove of the system’ 
from the Newtonian ‘value of the system’, nevertheless served, perhaps 
unwittingly, to treat thinking in terms of a system as a dogma itself.36
Classical Military Theory -  A Juridico-Political Overview
Given this lineage, it is not surprising that the phenomenon of War was 
also influenced by the metaphysical constructs of the Enlightenment. It was 
recognized that War, which was after all a human activity, was “ruled by
34 Ibid., p 8
35 Note: Earlier, on page 42, quoting Taylor, we had noted that “the Cartesian conception began from the 
prem ise that there was no pre-ordained a p rio ri ‘order o f  Ideas ... (Taylor, Sources o f  the S e lf  p 145). 
Superficially, this may seem  to be at variance with the assertion being made here that the Cartesian system  
did have an a priori ‘stance’. It will be appreciated that the a p r io r i order o f  Ideas that Taylor is referring to 
is that o f  Plato, which, in the context o f  Descartes, should be understood as the D ivine, which Descartes 
was attempting to suborn. This, however, does not contradict the ‘other’ a p rio ri that Descartes did invoke 
-  the Cartesian notion o f  the Self.
36 Cassirer notes two examples from the 18 th Century -  that o f  D ’Alembert and Condillac making this 
distinction. D ’Alembert, in the “Preliminary Discourse to the French Encyclopedia makes this d that 
distinction the central point o f  his argument and Condillac in his “Treatise on System s”, gives it explicit 
form and justification. See Cassirer, The Philosophy o f  the Enlightenment, p 8.
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arbitrary traditions’, ‘blind prejudices’, ‘disorder and confusion’...All these had 
to be replaced by critical analysis and systematic schemes which [could] be 
understood in definitive and universal terms, largely overriding circumstantial 
differences and historical change.”37 This signaled “the shift towards a 
representation of the soul and its activities in terms structured by thought about 
the material world and sometimes even in material terms.”38 The consequence of 
this was to strongly emphasize on individual human agency in moral conduct, 
economic activity and politics and from this to draw conclusions about human 
nature. This found its most explicit manifestation with the question of law.
Roger Smith asserts that there were two generalized orientations to law. 
The first was the view that held law to be intrinsic to the divine order of things, 
while the second view held that it was a human construction. The tension between 
these two apparently conflicting views manifested itself in the contradictory 
pressures which law faced to make itself systematic and practical. In the sixth 
century, the Byzantine Emperor, Justinian, drew up what is considered the 
greatest contribution of Rome to western civilization -  Roman Law - embodied in 
the Digest and the Institutes, which he decreed were not to be commented on. Yet, 
according to Smith, medieval scholars had proceeded to do just that. By the 
sixteenth century, “the techniques and ethos of humanist scholarship created a 
vast amount of jurisprudence to accompany these inherited laws.”40
37 Gat, A H istory o f  M ilitary Thought, p 30.
38 R oger Smith, The Fontana H istory o f  the Human Sciences, (London, UK: Fontana Press, 1997), p 84.
39 Ibid.
40 Ibid., pp 85-86
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Simultaneously, the tradition of English common law (i.e., custom) not only 
affected this development of jurisprudence, it also influenced the question of 
whether jurisprudence should be understood in terms of a rational discipline. By 
the seventeenth century there occurred a shift in the prevailing medieval 
jurisprudence in terms of three basic categories -  the category of the person, the 
category of things and the category of actions. At once, one can see how the 
concept of the individual (that is the person with a body, property and free will) 
assumed a position of central importance. It is also significant to note that 
“ ...Christianity reinforced this articulation of the person, since faith held that a 
person is the possessor of an individual divine soul.”41 This notion of the 
individual bearing the characteristics of body, property and free will, in turn, 
found its equivalent in the notion of the State, which was considered to also 
possess a body, property and free will. This resulted in the great debates that 
began from the seventeenth century which had, as their central feature, the 
question of the identity of that which formed the ‘body politic’ (the tussle circled 
between three poles -  the monarch, the prince or the representation of people42). 
Thus, one can see how the search for “causes in jurisprudence and natural 
philosophy led to...[the] attempts to rationally understand history and nature and 
empirically to discover historical and physical agencies.”43 This reflected the 
shared Cartesian-Newtonian methodologies of observation and experience which 
further underlined the attention to Reason and universal realities.
41 Ibid., p 87.
42 Ibid.
43 Ibid., p 89.
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While not strictly within the time-frame commonly ascribed to the 
Enlightenment, Hugo Grotius remains an influential jurist and scholar, especially 
when investigating questions pertaining to war.44 The chaotic and savage Thirty 
Years’ War provided the background against which Grotius wrote his The Rights 
o f War and Peace (1625). Grotius considered the effects of the Thirty Years’ War 
-  civil anarchy, military stalemates and the potentiality of widespread unending 
wars -  as being damaging and sought to establish some common grounds on 
which humanity could agree upon. Deeply influenced by Galileo’s geometry (as 
Descartes was), Grotius reacted against the political uncertainty of his times and 
affirmed the ideal of moral philosophy as being logical, consistent and systematic. 
His bid to create the common ground of humanity began with his attempt to give 
an account of human nature. Grotius posited that regardless of all else that may 
divide Man, there was one common link that linked all of humanity - the principle 
of self-preservation.45 This common link, Grotius, suggested, was highlighted by 
the fact that Man could not, if acting within Reason, violate this principle. In other 
words, Man could not imperil his own self. Certainly there could be actions 
undertaken that would or could undermine self-preservation, however, they would 
be, according to Grotius, irrational acts.46 This allowed Grotius to further suggest 
that the common link of humanity was not simply self-preservation, but self- 
preservation informed by Reason, which he glossed by asserting that Love, 
whose primary force and action are directed to self-interest, is the first principle of
44 Richard Tuck, The Rights o f  War and Peace: P olitica l Thought and the International O rder from  Grotius 
to K ant, (London: Oxford University Press, 2001), p 78.
^  Hugo Grotius, D e lure Praedae Comm entarius, I Trans. Gladys L. W illiams and Walter H. Zeydel, 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1950), pp 10-11
46 Tuck, The R ights o f  War and Peace, p 100
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the whole natural order.”47 This, for Grotius, was the universal human reality. It is 
important to note that knowledge of this reality was the corner-stone of conduct, 
not only of Man but also of States.48
Further, Grotius, using the argument of self-preservation (informed by 
Reason) being the universal human reality, was able to suggest that the individual 
had the right to pursue his/ her own self-interest provided it did not impinge on 
the self-interest of others and in this manner, he was able to turn the theory of 
natural law from its medieval focus on duty, which was based on a conception of 
the divine construct of nature (including Man) to one of ‘rights’.49 By stating this 
Grotius, was also making a significant comment on a particular attribute of man -  
his inherent sociability. It should be noted that Grotius’ formulation of Man’s 
nature in terms of self-preservation and the centrality of Man’s attributes would 
form the base on which individualist thought about human nature and government 
would evolve.50 The result of Grotius’ formulations would also set the agenda for 
the ‘just war’ concept and would prove to be another manifestation of the 
instrumentalization of war. Post Grotius, therefore, war became increasingly 
understood as the means by which self-interest was served and the self was 
preserved. The significant caveat, however, which served to check the wanton-
47 R. Tuck, “The ‘M odem ’ Theory o f  Natural Law”, in A. Pagden (Ed.) The Languages o f  P o litica l Theory 
in E arly  M odern Europe, (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1987), p 113. Quoted in Roger 
Smith, p 91. See also Richard Tuck, The Rights o f  War and Peace, p 86.
48 Tuck, The R ights o f  War and Peace, p 88-89
49 Grotius, D e lu re  P raedae Commentarius, I, p 18.
50 Smith, The Fontana H isto iy  o f  the Human Sciences, p 92.
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ness of war, as witnessed by Grotius himself, was the underlying presence of 
Reason, which would inform self-interest and self-preservation.
This sentiment was also echoed by the Swiss diplomat and lawyer, Vattel, 
the author of The Law o f Nations (1758), who “offered a guide to two critical 
questions: (1) Are there legitimate causes for war and (2) Could war be regulated 
by rules or laws that limit the severity of impact on humanity?”51 Vattel 
concluded that ‘lawful’ war was distinguished by certain easily identifiable 
objectives -  recovery of belongings, exacting dues, providing security and self- 
defence. The stark continuation between the thoughts of Vattel with those of 
Grotius and, as we shall see, of Hobbes, is manifested by his ascribing the 
principle of self-defence as a natural law. Thus, Vattel states, “...we have shown 
that nature gives men a right to employ force, when it is necessary for their 
defence, and for the preservation of their right. This principle is generally 
acknowledged: reason demonstrates this; and nature herself has engraved it on the 
heart of m an...”52 Aside from reaffirming the intrinsic Reason-centric nature of 
Man, Vattel’s formulations were also instrumental in defining the standards which 
would govern war. More importantly, Vattel held the view that the ‘object’ o f war 
was to do whatever is necessary to bring (Vattel uses the word ‘reduce’) an 
opponent to ‘reason’52 This is of particular interest to us because with this
51 Armstrong Starkey, W arfare in the Age o f  Enlightenment, 1700-1789, (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 
2003), p 17.
52 Emmerich von Vattel, “O f War,” in The Laws o f  Nations, or, the Principles o f  the L aw  o f  nature, A pplied  
to the Conduct and Affairs o f  N ations and Sovereigns, Ed. Joseph Chitty, (Philadelphia, PA. T and J. W. 
Johnson, 1861), p296, 302. Quoted in Armstrong Starkey, Warfare in the Age o f  Enlightenment, p 17.
53 See Emmerich de Vattel, The Law o f  Nations or the Principles o f  Natural L aw  (1758). Book 3, Chapter 
3, #  26. A vailable at http ://www.l on an g.com /exl ibri s/vattel/
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statement Vattel implied that the participants of a war were bound to be subject to 
Reason and when that equilibrium failed, it presented a condition wherein the 
party that broke the bounds of Reason could be subjected, by acts of force, to 
return to the fold of Reason and, thus, how Reason provided the overarching fold 
within which ‘security’ was not only possible but also guaranteed.
Grotius’ formulation of self-preservation informed by Reason also had its 
parallel in Hobbes’ attempt to find a rationale for an ordered civil society. 
However, Hobbes’ conclusions were very different and they, in no small part, 
contributed to the ‘modem’ understanding of war. Being heavily influenced by 
Descartes (and Gassendi), Hobbes was of the view that “ ...Science is the 
knowledge of Consequences, and dependence of one fact upon another: by which, 
out of that we can presently do, we know how to do something else when we will, 
or the like, another tim e...”54 Further, he shared, with Descartes and Gassindi, the 
view that nature is made up of small particles of matter in motion. This attribution 
of corporeality to nature enabled him to argue that the world, including human 
nature, is material. Given his views on science and the corporeality of nature, 
Hobbes was then able to posit that human actions, specifically, self-preservation, 
could be explained in the same manner as the motions of physical particles. His 
explanation for the actions of Man as being synonymous with the movement of 
particles allowed him to provide a ready explanation for the violence that was 
visible in common human interactions. He suggested that it was the natural and 
unbridled drive of individual self-preservation that led every man to strive to
54 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, Ed. J. C. A. Gaskin, (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1998), p 31.
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establish power over others. This inevitably would lead to a conflict-ridden 
scenario, which reflected the political condition within which Hobbes found 
himself. Understanding human acts in terms of pain and pleasure, Hobbes then 
suggested, would only serve to explicate the supposed mysteries of human action. 
Instead of appealing to any transcendental reasons, Hobbes simply suggested that 
since human acts were guided by the sensations of pain and pleasure, these 
sensations also provided the adequate provocation to either engage or to not 
engage in acts.55 Working from this premise, Hobbes was thus able to postulate 
that “ ...were the nature of human actions as distinctly known as the nature of 
quality in geometrical figures...mankind should enjoy...an immortal peace.”56 
But how was this ‘immortal peace’ to be achieved?
Hobbes exhorted his readers to engage in observing and comparing what 
we observe in others with what we observe in ourselves. This observation would 
lead us, Hobbes thought, to recognize the instrumentality of Reason in governing 
the passions which, if unchecked by the rule of Reason, would lead to a condition 
of conflict. Recalling in this context Hobbes’ conception of Man as a particle 
propelled by nature to seek self-interest (which necessarily includes self- 
preservation), we find that the Hobbesian formulation of sociability was not the 
same as the Grotian construct. For Hobbes, sociability was not a natural condition 
- it was an artificial construct which depended wholly on the observation of how
55 Ibid., pp 33-36 , J .
56 G R ossini “The Criticism o f  Rhetorical Historiography and the Ideal o f  Scientific Method: History, 
Nature and Science in the Political Language o f  Thomas Hobbes” in A. Pagden (Ed.) The Languages o f  
P o litica l Theory in E arly M odern Europe , (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1987), p 113.
contradictory self-interests of individuals held the potentiality to negate their core 
self-preservative tendency, which to Hobbes was the natural condition. This 
condition Hobbes described in dramatic terms: “ ...it is manifest, that during the 
time men live without a common power to keep them all in awe, they are in that 
condition which is called war; and such a war, as is of every man, against every 
m an...” To escape this condition of war, Hobbes posits, what he calls a ‘general 
rule of reason’, by which, “every man ought to endeavor peace, as far as he have 
hope of obtaining it...”58 Hobbes’ corollary to this was that if a man is unable to 
achieve peace, then he should defend himself by all means. To Hobbes, this was 
the fundamental rule of nature. However, he was astute enough to derive a further 
law which stated that “a man be willing to, when others are so too, as far-forth, as 
for peace and defence of himself he shall think it necessary, to lay down this right 
to all things; and be contented with so much liberty against other men, as he 
would allow other men against himself.”59 This may be considered as being an 
originary point for the Hobbesian notion of ‘the contract’. But the culmination of 
the Hobbesian project was in his formulation of the Leviathan, which was that 
“common power to keep...all in awe.” It is not surprising that the Hobbesian 
Leviathan worked from a number of common premises of the seventeenth 
century. The first was the mechanistic conception of the Leviathan described by 
Hobbes in the language of mechanical things. The second was the consideration 
of the Leviathan as a body-politic. And, the third was the underlying role of 
Reason -  both for constructing the civil man and the Leviathan. Thus, as Roger
57 Hobbes, Leviathan, p 84.
58 Ibid., p 87.
Smith points out, Hobbes made “the link between mechanical technology and 
political technology.”60 He also restated the mechanistic and materialistic 
categories for a new science of Man.
The theories of Grotius, Vattel and Hobbes, mentioned here solely as 
illustrative examples, thus served two purposes. First, they reduced war to a 
function that found its meaning within the context of the body-politic and second, 
they reinforced the possibility of war to be understood, if not strictly in 
mechanical terms, at least in rational terms. A gradual, but unmistakable, 
instrumentalization of War was underway.
Classical Military Theory -  An Evolutionary Overview
The reconfiguration of Reality by Reason, which was underwritten by a
conception of a rational Self, afforded the military intellectuals and theorists of
Age of Enlightenment the opportunity to introduce mathematical precision and
certainty to the study of war. Yet, the influences of the neo-classicism of the arts
of the seventeenth century retained some of their potency. Thus, for example,
Folard, identified three themes which characterized the development of military
thinking in the Age of Enlightenment. First, an admiration and attention to
Classical Greek and Roman military practice, which served as ready and 
^—
exemplary military models during the Enlightenment. This was also indicative of 
the emphasis given on the methodology of historical observation and the
60 Smith, The Fontana H istory o f  the Human Sciences, p 108.
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dispelling of any concerns about the notion of historical change. Second, the 
consideration of war as a science and the attempt to identify rational and universal 
principles governing the conduct of war, and third, the recognition of the ‘military 
spirit’ or what might be considered as the psychological foundations of war.61 
Thus, while the tendency to cast the study of war into a set of definitive and
universal principles grew stronger, there was also a tacit recognition that a part of
the conduct of war (that is, the methodology of war) would remain outside the 
efforts of formalization. These variables, which remained outside the efforts of 
formalization, were entrusted to the care of the Commander who would be the 
primary instrument to apply the formalized principles of war to specific situations. 
Yet, despite the recognition of the critical role of the commander in the context of 
war, the attention of the military theorists of the Enlightenment remained focused 
on developing and articulating a very definite system of war.
This is best illustrated in the words of De Saxe:
. . .b e fo r e  en larg ing  too  m u ch  upon the e leva ted  [e le v e e s]  parts o f  w ar, it w ill b e  
n ecessa ry  to treat o f  the lesser , b y  w h ich  I m ean  the p rin cip les [p r in c ip e s ] o f  the 
a r t... A s  in  architecture for exam p le , the k n o w led g e  o f  the fundam ental prin cip les  
is  a p rerequisite to the operation  o f  g en iu s .62
61 In this connection, it is important to note that Folard may be considered as being one o f  the first thinkers 
o f  the Enlightenment to apply Vesprit philosophique  to war. See Starkey, Warfare in the A ge o f
Enlightenm ent, 1700-1789, p 34. >
62 Quoted in Gat, A H istory o f  M ilitary Thought, pp 34-35. See also Michel Foucault, D iscipline and Punish
-  The Birth o f  the Prison, (London, UK: Penguin Books, 1991), p 139.
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It is significant that De Saxe’s work, Reveries on the Art o f War, (published, 
1756), despite being dismissed not only by himself as being ‘irregular and 
inelegant (which may be attributed to that period’s customary literary gesture), 
and by Jomini (whom we shall consider at some length below) as being a failure 
as it was, according to Jomini, not universal and definitive, was a comprehensive 
treatise on war. In it, De Saxe, advanced a number of original ideas but the most 
valuable contribution that he made was to subject “military affairs to reasoned 
criticism and intellectual treatment, and the ensuing military doctrines were 
perceived as forming a definitive system.”63 Even preceding De Saxe’s work, 
however, was the Art o f  War by Principles and Rules (published, 1748), by 
Marquis de Puysegur -  which was commented on and reviewed by De Saxe. In it, 
Puysegur attempted to formulate a “universal theory of war...derived from 
historical observation”.64 Dismissing the claims that historical change influenced 
the conduct of war, Puysegur contended that far from being irrelevant, warfare 
during the times of antiquity was more than relevant for his age and times. 
Decrying the call that warfare of his age was a ‘new’ form of war, he suggested 
that “despite all the changes in armament, the science and art of war remained the 
same at all times. Expressing neo-classical conceptions, Puysegur emphasized 
that the successes of all the great generals throughout history had been the result 
of adherence to the universal rules of war.”65 In addition to the method of 
‘historical observation’ engaged in by Puysegur which, we should note, follows 
from the original Cartesian-Newtonian construction of Reality by the
63 Gat, A H istory o f  M ilitary Thought, pp 34-35
64 Ibid., p 36. -
65 Quoted in Gat, A H istory o f  M ilitary> Thought, p 36.
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methodology of observation informed by Reason, Puysegur also gave expression 
to a more immediate ideal of the Enlightenment —\esprit geometrique (the spirit of
geometry). ucfJy-
1' /
■ >'. pC. i ' - : i, -■ ’ a
Picking up on the celebrated works of Vauban, Puysegur, focused on siege 
warfare. In the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries “sieges were far more 
frequent than pitched battles... They were the focal operations of a campaign...”66 
Vauban’s work was developed in this context and he “perfected the geometrical 
system of fortifications and also developed a highly effective method of attacking 
fortresses. This was a systematic and uniform procedure that achieved an almost 
certain breakthrough with little bloodshed.”67 Puysegur reasoned that if siegecraft 
could be made universal and scientific (more precisely, geometrical), as Vauban 
had done, the same could also be done for field warfare. This would imply 
emphasizing on the application of the disciplines of geometry and geography to 
war. Given that armies operated in space and that geography provided the 
concrete knowledge of that space, geometry was held to provide the precise 
instruments for analyzing and regulating movements of the armies within it.
The performance of the Prussian Army in the Seven Years War and the 
generalship of Frederick the Great was to direct a great deal of attention to its 
organization and doctrines. While the generalship of Frederick the Great was 
attributed to his genius, which could not possibly be studied, the operational art of 
the Prussians was given a very close scrutiny. In the attempt to better understand
66 Henry Guerlac “Vauban: The Impact o f  Science on War” in Peter Paret, Ed. M akers o f  M odern Strategy
-  From  M achiavelli to the N uclear Age, (Princeton, MA: Princeton University Press, 1986), pp 73-74.
67 Gat, A H istory o f  M ilita iy  Thought, p 37.
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the perfection achieved by the Prussians in “mechanically...firing and 
maneuvering of linear formation[s] operating in close order”68, leading French 
Enlightenment thinkers began to reexamine the lessons from antiquity. Maizeroy 
maintained that...
...though the invention of powder and of new amis have occasioned various 
changes in the mechanism of war, we are not to believe that it has had any great 
influence on the fundamental part of that science, nor on the great maneuvers. 
The art of directing the great operations is still the same.69
While this reinforced the essential methodology of Puysegur of looking back into 
antiquity for the universal principles of war, Maizeroy was also instrumental in 
giving a fresh impetus to the concept of ‘tactics’ which, in the context of the 
Enlightenment, was understood as a system of army organization and battle 
formation. It should be noted that the military thinkers of the Enlightenment 
“tended to look upon the conduct of armies on the battlefield predominantly as a 
product of their battle formation and related doctrines, ‘tactics’ also implied the 
conduct of battle itself.”70 Thus, Maizeroy’s focus was on the search for the 
perfect system of tactics. By relying on a close analysis of historical data and 
explicitly referring to the Pythagorean philosophy which held that numbers 
underlay all phenomena, Maizeroy maintained that military formations had to be 
based on the correct choice of the universal numbers that insured flexible internal
69 M alzero l! A System  o f  Tactics, (London, UK: 1781), quoted in Gat, A H istory o fM ilita ry  Thought, p 42.
70 Gat, A H istory o f  M ilitary Thought, p 43.
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division and maneuver71 thus reiterating, albeit in a fresh sense, the universal 
mathesiSj, that underlay, among other things, not only the art of war (as explicated 
in military theory), but also in the phenomenon of war.
In addition, Maizeroy, influenced by his studies of Emperor Maurice and 
his military treatise, Strategicon, deployed the word ‘strategy’ (which he derived 
from the Greek word ‘strategos’) with specific reference to the operational 
conduct of war. It is important to note that while Maizeroy may be credited with 
the first modem usage of the term ‘strategy’, it was von Bulow, who “divided the 
conduct of operations between strategy and tactics in the sense which is known
79today.” Maizeroy held the view that while ‘tactics’ - which was concerned with 
“ ...the respective position of men who make up a troop in relation to that of the 
different troops that make up an army, their movements and their actions, their 
relations with one another”73 -  could be reduced to a firm set of rules and 
principles, ‘strategy’, which was the operational conduct of war, demanded the 
deployment of what he termed ‘the most sublime faculty of mind... reason’ since 
it depended on physical, moral and political circumstances.74 While Maizeroy 
attributed to these circumstances the fluidity of change, which he considered 
wholly within the domain of what he called the Genius, he nevertheless extracted 
and presented some ‘rules of strategy’ which bear a remarkable congruence to
71 Ibid.
72 Ibid., p 44.
73 M aizeroy, quoted in M ichel Foucault, D iscipline and Punish, p 168.
74 M aizeroy, Quoted in Gat, A H istory o f  M ilitary Thought, p 44
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what is today understood as ‘the principles of war’.75 Despite the inklings of the 
role of the Genius in war and the consideration of the operations of war in terms 
of strategy, the focus of the military thinkers of the Enlightenment, however, 
remained fully on tactics and the firm principles which would provide a definitive 
system of conducting war.
A Kehr to the In-Human
The greatest impact during this stage of the development of the sciences of 
the military, however, was felt with the publication of A General Essay on Tactics 
in 1772. Written by a young nobleman, Guibert, the book trumpeted two basic 
themes. The first was the demand of a citizen army and the second was the call 
for a war of maneuver.76 Guibert, breaking away from the precedent set by 
Maizeroy, considered the two thematic elements of his book under the single 
label, tactique. As we have seen, the word ‘tactics’, in a general sense involved 
the maneuvering of troops and at that time included within its ambit both, what 
Maizeroy had identified as ‘strategy’ under the label of ‘grand tactics’, and the 
unit level movements, which we today understand by the term tactics.77 Guibert, 
however, rejected this constriction of meaning of the word ‘tactics’. To him, 
‘tactics’ was virtually all of military science and was composed of two elements. 
The first was the raising and training of armies and the second was the art of
75 Gat, A H istory  o f  M ilitary Thought, p 44-45.
76 R. R. Palmer, “Frederick the Great, Guibert, Bulow: From Dynastic to National War , in Peter Paret, Ed.
M akers o f  M odem  Strategy, p i 07.
77 Ibid.
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generalship. Guibert s ambition, thus, was nothing less than to raise ‘tactics’ as 
the science of all times, all places and of all arms.”78 Tactics was thus to be 
elevated, in Guibert’s scheme of things, to the position of a universal truth. 
Guibert s influence and contribution to the development of military thought is 
based on the two themes that he forcefully argues in his work and we shall 
consider both at some length.
At the outset, it must be noted that Guibert’s call for a ‘citizen army’ was
in its essence, not a radically new one. The lineage of the call that “military
forces...must be composed by the inhabitants of the state that the army is
expected to defend”79 can be found in the writings of Machiavelli. This call also
highlighted the “close connection and interrelationship between political and
military institutions”, which forms the critical thesis of Machiavelli.80 This
Machiavellian observation, whose echo can also be found in the works of
Montesquieu, Rousseau and Mably, among others, was a familiar doctrine of the
Enlightenment. Guibert began his call for a re-evaluation of the military system
prevalent in France by drawing attention, like many others of his age, to the
81“ideal, simple, and vigourous republics of antiquity.” Then, following
78 Quoted in R. R. Palmer, “Frederick the Great, Guibert, Bulow: From Dynastic to National War”, in Peter 
Paret, Ed. M akers o f  M odern S trategy , p i 07
79 Felix Gilbert, “Machiavelli: The Renaissance Art o f  War” in Peter Paret, Ed. M akers o f  Modern Strategy, 
p 26. Similar calls were made by others during this time. See, for example, Joseph Servan s The Citizen  
S old ier  (1780) and even M ontesquieu’s Reflections on the Causes o f  the Grandeur and D ecline o f  the 
R om ans (1734).
80 See N icco lo  M achiavelli, The Prince, Tran. W illiam J. Connell, (N ew  York: St. Martin’s Press, 2005). 
See also his A rt o f  War, Trans. Christopher Lynch, (Chicago: Univ. O f Chicago Press, 2005)
81 Gat, A H istory o f  M ilitary Thought, p 47.
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Montesquieu s articulation of the connection and inter-relation between all 
aspects of the socio-political fabric, Guibert suggested that...
Politics is naturally divided into two parts, interior and exterior politics. The first 
is the basis of the second. All of which belongs to the happiness and the strength 
of a people springs from their sources, laws, manners, customs, prejudice, 
national spirit, justice, police, population, agriculture, trade, revenues of the 
nation, expenses of the government, duties [and] application of their produce.82
The result of this analysis of politics led Guibert to suggest that “a comprehensive 
scientific study of the politico-military sphere must...analyze all these factors in 
depth.” This he proceeded to do by looking back into history. Guibert’s 
investigations revealed to him that the great captains of antiquity left behind no 
‘universal principles’ of war, a situation which he found disturbing for it 
highlighted, what he called, the ‘fundamental error’ in the science of war. This led 
him to observe that...
Almost all sciences have certain or fixed elements, which succeeding ages have 
only extended and developed, but the tactics, till now wavering and uncertain, 
confined to time, anns, customs, all the physical and moral qualities of a people, 
have of course been obliged to vary without end and for a space of a century to 
leave behind nothing else than principles disavowed and unpracticed, which have 
ever been cancelled and destroyed by the following age.84
Guibert, A G eneral E ssay on Tactics, p xxi. Quoted in Gat, A H istory o f  M ilitary Thought, p 48.
Gat, A H istory o fM ilita ry  Thought, p 48. , .r.
Guibert, A G eneral E ssay on Tactics, pp xlvi-xlviii. Quoted in Gat, A H istory o f  M ilitary Thought, p 49.
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To avoid this situation from recurring and in keeping with the dominating view of 
a universal condition inspired by the scientific ideals, Guibert, once and for all, 
wanted to base military science on the methods of Newton, Leibnitz and 
D Alembert. Further he insisted that an incorrect methodology was responsible 
for the chaotic state of affairs that he claimed to have discerned in the field of 
military science. His observations, in this context, are worth noting:
Let us suppose that the first mathematical truths are taught to a people inhabiting 
the two extremes of the globe...they must evidently in time arrive at the same 
result of principles. But has there been in the tactics any clear cut truth 
demonstrated? Are the fundamental principles of this science established? Has 
one age ever agreed on this point with its preceding one? But why was there no 
such work, which could have laid a firm foundation for its principles? It is for 
this reason that the military have for a long time been ignorant how to analyze 
the subject.. .and unacquainted with the method of explaining and arranging their 
ideas.86
It was on this premise that Guibert offered his A General Essay on Tactics which 
would lay down the definitive principles that guided war and its conduct, which 
he deemed would have universal applicability. Thus, for Guibert, “tactics...would 
constitute a science at every period of time, in every place, and every species of 
arm s...”87 Based on this, Guibert offered his conception of a '‘war of maneuver’. 
In this context, however, while being a proponent of citizen-armies, Guibert did 
not favour mass armies. “Huge armies he regarded as signs of the ineptitude of
85 Gat, A H istory o f  M ilitary Thought, p 49.
86 Guibert A  General Essay on Tactics, pp 2-3. Quoted in Gat, A H istory o f  M ilitary Thought, p 49.
87 Guibert! A General Essay on Tactics, p 99. Quoted in Gat, A H istory o f  M ilitary Thought, p 50.
98
men in authority.”88 Decrying the importance of fortifications that had been so 
valued by Vauban, and later by Maizeroy, Guibert held the view that 
forts...should be few, very strong, and entirely auxiliary to strategic
i?89 Displaying an orientation to ‘the offensive’, Guibert then opined 
that a highly mobile army, “that travels light, living on the country, will gain new 
mobility, range of action, and power of surprise.”90 By positing this Guibert was 
presenting a trenchant criticism of the French military system in vogue in his 
time, which favored a large civilian baggage train which only served to encumber 
the operational status of the fighting force.
Guibert further sharpened his conception of a ‘war of maneuver’ by 
addressing the developments in the organizational system of the army, especially 
the divisional system, seriously. Breaking from the system devised by Frederick 
the Great, who usually deployed his forces by dividing his army and marching 
them in a way that would enable the parts to come together in a battle line on 
achieving contact with the enemy, Guibert, strove to sever the link between 
marching orders and the final battle order.91 This enabled him to consider whole 
divisions as columns, which could cover a vast theater of operations and would be 
instrumental in forcing the enemy to turn to a position of disadvantage relative to 
the attacker. In Guibert’s view, such an arrangement would allow a battlefield
88 R. R. Palmer, “Frederick the Great, Guibert, Bulow: From Dynastic to National War”, in Peter Paret, Ed.
M akers o f  M odern S trategy, p 109.
89 E ssai gen era l de tactique  (1772) in Oeuvre militaries du comte de Guibert, 5 vols. (Paris, 1803), 2 .208-
20. Quoted in R. R. Palmer, “Frederick the Great, Guibert, Bulow: From Dynastic to National War”, in
Peter Paret, Ed. M akers o f  M odern Strategy, p 110.
90 R. R. Palmer, “Frederick the Great, Guibert, Bulow: From Dynastic to National War”, in Peter Paret, Ed.
M akers o f  M odern S trategy, p 109.
9IIb id .,p  110
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commander to go ahead of his troops and to reconnoiter the lay of the land, which 
would consequently enable him to devise his particular battle-tactics, including 
the positioning of his independently marching divisions, based on situational
92specifics. The result, according to Guibert, would be the realization of a more 
flexible condition on the battlefield primarily due to the essential pliability of the 
battle-formations at the hands of an astute commander. While Guibert overtly 
credits Frederick with having used such a system, especially at the Battle of 
Hohenfriedberg (1745), it is evident that this system found its closest of 
expressions in some of the operations conducted by Napoleon.93 In sum, 
therefore, the system propounded by Guibert was a distinct change from the 
positional warfare system (based on the system of fortification) to a more flexible 
system of maneuvering which, more often than not, involved forcing the position
r"
of an enemy. This tactique was certainly not tactical in the sense that we 
understand the word today. It was, as Clausewitz would put it some years later, an 
expression of the Absolute logic of War. This state of permanent-offense, which 
has since been seen in many avatars, such as flexible-offence/ defence, 
proportionate response, etc. was Guibert’s Absolute War -  the ideal referent to 
being martial.
Guibert’s qualification of this ideal Absolute War was expressed by him in 
the following terms: “[PJeoples,” Guibert asserted, “are indifferent to the fortunes 
of war, because prisoners are no longer slaughtered in cold blood, and the
92
93 For a detailed account o f  N apoleon’s operational and strategic art o f  war see David Chandler, The
C am paigns o f  N apoleon, (N ew  York: Scribner, 1973)
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civilians of a conquered province suffer no inconvenience except to pay tribute 
often no heavier than their old taxes.”94 This led him to conclude that the peoples 
of Europe were all ‘soft’ and that governments which, according to Guibert, were 
all despotic machineries were weak in character. Guibert held little prospect for a 
change in this scenario. Thus, instead of striving to achieve his ideal, which was a 
vision wherein he supposed that...
a people should arise in Europe vigorous in spirit, in government, in the means at 
its disposal, a people who with hardy qualities should combine a national army 
and a settled plan of aggrandizement...[would be able to]...subjugate its 
neighbours and overwhelm...weak constitutions like the north wind bends 
reeds...”95
...he settled on a more moderate, but in many ways also more chilling, vision 
which he recommended to France. “What we must do”, Guibert said, “since we 
cannot have citizen troops and perfect troops, is to have...troops at least 
disciplined and trained.”96 This tied in directly with Guibert’s conception of a 
‘war of manuever’. For Guibert’s system of maneuver to be successful, he held 
the view that “[Discipline must be made national. The state...will have a simple 
reliable, easily controllable administration. It will resemble those huge machines,
97which by quite uncomplicated means produce great effects. . .” (my emphasis) 
Thus, Guibert’s vision of a disciplined army was based on a system of national
94 R. R. Palmer, “Frederick the Great, Guibert, Bulow: From Dynastic to National War”, in Peter Paret, Ed.
M akers o f  M o d em  Strategy, p 107.
95 Ibid.
96 Ibid., p 108
97 Guibert, A G eneral E ssay on Tactics, p xxiii-xxiv. Quoted in M ichel Foucault, D iscipline and Punish, p
169.
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discipline where there is not a single moment o f  life from which one cannot 
extract forces, providing one knows how to differentiate it and combine it with 
others.”98 (my emphasis)
But to attribute this vision solely to Guibert would be simplistic. As
Foucault demonstrates, “[F]rom the seventeenth century, to the introduction, at
the beginning of the nineteenth century, of the Lancaster method, the complex
clockwork of the mutual improvement school was built up cog by cog.”99 Against
this backdrop, Foucault shows us how “discipline [was] no longer simply an art of
distributing bodies...but of composing forces in order to obtain an efficient
machine.”100 Consequent to this, as Foucault highlights, the concept of an intrinsic
characteristic defining the individual human body undergoes a considerable shift.
In the military context, where the individual body was once considered as the
repository of ‘bravery and strength’, under the system of ‘divisions’ proposed by
Guibert, it (the individual) was, and continues to be, transformed into a site of
regularity and order, thus allowing for its easy manipulation101 in terms of, say, a
102chronological serialization -  time-tabling. This meant that the constituent 
elements of the division could be organized in terms of a linear conception of 
time, which would enable each part of the divisional machinery to function like 
clockwork to produce -  in a combinatorial alliance with the other parts of the
98 Foucault, D iscipline and Punish, p 165.
99 Ibid. For a fuller description o f  the Lancaster-Bell method and for a source o f  case studies in support o f  
Foucault’s assertion, see John S Hassard, “Researching Foucault's Research: Organization and Control in 
Joseph Lancaster's Monitorial Schools”, in O rganization, Vol. 9, No. 4, 615-639 (2002)
100 Foucault, D iscip line and Punish, p 164.
101 Ibid.
102 Note: It was Napoleon who once sa id ... ’space we can regain; Time we never recover’.
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division — an optimum result.103 This would enable the commander on the 
battlefield to achieve an effective system of command. Thus, the commander 
would find it necessary to only issue the briefest of commands and would be able 
to realize the desired output at a desired time at the most propitious moment. One 
can already see the beginnings of the Deleuzian war-machine in this.
Foucault suggests that the necessity of the constituent elements of this 
military machine to ‘understand’ commands was overridden by the need to simply 
recognize signals, which in turn would trigger a prearranged reaction. Casting a 
perspectival eye on these developments, Foucault suggests that such a system of 
discipline enabled the emergence of four techniques -  the drawing up of tables, 
prescription of movements, imposition of exercises and the arrangement of 
tactics.104 It is important to note that the notion of tactics that Foucault alludes to 
is the system of tactics that Guibert propounded, which encompasses strategy, 
operations, tactics (including unit level tactics), in other words, all what we today 
understand as functionally distinct entities. The implications of this, if we recall 
Guibert’s introductory analysis of the socio-economic fabric and his notion of 
‘national discipline’, are critical. Foucault puts it well, when he states, “[I]n 
the...eighteenth century states, the army guaranteed civil peace no doubt because 
it was a real force...but also because it was a technique and a body of knowledge
103 Foucault, D iscip lin e and Punish, p 165.
104 Ibid., p 167.
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that could project [its] schema over the social body.”105 Read in this way, 
.Guibertj^ tactique reveals to us much more than a proto theory of maneuver.
Guibert sought to supplant the theories of positional warfare — siege 
warfare, the system of fortifications - as propounded by Vauban and later by 
Puysegur and Maizeroy and others, but he remained fully committed to the core 
principles that underlined the Enlightenment period. Reason, masquerading as 
efficiency, mobility, calculation, remained unquestioned. Thus, the tendency to 
see war as being subject to universal rules and principles that were globally 
applicable and, as being a particular mode of relationality between nation-states - 
guided by a set of rules that drew their inspiration from the works of, among 
others, Grotius, Vattel, and Hobbes -  is understandable. But what Guibert’s A 
General Essay on Tactics also demonstrated was how, with the aim to ‘project its 
(that is to say, Reason’s) schema’, the martial mobilization of Reason began to 
gradually take place. This, as Foucault points out, was very much evident in 
Guibert’s notion of a ‘national discipline’. As we have seen, for Guibert, ‘national 
discipline’ was the necessary pre-requisite that would allow for the machinery of 
war to take advantage of ‘mobility, range of action, and power of surprise’. The 
impact of this, as we will see in the context of the present study (and as Foucault 
has shown elsewhere), has left a lasting impression on military theory. In this 
sense, Guibert’s contribution to the evolution and development of the military was 
a landmark effort and, to say the least, ambitious.
105 Ibid., p 168.
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The influence of Guibert’s work, specifically in the context of the conduct 
of war, was visible particularly in the Napoleonic campaigns. As Napoleon was to 
so vividly demonstrate, mobility, rapidity, and boldness in the conduct of 
operations; the insistence on reducing the encumbering baggage-train that bogged 
down the mobility of armies; the solving of logistical problems by resorting to a 
heavy reliance on the countryside; flexible maneuvering in open columns before 
deploying into the battle line, and the movement of divisions in independent 
formations were all indications of the influence that Guibert’s theories had on the 
conduct of war. Indeed, as Gat points out, “Guibert’s ideas were practically the 
basis of the official Ordinance of 1791 with which the armies of the Revolution 
went to war.”106 But, the Napoleonic campaigns, while apparently vindicating the 
theoretical postulates of Guibert, also brought to light fresh experiences and 
challenges. These experiences did not escape the military theorists of the times. 
They continued to study the problems of war and its conduct meticulously. 
Simultaneously, the ideals that had informed the French Enlightenment had by 
now permeated through the European continent. In Germany, this movement was 
known as the Aufklarung.
Mind(ing) the Gap: Between Guibert and Jomini
The space between Guibert’s theories on war and Jomini’s works is 
marked by the emergence of a lesser (in terms of profile, but little else) set of 
military thinkers who working from within, what Gat calls, a “provincial
106 Gat, A H istory o f  M ilitary Thought, p 54.
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mindset , developed the ideas propounded by the military theorists of an 
“Enlightened” France, specifically the works of Guibert. This should not, 
however, reinforce the view that the output of the military thinkers of the German 
Aufklarung was merely a clone of the French theoretical model. There were subtle 
but significant differences. Thus, while the primary thrust of the French model 
was the development of a ‘science’ of the military, which manifested itself as the 
‘quest for a definitive formula’ for all matters pertaining to war and the military, 
the German Aufklarung movement, at least initially, did not follow the scientific 
model as stringently as did the French. This is not to say that the German 
Aufklarung thinkers abandoned the scientific ideal, contrarily, their primary 
interest was in ‘the broadening of military knowledge’ and its dissemination,
1 07especially in the circles of the officer corps.
“The emphasis on education -  typical of the Enlightenment belief in the
ability to transform man and society and in the value of knowledge -  was
108particularly popular during the German Aufklarung.” This led writers like 
Ferdinand Friedrich von Nicolai to react against the strict scientific- 
methodological program of the French Enlightenment. Thus, von Nicolai 
suggested that a simple study of the principles that guided the military - as posited 
by the likes of Guibert - was characteristic of the Enlightenment and that such 
‘simplistic’ studies betrayed a significant (to him) deficiency. As a counter to this 
he suggested that the ‘man’ within the officer (and here it is important to note the
107 Ibid., pp 56-58.
108 Ibid., p 63.
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lestriction of this suggestion by von Nicolai to only the officer corps) needed to 
be educated. To do this, he suggested, a broad curriculum was necessary. Basic 
education, which would include religion, art, languages and the classics would be 
followed by a course of advanced studies that exposed the students to pure and 
applied science, only after the conclusion of which were the students to be 
introduced to the specifics of a purely military education, including the study of 
equipment, organization, armaments, military architecture and tactics. This over­
arching ‘system’ of education was further refined by Friedrich Wilhelm von 
Zanthier, who in his An Attempt to Study the Art o f War (published, 1775), echoed 
the tune sung by Guibert. He stated that “if war is to be studied as a science rather 
than a craft, theory above all must bring order into this labyrinth by clearly 
defining its various branches.”110
Von Nicolai’s and von Zanthier’s works are just two examples of a set of 
numerous studies published during this time, all of which concentrated on 
reaffirming the need to systematize the study of war. Thus, it will be noted that 
while maintaining the core links with the essentials of the French Enlightenment, 
the German Aufklarung movement, in the military context, also began to 
propound the need to develop the institutional frameworks within which a 
structured dissemination of the science of war could be conducted. The 
understanding of the primacy of education, in particularly specific ways, 
characterized by the careful delineation of the various disciplines that made up the
109 Ibid, pp 63-64
1,0 Ibid, p 65.
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science of war began to assume importance. Here again was a reaffirmation of yet 
another of the Cartesian ideals of understanding reality within the context of 
structured disciplines of study. In this connection, it is interesting to revisit von 
Nicolai’s primary thesis.
As mentioned earlier, von Nicolai had suggested that it was the ‘man’ 
within the officer that needed to be educated. This, when coupled with the vision 
of ‘national discipline’ envisioned by Guibert, made for a potent mixture, which 
would, more than anything else, be instrumental in achieving the regimentation 
not only of the basic units of an army, but would also provide the elementary tools 
with which, what Foucault calls, the techniques of discipline would be formulated 
that would eventually elaborate the procedures by which individual and collective 
bodies could and would be coerced.111 It is within this context that we find a 
conception of war that owed, in no small part, its origins to the Cartesian model of 
the Self was beginning to take a definite shape.112
The campaigns of Revolutionary France with all its energies and 
resources, coupled with the dramatic Napoleonic campaigns, gave rise to a 
situation where in a virtual ‘revolution’ in military thinking would find fertile 
ground. The1 rapidity that characterized the early campaigns of Napoleon was
111 Foucault, D iscipline and Punish, p 169.
112 Note: When w e say that a ‘conception o f  war’, which, in part, owed its origins to the Cartesian construct 
o f  the S e lf  began to take a definite shape, we do not imply that this conception o f  war, which was becoming 
increasingly understood in functional terms did not share its lineage with conceptions o f  war in the days o f  
antiquity. Thus, for example, the Roman Imperial project, with its attendant Justinian Code o f  Laws could  
be viably read as being a sophisticated manifestation o f  a similar functional conception o f  war. W e could 
take this lineage even further back by invoking the city-state system o f  the Greeks and the V edic kingdoms 
o f  the Indian sub-continent.
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based not only on the system of maneuver as presented by Guibert, but also on a 
concept that would find increasing resonance in the future -  line of operations. 
Indeed, in 1781, Henry Humphrey Evans Lloyd had expounded on this term and 
its wider implications. Simply put, a Tine of operation’ is that Tine’ which links a 
fielded army to its supply camps or depots.113 This allowed for a ‘new’ twist to be 
given to the original concept of a ‘war of maneuver’ as propounded by Guibert. 
While Guibert sought to introduce the flexibility of military operations by 
reducing the primarily civilian baggage-train that accompanied the armies of his 
time into battle by recommending the use of the countryside by the army, in 
Lloyd’s presentation, the growing size of the European armies preempted the 
attempt of an army to feed itself by resorting to pillaging the countryside. He held 
the view, and correctly so, that modem armies needed their own supply chains 
and that these held the key to the operational flexibility of the army.114 The line 
that connected these supply chains to the field army, thus, was of critical 
importance in the context of operational planning. Lloyd’s military ideas were not 
incorrect save for the fact, as pointed out by Colonel (later General) Templehoff, 
that they were incorrectly applied in Lloyd’s discussion of the campaigns of 
Frederick the Great and, as was commented on by Napoleon himself, were too 
rigidly applied.115 Lloyd (and Templehoff) while being essentially correct about 
the central importance of the Tine of operations’ had, however, failed to ‘read’, or 
at least to account for, the emerging socio-economic situation within which the 
battles of Revolutionary France and Napoleon had taken place. The fall of the
113 Gat, A  History o f  Military Thought, p 77
1.4 Ibid.
1.5 Ibid. p 79
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ancien regime also saw the rise of mass armies. These armies were different in 
nature from the formations of, say, Frederick the Great, in the sense that they 
were (at least in the initial stages) filled in by the mass conscripts who were 
motivated by a set of ‘new’ moral forces — forces which were imbued, in very 
general terms, by the ideals of the French Enlightenment and these armies lived at 
the expense of their enemies -  both financially and in terms of logistics.116
The same fate befell von Bulow, who, in his The Campaign o f 1800, 
claimed to be the ‘founder of military science’.117 Noting the new tactics that 
guided the Revolutionary Armies of France, von Bulow, however, chose to 
emphasize what he called the ‘principle of the base’ and the ‘angle of 90 degrees’. 
Von Bulow’s insistence on these two precepts led him to state that...
The agency of military energies, like other effects of nature, becomes weaker.. .in 
an inverse ratio of the square of the distance; that is to say, in this particular, of 
the length of the line of operations. Why should not this law, which governs all 
natural effects, be applicable to war, which now consists in little more than the 
impulsion and repulsion of physical mass?118
The appeal to Newtonian physics, in this, will not be missed. Von Bulow, thus, 
offered a science of strategy that was geometrical, and by pushing the logic of his 
argument to the limit, he also offered a science of politics, which could be 
mathematically calculated. Von Bulow’s theoretical efforts, however, failed in the
116 Ibid. p 87
117 Ibid, p 86
118 Adam von Bulow, The Spirit o f  the Modern System o f  War, (London, 1806), pp 198-99. Quoted in Gat,
A History) o f  M ilitary Thought, p 85
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same way as had the efforts of Lloyd and Tempelhoff. The evidence and 
experience of war, however, did not seem to match his theoretical postulates. The 
experience of Napoleon’s Italian Campaign of 1796-97 did much to disprove von 
Bulow s theory of the ‘angle of 90 degrees’ and Napoleon’s targeting of the mass 
of his enemy’s armies as the object of operations, which involved the focusing of 
massive and rapid concentration of his own forces against them, forsaking any 
and all other considerations, also served to undermine the narrow logic of the Tine 
of operations’.
From August 1793 onwards, the levee en masse represented a radical 
mobilization of the French masses, though this was a project that was already 
underway for a while before then. It was, in part, a sub-set of the endemic violent 
chaos that followed the French Revolution and a handy tool for the vanguards of 
the Revolution to repel the threats that the counter-Revolutionary Allied advances 
posed to the nascent Republic. While the levee en masse may not have been as 
universal as is often claimed, it was, nevertheless, widespread and represented a 
massive reorganization of French society. Among other things, the levee en masse 
was the first sign of an emerging civic-militarism that would afflict society. Thus, 
the Act of Conscription read:
From this moment on until the enemy has been chased away from the territory of 
the Republic, all French are in permanent requisition for the service of the 
armies.. .Young men will go to battle, married men will forge arms and transport 
supplies; women will make tents, uniforms, and serve in hospitals; children will 
pick rags; old men will have themselves carried to public squares to inspire the
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courage of the warriors, and to preach hatred of the kings and the unity of the 
Republic.119
This was a veritable call for a nation to arms and no aspect of society was exempt 
from the duties that the State demanded. If, in this context, we recollect the call 
for ‘national discipline’ issued by Guibert in conjunction with the calls made in 
the wake of the German Aufklarung movement to ‘educate the man within the 
soldier’, we can see how the institutionalization of war by the State proceeded. As 
this process took shape, a core of seasoned military professionals -  Carnot, 
Berthier and Napoleon (among others) -  began to lead this generally disorganized 
mass army to startling victories. The question that bedeviled observers of these 
frenetic but victorious operations engaged in by this newly constituted army was 
this -  how did they do it?
Jomini’s Science and Art o f War
Baron Antoine Henri de Jomini represents the last of a long line of 
illustrious Enlightenment military thinkers to present a theory of war based on 
‘immutable’ principles and is arguably one of the most influential theorists, 
though often underrated, to claim the mantle of being the ‘founder of modem 
strategy.’120 Jomini’s answer to those bedeviled by the rapid and victorious
119 John A. Lynn, The Bayonets o f  the Republic: M otivation and Tactics in the A rm y o f  R evolutionary  
France, 1791-94, (Boulder, CO: 1996), p 56.
120 John Shy, “Jomini”, in M akers o f  M odern Strategy, Ed. Peter Paret, p 143.
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campaigns of Napoleon and his cohorts was simple and elegant and it endeared 
him for the next three decades to the military professionals of the time. He said:
...strategy is the key to warfare; that all strategy is controlled by invariable 
scientific principles; and that these principles prescribe offensive action to mass 
forces against weaker enemy forces at some decisive point if strategy is to lead to 
victory...121
He then went on to reiterate this by saying...
The fundamental principles upon which rest all good combinations of war have 
always existed...these principles are unchangeable; they are independent of the 
nature of the arms employed, of times and places... Genius has a great deal to do 
with success, since it presides over the application of recognized rules, and 
seizes, as it were, all the subtle shades of which their application is susceptible. 
But in any case, the man of genius does not act contrary to these rules.122
From this it will be evident that Jomini was faithfully following the trajectory set 
out by his illustrious predecessors. However, Jomini was singular in the fact that 
while he worked to reduce ‘strategy’ to universal principles, he also made the 
determination that ‘tactics’ were difficult, indeed impossible, to regulate.123 It will 
be noted that while Jomini was following the original bifurcation between 
‘strategy’ and ‘tactics’ effected by von Bulow, he remained more cognizant of the
121 Antoine-Henri Jomini, Traite des grandes operations militaries, contenant I ’histoire des cam pagnes de 
F rederic  II, com parees a celles de I ’empereur Napoleon; avec un recueil des principes generaux de ‘lart de 
la guerre, 2nd Edition, 4 Vols., (1811) 2:312n. Quoted in John Shy, “Jomini”, in M akers o f  M odern  
Strategy, Ed. Peter Paret, p 146.
122 Antoine-Henri Jomini, Treatise on G rand M ilitary Operations, (New York, 1865), p 445 and pp 253-54. 
Quoted in Gat, A H istory o f  M ilitary Thought, p 114.
123 Gat, A H isto iy  o f  M ilitary Thought, p 115.
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effects of moral forces’ and of revolutionary technology on the battlefield.124 
Thus, Jomini tempered von Bulow’s stringent ‘scientific’ orientation by following 
closely the Napoleonic method of conducting war. Jomini also revised von 
Bulow s formulation of the ‘line of operations’. While von Bulow, as we have 
seen, tied the idea of the ‘line of operations’ to ‘supply’, Jomini, however, 
considered them in light of ‘communications’. This, in itself, was a radical move 
in that it altered the view of the commander to recognizing his enemy as an active 
participant in battle. The reflexivity of an army thus depended not only on 
securing its own ‘line of operations’, but also in interdicting that of the enemy’s. 
This was a new twist to the ‘art of maneuver’. The object of maneuvering was not 
merely to exploit the positional weakness of the enemy, but to bring him to battle 
and, following the Napoleonic practice, to destroy the fighting capability of the 
enemy. While this may convey a sense of the criticality of the ‘decisive battle’, a 
feature that finds a powerful statement in Clausewitz’s On War, with Jomini, it 
assumed a position co-equal to that of maneuvering for Jomini maintained that 
maneuvering could equally dislocate an enemy to the extent so as to force a 
decision on him.125
The criticality of maneuvering ', for Jomini was highlighted by the 
campaigns of Napoleon, which he followed avidly. He recognized that not only 
was a ‘battle’ necessary, it was also necessary to pursue a withdrawing enemy.
124 Ibid. See also Antoine Henri Jomini, The Art o f  War, Intro, by Charles M essenger, (London, UK: 
Greenhill Books, 1992), pp 60-71
125 Ibid p 118 See also John A. Lynn, B attle -  A H istory o f  Com bat and Culture from  A ncient G reece to 
M o d em  A m erica, (Cambridge, MA: W estview Press, 2003), p 181. Lynn marks the ambivalence that 
Jomini displayed about the importance o f  ‘the decisive battle’ and o f  the ‘art o f  m aneuver’.
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Thus, to be able to threaten the ‘lines of operations’ of the enemy, he suggested 
the envelopment’ which was to be directed at the extremities of the enemy.126 
This would, Jomini theorized, not only threaten the rear of the enemy, but also 
create possibilities that would assist in enabling the cutting off of his line of 
retreat. It was a stratagem that was used very often by Napoleon.127 Jomini also 
considered, aside from the ‘envelopment’, the assumption of a central position -  
under some circumstances -  to be equally important. Jomini suggested that if the 
movement of envelopment was not feasible due to either geographic conditions or 
the relative position of the enemy’s army, the attempt should be made to frontally 
assault the enemy’s position and to create a breach between his forces. This 
would, Jomini conjectured, allow an attacker a great deal of flexibility in 
defeating the enemy by maximizing the ‘interior lines of operations’.
One can see the heavy influence of Napoleon in much of Jomini’s 
formulations. Napoleon’s defeat of General Mack at Ulm in 1805 and the 
destruction of the Prussian army at Jena-Auerstadt in 1806 were classic examples 
of Jomini’s theories being put into practice. Napoleon’s swift maneuver towards 
his enemy’s rear and line of communications were a vindication of the Jominian 
‘art’ of war. But in 1815, Napoleon took the option of frontally assaulting the 
opposing Allies. He was partially successful when he broke through the center of 
the Allied line thus separating the British and Prussian armies, and defeated the 
Prussian Army at Ligny. However, poor co-ordination between sections of
126 Jomini, The A rt o f  War, pp 186-208
'27 jgjyjgg M arshall-Comwall, Napoleon as M ilita iy  C om m andei, (London. Penguin Books, 2002), p 25
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Napoleon s armies enabled the Allied armies to recover from their initial surprise 
and reunite, at which point, Napoleon lost the initiative and was decisively 
defeated at Waterloo. This was the first sign that the reduction of warfare to 
‘principles’, as propounded by Jomini, was suspect.
Like most of the Enlightenment military theorists before him, Jomini had 
made tacit assumptions about a number of things.
1. First, he had assumed that war and its conduct that could be scientifically 
explained. This betrayed his beholden-ness to the classic notion of a 
universal mathesis around which much of the philosophy of the 
Enlightenment clustered. Jomini’s understanding of ‘war’ was limited to 
the political regimes that he was familiar with. This led him to describe the 
conditions within which wars could be engaged in. Thus, he took the pains
to highlight wars as being defensive, offensive, national, for recovering
1 98rights, for expediency, of intervention, of opinion, and religious. “ Within 
all this, it will be noted, Jomini assumed the primacy of Reason. Indeed, it 
could be ventured that for Jomini, the State was the embodiment of 
Reason.
2. Second, it was obvious that though he did lay a great deal of emphasis on 
interdicting lines of communication and on the merits of envelopment, he 
had not ascribed any degree of ‘real’ autonomy to the enemy. Indeed, his
128 Jomini, The A rt o f  War, ppl6-35.
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entire theorization was premised on the assumption that the opposing 
combatants in war would operate along very similar lines.129 This, as Shy 
points out, was self-evident in Jomini’s ...
...preoccupation with “strategy” -  a set of prescriptive techniques for 
military analysis and planning that has continued to dominate thinking on 
the subject, and he did it by...approach[ing]...the problem of war, 
abstracting it from its political and social context, emphasizing decision­
making rules and operational result, turning war into a huge game of 
j:hess.130
Of course, it should be noted that in this he was not alone -  all his 
predecessors had made the similar assumption and all that followed him 
would continue to do so.
3. Third, Jomini was fully aware of the ‘demands’ of science, in whose 
province he saw the ‘art’ of war unfolding. Thus, he was careful to note 
when he introduced new nomenclatures that, “...in the development of a 
science, it is wrong for the same word to designate two very different 
things...”131 While the intent of Jomini is admirable, it is also indicative of
129 It should be borne in mind that Jomini did consider the case o f  the effects o f  ‘guerrilla operations’ on an 
army o f  regular formations. (See John Shy’s otherwise rather disparaging commentary on Jom ini’s ‘art o f  
war’ in M akers o f  M odern Strategy, p 170). Jomini, o f  course, understood such operations in the context o f  
‘civil, religious, or national war, or wars o f  opinion, which were aim ed struggles but without regular 
armies. Indeed, Jomini, h im self had experienced two such campaigns in Spain and in Russia.To combat 
such a situation, Jomini had suggested that the regular army needed to ‘occupy’ the enemy territory -  a 
project that Napoleon tried and failed as is evidenced by his experiences in the Spanish Peninsula. It also 
interesting to note the significant parallels between this Jominian suggestion and the operations being 
engaged in by the A llied Forces in Iraq post the overthrow o f  the regime o f  Saddam Hussein in 2003.
130 John Shy, “Jomini”, in Makers o f  Modem Strategy, Ed. Peter Paret, (Princeton, MA: Princeton Univ. 
Press, 1986), p 143
131 Jomini, The A rt o f  War, p 180 See Footnote.
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the extent to which Jomini was committed to the theorization of war as a 
science, and of his faithful adherence to the principles of the scientific 
method.
4. Fourth, while not as insistent as Guibert on a ‘national discipline’, Jomini, 
nevertheless found himself compelled to reiterate the critical importance 
of military institutions, thus carrying on the call for a ‘rational’ 
educational system which would serve to strengthen the military and thus, 
the State. He held the view that a military institution had to provide for not 
only a good recruiting system, but also a strict (but not humiliating) 
discipline, and an efficient system of organization and instruction.132 He 
underlined the importance of military institutions and of the military by 
stating that every government should ‘make the army the object of 
constant care’. But Jomini also went further and in this he anticipated 
Clausewitz. He held the view that...
...civilized governments ought always to be ready to carry on a war in a short 
time, - that they should never be found unprepared. And the wisdom of their 
institutions may do much in this work of preparation as foresight in their 
administration and the perfection of their system of military policy.134
The last of the above-listed Jominian assumptions needs a brief explanation. The 





an inherently political activity, which ‘civilized governments ought to always be 
ready to carry on in a short time’. To be sure, Jomini explicitly states that he was 
far from advising that states should always have the hand upon the sword and 
always be established on a warfooting.. ,”135 But then, he equally notes that “[I]t is 
particularly necessary to watch over the preservation of armies in the interval o f a 
long peace..."™  (my emphasis) Jomini then, it may be said, was working on the 
assumption that the condition of existence of the State was a condition of war and 
that ‘peace’ was always a ‘long interval’, but never the original condition of 
existence. What is of particular interest is the faint echo that is discemable in 
these words of Jomini - words that achieve a much greater visibility in Foucault’s 
Society Must be Defended, wherein Foucault explicitly overturned the classic 
Clausewitzian dictum of ‘war being an extension of politics by other means’. 
Thus, despite the often ‘bad press’ that accompanies the work of Jomini in the 
literature, it cannot be denied that he marked himself as being cognizant of not 
simply the fact that war had a politico-military dimension - he also demonstrates 
his acute intuition of a dimension of war that was far in excess the political.
A Preliminary Assessment
This admittedly brief overview of the emergence and evolution of military 
theory during the Age of Enlightenment allows us to draw some conclusions 
about the condition of war and the conceptions that guided the theorizations that
135 Ibid.
136 Ibid., p 47
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accompanied it.L7 What demands our critical attention within the context of this 
period of history is this - How were military forces designed and deployed? How 
was the battlefield conceptualized? To what end were these deployments made? 
And ultimately, what was the understanding of war that underpinned the 
theoretical and practical advances made in the context of warfare during these 
periods?
As we have seen, from de Saxe to Jomini there was marked consistency in 
how and why military forces were designed and deployed. Collectively, they 
represent a sharp break from the thinking about war and its conduct in the 
Medieval Age. The most significant signature of this break was, of course, the 
emergence of Reason as a foundational ‘organizing principle’ which, among other 
things, ultimately led to the progressive fracturing of the direct links between God 
and Man. This ‘turn’ to reason, particularly in the context of the study and 
practice of war, was no doubt enabled by the increasing popular view held by 
some of the most distinguished military theorists of the time that the ecology 
within which existence is possible -  where ‘existence’ understood, at the very 
least, as bare life - was marked by disorder and chaos, and thus a degree of 
systematization was necessary. This was deemed achievable by deploying 
Reason. Thus, the evolution of military theory was marked by a definite bias
137 The brevity o f  this overview, given the focus o f  this study, has resulted in a rather skewed account o f  
Enlightenment philosophies, particularly that o f  the rationalist school. Thus, for example, the contribution 
o f  Leibnitz (as an exponent o f  the Rationalist School) is glaringly m issing from this account. Similarly, as 
the reader w ill no doubt find - particularly in the section titled ‘A Kantian Intervention’ - though there are 
repeated references to ‘empiricism ’, this study lacks a descriptive account o f  the same. The author pleads 
guilty o f  such om issions which are not due to any measure o f  oversight -  rather they are deliberate.
Important as these ‘schools’ o f  philosophy are not only in and to the ‘field ’ o f  philosophy but also to this 
study, including them would have made this study unwieldy and unmanageable.
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towards increasingly ‘scientific’ methods which assumed Reality to be based on 
‘experience’, which in turn was based on a particular conception of the Self. The 
role of Newton (and of Boyle) was significant in this emergence and wide 
adoption of the scientific method. True, there were variations of this method such 
as those proposed by Hume, among others, but the foundations of the methods of 
science remained unshakable. Thus, as we have seen, there was a general 
orientation to try to account for war and its conduct as a science and in terms of a 
set of universal principles that would explain not only the conduct of war, but also 
the condition of war.
The emergence of these military theories -  backed by a growing body of 
creative and philosophical literature - also gave rise to, what Foucault terms, ‘an 
expression of disciplinary power’. In a sense this was inevitable for the 
systematization of a field of human activity necessarily involved the 
systematization of the ‘human’. There were, broadly, two aspects to this. The first 
was the organization of Man as a social body or in terms of a ‘body-politic’ -  a 
population - and the second was the organization of the very constitution of Man 
-  the body. The foundation on which this occurred was and remains a radical 
‘theory of power’, which while may not have been explicitly stated as so, but was, 
in essence, just that.
It was with Descartes’ expression of “I think, therefore, I am” that this 
theory of power found its material expression, for the object of the Cartesian
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attempt was to create and invest authority and sovereignty in and to the “I” that 
thinks. Descartes’ methods of observation and ‘power of reasoning’ gave 
legitimacy to only that which fell within the ambit of thinking. Thus, in effect, 
what Descartes did was to define the ‘norm’ and to invest it with ‘power’ and in 
doing so, the “I” invested itself as Sovereign which, as Agamben points out, was 
defined by Schmitt as “ ...he who decides on the state of exception”.138 What 
followed was the gradual institutionalization of this norm as a signature of power. 
Working from the premise that the “I” that thinks determines Reality, then the 
‘right’ to exercise power over and within this Reality was deemed to reside in the 
“I”. In this sense, the “I” was considered to be sovereign within the construct of 
Reason, and as such, was identified as an embodiment of Reason itself. As 
Foucault shows us, this trajectory also gave rise to a ‘subject’, which the very idea 
of sovereignty presupposed.139 This found its material expression in the military 
theories that emerged during the Enlightenment.
It will be appreciated that the primary rationale of military theory was (and 
remains) to ‘rationalize’ war and its conduct. Thus, we find military tactics, from 
de Saxe to Jomini striving to establish precise measures by which such a 
jj  regulation: could take place. This also meant that the ‘fodder’ of war, that is 
‘Man’, also had to be regulated. This was done, as Foucault convincingly 
demonstrates, by devising techniques of discipline and found its manifestation in 
the use of ‘timetables’, ‘the distribution of ‘bodies’ in space and in the
138 Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer -  Sovereign P ow er and B are Life, Trans. Daniel Heller-Rozaen,
(Stanford, MA: Stanford Univ. Press, 1998), p 11.
139 M ichel Foucault, Society M ust be Defended, p 44.
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organization of these bodies, all of which collectively contributed to the 
composition of ‘force’.140 It will be noted that while at one register these were 
manifestations of the techniques of discipline, they were also, in the context of 
military theory, the general elements that enabled the devising and deployment of 
‘tactics’. Thus, we find that the rise of ‘discipline’ was intimately connected with 
the tactics that were devised and deployed outside and on the battlefield. In our 
survey of the military theorists of the Enlightenment, we found that this 
emergence of ‘discipline’ was rather implicitly assumed - as was ‘the subject of 
war’.
Further, as we have seen, the conventional Hobbesian construct of the 
Leviathan is based on a reading of Hobbes’ assessment of a ‘natural condition’ 
which was characterized by a condition of contradictory self-interest. 
Superficially, it may be said that the three examples that Hobbes gives of the 
condition of war are:
1. within a ‘civil state’, where contradictory self-interests are not resolved
2. between ‘savages’ who do not have the benefit of the civil state, and
3. the relations that exist between civil states.
140 Foucault, D iscipline and Punish, pp 135-169.
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This, according to the conventional reading, is the signature of the warlike state of 
existence in which Man existed and which provided Hobbes with the rationale for 
proposing the construction of the Leviathan. The common-place view of the 
Hobbesian construct of the Leviathan, therefore, is one that removes the basis for 
war by pointing to the existence of the Leviathan. This, however, as Foucault 
points out, would only be a partial view of the dynamic that empowered the 
Hobbesian theory. On his part, Foucault alerts us to the possibility that Hobbes 
may be considered as the theorist “who said that war is both the basis of power 
relations and the principle that explains them.”141 (my emphasis)
Foucault shows us how the Hobbesian theory of power can be re- 
problematized. It could be said that what the Hobbesian ‘state of war’ actually 
presupposes is limited to a contest between ‘equals’ for a contest between 
‘unequals’ would always come to an end to the benefit of the stronger side, which 
in turn would bring about, theoretically, a cessation of the condition of war. Now, 
Foucault asserts that the signature of this condition is an interplay of 
representations, which is also indicative of a kind of diplomacy that maintains or 
seeks to maintain a near equal parity between two opposing forces. In this way, 
Foucault alerts us to the fact that what Hobbes was referring to was a state in 
which we are not at but in war. From this, Foucault concludes that 
“Hobbes.. .does not begin with war at all.”142
141 Foucault, Society M ust be D efended, p 89.
142 Ibid., pp 89-93.
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From these grounds Foucault shows us how the notion of sovereignty and 
the State emerged. In sum, Foucault contends that the notion of sovereignty (and 
of the State) formulated by Hobbes was based not only in terms of ‘institution’, 
but also in terms of ‘acquisition’. Briefly, Foucault shows how the institution of 
the ‘sovereign’ was based not so much on the ‘transfer’ of rights or power, but on 
the decision to enable the representation of rights and power. Given this, there is 
no actual ‘loss’ of rights and power to those who decide to have their rights and 
power represented by the ‘sovereign’ -  be it an individual or a collective body. 
Why? Simply because the ‘sovereign’ is a co-equal with those it represents, albeit 
as a ‘first among equals’. This co-relation between the Sovereign and the 
Individual allows for the former to also acquire, like the latter, an ‘individuality’ 
both real (like those whose rights and powers it represents) and artificial (by 
virtue of the fact that it is artificially constructed by those whose rights and power 
that it represents).143 On the other hand, Foucault described sovereignty by 
acquisition in terms of the ‘will to prefer life over death’, which, according to 
Foucault, “introduces us into...a juridical regime...and it is as juridical and 
legitimate as the sovereignty that was established through the model of 
institution...”144 Pursuant to this, Foucault shows us the instance where, according 
to him, Hobbes makes an appeal to a more primal ‘will to live’ with the example 
of the ‘child and its mother’.145 In Foucault’s assessment, therefore, “[F]or 
sovereignty to exist, there must be -  and this is all there must he -  a certain 
radical will that makes us want to live, even if we cannot do so unless the other is
143 Ibid., pp 93-94.
144 Ibid., p 95.
145 Ibid., p  96
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willing to let us live.” Thus, Foucault noted, “we ... find the same series: will, 
fear, and sovereignty”146 (my emphasis) -  Hobbes’ ‘state of nature’.
The question that must be posed here is this -  is there a subjectivity from 
which the ‘will to live’ emerges? Indeed, what is ‘that’ which wants to ‘live’? It 
will be noted that regardless of the radical interpretation provided by Foucault, the 
basic premise of the Hobbesian construct, as per a Foucauldian reading, was a 
‘life’ that had to have the ability to display a coherent ‘will to live’. Further, 
‘living’ had to be construed in a particular way which, this study contends, was 
and remains intimately tied to the notion of ‘death as a limit-condition’. Now, 
there are a number of ways by which an expression of the ‘will to live’ may be 
understood. At the most basic level, it may be referred to as a ‘species’, which 
displays a biological instinct in the form of the ‘will to live’. Yet, we find that ‘to 
live’ suggests a particular kind of ‘a life’. For an entity to ‘will’ living, it must 
know not only what ‘a life’ means, it would also have to know what ‘living’ 
means and what the ‘other’ of ‘to be alive’ means. This, in the first instance, 
presupposes the presence of thought. Thus, at the very least, there is an implicit 
assumption of a ‘thinking entity’ in this Foucauldian reading of ‘the will to live’. 
In the Cartesian context, this would be the ‘subject’ for the ‘will to live’ points to 
the presence of an I-ness which desires to live. It will be noted that the notion of 
this I-ness is determined (which is the subject, in the context of Cartesian notion 
of the Self) after the undetermined “I” in Descartes’ construct has been 
determined by thinking. In Descartes’ formulation, therefore, ‘thinking’ was the
146 Ibid.
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signature of ‘life’, indeed of existence and the absence of which was ‘death’. 
Thus, it will not be wrong to state that it was this ‘subject’ that was assumed to be 
subjected to the disciplinary modes of thinking which also underwrote much of 
the juridico-political and military theories of the Enlightenment. The assumption 
was always made that the subject of war was a subject who could be assumed to, 
at the very least, display the ‘will to live’. In other words, the ‘will to live’ was the 
most common rational factor that was shared by all men. From this to construct 
the edifice of the juridico-political system, which would not only explain but also 
shape and control the actions of Man, was an easy matter.
With reference to the above discussion it is also necessary to briefly dwell 
on the phrase - ‘to live’. What this phrase means, at this point, is not central to the 
discussion, though we have very briefly alluded to its implications above. What is 
of more importance, in the context of this study, is to recognize the presumption 
of a common meaning that this phrase held across the board. Given this, it is 
therefore not surprising that this presumption enabled the formation of a set of 
doctrines and institutions which reinforced the notion of a universal mathesis 
which also served as the foundation on which the conception of war unfolded. It 
will be appreciated that such an universal mathesis also allowed for the creation 
of an enemy who was not an Absolute Other, but an ‘Other’ relative to the Self 
and in this way the conception of war was kept within manageable limits of an 
(Anteractionjbetween two equal adversaries. In this sense, as we have seen above, 
the two adversaries in combat were not radically different. The ‘strategy’ of the
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Cartesian construct was to assert the Selfs sovereignty by ‘thinking’ the ‘norm’. 
Thus, that which lay outside the norm was not labeled unreal, but ab-normal. Ab­
normality, for the Self, was a condition that was included within the conditions of 
possibility of the Self for it necessitated the recognition of the condition of ab­
normality. The enemy thus had to fall within this construct of ab-normality and 
not outside it.147 Agamben perceptively points to this when he marks that the 
traditional duality of Western politics was not a case of the friend/ enemy binary 
but one of bare life/ political existence, bios/ zoe and exclusion/ inclusion.148 
Thus, the Self made the Other and this was expressed in a variety of ways - for 
example, Vattel’s injunction that the ‘object of war was to bring an enemy to 
reason’. Indeed, here is where Foucault’s analysis of Hobbes is most interesting 
for, as we have seen, Foucault showed how the Hobbesian notion of war 
presupposed an ‘equal opposite’. A problem, however, arises if the notion of the 
equality is removed from the contestants and we posit an Absolute Other (as 
contrasted with an excluded Other) in place of the traditional adversary of the 
Self. But this is a problem that did not afflict the military theorists of the 
Enlightenment. They did not consider the need to think in terms of an Absolute 
Other given their firm position within the universal mathesis that emanated from 
the Cartesian construct of the Self.
147 M ichel Foucault, Abnormal, Trans. Graham Burchell, Intro. Arnold I. Davidson, Foreword, Ewald et al, 
(N ew  York, NY: Picador, 2003), pp. xvii - xxv
148 Agamben, Hom o Sacer, p 8. N ote that ‘exclusion’ does not sim ply im ply ‘being excluded’ by som eone 
or som ething. Exclusion also suggests ‘not being a part o f  in originary terms.
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Thus, we find that there are at least five elements that consistently emerge 
from our overview of the military theories of the Enlightenment, which have 
remained at the core of the dominant strains of martial thinking. The first is that a 
conception of war was a function of a more fundamental conception of the Self, 
which owed its origin to the Cartesian construct. It was this which enabled the 
formulation of military theory in terms of a science and was deemed firmly 
grounded on Reason and thus, ‘universal’. The second is the understanding of the 
‘enemy’, where, the enemy was not an Absolute Other of the Self, but was an 
Other made its own by the Self. In this sense, the Enemy was an entity that was 
easily recognizable by the Self as it employed the same strategies and tactics as 
the Self did.149 The third is the emergence of a plethora of institutions -  both 
military and juridico-political -  which served to reinforce not only this conception 
of war but also the conception of the Self. Indeed this conception of the Self 
enabled, rather than hampered, the ‘control’ that was exercised over bodies -  the 
evidence of which, we have noted, resided not only in the institutions but also in 
the very tactics and strategies that were employed in the context of war. Fourth, 
this condition also led to the developing of specific ‘disciplines’ of knowledge, 
which served to organize Reality and which also contributed to the universal 
mathesis of the Enlightenment. And lastly, there was an implicit and dim 
recognition, and much understated, that there was an area of the Self which was 
radically undecidable/ unknowable. This, in the context of the evolution of 
military thought, was more often than not attributed to the realm of the Genius.
149 Carl Schmitt, The C oncept o f  the P olitical, Trans. & Intro. G. Schwab (N ew  Intro by Tracy B. Strong),
(Chicago: Univ. o f  Chicago Press, 1996)
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Interlude
Prelude to Clausewitz or,
... Waiting fo r  the revolution...150
As our cursory survey of the Enlightenment shows, the sudden burst of 
creativity that heralded the advent of the Age of Enlightenment driven - in no 
small part - by the dramatic advances in the field of the natural sciences 
stimulated the intellectuals of the time to establish the domain of Reason by 
attempting to create orderly sciences and disciplines in most, if  not all, spheres of 
human activity. In the context of the emergence and evolution of military theory 
we find that
...[T]he striking impressions in reading the works of the military thinkers of the 
Enlightenment is the all-embracing uniformity of their theoretical outlook... they 
did not differ in the fundamentals of their guiding objective -  the search for a 
general theory of war...there were, of course, varying interpretations and 
emphasis, but the central themes were both clear and indisputable. War, like all 
fields of nature and human activity, was susceptible to a comprehensive and 
systematic theoretical study. In part, it could be reduced to rules and principles of 
universal validity and possibly even mathematical certainty...151
This ‘tendency’ itself was based on a more fundamental belief in the ultimate 
rationality of Man and of the pivotal role of Reason to explain the actions of
150 Black Sabbath, “Computer God” in Dehumanizer, 1992
151 Gat, A H istory o f  M ilitary Thought, p 142
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152Man. But in 1789, “a series of interrelated processes mark(ed) a major point of 
transition in European, and possibly world history -  The French Revolution.”153 
While the Revolution may be understood as being the pinnacle of the 
Enlightenment Age, its occurrence also sounded the death-knell of that Age. The 
advent of Napoleon, while a product of the Enlightenment himself, was the 
signature of the gradual but perceptible decline of the ethos of the Enlightenment.
The impact of this was not only felt within the borders of France, but also 
across geographical, linguistic and political boundaries. There was a rising 
reaction to the core ideals of the Enlightenment which, as a movement, began to 
focus increasingly on the complexity and variety of human nature and its multiple 
realities. Critiquing the basic tenets of the Enlightenment, this intellectual 
movement stressed on the irreducibility of human emotions and creativity to 
formulaic expressions. This was the Counter-Enlightenment or Romantic 
Movement. In the context of warfare, this movement also breached the hegemonic 
domination of the leading military theorists of the Enlightenment Age.154 It is 
significant to note that the advent of the Romantic Age also thrust onto the center- 
stage, the role and locus of the idea of the genius as the Commander. It is in this
152 Peter Gay makes the important point that referring to the Age o f  Enlightenment as the A ge o f  Reason is 
fraught with danger. He suggests that i f  by ‘reason’ one im plies criticism and a position counter to 
‘credulity’ or ‘superstition’ then the use o f  the word is justified. The conventional habit o f  understanding 
‘reason’ (and ‘rationality’) in the context o f  the Enlightenment as being a signature o f  being contemptuous 
o f  emotion and inhabiting an empty universe stripped o f  all colour and love would be an error. See Gay, 
The Enlightenm ent -  The Science o f  Freedom , p 625. A countervailing argument, as w e have already seen, 
is provided by Schoules in his D escartes and the Enlightenments
153 Ludmilla Jordanova, “The Authoritarian Response”, in Peter Hulme and Ludmilla Jordonova Ed., The 
Enlightenm ent and its Shadows, (London, UK: Routledge, 1990), p202.
154 Gat, A H istory o f  M ilitary Thought, p 269.
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context that Clausewitz’s magnum opus, On War, presents itself as a key text -  
one that has since served as a model of how to think about war.
The reaction to the Enlightenment, among other things, took the form of a 
rejection of the Cartesian rationalism (and of dogmatic rationalism in particular) 
and the multi-varied strains that characterized it. The Romantic thinkers decried 
the general tendency of the Enlightenment to reduce what they considered to be a 
highly complex world to a set of “simple, fundamental, universal”155 ‘principles’. 
For the Romantic thinkers, the world was anything but simple and was not 
reducible to principles. Instead, the world - to them - was highly complex and 
constituted by innumerable and singular elements, events and variables. Most 
importantly, for the Romantic thinkers, the world was deemed to be always in a 
state of change and transformation, which precluded its reduction to a core set of 
laws. Thus, as Gat points out, Hamann, who is considered to be the...
...spiritual mentor of the men of the ‘Storm and Stress’ {Sturm und Drang) 
period, scorned the Enlightenment’s blindness to, and loss of touch with, rich and 
vital reality on which it arrogantly attempted to force artificial, crude, and 
superficial principles and frameworks. Genuine knowledge (it was deemed) was 
always the knowledge of singular and unique cases.156
While Hamann may be considered as being an ‘early’ Romantic thinker, we 
would not be too far off the mark to suggest that the general tenor of the Romantic 
thinkers who were to follow him was to repeatedly, and in increasingly
155 Ibid., p 144
156 Ibid.
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sophisticated styles and methods, question universal principles and to celebrate 
the ‘particular’ - a feature that found explicit mention in, among others, Fichte’s, 
Schelling’s and Hegel’s philosophies.157
Thus, the movement against the Enlightenment -  following Gat’s exegesis 
-  may be clustered around four principle thematics. (1) A reaction against the 
mechanistic and rationalist doctrines which drew their inspiration from Descartes, 
and Newton. (2) A rejection of the claim that man was a tabula rasa. (3) An 
emphasis on the individual as a creative and imaginative entity and (4) the 
adoption of a historical perspective that resisted the measuring of societies and 
historical periods through universal perspectives and values.158 Superficially, this 
would suggest that the Romantic philosophers (and, one might add, the military 
thinkers influenced by the essentials of Romantic philosophy) insisted on 
breaking up the vice-like hold of the notion of universal mathesis. But was this 
really the case? Our next step, therefore, will be to investigate this question by 
looking closely at the philosophical kernel around which Clausewitz formulated 
his, admittedly incomplete, ‘theory of war’.
157 See, for example, Di Giovanni, George and H. S. Harris, eds. Between K ant an d  Hegel: Texts in the 
D evelopm ent o f  Post-K antian Idealism , Revised Edition, (Indianapolis, Indiana: Hackett Publishing 
Company, Inc., 2000); Stephen Houlgate, An Introduction to H egel: Freedom , Truth and H istory, 2nd 
Edition (Oxford: Blackwells, 2005)




It will be recollected that in the sphere of dogmatic rationalism, the theory 
of knowledge was based on the notion of ‘correspondence’ -  between the subject 
and the object -  which empowered the Cartesian Self (and concomitantly, the 
Enemy) in the first instance. Thus, the aim of dogmatic rationalism, which takes 
Descartes’ philosophical system as its point of origin, was to reach an accord 
between the ‘order of ideas’ and the ‘order of things’. In contrast to this, Kant’s 
metaphysical project was
...to sketch the architectonic of all cognition issuing from p u r e  r e a s o n . . . [  and his 
starting point was].. .from.. .the general root of.. .cognitive power [which] divides 
and thrusts forth two stems, one of which is r e a s o n . . .{by which Kant 
meant).. .the whole higher cognitive power...159 (emphasis in original).
Thus, Deleuze, while noting that “Kant defines philosophy as ‘the science of the 
relation of all knowledge to the essential ends of human reason’, or as ‘the love 
which the reasonable being has for the supreme ends of human reason’”,160 he 
also observes that “ ...we can already identify a struggle on two fronts: against 
empiricism and against dogmatic rationalism.”161
159 Immanuel Kant, Critique o f  Pure Reason, Trans. Werner S. Pluhar, Intro. Patricia W. Kitcher,
(Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 1996), p 757-758
160 G illes D eleuze, K a n t’s C ritical Philosophy, Trans. Hugh Tomlinson & Barbara Habberjam,
(Minneapolis: Univ. o f  M innesota Press, 2003), p 1
161 Ibid.
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The Kantian intervention in this battle between the two fronts was 
spearheaded by the ‘doctrine of faculties’, which as Deleuze points out, is the 
“real network which constitutes the transcendental method.”162 It should be noted, 
when read with Deleuze, the Kantian transcendental method is underwritten by an 
immanent principle -  one in which “reason...takes itself as its own end.”163 This 
‘method’, essentially, undercut both rationalism and empiricism by grounding 
reason in itself -  as a faculty of ends - unlike the latter two systems which, in the 
case of empiricism relies on personal experience and, in the case of rationalism, 
on a higher end -  ‘a Being, a Good, or a Value, taken as a rule of will.’164 Further, 
we should recognize that this method, though bringing about a ‘Copemican 
Revolution’ in the field of philosophy, remained partial to what Horkheimer refers 
to as “the faculty of classification, inference, and deduction...[which 
is]... essentially concerned with means and ends, with the adequacy of procedures 
for purposes more or less taken for granted...”165 In sum, therefore, Kant’s 
transcendental method set out to determine (1) the true nature of reason in terms 
of its interests and ends and (2) the means by which these interests and ends may 
be achieved.166 Thus, for Kant, “...all the concepts, nay, all the questions which 
pure reason presents to us, have their source not in experience, but exclusively in 
reason itself.. .since reason is the sole begetter of these ideas, it is under obligation
?? 167to give an account of their validity or of their illusory dialectical nature...” This
162 Ibid, p 10
163 Ibid., p 2
164 Ibid, pp 1-3




may be considered as being one of the central tenets of Kant’s contributions to the 
development of critical philosophy. While Kant’s full contribution to the 
‘revolution’ in philosophy warrants a much more engaged and detailed exegesis 
than this study can offer, in the present context, we shall limit our descriptive 
overview to two specific elements of his critical philosophy that are of especial 
interest to us.
Taken as whole, as Wilkerson informs us, Kant’s philosophical endeavors 
were geared towards a two-fold objective:
First, Kant wants to expose the vacuous metaphysics of traditional rationalism. 
To do that he must first develop his own positive account of knowledge, must 
establish for example that we can only make knowledge claims about spatio- 
temporal substances which obey causal laws...[thus]...he must discuss specific 
problems about space, time, substance and causality.. .Second.. .he thinks that we 
can and should leave room for some a priori knowledge of the 
world...[thus]...according to Kant we can and do know a priori that objects are 
spatial, temporal, causal etc.168
Pursuant to this Kant asked, “What is the fact of knowledge?”169 By posing this 
question, Kant thus confronted a fundamental metaphysical question -  a question
170that leads directly, as Deleuze suggests, to the ‘object of metaphysics’. Kant’s 
answer to this question, of course, was that ‘the fact of knowledge is that we have
168 T. E. W ilkerson, K ant's C ritique o f  Pure Reason -  A Com m entary fo r  Students, (Bristol: Thoemmes 
Press, 1998), p 7
169 G illes D eleuze, K a n t’s C ritical Philosophy, p 11
170 Ibid.
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a priori representations, which enable us to engage in judgment.’171 It is this 
Kantian notion of the a priori that is of critical interest to us.
While reading Kant, Deleuze suggests that “[Njecessity and universality 
are the criteria of the a priori. The a priori is defined as being independent of 
experience, precisely because experience never ‘gives’ us anything which is 
universal and necessary.”172 The independence that Deleuze refers to here, it is 
critical to note, is a strategic one in the sense that it is not limited by objective 
facts, which are yielded to us by experience, and in this sense, the realm of the a 
priori is necessarily subjective. But, as Deleuze is quick to point out, “the given 
cannot be the basis of the operation by which we go beyond the given.”173 Thus, it 
is evident that the a priori would not only have to be confirmed by our 
experience, but would also have to respond to it. This, in essence, was the Kantian 
notion of knowledge as distinguished from mere representation for, in Deleuze’s 
words, “[A] representation on its own is not enough to form knowledge. In order 
to know something, we need not only to have a representation, but to be able to go
174beyond it: ‘in order to recognize another representation as being linked to it.’”
As we will see, hidden within the maze of relations bind this Kantian notion of 
knowledge and representation is the case concerning the ‘real’ and the ‘absolute’, 
which is so critical to the entire Clausewitzian project.
171 Ibid.
172 Ibid, p 11, See also p 5.
173 Ibid, p 12
174 Ibid, p 4
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Further, the notion of a priori knowledge is equally applicable to what 
Kant referred to as the ‘categories’, which are “the a priori conditions upon which 
the possibility of experience rests, and which remain as its underlying grounds 
when everything empirical is abstracted from appearances.”175 Kant’s reliance on 
the a priori -  both in terms of knowledge and judgment -  finds further expression 
in his ‘proofs’ for the existence of a priori principles. Thus, for example, Kant’s 
first proof is crafted in terms of showing “that pure a priori principles are 
indispensable for the possibility of experience...for whence could experience 
derive its certainty, if all the rules, according to which it proceeds, were always 
themselves empirical, and therefore contingent?”176 Another example would be 
Kant’s notion of abstraction. As Caygill highlights, “[T]he proof of an a priori 
form of intuition abstracts from an empirical body all its qualities until it arrives at
177space as its ineluctable residium or a priori form of intuition.”
We should also not fail to appreciate, though the issue remains outside the 
declared scope of this study, that Kant’s notion of the a priori has given rise to, in 
Caygill’s words...
...an enormous debate which shows no sign of abating. At stake is an account of 
justified knowledge which is neither empiricist nor idealist...[and]...One of the 
main reasons for the longevity of the debate is the ambiguous and often cryptic
175 Howard Caygill, A K ant D ictionary, (Oxford: Blackw ell Pub., 2006), p 36
176 Ibid. p 36-37
177 Ibid., p 37
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account of the source of a priori universality which Kant offers in his published
■ * 178writings.
Interestingly, Caygill suggests that a perusal of Kant’s unpublished notes suggests 
that “the theoretical problem of the a priori is unequivocally linked to spontaneity 
and freedom, and through them to practical philosophy.”179 This last observation 
will also be of material help to us when we, in short order, proceed to investigate 
and appreciate the contribution of Clausewitz to the study of war.
For the moment, however, it is important to reiterate the criticality of the a 
priori in the Kantian architectonic by pointing to the revised definition of the term 
as effected by Kant. Thus, as Caygill points out, Kant “develops new criteria for a 
priori knowledge: it is (a) pure and (b) universal and necessary...The argument 
for the purity of a priori knowledge, judgments and elements holds that they are
1 BO‘clear and certain’ modes of knowledge independent of experience.” But, Kant 
did not simply rest after providing a redefinition of the term. He also provided a 
‘proof by ...
...abstracting from experience ‘everything which the understanding thinks 
through its concepts' thus ‘isolating’ sensibility and then ‘separating’ off 
'everything which belongs to sensation, so that nothing may remain save pure 




180 Ibid., pp 35- 36
181 Ibid. See also, Kant, Critique o f  Pure Reason, p74 (A22/ B36)
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The criticality of the notion of a priori knowledge in the Kantian scheme of things 
is further reiterated by Kant’s assertion that ‘not only is a priori knowledge 
independent of experience, but a priori knowledge is the very condition of 
experience.’182
The second point of interest for our present purposes is a term that we 
have used earlier -  ‘architectonic’. In the context of the Kantian oeuvre, 
‘architectonic’ assumes a special place, which he explored in his path-breaking 
Critique o f Pure Reason, specifically in the chapter titled ‘Transcendental 
Doctrine of Method’. Therein Kant gives us his definition of the word. For Kant, 
‘architectonic’ is “...the art of systems. Since systematic unity is what first turns 
common cognition into science... architectonic is the doctrine of what is scientific
1 83in our cognition as such...” As Caygill explains, “[T]he system is characterized 
by an organized unity which is the end to which the parts of the science relate, 
and in which they relate to each other. The architectonic end is distinguished from  
a 'technical ’ one by not being derived from empirical criteria arising from
184scientific discoveries; rather it anticipates them.” (my emphasis). It is 
interesting, and also important, to note that Kant is insistent on outlining the 
architectonic of human reason in dual terms: (1) nature and (2) reason, thereby 
underlining, in Caygill’s words, “the division between the philosophy of nature, 
which deals with all that is, [and] the philosophy of morals with that which ought
182 C aygill, A K ant D ictionary, p 36
183 Kant, C ritique o f  Pure Reason, p 755, A 832/ B860
184 Caygill, A K ant D ictionary, p 84
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to be.”185 In this context, we should note that for Kant ‘human reason’ was 
architectonic by nature -  the implication being that all (justifiable) knowledge 
belonged to a system. The criticality of the architectonic for Kant is reflected in 
the fact that he distinguished, rather sharply, between two notions of philosophy - 
the first being ‘technical’ -  in the sense as mentioned earlier -  as ‘a reflection on 
the products of human reason’; the second - the one which Kant perceived himself 
to be engaging in -  “as the legislator of human reason.”186
This sketch of the a priori and the architectonic within the Kantian 
intellectual project - despite its brevity and limited scope -  reveals to us a number 
of points of interest. First, Kant’s positing of the a priori -  both in terms of 
knowledge and judgment -  appears to us as an attempt to ‘make’ space for that 
which is beyond experience, that is to say, that which is independent of 
experience. Second, the a priori, as a consequence, allowed for the positing of the 
universal and the necessary. Third, as Deleuze demonstrates, Kant -  betraying a 
distinctly Aristotelian influence -  was able to develop the ‘categories’ which are
• • * 1 8 7essentially universal attributes or predicates. Kant’s framing of the 
architectonic -  which includes each of the above elements -  thus, is also 
significant in the sense that it represents a holistic ‘system underwritten by 
‘reason’. These collectively allowed Kant to re-assert ‘reason as the highest
185 Caygill, A K ant D ictionary, p 84. See also Kant, Critique o f  Pure Reason, p 755, A 840/ B868.
186 Kant, C ritique o f  Pure Reason, A 839/ B867, p 760. Caygill chooses to translate ‘legistator’ as ‘law  
giver’. See Caygill, A K ant D ictionary, p 84
187 G illes D eleuze, Les Cours D eleuze — Kant: Synthesis and Time, March 14, 1978, Traducteur: M elissa  
McMahon. Available at w w w .w ebdeleuze.com . Last accessed on Jan 05, 2007
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tribunal -  a basis from which he was later able to expound his ‘moral 
philosophy’.188
The Romance o f Clausewitz
The influence of Kant on Clausewitz is a much debated and disputed 
aspect of the history of the evolution of military thought.189 Some have contended 
that while Kant may have, to some degree, influenced Clausewitz, the evidence is 
not as clear as, for example, the influence of Montesquieu or even that of Fichte 
and Hegel.190 Others have discounted, indeed dismissed, the necessity of spending 
much time on tracing the philosophical influences on Clausewitz’s thinking. 
These latter commentators have suggested that it is not surprising that 
Clausewitz’s magnum opus betrays the prevalent philosophical tendencies of his 
times since Clausewitz, after all, was not only ‘bookish and introverted’, but also 
well networked with the leading intellectuals of the time.191 What is important to 
them, however, is the elegance of the Clausewitzian system which, while quite 
specific in detailing the rationale of individual military operations and situations,
188 See Immanuel Kant, The M etaphysics o f  M orals, Trans. Rodger J. Sullivan, Ed. Mary Gregor, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2000)
189 Gat, H istory o f  M ilitary Thought, pp 195-197. It should be noted that Clausewitz explicitly  
acknow ledges his debt to Montesquieu, though his intellectual debt to Kant remains obscure and 
unacknowledged. See Clausewitz, On War, ‘Comment’, p 63.
190 See, for example, Bernard Brodie, "On Clausewitz: A Passion for War," in W orld P olitics  25, no. 2 
(January 1973): 290 for the arguments in favor o f  a Hegelian Clausewitz. Parkinson provides the arguments 
in favor o f  a Kantian Clausewitz. See Roger Parkinson, Clausewitz: A B iography, (N ew  York, Cooper 
Square Press: 1st. Edition, December, 2002)
191 See, for example, John Lynn, Battle: A H istory o f  Com bat and Culture from  Ancient G reece to M odern  
A m erica, p203. See also Michael Howard, C lausewitz (N ew  York: Oxford University Press, 1983), pp 13- 
14
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nevertheless also managed to convey its universal-like nature.192 And then there 
are those who, while certainly not dismissing Clausewitz, reject the principle 
determinants of the Clausewitzian universe -  but only on the grounds of being 
obsolete. They, more often than not, call for a ‘reevaluation of all values’.193
Given that the life of Clausewitz has been documented in great detail, it is 
not necessary to review the same here.194 Nor will a general exegesis of 
Clausewitzian theory, which has been equally well documented, occupy our 
attention.195 Instead, we will engage with what are, in the context of this study, 
critical issues within Clausewitz’s theory of war - thematically arranged as (1) 
method (2) theory and (3) strategy. Within this scheme, we will not only 
contextualize Clausewitz’s insistence on the subordination of war to politics - 
made famous by the now well-worn dictum: ‘war is an extension of politics by 
other means’ - we will also pay close attention to how Clausewitz addresses the 
phenomena of chance and uncertainty, and how and in what light he views the 
‘commander’ and his role.
192 See, for example, Christopher Bassford, “John Keegan and the Grand Tradition o f  Trashing Clausewitz: 
A Polem ic”, War and H istory, v .l ,  no.3 (November 1994)
193 An interesting feature o f  the scholarship surrounding Clausewitz is the availability o f  studies and 
analyses in tw o broad categories - (a) those that highlight the philosophical indebtedness o f  C lausew itz’s 
thinking -  early and mature -  to various philosophical schools and impulses and/ or (b) those that debate 
the applicability and relevance - or otherwise - o f  C lausew itz’s theoretical efforts to current and emerging 
global conditions. See Gat, A H istory o f  M ilitary Thought, pp 219-237. For an account that calls for a 
change in the way we think o f  war -  a reevaluation o f  all values -  see Robert R. Leonard, Principles o f  War 
fo r  the Information Age, (N ew  York: Ballantine Books, 1998)
l94See, for example, Am os Perimutter, "Carl von Clausewitz: Enlightenment Philosopher: A Comparative 
Analysis," The Journal o f  Strategic Studies 11, no. 1 (March 1988); 7-19; Howard, Clausewitz and Gray, 
M odern Strategy.
195See, for example, Bernard Brodie, "The Continuing Relevance o f  On War," in Clausewitz, On War, Ed.
& Trans. M ichael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, N.J.; Princeton University Press, 1984); James King, 
"On Clausewitz: Master Theorist o f  War," N aval War College R eview  30 (Fall 1977):9; Bernard Brodie,
"In Quest o f  the Unknown Clausewitz," International Security  1, no. 3 (Winter 1977); 66
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Taken collectively, these will equip us to (1) outline a Clausewitzian 
‘architectonic’ of war, and (2) to engage with the philosophical core around which 
the architectonic of war -  as a strategic ensemble - sustains itself. In the wider 
context of this study, the latter objective will have far-reaching consequences for 
it will allow us to suggest - here recalling Szafranski -  that (a) Clausewitz’s 
efforts should be understood as not simply a response, but also a ‘mode of 
response’, to the emerging ‘epistemological challenges’ of his time and (b) that 
what may have begun as an epistemological exercise has now assumed an 
ontological character -  somewhat aided and abetted by Clausewitz himself.
i. Clausewitz, Methodologizing...
Let us begin by recognizing that “Clausewitz’s reformulation of the 
concept of military theory, which was directed against the theoretical outlook of 
the Enlightenment, was bound up with his effort to devise an adequate military 
theory of his own.”196 This conceptual reformulation took a dual form. In the first 
instance Clausewitz, dissatisfied with the efforts of his predecessors, took to 
critiquing their theories and ‘systems’ of war. Secondly, as Clausewitz’s thought 
matured, we find him engaged in not simply a critique of the earlier systems but 
in a more positively oriented problematization of war itself. Paret suggests that
197this second mode, for Clausewitz, was more programmatic.
196 Gat, A H istory o f  M ilitary Thought, p 192.






Now, in his essay, ‘On the State of the Theory of War’, Clausewitz wrote - 
...we expect great advantage from an intelligent development of theory, partly 
for the training of young students, and even more for the development of the art 
itself.”198 After clarifying that ‘method’, is “ ...a constantly recurring procedure 
that has been selected from a number of possibilities...[which] becomes routine 
when action is prescribed...rather than by general principles,”199 Clausewitz 
insisted that...
[I]t must necessarily be assumed that all cases to which such a routine is applied 
will be essentially alike. Since this will not be entirely so, it is important that it be 
true at least as many as possible. In other words, methodical procedure should be 
designed to meet the most probable cases...based on the average probability of 
analogous cases. Its aim is to postulate an average truth, which, when applied 
evenly and constantly, will soon acquire something of the nature of a mechanical 
skill, which does the right thing almost automatically.200 (emphasis in original)
Further, in 1808, in a note titled, ‘On Abstract Principles of Strategy’, Clausewitz 
sketched out, albeit tentatively, a structure that would eventually integrate the rich 
diversity of historical experience, and a methodology that would allow for a 
universal approach to the study and distillation of the same.201 As his letter to 
Fichte written in January 1809 shows, Clausewitz harbored the idea that 
underlying the diversity of historical experience, there did exist a universal 
constant element -  an element that was the object of ‘theory’ -  ‘the lasting spirit
Quoted in Gat, A H istory o f  M ilitary Thought, p 192.
Ibid.
Ibid
Gat, A H istory o f  M ilitary Thought, p 193.
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of war . What is interesting is that, for Clausewitz, this attention to the presence 
of a universal constant element’, which in the case of war was ‘the lasting spirit’, 
was not limited only to the martial context. Thus, for example, in a note written in 
1807 by Clausewitz to his fiancee, Marie, he observed that...
Religious feeling in its elemental purity will eternally exist in men’s hearts, but 
no positive religion can last forever. Virtue will eternally exert its beneficial 
influence on society; but the universality of this global spirit cannot be expressed 
in the restrictive fomi of a code of laws, and form itself will shatter sooner or 
later when the stream of time has washed away or reshaped the surrounding
203contours.
The intellectual reference made in this note can be traced if not directly to Kant, 
then at least to Schleiermacher, who was an avid Kantian.204 It is also indicative 
of Clausewitz’s familiarity with at least the general tenets of Kant’s philosophy 
and its methodological practices. It is, therefore, not surprising that Clausewitz
202 Gat, A H istory o f  M ilita iy  Thought, p 193
203 Quoted in Peter Paret, Clausewitz and the State, p 167. Letter to Marie, Oct 5, 1807.
204T 1ius, for example, in the Preface to The Critique o f  Pure Reason, Kant wrote: "Human reason has a 
peculiar fate in one kind o f  its cognitions: it is troubled by questions that it cannot dismiss, because they are 
posed to it by the nature o f  reason itself, but that it cannot answer, because they surpass human reason’s 
every ability.” (Kant, Critique o f  Pure Reason, (A vii), p 5. Schleiermacher, as Robbins, for example, 
show s us, “knew the difficulties o f  thinking religion. Like Kant, he knew that to locate the religious within 
the sphere o f  consciousness is already to reduce religion to an idol. But unlike Kant, Schleiermacher 
realizes that just as thinking has the danger o f  eclipsing the religious, so too does acting. Thus, for 
Schleiermacher, Kant's categorical imperative merely reinscribes the problem. Schleiermacher mediates his 
w ay between these extremes o f  consciousness (knowing and doing) by positing "a necessary and an 
indispensable third” . . .” Schleiermacher thus attempted to take the Kantian project further focusing  
particularly on the problem posed by religion to reason. See Jeffrey W. Robbins, "From Thinking to 
Religion: The Opening o f  Ideality in 19th Century Protestant Thought," Journal fo r  Christian Theological 
Research, 5:5 (2000). For an account o f  Schleiermacher’s work, see Friedrich Schleiermacher, On 
Religion: Speeches to its Cultured D espisers, Trans. John Oman, (N ew  York: Harper and Row, 1958). For 
K ant’s account o f  religion, see Immanuel Kant, Religion Within the Lim its o f  Reason Alone, Trans. 
Theodore M. Greene & Hoyt H. Hudson, (N ew  York: Harper Torchbooks, 1960)
146
did not, as his predecessors were wont to do, approach the study of ‘history’ 
dogmatically.
More importantly, however, we should not ignore the fact that, in 
philosophical terms - like Kant in the field of philosophy - Clausewitz was also 
caught between the Scylla of the a priori and the Charybdis of experience. Thus, 
in 1809, he noted:
Formula [is] abstraction. When by abstraction nothing which belongs to the thing 
gets lost -  as is the case with mathematics -  the abstraction fully achieves its 
purpose. But when it must omit the living matter in order to hold to the dead 
form, which is of course the easiest to abstract, it would be in the end a dry 
skeleton of dull truths squeezed into a doctrine. It is really astonishing to find 
people who waste their time on such efforts, when one bears in mind that 
precisely that which is the most important in war and strategy, namely the great 
particularity, peculiarity, and local circumstances, escape these abstractions and 
scientific systems.205 (my emphasis)
This note suggests three fundamental points. First, as mentioned above, 
Clausewitz, like Kant, was concerned with the relation between the a priori and 
experience. Clausewitz, like Kant, also disavowed choosing between the one and 
the other, and like his intellectual predecessor, Clausewitz attempted to bridge 
what he deemed to be the ‘gap’ between the two. Thus, in his more mature On 
War, Clausewitz asserted: “Theory exists so that one need not start afresh each 
time sorting out the material and plowing through...it is meant to educate the
205 Quoted in Gat, p A H istory o f  M ilitary Thought, p 194-95
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mind of the future commander.. .not to accompany him onto the battlefield.”206 To 
support this contention, Clausewitz further noted that...
. . . I f  the th eorist’s stud ies au tom atica lly  resu lt in  p rin cip les and ru les, and i f  truth 
sp on tan eou sly  crysta llizes in to  th ese  form s, th eory  w ill n o t resist th is natural 
ten d en cy  o f  the m in d ...th is  is in accord ance w ith  the sc ien tif ic  la w  o f  reason , to  
in d ica te  the p oin t at w h ich  all lin es co n v erg e , but never  to construct an algebraic  
form ula for use  on the b attlefie ld . E ven  th ese  p r in c ip le s  a n d  ru le s  a re  in te n d e d  to  
p r o v id e  a  th in k in g  m an w ith  a  f r a m e  o f  re fe re n c e  f o r  th e  m o vem en ts  he h as been  
tr a in e d  to  c a r r y  out, ra th e r  than s e r v e  a s  a  g u id e  w h ich  a t  th e  m o m en t o f  a c tio n  
la y s  d o w n  p r e c is e ly  th e  p a th  h e  m u st ta k e ,207 (m y  em p h asis)
Second -  the note refers to that from which, by abstraction, nothing gets lost -  
‘the thing’ or the ‘the thing-in-itself. This demonstrates a recognition and 
understanding of Reason in terms of an ‘elemental purity (that) will eternally exist 
in men’s hearts - in terms of ‘scientific laws’ and as a priori’. Thirdly, the note 
also reflects a conviction that ‘that which is the most important in war and 
strategy, namely the great particularity, peculiarity, and local circumstances, 
escape these abstractions and scientific systems’. It is evident that Clausewitz had 
already worked out the implications of these in as early as 1807 for, in an 
elegantly written note to Marie, Clausewitz had noted that ‘the universality of this 
global spirit cannot be expressed in the restrictive form of a code of
206 C lausewitz, On War, p 141
207 Ibid
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laws... [for]... form itself will shatter sooner or later when the stream of time has 
washed away or reshaped the surrounding contours’.208
Gat suggests that the note that Clausewitz had written to his wife in 1807 
betrays a fusion of Enlightenment and Romantic influences in Clausewitz’s 
thinking and work, particularly, the “blending of a high degree of sensitivity to 
the diversity of historical experience - with a belief in certain universal 
elements...typical of the early period of historicism.”209 Be that as it may, from 
the perspective of this study, these three points also inform Clausewitz’s strategic 
intent -  the positing of an architectonic which, while not being ‘dogmatic’, and 
thus architectural - as he perceived the systems offered by his predecessors as 
being - would nevertheless be a universal ‘frame of reference’ for the discussion 
of war, particularized by the specifics of individual experience. Clausewitz’s 
‘methodology’, therefore, remained a balancing act between the development of 
rules and principles, which would, in his words, “not be a positive doctrine, a sort 
of manual for action”, rather, it would be a ‘critical analysis’ which, to Clausewitz 
-  here betraying a distinctly Kantian influence -  was “the application of 
theoretical truths to actual events.”210 These observations, taken together, serve 
not only as examples of the significant indebtedness of Clausewitz’s martial
208 In the context o f  the letter to Marie, Clausewitz refers to ‘virtue’, where ‘virtue’ is an a p rio ri concept 
and  category.
209. Gat, A H istory o f  M ilitary Thought, p 196. Bassford makes a similar point. See Christopher Bassford, 
“Jomini and Clausewitz: Their Interaction”, Paper presented to the 23rd M eeting o f  the Consortium on 
Revolutionary Europe, Georgia State University, 26 February 1993. Available at 
http://www.claiisewitz.com/CWZHOME/Jomini/JOMINlX.htm. Last accessed on March, 2008.
210 Clausewitz, On War, p 141, p 156
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theorizations to the Kantian philosophical project, they are also representative of a 
core philosophical tension that runs through the heart of his On War.
Despite what we can already discern -  albeit faintly -  as being an 
emerging architectonic in Clausewitz’s theoretical efforts, we should not ignore 
his insistence on asserting that...
[GJiven the nature of the subject, we must remind ourselves that it is simply not 
possible to construct a model for the art of war that can serve as a scaffolding on 
which the commander can rely for support at any time. Whenever he has to fall 
back on his innate talent, he will find himself outside the model and in conflict 
with it; no matter how versatile the code, the situation will always lead to the 
consequences...talent and genius operate outside the rules, and theory conflicts 
with practice,211 (emphasis in original) V
Thus, one may ask: Given the “nature of the subject”, how then is it even possible 
to attempt at providing a theory of war?
ii. Clausewitz, Theorizing...
The answer lies in one of the most curious, and by far the most interesting, 
sections of his famous text, On War, titled, ‘On the Theory of War’. After 
engaging in a brief discussion between the understandings of ‘war’ as a ‘science’ 
and as an ‘art’, which is not of primary interest to us here, Clausewitz then








proceeded to identify the “Alternatives which Make a Theory Possible”.212 
Clausewitz’s central concern was to highlight how ‘theory’ need not necessarily 
conflict with ‘reality’ -  a criticism that he continually levied on his predecessors 
and their ultra rationalistic theories of war. Though the problem associated with 
‘reality’ is essentially an ontological one, Clausewitz began by suggesting that 
“[I]t is the task of theory...to study the nature of ends and means”213 thus calling 
for a consideration of the problem in epistemological terms. Further Clausewitz 
insisted on such an epistemological consideration by defining ‘war’ as “fighting, 
for fighting is the only effective principle in the manifold activities generally 
designated as war.”214 The significance of this, Clausewitz pointed out, lay in the 
fact that a general theory which purports to be “valid for the majority of the cases 
and not completely unsuitable for any...must be based on the most prevalent
i r
means and their most significant effects.” To further reiterate the point, 
Clausewitz also draws our attention to the two main categories that characterize 
war, namely, the preparations for war, and war proper.216
Following through with this program, Clausewitz’s next attempted to 
identify what he perceived to be the “Principle Problems in Formulating a Theory 
of the Conduct of War.”217 As pointed out earlier, Clausewitz suggested that 
‘theory should be study, not doctrine’. When read in the context of the principle
Ibid, p 140 
Ibid, p 146 
Ibid, p 127 
Ibid, p 128 
Ibid, p 131 
Ibid, p 137
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problems that are confronted while formulating a general theory of war such as, 
the ‘effects of danger’, intellectual qualities, moral forces and effects’, and the 
uncertainty of information, we find that Clausewitz’s attempt was not so much to 
erect an immutable, indestructible and universal ‘architecture’ of war, rather, it 
was an attempt to lay out the field of war -  a space or a domain that would, in his 
words,
admit the feasibility of a satisfactory theory of war -  one that will be o f real 
service and will never conflict with reality. It only needs [according to 
Clausewitz] intelligent treatment to make it conform to action, and to end the 
absurd difference between theory and practice that unreasonable theories have so 
often evoked.218 (my emphasis)
This, as we have seen, Clausewitz proceeded to do by delineating the “concepts of 
method and routine...that governs the world of action like a duly constituted 
authority.”219 Only after repeatedly clarifying the epistemological implications of 
the problem, did Clausewitz partially address the ontological dimensions of the 
problem by suggesting that the primary purpose of any theory was “to clarify 
concepts and ideas”.220
Clausewitz identified ‘law’, ‘principle’, ‘rule’, ‘regulations and directives’ 
and ‘method’ as being “the logical hierarchy that governs...action.”221 But, he 
was too astute and philosophically-minded to fall into the trap of propounding
218 Ibid, p 142
219 Ibid, p 151
220 Ibid, p 132





laws that could or would rigidly govern ‘war’ and in this he clearly 
distinguished himself from his illustrious predecessors. Clausewitz chose to 
ignore the two narrow and formal understandings of ‘law’— first, ‘as a matter of 
cognition’ where it is ‘the relationship between things and their effects’, and 
second, “as a matter of will...synonymous with decree and prohibition.”222 
Instead, Clausewitz artfully opted for an understanding of ‘law’, which in his own 
words,
...is the broadest concept applicable to both perception and action. In its  li te r a l  
sen se , th e  term  o b v io u s ly  co n ta in s  a  su b je c tiv e , a rb i tr a r y  e lem en t, a n d  y e t  it 
e x p re s se s  th e  v e ry  th in g  on w h ich  m an a n d  h is en v iro n m en t e s s e n tia lly  d e p e n d ,223 
(my emphasis)
This he related to the notion of ‘principles’. Consider, for example, the 
following:
In the conduct of war, perception cannot be governed by laws: the complex 
phenomena of war are not so uniform, nor the uniform phenomena so complex, 
as to make laws more useful than the simple truth....Nor can the theory of war 
apply the concept of law to action, since no prescriptive formulation is universal 
enough to deserve the name of law be applied to the constant change and 
diversity of the phenomena of war.224
For any theorist attempting to develop and articulate a ‘general theory of war’, 





phenomenon of war may be a universal one, its particular manifestations are too 
complex and diverse to be codified under the heading of ‘laws’. But Clausewitz 




.. .law[s] of action, but not in its formal, definitive meaning; [they] represent only 
the spirit and the sense of the law: in cases where the diversity of the real world 
cannot be contained within the rigid form of law, the application of principle 
allows for a greater latitude of judgment.225
Further, Clausewitz drew a distinction between an objective principle and a 
subjective one where the former was based on objective truths, while the latter on 
subjective considerations. In this way, Clausewitz was able to close the gap 
between ‘rules’, and ‘laws’ by emphasizing, a trifle disingenuously, on their being 
roughly “synonymous with principle”.226 Clausewitz thus indicated that ‘laws’, 
‘principles’ and ‘rules’ -  understood in the above sense - “enables us to derive a 
general law of action”.227 In the context of this study, it is important to mark that 
this is nothing less than a statement exclaiming the strategic intent of Clausewitz’s 
celebrated, albeit incomplete, work, On War - an intent to provide a ‘general 
theory of not simply the manifestations of war, but also of the phenomenon of war 
itself.





Admittedly, Clausewitz related this most curious assessment to a narrower 
discussion of strategy’ and ‘tactics’, but the implications of his theory-building 
exercise cannot be missed. Simply put, what Clausewitz was engaging in was the 
development o f a structure o f thinking that would guide not simply the 
employment o f strategy and tactics in the conduct o f  war, but also a general 
strategic mode o f thinking about ‘war’. In other words, ‘principles’ and ‘method’
both of which, it will be appreciated, are descriptive and prescriptive in nature 
form the sinews of a patently Clausewitzian architectonic of war.228
Recall, in this context, Clausewitz’s letter to Marie (1809). In it he wrote:
...It is really astonishing to find people who waste their time on such efforts, 
when one bears in mind that precisely that which is the most important in war 
and strategy, namely the great particularity, peculiarity, and local circumstances, 
escape these abstractions and scientific systems.229
228 O f course, scholars like Bassford will argue this differently. Thus, for example, note what he says in the 
context o f  how to read Clausewitz: “There are essentially two ways to read Clausewitz. The first is to pore 
through the pages o f  On War looking for practical hints and military prescriptions. These are certainly 
present, despite Clausewitz's insistence that fundamental theory must be descriptive, not prescriptive.” 
Further, in a related footnote, Bassford criticizes Keegan for ignoring this. Therein he notes: “K eegan... 
ignores this fundamental o f  Clausewitzian theory and says that Clausewitz was "struggling to advance a 
universal theory o f  what war ought to be, rather than what it actually was and had been." (emphasis in 
original) See, Christopher Bassford, “John Keegan and the Grand Tradition o f  Trashing Clausewitz: A 
Polem ic”, in War and History, v .l ,  no.3 (November 1994). It is interesting to note that the footnote quoted 
in its entirety above critiques Keegan for assuming that Clausewitz was advancing a universal theory o f  
‘what war ought to b e’. The critique is not about Keegan assuming that Clausewitz was indeed 
propounding a universal theory o f  war. Read in this way, it could thus be said that Bassford does not 
contest the notion that Clausewitz was propounding a ‘universal theory o f  war’. Seen in this light, then, 
how ever valid Bassford’s immediate critique o f  K eegan’s reading o f  Clausewitz maybe, nevertheless, 
essentially, a ‘universal theory o f  war’ is not limited to a descriptive role, it is prescriptive too else the word 
‘universal’ loses, for lack o f  a better word, its universality.
229Quoted in Gat, A H istory o f  M ilitary Thought, pp 194-95
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Thus, unlike Guibert or, more to the point, Jomini, Clausewitz desisted from 
producing an architecture’ of war, rather, he made allowance for ‘chance’, 
diversity and the ‘unknown’ by positing ‘laws’ (‘...the broadest concept 
applicable... ), principles, and rules, which serve to enable, in his words “an 
analytical investigation leading to a close acquaintanceship with the subject [of 
wav]...The closer it comes to that goal, the more it proceeds from the objective 
form o f a science to the subjective form o f a skill.. .”230 ( m y  emphasis) Note how 
Clausewitz, with consummate care, deftly navigated through the ‘dogmatic’ 
grounds occupied by his predecessors. To appreciate Clausewitz’s theoretical 
dexterity and the impact it had on his project as a whole it is necessary to take a 
step back and briefly remind ourselves of the influence that the philosophies of 
the Romantic Age had on the evolution and development of military theory and 
the study of war.
Perhaps an adequate and pertinent summation of the mood of the 
Romantic philosophy at the time may be found in Victor Hugo’s proclamation,
9 T 1“All systems are false; only genius is true.” It will be recalled that one of the 
most critical factors that distinguished the Romantics from their predecessors was 
the former’s resistance to the...
230 C lausewitz, On War, p 141 It is necessary to note that the apparent distinction between Jomini and 
C lausewitz, as has been suggested by a number o f  military theorists and scholars, may not be as clear-cut as 
they m ay have suggested. For a cogent analysis o f  the inter-relationship between Jomini and Clausewitz, 
see, Christopher Bassford, “Jomini and Clausewitz: Their Interaction”, Georgia State University, 26 
February 1993. See also, Major Francis S. Jones (USAF). "Analysis and Comparison o f  the Ideas and Later 
Influences o f  Henri Jomini and Carl von Clausewitz", Paper, M axwell Air Force Base, AL: Air Command 
and Staff C ollege, April 1985.






...rational tidiness of the Enlightenment...a rational world that could be 
examined, understood, and controlled by Reason...[wherein]...[T]he methods 
and principles of natural science were to be applied to a whole range of human 
experience, including the moral universe, to reveal the rational simplicity of 
reality.232
In this way, Romantic philosophy, in general, eschewed the strict bounds of the 
rational and was more concerned with the non-rational. It will also be recalled that 
Kant - “a consummation of the Enlightenment...[and]...as a wellspring of 
German Idealism”233- while working to position Reason as the ‘highest tribunal’, 
also made room for what he called the ‘antinomy’.234 This was nothing less than a 
tacit acknowledgment, by Kant, that even from within the prism of ‘pure reason’, 
there were some things that Reason itself could not address. Among other things, 
this also allowed for a refocusing on the possibility of Chance which, till then 
was, as Lynn puts it, “...a threat to the predictable and the regular...[It] now
9 9 Sbecame a major factor, an unavoidable and accepted determinant.”
Not surprisingly, Clausewitz followed a similar trajectory. As we have 
seen, having first critiqued what he considered as the straitjacketed approach of 
his predecessors to the study of war, Clausewitz began to develop a more flexible 
approach -  an architectonic -  in which allowances could be made not only for all 
that lay within, but also potentially beyond the reach of Reason. In this way, 
Clausewitz was also attempting to account for -  to take stock of - probabilities,
Lynn, B attle: A H istory o f  Combat and Culture from  Ancient G reece to M odern Am erica, p 190
Lynn' B attle: A H istory o f  Com bat and Culture from  Ancient G reece to M odern America, p 191 
C aygill, A K ant D ictionary, p 75-77.





chance, and the unexpected. What is novel about Clausewitz is the tack that he 
took to address this problematic and it is, quite justifiably, one of the lasting 
legacies that Clausewitz has left to the study of war.
(de) Constructing War, absolutely...really...
Clausewitz defined war as “an act of force to compel our enemy to do our
9)236will.” Noting in passing the striking similarity between this definition and 
Vattel’s view on the ‘object’ of war which, as we have seen, ‘was to do whatever 
is necessary to bring an opponent to ‘reason’,237 we find that Clausewitz was also 
careful to base his definition on ‘hostile intentions’, which he qualified in the 
following manner:
...Two different motives make men fight one another: hostile feeling and hostile 
intentions.... Even the most savage, most instinctive, passion of hatred cannot be 
conceived as existing without hostile intent...it is the most universal 
element...[I]t would be an obvious fallacy to imagine war between civilized 
peoples as resulting merely from a rational act on the part of...governments and 
to conceive of war as gradually ridding itself of passion...That would be a kind 
of war by algebra.238 (emphasis in original)
Clausewitz then drew three conclusions from this. First, he identified two primary 
aspects of war -  Absolute War and Real War; second, he concluded that ‘the 
original motive’ for war resided in its ‘political object’, and third, he concluded -
Clausewitz, On War, p 75
See http://www.lonang.com/exlibris/vattel/. Book 3, Chapter 3, #  26. See above, p 47.
Clausewitz, On War, p 76
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no other human activity is so continuously or universally bound up with 
chance. These conclusions enabled Clausewitz to propose what has since
become famous as the paradoxical trinity of war. In his words...
...War is more than a true chameleon that slightly adapts its characteristics to the 
given case. As a total phenomenon its dominant tendencies always make war a 
paradoxical trinity -  composed of primordial violence, hatred, and enmity, which 
are to be regarded as a blind natural force; of the play of chance and probability 
within which the creative spirit is free to roam; and of its element of 
subordination, as an instrument of policy, which makes it subject to reason 
alone.240 (my emphasis)
Thus, if we could speak of the ‘components’ of war then, based on the above, they 
would be (1) a blind natural force and, (2) the (inter)play of chance and 
probability.241 The third element was not strictly a component of war -  it was an 
indication, albeit a critical one, of war’s potentiality to be instrumentalized. Thus, 
when Clausewitz mentions that the motive of war lies in its political object, we 
should be careful to recognize that he is not referring to war as an originary 
condition or phenomenon, rather, he is pointing to the domain within which the 
phenomenon of war is most likely to be triggered and actualized. For Clausewitz, 
therefore, in originary terms, war’s principal components were only two in 
number - blind natural force and the play of chance.
239 Ibid, pp 75-89, 85
240 Ibid, P89 . • . ,
241 Katherine l .  Herbig makes a similar point though, as we will, see H erw igs assessm ent is deeply 
problematic indeed contradictory, when w e discuss the Chance and the Genius below . See Katherine L. 
Herbig, “Chance and Uncertainty in On War” in Clausewitz and M odern Strategy, Ed. Michael Handel, 






Recall that Clausewitz’s stated objective was to devise a ‘methodical 
procedure.. .to meet the most probable cases.. .based on the average probability of 
analogous cases. Its aim...to postulate an average truth’. The critical move that 
Clausewitz made in this context was to postulate an a priori distinction within the 
concept of ‘war’ in terms of Absolute and Real War and by establishing by 
identifying the limit of Reason in the phenomenon of Absolute War. Thus, early 
in On War, he presented the “essence of war...as an eruption of force and 
violence”,242 which he understood as ‘true war, or absolute war’.243 For 
Clausewitz, this ‘true war, or absolute war’, was nothing but “a struggle for life 
and death -  a struggle, that is, in which at least one of the parties is determined to 
gain a decision.”244 The implicit annihilation that awaited the participants of an 
Absolute War -  going by its logic of strikes and counter-strikes -  was a fact that 
was not underestimated by Clausewitz. Indeed, he frequently cites the example of 
the campaigns of Napoleon as being a proximal condition of Absolute War in 
Real terms. As a point of passing interest -  we should bear in mind that some 
scholars, particularly Gat, suggest that Clausewitz’s later writings indicate that it 
was on this very point that “Clausewitz’s view of the nature of war as all-out 
fighting, centering on the engagement, fell into crisis.”245 For our purposes, 
however, we only need take note of the following:
Gat, A H istory o f  M ilitary Thought, p 225
Clausewitz, On War, pp 488-489
Ibid, p 488
Gat, A H istory o f  M ilitary Thought, p 215
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1. First, Clausewitz’s analysis of the theories of his predecessors - informed 
by a close examination of military history - suggested to him that ‘the 
universally valid element’ of the conduct of war was ‘saturated by the urge 
for a decision’, which necessarily implied the absoluteness of violence - 
though he did accept that “[T]he age in which this postulate...was at its 
strongest was the most recent one,”246that is to say, the age preceding 
his.247 Clausewitz insisted that ‘absolute war’ was an expression of the 
logical necessity to overthrow the enemy; it is the succession of blows and 
counter-blows struck with almost equal energy.248 In other words, 
Absolute War, presuming no external influence, was the maximum effort - 
applied repeatedly - at a decisive point - for a decisive decision - with a 
single logical object: Absolute defeat of an enemy. This ‘logic’ was, in 
Clausewitz’s words, war’s “...natural tendency ...in its philosophical and 
strict logical sense alone and does not refer to the tendencies o f the 
forces ...including... the morale and emotions o f the combatants.”249 (my 
emphasis) Clausewitz further asserted that this logic remained true 
regardless of whether war was a duel between two contestants, or a hostile 
engagement between coalitions of nations. Based on the above, it could 
then be said that Absolute War -  that is, the logic of war -  displays two 
characteristics: (1) by virtue of being, at the least, co-constituted by ‘blind
246Clausewitz, On War, p 593
247 C lausewitz, On War, pp 488-489
248 Ibid, p 579 . . , « , , . . i ,
249 Ibid p 89 N ote that Clausewitz, elsewhere in On War, insists that war has no logic, it only has a
grammar’. This is, to say the least, a most curious statement for Clausewitz is claiming that a ‘grammar’ is 
bereft o f  logic.
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natural force’, it was, to some measure, independent of the political 
because as a pure expression of blind natural force, the ‘succession of 
blows and counter-blows’ need have no basis in the political and (2) when 
this blind natural force did manifest itself within the political, it could 
potentially “usurp the place of policy the moment policy had brought it 
into being; it would then drive policy out of office and rule by the laws o f
, ,250its own nature.” (my emphasis) We need to be careful here. Clausewitz
insists that “in the field of abstract thought...it [i.e., war] reaches the 
extreme, for here it is dealing with an extreme: a clash o f forces freely 
operating and obedient to no law but their own...an almost invisible 
sequence o f logical subtleties. (my emphasis) Clausewitz absolutely 
insists that this ‘logic’ of war that determines the ‘succession of blows and 
counter-blows’ is not simply an in-human logic, but also a non-human 
logic. Thus, we would do well to resist the temptation of overlaying this 
non-human logic of Absolute War with peculiarly anthropocentric hues.
It is equally critical that we recognize Clausewitz’s subtle but 
simultaneous assignment of two versions of Absolute war -  as the ‘logic 
of war’ independent of the political and as ‘the logic of war’ at the 
disposal/ service of the political. But Clausewitz’s initial assessment of the 
dangers posed by Absolute War -  as the logic of war -  regardless of it 
being either subject to the political or not remained unchanged. He
contended that the logic of war — in the Absolute sense - devoid of 
emotion, morale and feelings — was marked by its desire for the 
annihilation/ the absolute defeat of the enemy and thus was dangerous and 
destructive.252 Indeed, he also added the corollary that like in its ‘true’ 
state, this logic -  even when manifested within the political - was equally 
(more to the point, materially) destructive and, therefore, dangerous — as, 
Clausewitz claimed, it was in the hands of Napoleon.253 Thus, it is not 
surprising that Clausewitz insisted that any theory of war must make room 
for Absolute War. Indeed, according to Clausewitz, Absolute War must be 
the principle that is invoked to “form a general point of reference, so that 
he who wants to learn from theory becomes accustomed to keeping that in 
view constantly, to measuring all his hopes and fears by it, and to 
approximating it when he can or when he must.”254(emphasis in original) It 
is important, at the risk of repeating ourselves, to emphasize that the 
principle of Absolute War, for Clausewitz, lay in its ‘logic’ and not in its 
instrumentality. The latter -  as in the case of Napoleon, Caesar and 
Alexander -  were mere instances of the Absolute principle in operation in 
the expanse of history and in the space and service of the political. A point 
of interest that is of relevance and here and which we will consider in 
some detail in the succeeding chapters is that this Clausewitzian concept
252 Note: Clausewitz, as this study suggests, implies a non-human conception o f  the ‘logic o f  war’. In this 
sense, it is outside the framework o f  Reason. But, as w e will see, this is also strictly not the case.
253 Ibid, p 592-593
254 Ibid, p 581
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of Absolute War (i.e., the logic of Absolute War) bears a startling 




2. Second, Clausewitz’s historical research also showed him that though this 
‘logic of war’ may be a ‘universal element’ and in this sense, ‘the rule’, 
the history of warfare in every age and country, paradoxically, showed 
that the majority of wars/ campaigns did not even approximate the 
universal element, thereby making the latter seem more of an exception 
rather than the rule.255 Gat suggests that this discovery posed a dilemma to 
Clausewitz and that, as a consequence, Clausewitz found his ‘lifelong 
conception of theory’ being shattered.256 Contrarily, this study suggests 
that the issue at stake is not whether Clausewitz’s ‘concept of war’ 
(Absolute War, which we have discussed in terms of the logic of war 
within and without a political context) failed to pass the test of experience. 
Nor is it the case that “the unity of the phenomenon of war, based on a 
lasting spirit that encompassed the diversity of forms, disintegrated; and 
the practical imperatives derived from this spirit -  the significant content 
of theory -  lost their validity.”257 It is simply that Clausewitz deduced -  
based on the evidence of his historical research -  that the ‘logic of war’ 
that he identified as Absolute War was incomplete. It needed to address, 
by including within its ambit, the element of possibilities, probabilities, 
chance and uncertainties to be fully workable. Clausewitz’s historical
C lausewitz, On War, p 501; Gat, p A H istory o f  M ilitary Thought, p 212-216
C lausewitz, On War, p 488-489, Gat, A H istory o f  M ilitary Thought, p 215
Gat, A H isto iy  o f  M ilitary Thought, p 216
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researches also showed that in this expanded form a theory of war could 
indeed be devised that could conceivably accommodate the rich, wide and 
varying particularities of history.258
3. Third, and most tantalizingly, Clausewitz fleetingly refers to ‘the pure 
concept of war’.259 It will be recollected that, for Clausewitz, the dual 
forces that tempered the Absolute logic of war were, on the one hand, 
reason (the political) and on the other, the interplay of possibilities, 
probabilities - of good and bad luck -  and of instances in which strict 
logical reasoning often plays no part at all. These latter forces, Clausewitz 
reminded us, “[were] always apt to be a most unsuitable and awkward 
intellectual tool.”260 Now, an overwhelming number of scholars and 
theorists view the interplay of possibilities and probabilities, collectively 
‘chance and uncertainty’, as a qualification, albeit an important one, of 
Absolute War (that is, the logic of war) -  a qualification that allows for the 
phenomenon of Absolute War to be experienced as Real War. This is not 
surprising as such a qualified understanding of chance and uncertainty is 
also textually supported in On War. Thus, for instance, we find Clausewitz 
musing about the following:
Why is it that the theoretical is not fulfilled in practice? The barrier in
question is the vast array of factors, forces and conditions in national
258 Clausewitz, On War, p 579-81
259 See, for example, Clausewitz, On W ar,p l%
260 Ibid, p 581
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affairs that are affected by war...Logic comes to a stop in this 
labyrinth...This inconsistency...is the reason why war turns into 
something quite different from what it should be according to its 
concept...turns into something incoherent and incomplete.261
Here, quite obviously, Clausewitz is qualifying, that is to say, he is 
marking out a distance between Absolute War and Real War — that is to 
say, between the theory and practice (of war) -  and points to a ‘non­
conducting medium’, in which “[N]o logical sequence could progress...as 
it were a simple thread that linked two deductions.”262 But it is also 
interesting to note that he is simultaneously pointing to another condition 
-  a condition referred to by Clausewitz as ‘the pure concept of war’ which 
he, by what can be described as a sleight of hand, conflated with principle 
of Absolute War. Note what Clausewitz says:
...the natural aim of military operations is the enemy’s overthrow, and 
that s tr ic t  a d h eren ce  to  th e  lo g ic  o f  the c o n c e p t can, in th e  la s t an a lys is , 
a d m it no o th e r . . .w e  sh o w e d  h ow  fa c to r s  in h eren t in th e  w a r-m a ch in e  
i t s e l f  can  in terru p t a n d  m o d ify  th e  p r in c ip le  o f  en m ity  a s  e m b o d ie d  in its 
agen t, man, a n d  in a ll  th a t g o e s  to  m ake  up w a i f  a re . Still, that process of 
modification is by no means adequate to span the gap between the pure 
concept of war and the concrete form that, as a general rule, war 
assumes .. .G e n e r a lly  it is .n o t a  c a se  in w h ich  tw o  m u tu a lly  d e s tru c tiv e  
e lem en ts  co llide , b u t one o f  ten sion  b e tw een  tw o  e lem en ts , s e p a r a te  f o r
261 Ibid p 579 Note Gat in his H istory o f  M ilitary Thought, translates . ..d e r  philosophischen  
V orstellunzsw eise  ’as ‘philosophical conception’, (p 221) whereas Howard and Paret in their standard 
translation o f  On War render it as “the theoretical concept”. W e have follow ed the Howard/ Paret version.
262 C lausewitz, On War, p 579
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the time being, which discharge energy> in discontinuous, minor 
shocks.263 (emphasis mine)
As we have seen, and as Clausewitz reiterates in the passage above, the 
logic of Absolute War is all-encompassing for it allows no other. The 
logic of Absolute War dictates that two elements will collide in a mutually 
destructive manner from which there is no possibility of escape. The 
outcome of the progress of such a logic will, therefore, be either the 
annihilation of any one party or (particularly in the nuclear age) the mutual 
destruction of both participants. While it may not be possible for us 
(humans) to identify or assign a meaning to the logic operative in such a 
condition, it can, however, be rationally calculated. This remains the case 
even if we take into account the myriad of instances where chance and 
uncertainty make their presence felt as the fog and friction of (absolute) 
war generated within and experienced by the ‘war-machine’. In the 
context of the ‘concrete form’ of Real War, the play of chance and 
uncertainty is even more pronounced, though the pronouncement is more 
in the form of additional complexities that are factored into war and its 
conduct. Clausewitz also notes that the ‘process of modification’, that is to 
say, the factors -  collectively, chance and uncertainty -that temper the 
logic of Absolute War and which apply to the more concrete form of Real 
War do not span the gap between these two ‘faces’ of war. Note that 
Clausewitz here - operating within a Kantian regime of Reason -  is not
263 Clausewitz, On War, p 579
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suggesting that Absolute War or Real War is incomprehensible or 
incoherent. But he does say that the gap between the theory and practice of 
war is incomprehensible and incoherent — a condition in which logic (and 
one could add Reason) comes to an end. Note also that this condition is in 
excess of not simply Real War, but also of Absolute War. This study 
contends that this excessive condition -  that which stands in stark contrast 
to both Absolute and Real war - is the concept of ‘pure war’ that 
Clausewitz fleetingly refers to. It is further suggested that Clausewitz was 
fully cognizant with the force of this concept and recognizing its potency 
was forced to constrain it to as far an extent as possible. It is important to 
reemphasize that this space occupied by the pure concept of war is one of 
absolute incomprehension, where the Other of Reason comes into play. 
From Clausewitz’s point of view, this situation would have been 
untenable. Thus, he insists on conflating this pure concept of war with 
Absolute War and then tempering the theory of Absolute War by being 
“...prepared to develop our concept of war...by leaving room for ever}' 
sort of extraneous matter.”264 Indeed, for Clausewitz, the critical series by 
which he developed his architectonic of war was nothing less than Pure 
War<>Absolute War<>Real War. Note that pure war is tempered by the 
affixation of a logic (which under some circumstances may be 
comprehensible, but not always necessarily so), which yields the 
phenomenon of Absolute War. To Absolute War, a number of orders of 
chance and uncertainty are added -  such as the fog and friction of war,
264 Clausewitz, On War, p 580
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natural inertia...the friction of its parts, all the inconsistency, 
imprecision, and timidity of man; and finally the fact that war and its 
forms result from ideas, emotions, and conditions prevailing at the
• ,,265time” — that may be theoretically calculable, but practically very 
difficult to compute. This is the phenomenon of Real War. As we will see, 
however, the matter does not simply end there because, for Clausewitz, 
Chance (in extremis, as the anterior condition to Reason) also represented 
the possibility of Reason extending its dominion over that absolute Other 
of Reason. When considered, particularly in the latter way, Clausewitz’s 
introduction of Chance in the context of his theory of war was a move that 
ultimately served to ‘bring war to reason’.
On the question of why Clausewitz adopted this stance, the answers are 
many and some are quite obvious. Thus, for example, the intention to bind war 
within an architectonic of reason was one of Clausewitz’s stated objectives. It 
could also be the case that perhaps Clausewitz recognized that the phenomenon of 
war was something that while being apparently recognized and subject to critical 
analysis in political terms, was actually in excess of such circumscriptions. Thus, 
perhaps, his insistence on taking into account the concept of Absolute War 
(informed by the pure concept of war) within any consideration of war-as-such. 
Certainly, Clausewitz’s exposure to the philosophies of the Enlightenment would 
have imparted to him a confidence in the prospect of ultimately understanding the 
mysteries of nature. In equal measure, Clausewitz’s exposure to the Romantic
265 Clausewitz, On War, p 580
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philosophies of his time would have taught him to have a healthy respect for the 
unknown unknowns . Regardless, however, when viewed in the context of the 
strategic object of Clausewitz’s theorizing efforts, it is important for us to note 
that the recognition and introduction of Chance was nothing less than an enabling 
- co-constituting — principle that allowed him to design a viable architectonic of 
war itself
Recall that originally, for Clausewitz, Absolute War exhibits a logic bereft 
of any emotions, feeling and morale -  regardless of whether this logic is 
expressed within or without ‘the political’. If, as this study speculates, it was 
indeed the case that Clausewitz took the above view of Chance, that is to say, he 
recognized the presence of chance, as an anterior condition to the logic of war 
(Absolute War), then Clausewitz’s fleeting reference to ‘the pure concept of war’ 
remains in excess of Absolute War in both its senses - as the logic of war and/ or 
its destructive operation/ manifestation in the political context. This study 
suggests that for Clausewitz, the ‘pure concept o f war ’ was this excess that was 
anterior to Absolute and Real War. This concept o f war, in its originary purity, is 
spectral but Real. It eludes our efforts to grasp it; nevertheless, it leaves its 
empirical traces in the form o f chance and uncertainty.266 But when considered in 
the context of a theory-building exercise, as Clausewitz himself noted, this ‘pure 
concept of war (even in its modified form of Absolute War) was an unreliable
266 N ote that the notion o f  ‘chance’ being invoked in this specific context is different from that used by 
C lausewitz as an instrument to ‘tam e’ the phenomenon o f  war. W e will have occasion to take a closer look  
at this ‘other’ notion o f  chance when we investigate Clausewitz’s strategizing o f  chance and uncertainty 
below .
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tool. Thus, in theoretical and operational terms, Clausewitz used ‘chance and 
uncertainty’ as an instrument -  like the political -  to temper and reign in the 
incoherence of the ‘pure concept of war’ by making it Real as Absolute War, 
which in turn was made material as Real War.267 This Clausewitzian gesture 
speaks volumes for by it he not only obviated the need to ignore chance and 
uncertainty which, going by his own arguments, could only be ignored at one’s 
peril, but also revealed much about the ‘pure concept of war’ which proved to be 
ungraspable in the Real despite the empirical traces left by it. In this way, as we 
can see, all along, at a subtle philosophical level, the central problem that 
Clausewitz was confronting, and proactively working to address, was nothing less 
than the problem posed by the question: ‘how to think when thinking is chaotic at 
its core’?
Put in this way, it is easy to understand why Clausewitz may have 
struggled with the idea. It is obvious that implicit in the Clausewitz’s ‘pure 
concept of war’ there is an apparently unbearable tension. This is reflected in 
Clausewitz’s insistence on the absolute inability of Reason to apply reason to the 
pure concept of war. Then again, it should also be mentioned that Clausewitz -  in 
keeping with his times - was also fairly confident of Reason’s ability to extend its
267 To be fair, this point o f  view  is held by a number o f  students o f  Clausewitz. What these scholars say is 
that Clausewitz view ed the phenomena o f  chance and uncertainty as prospects...opportunities...situations 
that can be taken advantage of. Indeed, Clausewitz h im self says so in On War. What these scholars do not 
highlight and what Clausewitz does not point out, however, is how  this stance -  that o f  exploiting chance - 
adopted by Clausewitz also reveals much about his strategic object -  to devise an architectonic within 
which the discussion o f  war could possibly take place.
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reach by conquering Chance and subordinating it to Itself.268 Indeed, after the 
publication and acceptance of Kant’s First Critique, Reason had subordinated 
itself to the highest tribunal -  Itself. But while doing so, it also had to 
acknowledge its own limit. Note what Kant says in the Preface to The Critique o f 
Pure Reason: "Human reason has a peculiar fate in one kind of its cognitions: it is 
troubled by questions that it cannot dismiss, because they are posed to it by the 
nature of reason itself, but that it cannot answer, because they surpass human 
reason’s every ability.”269 The question regarding Chance was one potent example 
of Reason confronting that which surpassed human reason’s every ability. But this 
did not mean that Reason did not either resist or even proactively combat its 
Other. Thus equipped, Clausewitz began his tentative attempt to bridge the gap 
between the a priori concept of war -  that is to say the pure concept of war 
disguised as Absolute War - and the experience of Real War.270 As we will see, 
this ‘hope’, in Hacking’s words, to ‘tame chance’ assumed an even more real 
presence with the advent of the Age of Information. 7
However plausible and delicate the above argument may seem, we should 
not be too hasty in accepting Clausewitz’s view that the pure concept of war was 
totally beyond reason and thus only needed an architectonic fashioned in part by
268 This is, in part, brilliantly documented by Ian Hacking in his The Emergence o f  Probability: A 
Philosophical Study o f  E arly Ideas about Probability, Induction and Statistical Inference, (Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1999)
269 Kant, Critique o f  Pure Reason, (A  vii), p 5. It is curious to note that despite the ‘other-ness’ o f  Chance 
to Reason, nevertheless, they remained ‘adjacent’ to each other.
270 Gat puts it well when he writes: “The young Clausewitz now developed a different, more 
comprehensive, and sophisticated synthesis o f  the new  intellectual themes, stressing the diversity and living 
nature o f  human reality and centering on the conceptions o f  rules, genius, moral forces, factors o f  
uncertainty, and history.” Gat, A H istory o f  M ilitary Thought, p 176.
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the political and Chance. A careful second look at the above analysis already 
points to a partial tempering of the phenomenon of war that was always/ already 
at work in Clausewitz’s theoretical efforts. Indeed, this element of ‘tempering’ is 
visible in one of the primary co-constituents of what Clausewitz, as we have seen, 
identified as the phenomenon of war - the ‘logic of war’ itself. Note that 
Clausewitz persistently describes the ‘logic of war’ as being mutually destructive 
for the combatants involved in it. Even i f  we disregard, as Clausewitz does, the 
elements o f morale, feelings and emotions in the context o f Absolute War, it is 
impossible to ignore the thanatological consequences that accompany the ‘logic 
o f war’. This is true not simply in the case of Real War, but also is implicit in the 
logic of Absolute War and in the Clausewitzian notion of pure war. In this light, it 
would appear that Land’s circumscription of war by Thanatos was always-already 
a consideration in Clausewitz’s theoretical efforts. For Clausewitz, War had 
always-already been subjected to, if not Reason per se, then at least to a 
thanatological ordering’. This, in a very material sense, marked the circle that 
circumscribed his understanding of the phenomenon of war -  pure or otherwise. 
In this way, this study suggests, the Limit of ‘the pure concept of War’, for 
Clausewitz, was thanatologically (pre)determined. Thus, Clausewitz’s ‘pure 
concept of war’, it would seem, was not all that ‘pure’ after all.
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The Mesh and Net, architectonically speaking..
While we will return to the above in short order, for our immediate 
purposes, however, we should not fail to acknowledge the deftness with which 
Clausewitz conducts the discussion on the distinction between Absolute War, 
Real War, and this ‘pure concept of War’. This, as we have seen, is reminiscent of 
the maneuver by which Kant had ‘linked the theoretical problem of the a priori to 
spontaneity and freedom, and through them to practical philosophy.’271 Also like 
Kant, Clausewitz sought to ground ‘the pure concept of war’ in an architectonic 
such that, as an a priori principle/ rule, it would (1) legitimize not only the 
formalization of an architectonic of war, but also, (2) canonize how the 
architectonic was designed thereby, ultimately, bringing war to reason.272 
Clausewitz’s sketching out of an architectonic of war, thus, was nothing less than 
an attempt to ‘tame’ a phenomenon that - to him - was in excess of the scientific 
laws of reason and which was inextricably laced with blind natural force and 
chance.273 The development of an architectonic, Clausewitz realized, was the only
way by which he could effect the maneuver that Kant had exercised when the 
latter had discussed Religion within the Limits of Reason. It is, therefore,
271 Caygill, A Kant D ictionary, p 37
272 M ichael Handel indirectly alludes to this. He says: “In developing a theoretical ideal type linked to 
reality by intervening variables, Clausewitz managed to construct a concise framework incorporating all 
elem ents necessary for the study o f  war.” See Clausewitz and M odern Strategy, Ed. Michael Handel, p 5. It 
should be noted that Handel does not make the distinction within the concept o f  Absolute War as we have 
done. Handel is, however, alluding to the Clausewitzian architectonic that we have referred to earlier.
273 There is no evidence to suggest that Clausewitz considered the ‘pure concept o f  war’ and its closely  
related corollary, Absolute War, in the terms suggested by this study -  particularly in Chapter One. This 
study, on its part, does not suggest this either. However, as w e will see, Clausewitz did confront an instance 
o f  what D eleuze referred to as ‘pure im manence’ in the form o f  chance and uncertainty, which were also, 
follow ing the argument above, co-constituents o f  the pure concept o f  war .
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important for us to recognize that Clausewitz’s grand/ meta strategic objective in 
the conceptualization and writing of On War was nothing less than to ‘discuss 
War within the Limits of Reason’. This was the Mesh and the Net that Clausewitz 
cast over the phenomenon of war.
Clausewitz adopts two simultaneous and co-existent strategies to effect 
this maneuver. First, he subordinates war to politics, and second, he makes space 
for the Genius as Commander which, this study contends, was Clausewitz’s way 
of instrumentalizing Chance, thereby making it into a hand-maiden of the Genius 
and ultimately to the phenomenon of war. As we have already seen, there were 
very good reasons for Clausewitz to effect this maneuver. It is indeed a telling 
commentary on the conceptual power and force of Clausewitz’s philosophy of 
war that today when we speak of the Clausewitzian theory of war or, more 
commonly, of war in general, we tend to ignore -  rather, we presume - these a 
priori elements within the concept of war operative in Clausewitz’s work. Thus, 
we remain content to problematize war within the architectonic -  the theoretical, 
indeed ontological, Mesh and Net - erected by Clausewitz and underwritten by a 
very Kantian understanding of Reason posited as an a priori concept/ principle.
Clausewitz set the strategic priority of his intellectual exercise by stating 
that his task “[was] to develop a theory that maintains a balance between...three 
tendencies, like an object suspended between three magnets.”274 These three 
tendencies, of course, are the famed trinity of war -  blind force, chance and the
274Clausewitz, On War, p 86.
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subordination of war to policy/ politics. As we have already seen, two elements of 
this trinity, namely, blind force and chance were ruled out by Clausewitz as being 
controllable. Thus, Clausewitz had to devise another method that would give 
substance to his efforts to devise an appropriate theory of war. This he undertook 
to achieve by re-emphasizing the elevated location and role of 'politics' (this 
geared to temper the element of 'blind natural force') and by positing the role and 
function of the Genius as Commander (this geared to contend with the vagaries of 
chance and uncertainty.)
Handel echoes the majority of Clausewitzian scholars when he suggests 
that “Clausewitz's greatest contribution to the study of war -  his Copemican 
revolution, so to speak -  was his emphasis on the centrality of politics in war.”2 ^  
Further, Handel notes...
Clausewitz demonstrated that war makes sense only as an extension of the logic 
of political action. War divorced from political life is pointless, for ideally, 
politics pursues a rational goal by enhancing the welfare and interests of the 
state. This [Handel claims] is the axiomatic foundation of his [Clausewitz's] 
theory of war [which] as straightforward as the idea of the primacy of politics in 
war is, it is also the most difficult to accept and implement in time of war.276 (my 
emphasis)
Yet, as we have seen, Clausewitz did not begin from the premise of war being 
subject to politics. Contrarily, the ideal - the 'pure' form of war in the abstract -
275 C lausew itz and M odern Strategy, Ed. Michael Handel, p 7. Scholars and students o f  war and strategic 
studies repeat this refrain endlessly. Among them Raymond Aron, Michael Howard, Peter Paret,
Christopher Bassford, Martin van Crevald and Colin Gray are prominent names.
276 Ibid.
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had, for Clausewitz, very little to do with rational goals and the logic of political 
action. Though, as we have seen, it did not entirely escape the thanatological 
considerations implicit in Reason itself. We have also seen how this prospect 
brought Clausewitz to the very edge of Reason -  a situation similar to that what 
Kant had to contend with when Reason confronted an antimony, namely, the 
problem of Religion. The ‘canon’ represented by the above-quoted words of 
Handel -  by way of an example - does not read Clausewitz in this way. This 
inversion of Clausewitz's dilemma tragically trivializes a core problematic that 
Clausewitz (indeed any philosopher of war) had to (and has to) contend with - 
something that Hermann Kahn, in an apparently unrelated context, over a hundred 
years later, curiously phrased as -  ‘thinking about the unthinkable’.277 It would 
have been obvious by now that this study neither presumes such a reading of 
Clausewitz -  nor does it endorse such a trivialization of Clausewitz’s theoretical 
efforts.
Clausewitz's first intellectual problem, thus, may be encapsulated in his 
efforts to contend with the non-human logic of Absolute War. In other words, for 
Clausewitz, though he could discern a pattern in the machinations -  that is to say, 
the logic - of Absolute War, it also brought home to him - operating from within 
the Kantian regime of Reason - the very potent realness of the limits of Reason. 
After all, let us not forget that Absolute War was nothing more than a 
theoretically manageable guide to the incoherence of the ‘pure concept of war’.
277 Hermann Kahn, Thinking about the Unthinkable in the 1980s, (N ew  York, NY: Simon & Schuster,
1984)
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Under these circumstances, Clausewitz, quite naturally, would have found it 
increasingly difficult to theorize on war for, in philosophical terms, he would have 
had reached the 'maximal limits' of Reason. Among other things, this would have 
also conveyed to him the excess of war as a phenomenon which may also be cited 
as the primary reason as to why he was led to insist that no theorization of war 
could afford to ignore Absolute War as “a general point of reference”278 Among 
other things, this may be also be offered as evidence of Clausewitz’s (perhaps 
tacit) recognition that perhaps ‘war in its most extravagant, uninhibited and 
originary sense does not serve the State.’279 Recognizing the 'excess' of the 
phenomenon of war -  this not being necessarily limited to the wantonness of the 
violence that war entails -  Clausewitz found, in Handel's words, 'the logic of 
political action' as being a suitable but tenuous framework -  in Heideggerian 
terms, a gestell -  within which war could and would be contained.280 Thus, it is 
suggested, Clausewitz's positing of the rational order of politics was merely a 
guise by which he attempted to secure war within the realm of Reason. Of course, 
Clausewitz was astute enough to recognize that this gestell was a flimsy one -  as 
Napoleon had demonstrated. Nevertheless, he insisted on this gestell-ing because 
-  from his perspective, as Handel, among others, points out -  it was the only 
surety by which war could even be made sense of. Moreover, it also contributed
278 Clausewitz, On War, p 581
279 Land, Thirst fo r  Annihilation, p 150
280 Pursuant to this, Beyerchen writes: “Clausewitz understood political participation as stimulus for, 
exercise o f  and constraint upon power. He knew that neither the Revolution nor the reforms created to 
combat it could be rolled back for long, because, as he wrote in his manuscript On War, "...once barriers—  
w hich in a sense consist only in man’s ignorance o f  what is possible— are tom  down, they are not so easily 
set up again." See Alan Beyerchen, “Clausewitz, Non-Linearity and, the Importance o f  Imagery” in 
C om plexity, G lobal Politics a n d  National Security, Ed. Alberts & Czerwinski, (Washington, D.C.:
National D efense University, 1997).
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to his strategic intention — that of creating an architectonic which would enable a 
reasonable theorization of the problematic of war. It is in this sense that this study 
suggests that there is a very real possibility that Clausewitz may have been more 
than aware that -  in originary terms -  war was not an extension of policy, rather, 
as Foucault was to theorize over a century and half later, that policy was an 
extension of war by other means.281
The second strategic objective of Clausewitz's theoretical effort was to 
contend with Chance and uncertainty, which was even more problematic than the 
non-human logic of Absolute War. As we have seen, to all intents and purposes, 
and even reiterated a number of times by Clausewitz himself, the non-human 
logic of war is an abstraction - a referential point -  which, in the context of Real 
War, is unlikely to come to pass, though Clausewitz himself claimed to see - quite 
intimately - the very real possibility of Absolute War manifesting itself -  
becoming real - in the hands of Napoleon. Thus, just as it would have seemed to 
Clausewitz that he had succeeded in securing war within the confines of Reason, 
another factor raised its head. This time, however, the problem was subversive in 
nature and origin for it represented an internal or intensive quake with/ in Reason 
itself. This was the problem of Chance and Uncertainty. It is important for us to 
recognize that this problem was altogether a different matter as compared to the 
blind logic of the natural forces that, according to Clausewitz, co-constituted war 
and which he had quite dexterously succeeded in containing within the gestell of
281M ichel Foucault, Society Must be D efended -  Lectures at the C ollege de France 1975-76, Ed. Bertani &
Fontana,Trans. David Macy, (London: Allen Lane, 2003), p 15
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the rational order of politics. Clausewitz realized that Chance and uncertainty 
were even more problematic than the ‘blind forces of nature’ for unlike the latter, 
the former intruded like unwelcome guests into the gestell of not simply the 
rational order of politics, but also within Reason itself. If Clausewitz is revered 
today as a pre-eminent philosopher of war, it is primarily because of his efforts in 
contending with Chance and Uncertainty, which he theorized in terms of ‘fog and 
friction’ in war. This acknowledgment of Clausewitz’s insight is, to a great extent, 
warranted and justified.
As we have seen, the most common readings of Clausewitz’s work, 
particularly, his On War, have tended to lessen -  by inverting - the impact that 
Clausewitz may have intended to impart with his theorizations of Absolute War. 
In the case of chance and uncertainty, the literature -  with a few exceptions -  has 
simply tended to reiterate that chance and uncertainty are very critical elements in 
war and its conduct. But this is simply not enough. There is more to this problem 
than what a mere glance would suggest. To put it in very rudimentary terms - the 
problem posed by chance and uncertainty is the presence o f chance and 
uncertainty in itself. Recall in this context the manner in which Deleuze attempted 
to speak about ‘absolute immanence’. He said,
Absolute immanence is in itself: it is not in something, to something; it does not 
depend on an object or belong to a subject. [...] When the subject or the object 
falling outside the plane of immanence is taken as a universal subject or as any
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object to which immanence is attributed, [...] immanence is distorted, for it then 
finds itself enclosed in the transcendent282
This study contends that Clausewitz, in the form of chance and uncertainty, thus 
encountered an instance of what Deleuze refers to as ‘absolute immanence’ — 
though it is unlikely that Clausewitz would have recognized it as such. In this 
sense, Clausewitz faced nothing less than an ontological problem. In the context 
of this study, it is hoped that a closer examination of how (and to a lesser extent, 
why) Clausewitz came to address the question regarding chance and uncertainty 
will not only help us to recognize the enormity and scale of the Clausewitzian 
project, it will also assist us to confront the single most challenging aspect of any 
philosophy of war.
In Fortuna’s Camp
No other human activity is so continuously or universally bound up with chance. 
And through the element of chance, guesswork and luck come to play a great part 
in war...War is the realm of uncertainty; three quarters of the factors on which 
action in war is based are wrapped in a fog of greater or lesser uncertainty.. .war 
is a gamble.. .war resembles a game of cards.283
With these lines, Clausewitz opened his campaign against Chance and 
Uncertainty and the impact of his efforts remain with us till today. Let us,
282 D eleuze, Pure Immanence, pp 26-27
283 Clausewitz, On War, pp 85, 101, 86
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however, begin by first reviewing the immediate context in which Clausewitz 
came to confront these twin disruptive phenomena. Herbig informs us that...
...Clausewitz looks at how chance affects planning, implementing, and the very 
thinking of wars; at what qualities commanders must have to surmount chance 
and uncertainty; at how chance shapes interactions between adversaries. He 
mulls over uncertainty’s sources and its distortion of the environment. He focuses 
on chance in his theories of the nature of war...considering how the realities of 
chance affect the possibility of arriving at a theory.284
While this serves as an adequate summation of Clausewitz’s concerns regarding 
Chance and Uncertainty, Herbig, quite correctly, also informs us that in his 
magnum opus, Clausewitz addresses these issues in a somewhat haphazard 
manner. Thus, Herbig, referring to ‘chance’ notes, “[Tjhese questions arise here 
and there in On War. Sometimes Clausewitz separates chance and uncertainty, 
sometimes he confounds them, and he often imbeds them in the context of other 
issues.”285 Herbig then, helpfully, suggests that...
there are four clusters of ideas which...are just loosely structured enough to 
allow us to draw more informed inferences...on the nature of war, on the 
personal qualities and ideas of the commander, on the relationship of chance and 
uncertainty (sic), and on the options for action in the face of these 
contingencies.286
284 Katherine L. Herbig, “Chance and Uncertainty in On War” in Clausewitz and M odern S trategy, Ed. 
M ichael Handel, p 96
285 Ibid. p 96
286 Ibid.
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Herbig’s ‘classificatory’ scheme, though helpful in its own right, does not 
however further our project to (1) investigate the singular problem of chance and 
uncertainty as confronted by Clausewitz and, more importantly, (2) of 
appreciating precisely ‘how’ and to what effect Clausewitz sought to ameliorate 
the perceived effects of Chance and Uncertainty. To be sure, Herbig does mention 
Clausewitz’s theorization on the nature and role of the Commander in the context 
of Chance and Uncertainty, but her investigation is not sustained and certainly 
does not address (1) precisely why Clausewitz chose to emphasize the role of the 
Commander in the context of these twin disruptive phenomena and (2) the 
consequence of the Clausewitzian understanding of the Genius as Commander. 
Herbig does, however, temptingly suggest that “to advance the theory of warfare 
one must grasp the effects of chance on the commander...[and]...in how well 
each commander could apply the ideas -  not specific solutions -  in On War to his 
own unique problems.”287 For the puiposes of this study, however, this does not 
suffice, for here -  like in the case of the ‘political’ - Clausewitz effects a tactical 
maneuver, which while geared to address the question of chance and uncertainty 
in operational terms, also marks a turn to the instrumentalization of Chance and, 
of that utterly Romantic figure of the Genius. Previously we noted that 
Clausewitz, in keeping with the intellectual developments of his time, would have 
very likely considered Chance as the Absolute Other of Reason. This, we 
asserted, was the case because, as a philosopher of war inspired by Kant, 
Clausewitz would have been well-placed to recognize Chance as being a Timit-
287 Katherine L. Herbig, “Chance and Uncertainty in On War” in Clausewitz and M odern S trategy , Ed.
M icheal Handel, p 100
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condition’ of Reason. It is therefore necessary for us to now take a closer look at 
precisely how Clausewitz deftly wove this limit-condition - ‘the play of chance and 
probability within which the creative spirit is free to roam’ -  into his account of war.
Also, given that we will be investing a fair amount of space to address this 
particular element of Clausewitz’s theory of war, it may help to clarify, at this 
stage, the immediate and tactical reasons as to why this investment in time and 
effort is being made.
1. First, having heard the din of battle himself, it would probably be safe to 
presume that Clausewitz had had a first-hand acquaintanceship with the 
vagaries posed by chance and uncertainty in war,288 which may have also led 
him to so emphatically state that war, unlike any ‘other human activity is so 
continuously or universally bound up with chance’. This Clausewitzian 
observation is also borne out by the literature on the history of war and its 
conduct which, when discussing war in its theoretical/ philosophical and 
operational aspects, seems to accord an inordinately high level of emphasis on 
chance and uncertainty. Thus we find the pages of military history containing 
an overwhelming number of direct - and sometimes oblique - references to 
chance and uncertainty and how they impact war and its conduct. Indeed,
288 Let us not forget that Clausewitz was a Major-General in the Prussian Army and, as such, had fought 
against Napoleon. Thus, he would have experienced war, albeit generally as a staff officer. During the 
infamous retreat o f  Napoleon from the gates o f  M oscow, he witnessed at first-hand the terrible loss o f  life 
involved in the crossing o f  the River Berezina. His relationship with Schamhorst, various staff-related 
assignments, and ultimately as the Director o f  the Staff C ollege - during his stint at the War O ffice in 
Berlin - gave Clausewitz not simply a bird’s eye view  o f  the terrain o f  war, but also to relate to such a 
martial vista experientially. For an eyewitness account o f  the Battle o f  Borodino, see Carl von Clausewitz, 
The Cam paign O f 1812 in Russia, (N ew  York: De Capo Press, 1995)
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these references not only appear in accounts of information/ net-centric 
warfare and even before that to mechanized warfare, but also in those that 
detail the regimented set-piece battles of the Enlightenment Era and earlier. At 
the meta-strategic level too, as the literature suggests, chance and uncertainty 
make their very potent presence felt.289 Further, the literature also points to 
how chance and uncertainty take on a very real - that is to say, thanatological - 
existence in the specific contexts of small/ micro combat units, and at the level 
of the individual soldier.290 This, in itself, warrants that we take a closer look 
at chance and uncertainty in the martial, particularly Clausewitzian, context.
2. Secondly, Clausewitz’s attempt to address chance and uncertainty, being more 
flexible than that of his predecessors and counterparts, remains the theoretical 
model of choice when discussing the fog and friction of war today. As we will 
see -  when we take up the case of network-centric warfare -  the exercise of 
this choice in the context of war in the Information Age continues to 
approximate the Clausewitzian model and for good reason. For us, therefore, 
to appreciate how the strategy and logic of NCW is geared to combat and 
quell (this being the ‘ideal’ condition) the vagaries of chance and uncertainty, 
it is necessary to take a keener look at how and under what conditions the 
phenomena of chance and uncertainty -  which Clausewitz discussed under the
289 See for example Edward Luttwak, Strategy: The Logic o f  War and Peace, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
Univ. Press, 1995); See also Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy o f  Conflict, (Harvard: Harvard Univ. Press, 
2007)
290 See, for example, the first-person accounts o f  the experience o f  war beginning with Ernst Junger, Storm  
o f  Steel, Trans. M. Hoffmann, (London: Penguin Books, 2004)
185
rubric of ‘fog and friktiori' -  evolved and interrupted the rational calculations 
of military theorists of the time.
3. Thirdly, the tendency to control (and in the more extreme cases, overcome) 
chance and uncertainty in the martial context -  as we have alluded to earlier -  
is nothing less than an attempt to accommodate chance and uncertainty within 
an architectonic of war, rather than having the architectonic being interrupted 
by them. It is only with Clausewitz -  though military theorists before him had 
indeed considered chance and uncertainty and had noted the (more often than 
not) deleterious effects that they had not only in the conduct of war, but on 
their attempts to devise a comprehensive theory of war - that such a proactive 
stance towards these disruptive phenomena was taken. As mentioned above, 
Clausewitz presumed to identify opportunities that could be exploited in the 
context of chance - though, it must be restated, he did place the figure of the 
Genius as the identifier and exploiter of the opportunities that chance and 
uncertainty afforded. This marks the most critical maneuver effected by 
Clausewitz to sketch out his architectonic of war. Being, as this study 
contends, a pivotal theoretical effort by Clausewitz in his work, On War, a 
closer look at how this maneuver was effected and the ramifications that it has 
had is warranted.
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But first it is necessary to direct our attention at the environment which 
provided the intellectual and philosophical context in which Clausewitz embarked 
on this project. Hacking informs us that...
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.. .Throughout the Age of Reason, chance had been called the superstition of the 
vulgar. Chance, superstition, vulgarity, unreason were of one piece. The rational man, 
averting his eyes from such things, could cover chaos with a veil of inexorable laws. 
The world, it was said, might often look haphazard, but only because we do not know 
the inevitable workings of its inner springs.291
Not only was the Age of Religion drawing to a close, but there was a rejuvenation 
in the intellectual spirit of those times wherein the world, that is to say nature, was 
being increasingly considered as being the playground of Man who, in turn, was 
nothing less than the embodiment of not simply practical reason, but also, pure 
reason. Our overview of Classical military theory bears this out. As we have seen, 
it certainly was not the case that the classical theorists of war did not recognize
292and/ or accept the presence of chance and uncertainty in war. They did. The 
point to note, however, is the economy of relations that marked the relationship 
between these theorists and chance and uncertainty in the context of war. The 
premise of this relationship was marked by an increasingly widespread optimism 
that was common enough in the Age of Reason -  particularly in its more 
deterministic modes. Essentially, this optimism was based on the notion that 
though ‘...[T]he world... might often look haphazard, but [this is] only because
Ian Hacking, The Taming o f  Chance, (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2002), p 1.
Gat, A H istory o f  M ilitary Thought, p 187
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we do not know the inevitable workings of its inner springs’.293 In other words, 
while recognizing the tactical messes that chance and uncertainty could and did 
create in war, strategically, the problem of chance and uncertainty - for the 
classical theorists - was not a major issue. For them, it was only a matter of time 
when even chance and uncertainty could be ‘tamed’. It all depended on when and 
in what manner ‘the inevitable workings of the inner springs of the world’ stood 
revealed. At this point, one can almost imagine Heidegger nodding in approval 
for, when put in the above manner, it was nothing less than a movement, which 
Heidegger would, no doubt, point to as an example of an ontic (re)presentation of 
an ontological activity -  an activity by which the world -  nature -  would stand 
unconcealed, and be brought-forth. In ontical terms, of course, Man effects this 
maneuver for it is He who will eventually command nature having understood her 
inevitable workings.
In the context of our brief overview of the classical theorists of war, this 
finds expression in the increasingly detailed models/ theories of war and its 
conduct that attempted to account for the phenomenon of war and of its conduct. 
It will be recollected that de Puysegur, displaying the esprit geometrique, 
proposed, in the form of a treatise on seigecraft and fortifications, a universal 
theory of war that would be scientific. Then Maizeroy, informed by the 
Pythagorean philosophy which held that numbers underlay all phenomena, 
focused on tactics -  his attempt being to fashion a perfect system of tactics, by 
means of deploying what he termed ‘the most sublime faculty of mind...reason’.






These theorists were then followed by, among others, Guibert, whom it is worth 
quoting again...
...Almost all sciences have certain or fixed elements, which succeeding ages 
have only extended and developed, but the tactics, till now wavering and 
uncertain, confined to time, arms, customs, all the physical and moral qualities of 
a people, have of course been obliged to vary without end and for a space of a 
century to leave behind nothing else than principles disavowed and unpracticed, 
which have ever been cancelled and destroyed by the following age.294
What Guibert wanted was nothing less than, again in his words, “... those huge
^95machines, which by quite uncomplicated means produce great effects.. For 
Guibert, therefore, a bit ominously, the ideal martial condition would be one 
where life and all the myriad of moments that comprise it were deployed to 
sustain ‘huge machines’ - systems where “there is not a single moment o f  life 
from which one cannot extract forces, providing one knows how to differentiate it 
and combine it with others.”296
Lastly, the hope of military theorists such as Henry Lloyd and von Bulow 
was to find a set of "rational principles based on hard, quantifiable data that might 
reduce the conduct of war to a branch of the natural sciences ... from which the 
play of chance and uncertainty" could be entirely eliminated.297 Though we have 
not considered the contribution of Lloyd to the study of war in any great detail,
Quoted in Gat, A H istory o f  M ilitary Thought, p 49.
Quoted in Foucault, D iscipline and Punish, p 169.
Foucault, D iscipline and Punish, p 165.
Howard, Clausewitz, p 13
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we should note that he had gained some name and fame by critiquing Frederick II 
as a strategist based on his purported application of scientific principles to the 
historical events of the Seven Years’ War (1756-1763). Thus, as Watts puts it...
[F]oreshadowing the mathematical approach that would later be pursued by the 
English automotive engineer Frederick W. Lanchester, Lloyd's enthusiasm for 
achieving certainty in war led him to argue that whoever understands the relevant 
military data stemming from things like topological and geographical 
measurements, march tables, supply needs, and the geometrical relationship of 
supply lines to fighting fronts (or of armies to their bases) would be "in a position 
to initiate military operations with mathematical precision and to keep on waging 
war without ever being under the necessity of striking a blow.298
Along with him, as we have seen, Von Bulow, in his ‘Pure and Applied Strategy’ 
(Reine und angewandete Strategie), took an even more quantitative position. In it 
he claimed that the success of a military operation depended largely on the angle 
formed by two lines running from the extreme ends of the base of operations to 
the objective. Thus, von Bulow opined, if the base of the operation was suitably 
placed and sufficiently extended for the two lines to converge on the target at an 
angle of 90 degrees or more, "victory was as certain as could reasonably be 
expected."299 In some respects, these instances of martial theorizations may be 
considered as the apogee of the ultra rationalistic theories of war. Soon, however, 
such rigid determinisms began to be tempered. Thus we find that beginning with 
Jomini and culminating with Clausewitz, military theories and theorizations on
298 Barry Watts, Clausewitzian Friction and Future War, McNair Paper Number 5 2 ,,  October 1996.
A vailable at http://www.ndu.edu/mss/M cNair/mcnair52/m52cont.html Last accessed on May 19, 2007
299 Paret, C lausew itz and the State, 92
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war began to temper the prospects of a rigid rationalism, which was more often 
than not wrecked by the intrusions of chance and uncertainty. The formal 
accommodation of chance and uncertainty within the rubric of war had begun.
Additionally, Hacking, but also Foucault, shows us that during the time­
frame within which the transformation in the conceptualization and understanding 
of war and military theories from the stage of a dogmatic over-rationalization to 
its being tempered by the gradual accommodation of chance and uncertainty took 
place, there was a huge intellectual and societal transformation that was also 
underway. Society was becoming statistical.300 It is in this context that, in part, the 
emergence of chance and uncertainty, rather, the problematization of chance and 
uncertainty, in the Clausewitzian context gains traction. Our immediate task on 
hand, therefore, will be to assess the impact of chance and uncertainty on 
Clausewitz’s theoretical efforts and to follow the dexterous moves that he made to 
account for them within his architectonic of war. In the process, it will also aid us 
in preparing the grounds for the (re) examination of network-centric warfare that 
will follow.
300 Ian Hacking, The Taming o f  Chance, p 1; Foucault also makes the same point, particularly in his 
D iscip line and Punish  and in M adness and Civilization  -  H istory o f  Insanity in the A ge o f  Reason, Trans. 
R. Howard, (London, UK: Routledge, 1990).
i. The Face o f Chance
In the context of the military theories of the Enlightenment Age which, as 
we have seen, reached their apogee in the works of Guibert, Lloyd, von Bulow 
and others, the rationalistic order of things was marked by the tendency of these 
theorists to devise a system which would allow for the ‘perfect’ calculability of 
combat. This, more often than not, spilled over in to how war was understood and 
related to. The missing piece of the puzzle for these overly rationalistic 
philosophers of war was the case of the ‘exception’ to the rule, which was the 
interruption that upset all their rationally constructed plans.
What was missing was a ‘law’ or a ‘principle’ that would aid in addressing 
the ‘exception’ to the more general rules that comprised their ‘art’ of war. This 
‘exception’ manifested itself in a myriad of ways. Thus, for example, it could take 
the form of ‘natural’ variables, such as the weather, geography, emotions, morale 
etc. Then there were other, more prosaic, variables that influenced the conduct of 
war. These included logistical dislocations, unforeseen bottlenecks in command 
and control, malfunction of equipment etc. Even the history that these theorists 
used for their theorizing purposes was strewn with examples and instances of such 
variables disturbing the tightly controlled plans of war. Not only did they upset 
the operational dimensions of war, they also forced themselves into the strategic 
and meta-strategic dimensions of war.301 The consequence of this was an even
301 It is worth pointing out that even Thucydides’ celebrated account o f  the Melian Dialogue, which may be 
considered as an exemplary example o f  war-making at the meta strategic level - despite its cold rationalism
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more rigid insistence on rules and principles that would make the conduct of war 
as friction-less as possible and the premise was that these variables could be 
accounted for. This is very much in evidence in, for example, Jomini’s theoretical 
efforts. It did not mean, however, that Jomini was blind to the vagaries of chance 
and uncertainty. As we have seen, he held the view that...
. . .T h e  fundam ental p rincip les upon  w h ich  rest all g o o d  com b in ation s o f  w ar  
h a v e  a lw ays e x is te d ...th e s e  prin cip les are unchangeable; th ey  are ind ep en d en t o f  
the nature o f  the am is em p loyed , o f  tim es and p la c e s . . .G en iu s  h as a  g r e a t  d e a l to  
d o  w ith  su ccess , s in c e  it p r e s id e s  o v e r  th e  a p p lic a tio n  o f  r e c o g n ize d  ru les, a n d  
se ize s , a s  it  w ere , a ll  the su b tle  sh a d e s  o f  w h ich  th e ir  a p p lic a tio n  is su sc e p tib le .  
B ut in  any case , the m an o f  gen iu s d oes not act contrary to th ese  ru les .302 (m y  
em p h asis)
Note how Jomini, while insisting on the point that the fundamental principle upon 
which all good combinations of war have always existed...are unchangeable and 
independent of the nature of the arms employed, of times and places, nevertheless 
accepted that there were ‘subtle shades’ where the application of these 
fundamental principles of war were left inadequate. These he dispatched with 
haste to the realm of the Genius.
(particularly from the Athenian perspective) -  was also ridden with the element o f  chance. O f course there 
is a viable case to argue that the M elians would have felt its impact more severely than the Athenians given  
the outcom e o f  the exchange as reported by Thucydides. A more recent example would be the Cuban 
M issile Crisis. Again, in terms o f  military hardware and their efficient use, the US and Soviet strategists 
knew with a large measure o f  accuracy o f  the outcomes o f  a clash o f  arms, particularly, nuclear weapons. 
These were and are com m only expressed in game-theoretic terms. However, at the level o f  Kennedy and 
Khrushchev, despite the plethora o f  scientific studies, analyses, and decision-aids at their disposal, the 
matter would have been riddled with very high degrees o f  chance and uncertainty.
302 Quoted in Gat, A H istory o f  M ilitary Thought, p 114.
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Now, Barry Watts informs us that Clausewitz referred to the phenomena 
of chance and uncertainty under the umbrella of what he (Watts) refers to as the 
‘unified theory of Friction’ (Friktion). He further points out that by the time 
Clausewitz delivered his summary lecture at the Berlin War College, in 1811, he 
had identified two distinct sources of what he termed "the friction of the whole 
machinery": "the numerous chance events, which touch everything" and "the 
numerous difficulties that inhibit accurate execution of the precise plans that 
theory tends to formulate."303 According to W atts...
the seco n d  source o f  fr ic t io n ... internal resistan ce  to p rec ise  p lans - reca lls  the 
type o f  frictional im ped im en t that C lau sew itz , in  a letter to  h is w ife  in  1806 , had  
first referred to. T he first - the p lay  o f  ch an ce - represents a sign ifican t exp an sion  
o f  the orig inal notion  through the addition  o f  a seco n d  m ajor ca tegory  or sou rce  
o f  fr iction .304
This, however, leaves unsaid precisely how Clausewitz would have approached 
the problems posed by chance and uncertainty. Beyerchen, in this context, 
provides us with a lead. He suggests:
T he con n ection  b etw een  ch an ce and uncertainty p rov id es a m ean s o f  
understanding both, i f  w e  draw  on the in sigh ts o f  the late n in eteen th -cen tury  
m athem atician  Henri. P oincare, w h o se  understanding o f  the m atter w as pow erfu l 
en ou gh  that he is a frequently  c ited  sou rce in  non linear sc ie n c e  today. P oincare  
argued that ch an ce com es in three gu ises: a sta tistica lly  random  p h en om en on ; the
303 Quoted in Paret, C lausewitz and the State, p 191; See also Watts, Clausewitzian Friction and Future 
War, 1996.
304 Barry Watts, Clausewitzian Friction and Future War, McNair Paper Number 5 2 , , October 1996. 
A v a ila b le  at h ttp://w w w .ndu.edu/inss/M cN air/m cnair52/m 52cont.htm l Last accessed on May 19, 2007
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am p lifica tion  o f  a m icrocau se; or a co o lfu n ctio n  o f  our ana ly tica l b lin d n ess. H e  
d escrib ed  the first as the fam iliar form  o f  ch an ce  that can arise w here  
perm utations o f  sm all ca u ses are ex trem ely  num erou s or w h ere  the num ber o f  
variab les is  quite large. T h is fo n n  o f  ch an ce can  b e  ca lcu la ted  b y  statistica l 
m eth od s. T he very  large num ber o f  in teractions p roduces a d isorgan ization  
su ffic ien t to  result in a sym m etrica l (i.e ., G au ssian  or b e ll curve) probability  
distribution . N o th in g  s ign ifican t is left o f  the in itial con d ition s, and the h istory  o f  
the sy stem  n o  longer m atters. It is p o ss ib le  that C la u sew itz  w as aw are o f  this 
general lin e  o f  reason ing. A s w ith  m agn etism  and friction , im portant 
d ev e lo p m en ts in  probability  th eory  w ere  occurring  in  C lau sew itz 's tim e, and w e  
k n o w  that h e  read in ten se ly  in  m athem atica l trea tises .305
While we should note that Poincare’s mathematical works came a few decades 
after Clausewitz, Beyerchen’s point is well made. Additionally, as Hacking points 
out, the intellectual project of addressing the phenomena of chance and 
uncertainty was already evident in the works of Leibnitz, who “was a witness 
to...the emergence of probability around 1660 and just afterwards.”306 This is lent 
further credence to if we note what Hacking has to say in this context:
[I]t is  notab le  that the probability  that em erged  so  su d d en ly  (in  the 1 6 6 0 s) is 
Janu s-faced . O n the one s id e , it is sta tistica l, con cern in g  it s e lf  w ith  stoch astic  
law s o f  ch an ce p rocesses . O n the other s id e  it is ep is tem o lo g ica l, d ed icated  to  
a sse ss in g  reason ab le d egrees o f  b e l ie f  in  p rop osition s qu ite d evo id  o f  statistica l 
back grou nd .307
305 Alan Beyerchen, "Clausewitz, Nonlinearity and the Unpredictability o f  War," International Security,
17:3 (Winter, 1992), pp. 59-90.
Ian Hacking, The Taming o f  Chance, p 9. See also Hacking, The Em ergence o f  P robability.
Ian Hacking, The Emergence o f  Probability, p 12.307
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Further, we should not forget that Poincare’s summation of how the phenomena 
of chance and uncertainty could be analyzed and addressed was the culmination 
of a gradual process that preceded Clausewitz by almost two centuries. This, as 
we have seen, was nothing less than a signal of the erosion of determinism that 
had been the hallmark of the rationalistic order of things post the Age of Religion. 
Indeed, it could be said that Poincare’s three guises of chance -  statistically 
random phenomena, amplification of micro causes, and our (human) propensity 
for analytical blindness -  had already been worked out in some detail by the time 
Clausewitz came to confront them in the context of his theorization of war. Thus, 
it is possible, indeed probable, that Clausewitz would have been familiar with the 
developments in this field. In the context of the evolution of military thought, this 
transformation, albeit perhaps not strictly in these terms, was already undemay 
when Guibert, for instance, wrote his seminal A General Theory o f  Tactics. So, 
what was the nature of the chance and uncertainty that Clausewitz confronted?
Let us see how Clausewitz framed this problem. In On War, he wrote:
W ar is  the realm  o f  uncertainty; three quarters o f  the factors on  w h ich  action  in  
w ar is  based  are w rapped in  a fo g  o f  greater or le sser  uncertainty. A  sen s itiv e  and  
discrim in atin g  ju d gm en t is ca lled  for; a sk illed  in te llig en ce  to  scen t out the  
tru th ...W ar is the realm  o f  chance. N o  other hum an ac tiv ity  g iv e s  it greater 
scop e: no other has such  in cessan t and varied  dea lin gs w ith  th is intruder. C hance  
m ak es everyth in g  m ore uncertain  and interferes w ith  the w h o le  cou rse o f
. 308even ts .
308 Clausewitz, On War, p 101
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In this remarkable passage, for which he is justifiably praised, Clausewitz 
demonstrates his acute appreciation of not simply the criticality of chance and 
uncertainty in war - it also suggests his proposed tack for dealing with these 
disruptive phenomena. But what precisely did Clausewitz mean when he referred 
to the ‘fog of greater or lesser uncertainty’?
Consider the following:
...the general unreliability of information presents a special problem in war: all 
action takes place, so to speak, in a kind of twilight, which, like fog or moonlight, 
often tends to make things seem grotesque and larger than they really 
are...Whatever is hidden from full view in this feeble light has to be guessed at 
by talent, or simply left to chance. So once again for lack of objective knowledge 
one has to trust to talent or to luck.309
This passage suggests that Clausewitz attributes information -  rather, the lack of 
it - to the ‘fog of greater or lesser uncertainty’ and to ‘chance which, particularly 
in the context of war, makes everything more uncertain and which interferes with 
the whole course of events’. Now, it is tempting to suggest that this lack of 
information -  rather, in Clausewitz’s words, ‘the paucity of information’ -  is a 
function of statistically random phenomena and of amplified micro causes which 
the common man is unable to identify.310 Indeed, this is how most commentators
309 Clausewitz, On War, p 140
310 N ote that Beyerchen makes a distinction between these two elements -  statistically random phenomena 
and micro causes. His argument, while elegant, remains suspect. It is interesting to note that Beyerchen 
does not allow for the amplification o f  micro causes to contribute to what under the laws o f  probability 
w ould be regarded as statistically random phenomena. See Alan Beyerchen, "Clausewitz, Nonlinearity and 
the Unpredictability o f  War," International Security , 17:3 (Winter, 1992), pp. 59-90
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approach this element in Clausewitz’s theory of war, which also dovetails quite 
neatly into the three guises of Chance that Poincare identifies. But Clausewitz 
also hinted -  but only hinted - at something else -  something in excess of 
statistically random phenomena and amplified micro causes -  that posed a 
seemingly insurmountable problem not simply in the context of the conduct of 
war, but also while positing a ‘theory of war’. Thus, for example, Clausewitz 
noted,
...The difficulties accumulate and end by producing a kind of friction that is 
inconceivable unless one has experienced war...Countless minor incidents - the 
kind you can never really foresee - combine to lower the general level of 
performance, so that one always falls short of the intended goal....The military 
machine - the army and everything related to it - is basically very simple and 
therefore seems easy to manage. But we should bear in mind that none of its 
components is of one piece: each part is composed of individuals...the least 
important of whom may chance to delay things or somehow make them go 
wrong...This tremendous friction, which cannot, as in mechanics, be reduced to a 
few points, is everywhere in contact with chance, and brings about effects that 
cannot be measured, just because they are largely due to chance.311
At first glance, it would appear that what Clausewitz is reiterating the very 
Kantian distinction between the a priori and experience by insisting that unless 
one has experienced war, one is unable to appreciate the ‘countless minor 
incidents’ that degrade the performance of -  note Clausewitz’s words at this point 
- ‘the military machine’, which he identifies as ‘the army and everything related 
to it.’ He also notes, among other things, the lacking of mechanics -  his passing
311 Clausewitz, On War, 119-120
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reference to Newtonian science -  to account for the ‘tremendous friction’ that the 
components of the military machine undergo, but also exhibit. To this we must 
also add his observation that not only is friction caused by the components and the 
sub-components of the components of the military machine as they interact with 
themselves as a ‘whole’, but their collective and individual contact with external 
conditions ‘brings about effects that cannot be measured, just because they are 
largely due to chance’. Based on this, we would not be incorrect to conclude that 
Clausewitz’s notion of chance and uncertainty was a condition marked by internal 
friction, which is generated as the military machine performs its tasks, and 
^external friction I that occurs as the military machine comes in contact with its 
environment, that is to say, its operational environment. As we will see, 
Clausewitz did indeed design his methodology for dealing -  in operational terms - 
with chance and uncertainty by working from precisely such a premise. But the 
picture that Clausewitz builds up in this powerful passage is even more intriguing 
than simply these observations for if the matter were to be simply left standing at 
this point, it would remain a rather simplistic understanding and rendition of what 
is not simply a military problem but first a more fundamental and philosophical 
problem.
Consider, for example, the following: “[T]he deduction ofjTfect from 
cause is often blocked by some insuperable extrinsic obstacle: the true causes may 
be quite unknown. Nowhere in life is this so common as in war, where the facts
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are seldom fully known and the underlying motives even less so.”312 Recall here 
our discussion on the pure concept of war. What Clausewitz draws our attention 
to here is nothing less that his rather sophisticated understanding of chance and 
uncertainty. He notes, incisively, that cause-effect relationships decompose into 
meaninglessness at one point of time or the other. Note that he is not making this 
assertion simply in the context of the military. He specifically refers to this 
process of decomposition to be occurring in ‘life’ as such. Further, he identifies 
the catalyst that aids and abets this decomposing as something that is seemingly 
insuperable, but obviously extrinsic to the cause-effect relationship -  the origin of 
which remains unknown. This state of affairs Clausewitz identifies as being 
present in life, but which -  according to him -  is discemable at a much finer 
resolution within the context of war and combat. In net effect, therefore, 
Clausewitz is not making a case for a simplistic relativism -  in life and war. We 
find that he is pointing to a condition marked by a peculiar kind of chance and 
uncertainty, which is in excess of the chance and uncertainty that results from the 
internal and external frictions of a war-machine. This not only appears from 
nowhere but, according to Clausewitz, it always already exists. Indeed, 
Clausewitz also seems to be saying that it is in such turbulent and chaotic 
conditions that life and war unfold. We need to be careful here. Note that the 
chance and uncertainty that Clausewitz designates as insuperable, extrinsic and 
unknown is quite different in nature from the sense of chance and uncertainty that 
is more commonly associated with the fog and friction that is endemic to the 
operational conditions of the Clausewitzian war-machine. It is, of course, true that
312 Clausewitz, On War, p 156
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when the war-machine is operational, situations and circumstances are 
encountered that are either the effects of friction, or are clouded in a fog of chance 
and uncertainty. It may also be the case that in some, indeed in most, instances the 
cause-effect relationship that can explain these instances of friction and of chance 
and uncertainty appear to be inscrutable to most; however, there is a qualitative 
difference between these instances and the state of affairs that Clausewitz 
associates with the intrinsic instability in life and war. As we will see, in the case 
of chance and uncertainty which the fog and friction of war are signature of, the 
possibility of making a casual connection between seemingly unrelated events 
remains, at least as a potentiality, in the hands of the Genius. On the subject of the 
chance and uncertainty that rents life and war, however, Clausewitz remains silent 
-  though he conveys much with his silence to the point of compelling us to pay 
even more careful attention to how he maneuvers around the issue.
Now, if we were to cast our reading of the just quoted passage from 
Clausewitz into Deleuzian terms, it could be said that when Clausewitz 
encounters chance and uncertainty in the wider expanse of ‘life and war’, he is 
encountering nothing less than an instance of immanence where “there are always 
many infinite movements caught within each other, each folded in the others, so 
that the return of one instantaneously relaunches another in such a way that the 
plane of immanence is ceaselessly being woven...”313 Following through in the 
Deleuzian vein, it could be said that aside from the chance and uncertainty that
313 D eleuze & Guattari, What is Philosophy?  Trans. Tomlinson & Burchell, (N ew  York: Columbia Univ.
Press, 1994), p 38
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Clausewitz identified as being disruptive in the operational sense, the face of 
chance and uncertainty that Clausewitz remained silent about was the one that 
would have also appeared to him like a “section of chaos...characterized less by 
the absence of determinations than by the infinite speed with which they (the 
determinations) take shape and vanish.”314
At this point it is expected that skeptical readers would begin to resist this 
co-relation that is being drawn between the phenomenon of chance (and 
uncertainty) as encountered by Clausewitz and the Deleuzian notion of the plane 
of immanence. They would, however, be cautioned to revisit Clausewitz’s 
problem again. As mentioned above, Clausewitz was perceptive enough to note 
that there was an ‘insuperable extrinsic obstacle in deducing effect from cause’. 
What this suggests is that Clausewitz - who had personally experienced war - 
remained cognizant of the problems associated with causality, or more accurately, 
with the lack of it, on the field of battle in particular and on questions regarding 
life and war in general. Crucially, Clausewitz, who had personally seen the ‘face 
of battle’ and who was, it is fair to say, familiar with the ‘tempo of operations’ 
would have also been able to appreciate that even if specific determinations - that 
is to say, concrete information - were available, the tempo of operations would 
necessarily render such determinations mobile thereby making them progressively 
indeterminate. Clausewitz’s recognition of chance and uncertainty’s originary 
contingent nature, which remained in excess of the exertions of an algebra that 
purported to contend with the fog and friction associated with war (and of life),
3,4 D&G, What is Philosophy?  p 42.
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would thus have come about in this way. Clausewitz, in this way, albeit in his 
own terms, would thus have confronted the problem of chance and uncertainty in 
terms of what Deleuze refers to as the ‘infinite speed with which determinations 
take shape and vanish’.
Now consider what Deleuze and Guattari have to say about the infinite 
speed that characterizes the chaos of the plane of immanence. They suggest...
This [the movement associated with infinite speed] is not a movement from one 
determination to the other but, on the contrary, the impossibility of a connection 
between them, since one does not appear without the other having already 
disappeared, and one appears as disappearance when the other disappears as 
outline.315
Given this, it is not surprising that Clausewitz would, perhaps a trifle plaintively, 
write: Chance makes everything more uncertain and interferes with the whole 
course of events. Again, it is important for us to note that when Clausewitz writes 
about chance making everything more uncertain, he is not simply referring to the 
friction that the military machine - including its components and sub-components 
- experiences in itself and in its contact with the operational environment, he is 
also including the ‘exterior problem’ within the ambit of chance. Note that this 
notion of chance and uncertainty, as we have seen above, in some measure 
always-already reflects an excessive-ness. In this form, this study contends, 
chance and uncertainty intrude and reside as unwelcome guests within any
315 Ibid. p 42
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coherent ensemble -  theoretical and otherwise. In this sense, therefore, the ‘fact of 
chance’ that Clausewitz would have been a witness to - in originary terms - veers 
very close to the immanent nature of the ‘chaos’ that marks the Deleuzian ‘plane 
of immanence’. In fact, when Deleuze and Guattari suggest that, “[C]haos makes 
chaotic and undoes every consistency in the infinite...[it]...is not an inert or 
stationary state,”316 Clausewitz, particularly in the context of chance and 
uncertainty in war, would have agreed for the undoing of the consistency of 
information -  regardless of whether it emanated from with the ‘military machine’ 
or from the contact of the military machine with its operational environment -  
would have been a phenomenon that Clausewitz would have readily recognized 
and appreciated. Thus, in the famous chapter on Friction in War, Clausewitz 
noted, “Once war has actually been seen the difficulties become
3 17
clear...Friction...is the force that makes the apparently easy so difficult.” In 
this way, for Clausewitz, the more critical intellectual problem, even before the 
operational problem made its appearance, would have been -  How to think when 
the condition of thought -  that is to say, the condition in which thought was 
possible - is embedded in a condition of chaos? This, in essence, was the problem 
of chance and uncertainty that Clausewitz faced.
316 Ibid. p 42
317 Clausewitz, On War, p 119, 121
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ii . Strategizing Chance
It will be evident by now that the phenomena of chance and uncertainty 
confronted by Clausewitz was not something that could be explained away as 
being merely ‘accidental’, ‘random’, and as a matter of analytical blindness. 
Rather, it was a fundamental philosophical problem that threatened to disrupt, 
indeed make incoherent, his strategic intent to forge a comprehensive theory of 
war. Clausewitz, faced with this problem, resorted to a number of strategic and 
tactical maneuvers that cannot help but invite our admiration.
We have already noted that the specific nature of the problem of chance 
and uncertainty for Clausewitz was less a question of the lack of information; 
rather, it was a question of speed, that is to say, of time. In other words, for 
Clausewitz, the critical element was that given the tempo of operations and the 
infinite variations, permutations and combinations that war-as-such entailed, the 
possibility of developing, maintaining and operating on the basis of a consistent 
set of information was not simply difficult but impossible. Seen from 
Clausewitz’s point of view the problem would have seemed understandably 
intractable. But it is also interesting to note that despite Clausewitz’s overt 
acknowledgement of the radical indeterminacy that the phenomena of chance and 
uncertainty presented — in operational and theoretical terms — a desire for
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consistency and determinacy remained and this involved nothing less than a 
consideration of ‘life (particularly ‘martial life’) as the conquest of mobility’.318
It could be argued that this was in no way different from what 
Clausewitz’s predecessors -  particularly Lloyd, von Bulow and Jomini — were 
attempting to achieve by means of their theories of war. This point of view 
though, at first glance seemingly true, underestimates the subtle but radical 
transformations that were operative in the Clausewitzian theory of war. Thus, for 
example, unlike the martial theories of his predecessors, Clausewitz’s theory - by 
allowing for the active play of chance and uncertainty in the context of war - 
refused to straightjacket the phenomenon of war. The result was that unlike the 
works of his predecessors, Clausewitz’s theory of war remained flexible enough 
not to be disrupted by the twin phenomena of chance and uncertainty. Thus, while 
his predecessors’ theories found themselves being repeatedly interrupted and 
dislocated by chance and uncertainty, Clausewitz’s deft maneuver to in-corporate 
these two phenomena as intrinsic constituents of his theory - thereby making the 
transition from one designing an architecture of war to one purporting to 
unconceal the architectonic of war - made sure that his theory would (a) “not be 
forgotten after two or three years, and that possibly might be picked up more than 
once by those who are interested in the subject”319, and (b) “bring about a 
revolution in the theory of war.”320 It is worth noting that on both these counts
31 ^ 'Bernard Steigler, Technics and Time I, p 17.
319 Clausewitz, On War, p 58 & 63
320 Clausewitz, On War, p 70
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Clausewitz was largely successful.321 Indeed, it could be argued that not only did 
Clausewitz s theoretical exertions bring about a revolution in the theory of war, 
they also single-handedly created a viable paradigm within which the theory of 
war could be made intelligible. This, as we have seen, Clausewitz did by devising 
a theory of war that took into account not simply the presence of chance and 
uncertainty, but that was also informed by (at least an implicit) understanding of 
chance and uncertainty - unlike his predecessors — as an instance of pure
322immanence.
Clausewitz’s theory of war also casts an interesting light on the massive 
but subtle transformations that were simultaneously underway in the ‘social’ at 
that time. Our interest in this is not simply driven by the fact that such 
transformations were evident in Clausewitz’s work -  it is also motivated by the 
fact that these transformations also provided the fundamental grounds on which
321 Note: An exception to this would be the use o f  Jomini’s A rt o f  War as part o f  the training curriculum o f  
the US Army. Thus, for example, Maj. Ebner (US Army, Combat Studies Institute) writes: “The U.S. Army 
presents itse lf as a Clausewitzian organization. Officers in the Army fondly quote the Prussian theorist 
and, at the strategic level, his dictums dominate; political control o f  the military, war as an extension o f  
policy, his trinity, etc. Consideration o f Clausewitz’s friction and fog o f  war has translated into the 
doctrine o f  auftragstaktik  and maintenance o f  initiative at the lowest possible levels o f  command. At the 
tactical and operational levels, however, the U.S. Army remains more firmly rooted in the ideals o f  
Antoine-Henri Jomini. Jomini’s scientific approach to understanding and succeeding at war lies at the 
heart o f  A nny doctrinal operations. The American Army, in its collective description o f  war and its 
m ethods o f  planning operations in war, follow s more closely the Swiss theorist than the Prussian. The U.S. 
Army, particularly at the tactical and operational levels, espouses the collective genius o f  good staff work 
and the military decision-making process (MDMP) rather than the singular genius o f  military command 
embraced by Clausewitz. This reliance upon military science and method over the application o f  genius 
firmly defines the U.S. Army, tactically and operationally, as a Jominian institution.” See Maj. Gregory 
Ebner, “Scientific Optimism: Jomini and the US Army”, The US Army Professional Writing Collection. 
A vailable at http://www.armv.mil/professionalwriting/volumes/volume2/iuly 2004/7 04 2 pf.htm l. A lso  
available at http://www-cusc.armv.mil/csi/research/writing/Papers%20c600/Commendebner2.asp Last 
accessed on Jan., 2008
322 It must again be reiterated that Clausewitz, at least in On War, did not make any direct or specific  
mention about the immanence o f  chance and uncertainty. However, as w e have seen, there are a number o f  
indications in his text that he may have had intuited this.
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Clausewitz proposed the role and function of the Genius in war. As we have 
already seen, one central feature of these transformations was the fact that society 
was becoming statistical. As Hacking informs us,
[E]very state, happy or unhappy, was statistical in its own way. The Italian cities, 
inventors of the modem conception of the state, made elaborate statistical 
inquiries and reports well before anyone else in Europe. Sweden organized 
pastors to accumulate the world’s best data on births and deaths. France, nation 
of physiocrats and probabilists, created bureaucracy during the Napoleonic era 
which at the top was dedicated to innovative statistical investigations....the 
English inaugurated ‘political arithmetic’ in 1662 when John Gaunt drew 
demographic inferences from the century old weekly Bills of Mortality for the 
City of London.323
As a consequence, “[A] new type of law came into being, analogous to the laws 
of nature, but pertaining to people...They carried with them the connotations of 
normalcy and of deviations from the norm.”324 But to what end?
Foucault shows us that this type of ‘law’ emerges at the...
...crossroads of two processes: one that, shattering the structures of feudalism, 
leads to the establishment of the great territorial, administrative, and colonial 
states; and a totally different movement that, with the Reformation and Counter- 
Reformation, raises the issues of how one must be spiritually ruled and led on 
this earth in order to achieve eternal salvation.325
323 Ian Hacking, The Taming o f  Chance, p 16
324 p  J
325 M ichel Foucault, “Govemmentality” in Essential Works o f  Foucault 1954-1984, Vol., 3, Ed. James D. 
Faubion, (London: Penguin Books, 2002), p 202
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Thus we find questions like “[H]ow to govern oneself, how to be governed, how 
to govern others...in their multiplicity and intensity”326 surfacing. As we have 
seen earlier, the emergence of a statistics of society or, more precisely, beginning 
to understand society statistically, was a transformation that had been underway 
for a while. By way of an example, Hacking points to Leibniz as being one of the 
key participants who played a role in the emergence of probability and the 
mathematics that underwrote it. Indeed, Leibniz, going by Hacking’s assertion, 
may also be considered to be the philosophical godfather of Prussian official 
statistics. Leibniz’s premise, in this context, was nothing less than the following: 
If a Prussian state was to be brought into existence (and he was all for it), the 
critical raw material for such a state was the population. This, according to
'K') 7Leibniz was ‘the true measure of power of a state’. And how was this measure 
of population, which Leibniz recognized as being the measure of a State’s power, 
to be ascertained? In response,
[H]e formulated this idea of a central statistical office...serving the different 
branches of administration: military, civil, mining, forestry and police. It would 
maintain a central register of deaths, baptisms and marriages. With that one could 
estimate the population, and hence measure the power of the state.328
In Foucault’s terms, this is nothing less than a signature of the emergence of the 
art of government. As Foucault puts it, “[T]he state as the set of institutions of 
sovereignty has existed for millennia. The techniques of the government of men
326 Ibid.
327 Ian Hacking, The Taming of Chance, p 18
328 Ibid. p 18
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also existed for millennia. But it is on the basis of a new general technology [of] 
the government of men that the state took the form that we know.”329 Leibniz’s 
central statistical office’ may thus be considered as an early candidate of 
precisely such a technology -  indeed of a strategic technical ensemble - designed 
specifically with the aim of developing and deploying this ‘new general 
technology [of] the government of men.’ Further, as Foucault shows us in his 
studies spanning the diverse fields of psychiatry, medicine, criminology and 
others, “the development of demography, of urban structures, of the problem of 
industrial labour -  based on the core raw material of statistics of populations - had 
raised in biological and medical terms the question of human “populations” 
...The social “body” ceased to be a simple juridico-political metaphor (like the
T i n
one in the Leviathan) and became, instead, a biological reality...” Considered 
in this light, it could be said that Leibniz’s ‘central statistical office’ was effecting 
nothing less than a transformation of force (power in Foucault’s terms) -  for, as 
Foucault shows us, what such strategic statistical ensembles actually did was to 
transform ‘power’ from being merely an exclusive, separative, restrictive, 
repressive and deductive tool, into an element that was productive, creative and 
empowering.331 As an aside, note that the parallels between Leibniz’s ‘central 
statistical office’ and the Office of Force Transformation are somewhat startling! 
Leibniz’s ‘central statistical office’, it could be said, was a remarkably prescient
329 M ichel Foucault, Security, Territory, Population  -  Lectures a t the College D e France 1977-78, Ed. By 
M ichel Senellart, Trans. B y Graham Burchell, (London, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), p 120 See 
footnote marked ‘f  ’
330 M ichel Foucault, “About the Concept o f  the “Dangerous Individual” m E ssential Works o f  Foucault 
1954-1984  Vol., 3, Ed. James D. Faubion, (London, UK: Penguin Books, 2002), p 186
331 M ichel Foucault, Abnormal, Trans. Graham Burchell, Intro. Arnold I. Davidson, Foreword, Ewald et al, 
(N ew  York, NY: Picador, 2003), p48
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precursor to the Pentagon’s Office of Force Transformation. In both instances, the 
objective o f the respective organizations being not simply to collect, collate and 
analyse data, but also to create data by a progressively detailed and highly 
technical diagramming o f Nature. In passing, it should also be noted that though 
we do invoke Leibniz as the philosophical father of Prussian official statistics and 
Clausewitz who was a Prussian by birth...
[T]he Prussia that overthrew Napoleon created a conception of a society that 
resolutely resisted statistical generalization. It gathered precise statistics to guide 
policy and inform opinion, but any regularities they might display fell short of 
laws of society. The Prussians created a powerful bureau but failed to achieve the 
idea of a statistical law. That was left for the France that survived Napoleon.332
For our purposes, of course, the crucial question remains - what was the 
organizing principle of this state that based itself on these new techniques of 
governing men? It was the principle of the ‘norm’. It is critical to note that this 
principle organized itself around nothing less than the laws of chance which, by 
means of a mathematical understanding of probability, contributed in no small 
measure to the erosion of ‘determinism’. Though the intensity with which these 
‘norms’ organized themselves around the laws of chance varied from place and 
time -  as the example of Prussia and France suggests - Hacking tells us that “[T]o 
believe there were such laws one needed law-like statistical regularities in large
332 Ian Hacking, The Taming o f  Chance, p 35
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populations. How else could a civilization hooked on universal causality get the 
idea of some alternative kind of law of nature or social behavior?”333
Responding to the question regarding the ‘norm’, Foucault’s analysis is 
worth noting in some detail. Foucault observed that...
...What makes the totality of the Classical episteme possible is primarily the 
relation to a knowledge or order. When dealing with the ordering of simple 
natures, one has recourse to a m a th esis , of which the universal method is algebra. 
When dealing with ordering of complex natures (representations in general, as 
they are given in experience), one has to constitute a tax in o m ia , and to do that 
one has to establish a system of signs...[A]t the two extremes of the Classical 
episteme, we have a m a th esis  as the science of calculable order and a g e n e s is  as 
the analysis of the constitution of orders on the basis of empirical 
series...Hedged in by calculus and g e n e s is , we have the area of the 
table....T axinom ia  is not in opposition to m a th e s is . . .for it too is a science of 
order -  a qualitative m a th e s is . . .Confronted by g e n e s is ,  it functions as a 
semiology confronted by history. It defines, the general law of beings, and at the 
same time the conditions under which it is possible to know them.334
Foucault further argued that...
...the theory of signs in the Classical period was able to support simultaneously 
both a science with a dogmatic approach, which purported to be a knowledge of
333 Ibid., p 3
334 M ichel Foucault, The O rder o f  things, pp. 80-83 For an implicit critique o f  this Foucauldian position and 
its related m ethodology see George Steiner’s review o f  ‘The Order o f  Things’. George Steiner, “The 
Mandarin o f  the Hour-Michel Foucault”, Feb 28, 1971, Copyright 1998 The New York Times Company. 
Available at http://cogweb.ucla.edu/Abstracts/Foucault.html. Last accessed on Jan 2008.
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nature itself, and a philosophy of representation, which, in the course of time, 
became more and more nominalistic and more and more skeptical.335
This, according to Foucault, is also the reason as to why this episteme disappeared 
by the end of the 18th century. In Foucault’s words,
...after the Kantian critique [and] all that occurred in Western culture...a new 
type of division was established: on the one hand mathesis was regrouped so as 
to constitute an apophantics and an ontology...on the other hand, history and 
semiology united to form those interpretive disciplines whose power has 
extended from Schleiemiacher to Nietzsche and Freud.336
Nevertheless, the identification (and later codification) of the ‘norm’ that began 
from within the massive statistical tables of what Foucault refers to as the 
Classical period was a project that continued into the age of ‘interpretive 
disciplines’, that is to say into the 19th century and beyond, albeit at a curve. Thus, 
as Foucault brilliantly demonstrates...
What we have then is a system that is.. .exactly opposite of the one we have seen 
with the disciplines. In the disciplines one started from a norm, and it was in 
relation to the training carried out with reference to the norm that the normal 
could be distinguished from the abnonnal. Here [that is to say in the post 
Classical period, for Foucault], instead, we have a plotting of the normal and the 
abnormal, of different curves of normality, and the operation of normalization 
consists in establishing an interplay between these different distributions of
335 Foucault, The O rder o f  Things, p 82.
336 Foucault, The O rder o f  Things, p 82
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normality and [in] acting to bring the most unfavourable in line with the more 
favourable.337
In effect, therefore, the ‘norm’ was not simply an acceptable parameter of 
behavior and/ or bearing; it was also the average, that is to say, the normal and 
most probable behavior of things, including individuals.
Despite Foucault’s cautionary note that though the grid of kinship formed 
by mathesis, taxinomia and genesis in the 17th and 18th centuries defined the 
general configuration of knowledge, and despite the fact that after Kant’s 
‘copemican revolution’ a regrouping of this grid occurred, it cannot be denied that 
the foundational structures on which such knowledge, that is to say, the tabula, 
was grounded remained essentially in place. This was as true for Foucault’s 
Classical period as it was for the times that succeeded it. Why? As Foucault 
showed us, a tabula...or even simply, tabula “enables thought to operate upon the 
entities of our world, to put them in order, to divide them into classes, to group
95338them according to names that designate their similarities and their differences.”
In this form, the tabula is thus a ...
‘system of elements’ -  a definition of the segments by which the resemblances 
and differences can be shown...which is given in things as their inner law, the 
hidden network that determines the way they confront one another, and also that
337 Foucault, Security, Territory, Population, p 63
338 Foucault, The O rder o f  Things, p xix
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Thus, the tabula formed a grid of intelligibility -  in Foucault’s terms, ‘an ordering 
of things’ -  which while itself undergoing a transformation in character in the 
manner described by Foucault, nevertheless retained the notion of a ‘grid’. But 
this tabula also brought in its wake “the suspicion...of a worse kind of disorder 
than that of the incongruous, the linking together of things that are 
inappropriate.”340 It is important to note that this ‘disorder’ was not necessarily 
chaotic, rather it was a state where ‘things are ‘laid’, ‘placed’, ‘arranged’ in sites 
so different from one another that it is impossible to find a residence for them, to 
define a common locus beneath them all.”341 (emphasis in original) Thus, in 
Foucault’s colourful words, “this...space in which things are normally arranged 
and given names.. .(also seem to resist being arranged).. .into any coherent pattern 
(a grid); as though that simple rectangle were unable to serve...as a homogeneous 
and neutral space in which things could be placed so as to display at the same 
time the continuous order of their identities and differences...”342 Paradoxically, 
therefore, instead of exhibiting the stability of structures and categories, that is to 
say, exhibiting an intrinsic coherence and order, the tabula is also a site of 
transient, temporary and dispersing multiplicities of groupings -  an ‘agglutination 
of diverse similarities’ - in a constant state of (re)organization and disturbance 
that seem to forever reel on the brink of a vertiginous anxiety. But Foucault also
Ibid., p xxi




teaches us to recognize this vertigo as that induced by the complex as opposed to 
the vertigo of chaos for, as he suggests, “it is only in the blank spaces of this grid 
that order manifests itself in depth as though already there.”343 Thus, even there 
where, in Clausewitz’s words, ‘logic comes to a stop’, Foucault suggests that 
“there exists, below the level of...spontaneous orders, things that are themselves 
capable of being ordered, that belong to a certain unspoken order; the fact, in 
short, that order exists”2,44 (emphasis in original).
Now, our survey of military theorists of the Enlightenment Era (which 
roughly corresponds to what Foucault refers to as the Classical period) shows us 
that the dogmatically ultra-rationalistic martial theories of Puyseguyer, Lloyd, von 
Bulow, Guibert, and even that of Jomini remained fixated by and with this grid of 
intelligibility. In this way, they remained partial to the mathesis, taxinomia, 
genesis series. As we have seen, it was also the case that while each of these 
theorists had encountered chance and uncertainty -  the dark side, in a manner of 
speaking, of the tabula -  they, in keeping with the spirit of their times, relied on 
the ordering principle of the mathesis, taxinomia and generis series which, they 
optimistically held, would quell the disruptions that created a turbulent space 
between their theoretical efforts and actual events — a point which Clausewitz 
made much of. If we take Foucault’s argument seriously, then it would appear 
that what the military theorists of the Enlightenment Age had done was to 
establish a norm from which they drew their inferences and conclusions. This
343 Ibid., p xix
344 Ibid., p xxii
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norm would have been established to develop and maintain the mathesis, 
taxinomia, genesis series. What, however, these theorists were unable to leverage 
- to the extent Clausewitz did - was this hidden order of things, which lay within 
the interstices of the things that populated the tabula. These were the gaps wherein 
(absolute) reason came to a standstill and, as such, were the differential-spaces 
between ‘theoretical truths (the grid of intelligibility) and the multifarious 
unaccountable and inexplicable instances within actual events (the gaps in this 
grid of intelligibility)’. Clausewitz, on the other hand, did not fail to recognize 
that both theoretical truths and actual events were underwritten by order, that is to 
say Reason, or ‘a reason’, which on the one hand was obviously apparent, indeed 
explicit (as in the case of theoretical truths); while on the other (in the case of 
actual events), it was hidden, though always already there. In this way, Clausewitz 
effected a dual maneuver.
The first maneuver Clausewitz effected was to make a distinction within 
the phenomena of chance and uncertainty. At the most superficial level, the 
problems associated with chance and uncertainty lie within the matrix that a 
viable theory of war would lay out. At a second level, he identified chance and 
uncertainty -  manifested as complexity -  residing in the interstices of the ; 
classifications and groupings that constitutes the mathesis, taxinomia, genesis '! 
series which, as we have seen, Foucault suggests has constituted the grid of 
intelligibility in various mutations since what he refers to as the Classical Age. 
However, here like Foucault, Clausewitz also discovers the existence of/order,, )
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though this existence is generally ignored by the analytical blindness of humans 
(with some significant exceptions), which lends to the appearance of chance and 
uncertainty. Having conducted his own version of the mathesis, taxinomia, 
genesis series on chance and uncertainty in the above manner, Clausewitz then - 
by introducing the figure of the genius - made the case for the application of 
sufficient reason’ to bridge the gap between theoretical truths and actual events 
where the play of chance and uncertainty takes place.345
Pursuant to this, Clausewitz noted that “[T]he influence of theoretical 
truths on practical life is always exerted more through critical analysis than 
through doctrine.”346 For a theorist who was scathing in his attacks on the rigid 
theoretical ‘truths’ of his predecessors, this turn to ‘critical analysis’ was most 
curious, though understandable. Indeed, Clausewitz went to some lengths to 
discuss the importance of ‘critical analysis’ while engaging in the formulation of a 
theory of war. As Gat informs us, Clausewitz began from the premise that 
“[Tjheory was by no means divorced from praxis; on the contrary, it had to be
345 The Principle o f  Sufficient Reason has been generally attributed to Leibniz. It consists o f  the follow ing  
propositions: For every entity x, i f  x exists, then there is a sufficient explanation why x exists; For every 
event e, i f  e occurs, then there is a sufficient explanation why e occurs; For every proposition p, i f  p is true, 
then there is a sufficient explanation why p is true. It is interesting to note that while the Principle o f  
Sufficient Reason may seem to be fatalistic, Leibniz did make provision for ‘contingency’ by stating, “W e 
have said that the concept o f  an individual substance [ Leibniz also uses the term haecceity ] includes once 
for all everything which can ever happen to it and that in considering this concept one will be able to see 
everything which can truly be said concerning the individual, just as we aie able to see in the nature o f  a 
circle all the properties which can be derived from it. But does it not seem that in this way the difference 
between contingent and necessary truths will be destroyed, that there w ill be no place for human liberty,
qyi absolute fatality will rule as well over all our actions as over all the rest o f  the events o f  the 
world? To this I reply that a distinction must be made between that which is certain and that which is 
necessary.” Leibniz, D iscourse on M etaphysics, Trans. Dr. George R. Montgomery (Open Court 
Publishing Company , 1902), #13, Available at http://www.class.uidaho.edu/mickelsen/texts/Leibniz% 20- 
%20Discourse%20on%20Metaphysics.htm#_*. Last accessed on Jan 2008.





translated into praxis.”347 For Clausewitz, ‘critical analysis’ was the tool by which 
such a gap could be bridged. Yet, such a faculty for ‘critical analysis’ could not 
take place in a vacuum, thus it is not surprising that Clausewitz was led to suggest 
that “ ...a working theory is an essential basis for criticism. Without such a theory 
it is generally impossible for criticism to reach the point at which it becomes truly 
instructive -  when its arguments are convincing and cannot be refuted.”348 Thus 
Clausewitz noted:
...it would be wishful thinking to imagine that any theory could cover every 
abstract truth, so that all the critic had to do would be to classify the case studied 
under the appropriate heading. Equally, it would be ridiculous to expect criticism 
to reverse course whenever it came up against the limits of a sacrosanct theory. 
The same spirit of analytical investigation which creates a theory should also 
guide the work of the critic...The function of criticism would be missed entirely 
if criticism were to degenerate into a mechanical application of theory. All the 
positive results of theoretical investigation -  all the principles, rules, and methods 
-  will increasingly lack universality and absolute truth the closer they come to 
being positive doctrine. They are there to be used when needed, and their 
suitability in any given case must always be a matter of judgment. The critic 
should never use the results of theory as laws and standards, but only -  as the 
soldier does -  as aids to judgment,349 (emphasis in original)
Naturally, the question arises - who is qualified to make judgments when ‘all 
positive results of theoretical investigations increasingly begin to lack 
universality’ and to render a translation between theory and praxis? And, what is 
the nature of judgment that is being made? At this point, it is necessary to pay
Gat, A History o f Military Thought, p 213
Clausewitz, On War, p 157
Clausewitz, On War, pp 157-158
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heed to Clausewitz’s cogent reminder about the limits of theory. In On War, he 
wrote:
[G]iven the nature of the subject...it is simply not possible to construct a model 
for the art of war that can serve as a scaffolding on which the commander can 
rely for support at any time. Whenever he has to fall back on his innate talent, he 
will find himself outside the model and in conflict with it; no matter how 
versatile the code, the situation will always lead to the consequences we have 
alluded to: talent and genius operate outside the rules, and theory conflicts with 
practice.350
This conflict between theory and practice, which leads ‘talent and genius’ to 
operate outside the rules, was nothing but a tacit recognition of the problems that 
chance and uncertainty posed not simply in the operational art of war, but in the 
theorization of war itself. It also made clear the precise role that ‘talent and 
genius’ played in such circumstances. Thus, Clausewitz’s positioning of ‘talent 
and genius’ assumes a significance that we will be ill-advised to ignore -  though 
this assessment comes with a caveat. It is essential to clarify the significance of 
the last line in the above-quoted section from Clausewitz for it has the potential to 
be misunderstood. We should pay particular attention to the fact that Clausewitz 
here is being highly critical of the theoretical positions held by his predecessors 
and is not endorsing the point of view that ‘talent and genius operate outside the 
rules’. As we have seen in the case of Jomini, the ‘art of war’ was essentially a 
schematic which attempted to provide for most, if not all, the possibilities in war. 
These constituted the ‘rules’ and ‘laws’ that governed war and its conduct. But we
350 Clausewitz, On War, p 140
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have also noted that despite the bent to over-rationalize the phenomenon of war, 
these rationalistic theorists of the Enlightenment era were also cognizant of the 
fact that within the phenomenon of war there was a space that was ridden with 
chance and uncertainty, which in the case of Jomini, was dispatched to the realm 
of the genius.351 What this suggests is that for Clausewitz’s predecessors, when 
and if necessary, talent and genius could indeed operate outside the general rules 
and prescriptions of war. This, as we have alluded to earlier, was their mechanism 
for dealing with the vagaries of chance and uncertainty. But Clausewitz insisted, 
in a note written either in 1808 or 1809 that “genius, dear sirs, never acts in
352contrary to the rules.” Instead, what Clausewitz suggests is the following:
Anything that could not be reached by the meager wisdom of such...points of 
view was held to be beyond scientific control: it lay in the realm of genius, which 
rises above all rules. Pity the soldier who is supposed to crawl among these 
scraps of rules, not good enough for the genius, which genius can ignore, or 
laugh at. No; w h a t g en iu s d o es  is th e  b e s t rule, a n d  th eo ry  can  do  no  b e tte r  than  
show how a n d  w h y th is sh o id d  b e  th e  c a s e .353 (my emphasis)
It is interesting to note that at this point, Clausewitz appears closest to Kant, for 
the latter, in his monumental Critique o f Judgment, wrote: “Genius is the talent 
which gives rule to art...[it] is a talent for producing that for which no definite 
rule can be given.”354 Clausewitz’s critique of his predecessors’ theories with 
specific reference to the role of the genius is thus a complicated one. While on the
351 Gat, A H istory o f  M ilitary Thought, p 179-180
352 Quoted in Gat, A H istory o f  M ilitary Thought, p 178
3 5 3  Clausewitz, On War, p 136 , . , / T  j  t t ^  r w  j T T  • ■+
354 Immanual Kant, Critique o f  Judgment, Trans. James. C. Meredith, (London, UK: Oxford University
Press, 1961), pp 168 & 181.
221
one hand he decries the attempt of the Enlightenment theorists to leave all and 
sundry which fell outside their rational schematics of war to the realm of genius, 
on the other hand, however, Clausewitz remained as beholden as them to the 
notion of the genius. The proverbial ‘twist in the tale’ is present in how 
Clausewitz’s ‘military genius’ operated given the rules and principles that govern 
war and its conduct.
Clausewitz attributes the role of a ‘rule-maker’ to the genius which leads 
him, as we have seen, to insist on the point that ‘genius never acts contrary to the
i f f
rules.’ Naturally, the question arises -  to what end did Clausewitz position the 
genius as a player by rules and one who stands above them? As we have noted 
earlier, Clausewitz, unlike his predecessors, identified the complexity within the 
mathesis, taxinomia, genesis series as not so much a case of chaos, but rather as 
the inability -  because of an analytical blindness - to find a common locus. Thus, 
for Clausewitz, the Genius, operated as one who by means of a superior and more 
acute analytical ability was able to discern the order of thingSjin instances and 
events where other more common analytical efforts could only discern a 
seemingly insuperable fog of uncertainty.
355 i f  \yg take Foucault’s account o f  the disappearance o f  the Classical episteme and the subsequent 
turn to the union o f  history and semiotics and o f  the rise o f  what he refers to the interpretive disciplines , 
w e find this there is a strong resonance between the kind o f  functions that the Clausewitzian genius 
performs. For, as Clausewitz puts it, i what the genius does is the best rule. In this connection also note 
how  Dillon marks the function o f  the Commander or the general — the giver o f  signs. See M ichael Dillon, 
“Intelligence Incarnate: Martial Corporeality in the Digital A ge”, B ody & Society , (London/ N ew  Delhi: 




We should also be careful to note that Clausewitz, in a rather self- 
depreciating manner, distinguishes the precise type of genius that plays this 
central role in a martial context. Thus, in his own words, Clausewitz states:
Any complex activity, if it is to be carried on with any degree of virtuosity, calls 
for appropriate gifts of intellect and temperament, If they are outstanding and 
reveal themselves in exceptional achievements, their possessor is called a 
“genius”... But since we claim no special expertise in philosophy or grammar, 
we may be allowed to use the word in its ordinary meaning ... “genius” refers to 
a very highly developed mental aptitude for a particular occupation.356
Note that this complex activity (war) was not chaotic. Indeed, it could not be. 
Rather, it was ‘complex’, that is say, it ranged from those empirical orders/ codes 
-  governing perception, exchange, language, techniques, values and hierarchy of 
practices -  to “scientific theories or philosophical interpretations which explains 
why order exists in general, what universal law it obeys, what principle can 
account for it...” The Clausewitzian Genius, thus, stands between these two 
extremes -  in “...another domain which, even though its role is mainly an 
intermediary one, is....more confused, more obscure, and probably less easy to 
analyze.”357 Thus, Clausewitz noted...
...we cannot restrict our discussion to genius proper, as a superlative degree of 
talent, for this concept lacks measureable limits. What we must do is to survey all 
those gifts of mind and temperament that in combination bear on military 
activity. These, taken together, constitute the essence of military genius. We 
have said in combination, since it is precisely the essence of military genius that
Clausewitz, On War, p 100
Foucault, The O rder o f  Things, p xxii
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it does not consist in a single appropriate gift -  courage, for example...Genius 
consists in a h arm on iou s co m b in a tio n  o f  e lem en ts , in which one or the other 
ability may predominate, but none may conflict with the rest.358 (emphasis in 
original)
Note how Clausewitz, while acknowledging that there is a need to precisely 
identify the type of genius who gains prominence in the field of military matters -  
the military genius -  also marks the expansive essence of this particular type of 
genius whom he distinguishes from the other types of genius. Thus, according to 
Clausewitz, the military genius is one who, unlike say, like a mathematical genius 
or a philosophical genius, is able to imbibe a harmonious combination of 
elements.359 In fact, Clausewitz went even further. He suggested that such a 
genius was quite a singular personality. Thus, in Clausewitz’s words, “[I]f every 
soldier needed some degree of military genius...armies would be very weak, for 
the term refers to a special cast of mental or moral powers which can rarely occur 
in an army.”360 Then, after noting the importance of courage in the context of his 
discussion of the genius, Clausewitz highlighted the key characteristics that 
distinguish this genius from the ‘norm’. It is worth quoting Clausewitz in some 
detail here.
358 Clausewitz, On War, p 100
359 This study has a number o f  uncomfortable reservations on this issue. Thus, for example, it resists 
C lausew itz’s insinuation th a t1 mathematical and philosophical geniuses fail to exhibit the ability to imbibe 
a harmonious combination o f  elements. It should also be noted, however, that the recent Alan Sokal affair 
did much to shake up the complacency o f  this author. The persons involved on all sides in this sordid affair 
displayed very little o f  the ability to imbibe ‘a harmonious combination o f  elem ents’. Though, o f  course, 
the claim is also not being made that the participants in this affair were geniuses o f  any type. See, Sokal & 
Bricmont, fa sh io n a b le  Nonsense: Post-M odern Intellectuals Abuse o f  Science, (London. Picador, 1999)
360 Clausewitz, On War, p 100
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If we pursue the demands that war makes on those who practice it, we come to 
the region dominated by the p o w e r s  o f  in te lle c t. War is the realm of 
uncertainty...A sensitive and discriminating judgment is called for; a skilled 
intelligence to scent out the truth. Average intelligence may recognize the truth 
occasionally, and exceptional courage may now and then retrieve a blunder; but 
usually intellectual inadequacy will be shown up by indifferent 
achievement...Since all information and assumptions are open to doubt, and with 
chance at work everywhere, the commander continually finds that things are not 
as he expected... If the mind is to emerge unscathed from this relentless struggle 
with the unforeseen, two qualities are indispensible: f i r s t  an in te lle c t that, even  in 
th e  d a rk e s t hour, re ta in s so m e  g lim m erin g s  o f  th e  in n er lig h t w h ich  le a d s  to  th e  
tru th ; a n d  secon d , th e  co u ra g e  to  f o l lo w  th is f a in t  lig h t w h e re v e r  i t  m a y  le a d .i6[ 
(all emphasis in original)
And then to make the point even clearer, Clausewitz insisted that this faculty of 
the genius is not simply limited to the heat of battle, that is to say, the 
engagement, but also to strategy.362
By now it will have been noted that the Kantian thematic that emerges 
from within Clausewitz’s discussion of the Genius is stark and difficult to ignore. 
Thus, for example, for Clausewitz, ‘genius consists in a harmonious combination 
o f elements'. This notion of the genius corresponds to what Deleuze describes as 
the Kantian notion of the genius for whom “the creative intuition as intuition of an 
other nature, and the concepts of reason as rational Ideas, are adequately 
unified.”363 Note that for Kant, “the theory of Genius...manages to bridge the gap
361 Clausewitz, On War, pp 101-102
362 C lausew itz, On War, p 102
363 D eleuze, “The Idea o f  Genesis in Kant’s Esthetics”, m D esert Islands and Other Texts, 1953-1974, Ed.
David Lapoujade, Trans. M. Taormina , (N ew  Y ork, NY: Semiotext(e), 2 0 0 4 ), p67
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that had opened up between the beautiful in nature and the beautiful in art.”364 
This was not simply a matter of a theory of aesthetics, for the theme of an 
agreement among several faculties, which as Kant’s third Critique shows us can 
only be embodied in the figure of the Genius, is a running constant in the Kantian 
Critique. Kant, in the Critique o f Pure Reason, had suggested that there was a 
tripartite harmonious relationship between the faculties of understanding, 
imagination and reason in keeping with a speculative purpose. The core objective 
of the first Critique was to demonstrate how the understanding disposes a priori 
concepts by inducing the imagination and reason to subject objects for speculative 
purposes to itself. In the Critique o f Practical Reason, Kant took the argument a 
step further and demonstrated how reason, mediated by the Moral Law, 
determines supersensible objects which are necessarily subject to it and how 
Reason induces understanding to a particular function in accordance to a practical 
purpose.365 Thus Deleuze cautions us, “[I]n the first two Critiques...we cannot 
escape the principle of an agreement of the faculties among themselves. But this 
agreement is always proportioned, constrained and determinate: there is always a 
determinative faculty that legislates, either the understanding for a speculative 
reason, or reason for a practical purpose.”366 (emphasis in original) But, in the 
case of aesthetic judgment, which Kant discusses in the third Critique, “the 





reason. Kant’s argument, as highlighted by Deleuze, is simple, but incisive. 
Thus, Deleuze notes:
Esthetic pleasure is itself disinterested pleasure: it is not only independent of any 
empirical purpose, but also any speculative or practical purpose. It follows that 
esthetic judgment does not legislate; it does not imply any faculty that legislates 
objects. Indeed, how could it be otherwise, since there are only two sorts of 
objects -  phenomena and thing-in-themselves: the first are governed by the 
legislation of understandings for a speculative purpose; and the second, by the 
legislation of reason for a practical purpose?368
But this ‘liberation’ of the imagination also allows for the possibility of enabling 
the other two faculties be liberated in themselves. Thus, Deleuze, while reading 
Kant’s third Critique tells us that...
...the Critique of Judgment releases us in a new element: 1) a contingent 
agreement of sensible objects with all our faculties together, instead of a 
necessary submission to one of the faculties; 2) a free indeterminate harmony of 
the faculties among themselves, instead of a determinate harmony presided over 
by one of the faculties.369
It is only after establishing this that Kant, according to Deleuze, suggests that the 
Genius “engenders the esthetic agreement between the imagination and the 
understanding. It engenders each faculty in this agreement, the imagination as 






make up Kant’s Critique o f Judgment “converge on...the suprasensible unity of 
our faculties, “the point of concentration,” the life-giving principle that 
“animates” each faculty, engendering both its free exercise and its free agreement 
with the other faculties.”371 It is for this reason that Kant emphasizes the crucial 
role played by his Critique o f Judgment, for it was nothing less than an attempt by 
which a passage between a speculative purpose and a practical purpose is made.
The significance of the Kantian notion of the Genius, which equally 
applies to the Clausewitzian notion of the genius is, thus, aptly summed up by 
Deleuze in the following terms:
Genius has properties analogous to those of purpose: it furnishes a matter, it 
incarnates Ideas, it causes reason to give birth to itself, and it liberates the 
imagination and expands the understanding. But genius exercises all these 
faculties first and foremost from the vantage point of the creation of a work of 
art. Finally without losing any of its singular and exceptional character, genius 
must give a universal value to the agreement which it engenders, and it must 
communicate to the faculties of the spectator something of its own life and 
force.372
The Clausewitzian genius which, as we have established above, is closely 
modeled along the lines of the Kantian genius is thus an entity or an agent that is 
able to operate in an unrestricted manner in a condition bereft of the faculties o f I 
reason and understanding. This, as we have seen, is the condition that is not only 




but also in that gap between the two, which we identified as being the pure 
concept of war. We should also not ignore the core functionality of the 
Clausewitzian genius, who was not simply limited to operating in an unrestricted 
manner in conditions bereft of reason and understanding, he was also to ‘make’ 
rules, principles and laws by which reason and understanding could be brought to 
such conditions.
Thus, we find the Clausewitzian Genius performing three critical 
functions. First, the Genius deals with the complexity of the machinations of the 
war-machine, that is to say, with the fog and friction that is internal to the war- 
machine. In this role, the Genius is the one who is able to, by means of a superior 
faculty of perception, make causal connections and to chart out the likely 
trajectory of the effects of such friction. Second, the Genius also deals with the 
external friction that comes about as the war-machine comes in contact with its 
operational environment. This operational environment is marked by a 
proliferation of qualities and forms - a multiplicity of existing things -  which 
creates “tangled paths, strange places, secret passages, and unexpected 
communications.”373 Yet, as Foucault shows us, this profusion of forms and 
qualities was (and remains) underwritten by the mathesis, taxinomia, genesis 
series, which hinted at the presence of an order “which is given in things as their 
inner law, the hidden network that determines the way they confront one another, j 
and also that which hasjno existence except in the grid!. .and it is only in the blank 
spaces of this grid that order manifests itself in depth as though already there,
373 Foucault, The O rder o f  Things, p xx
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waiting in silence for the moment of its expression.”374 For the majority, afflicted 
by an analytical blindness that the initial plethora of qualities and forms trigger, 
discerning this overt and covert presence of order can be daunting. Thus, the 
second task of the Genius was to be able to cast a keen eye over such tangled 
pathways and to recover the order that lay below such ‘tangled pathways’. The 
third task of the genius was to make “manifest the modes of being of order 
(which) can be posited as the most fundamental of all: anterior to words, 
perceptions, and gestures”.375 Recall, in this context, that the key characteristic of 
the Kantian Genius was to be able to incarnate Ideas, to assist in the birth of 
Reason, to liberate the Imagination and to expand understanding. In a similar 
fashion, by deploying higher intellectual abilities backed by a very finely tuned 
pitch of vision, the Clausewitzian Genius strove to bring order to the ‘chaos’ of 
war. Thus, Clausewitz, while noting that the genius could never hope to be of 
historical significance if he did not display courage, fortitude, character and 
temperament, observed that...
...Circumstances vary so enormously in war, and are so indefinable, that a vast 
array of factors has to be appreciated -  mostly in the light of probabilities alone. 
The man responsible for evaluating the whole must bring to his task the quality 
of intuition that perceives the truth at every point.. .What this task requires in the 
way of higher intellectual gifts is a sense of unity and a power of judgment raised 
to a marvelous pitch of vision, which easily grasps and dismisses a thousand 
remote possibilities which an ordinary mind would labor to identify.. ,376
374 Ibid., p xxi
375 Ibid., p xxiii
376 Clausewitz, On War, p 112
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In this context, recall also Clausewitz’s principal concern while fashioning a 
viable theory of war. As we have seen, he insisted that his theory of war would 
leave room for every sort of extraneous matter, which resists codification -  indeed 
even the prospect of theorization. Given the above, it is not surprising that, for 
Clausewitz, the Genius was the ultimate instrument who could gather up all these 
loose ends (which in the context of war and life are complex, multi-varied and 
which continually multiply exponentially) thereby fashioning an order of sorts, 
which become laws, rules and principles, in the loose manner in which Clausewitz 
had defined them.
The only matter that now remains to be addressed before we can conclude 
this extended discussion on the Clausewitzian architectonic of war is the question 
of the immanence of chance and uncertainty that we asserted Clausewitz had 
fleetingly alluded to when he referred to ‘the pure concept of war.’ We have 
already established that a ‘formal’ theory of war -  as the examples from the 
theories of war of the Enlightenment show us -  would have not been able to 
accommodate the fog and friction of war, leave alone the chaos that characterizes 
chance and uncertainty in their immanent form. We also noted Clausewitz’s 
recognition of this and of his disparaging observations on the attempts of his 
predecessors to do precisely this. The question thus remains: Given that we have 
asserted that Clausewitz did in fact recognize the immanent face of chance and 
uncertainty, how did his theory of war accommodate the same? We have already 
noted that Clausewitz had remained silent about this problem. But, considering
231
the functions of the genius, particularly the third function as mentioned above, we 
will not be too far off the mark if we suggest that, for Clausewitz, the genius 
remained the only viable instrument by which chance and uncertainty -  in their 
immanent guise -  could be dealt with. Recall, that following Kant’s argument, the 
Clausewitzian genius was the only one who could ‘perceive the truth at every 
point’. We also noted in our discussion of the Kantian Genius that the Imagination 
is freed from the constraints of understanding. Moreover, under the regime of the 
Kantian Genius, reason, understanding and imagination achieve a ‘free/ liberated’ 
unity thereby infusing what Deleuze refers to as “the life-giving principle that 
animates each faculty, engendering both its free exercise and its free agreement 
with the other faculties...(resulting in)...the supersensible unity of our 
faculties.”377 It is important for us to note that the notion of a ‘unity’ (which in 
Kant’s case is ‘suprasensible’) that the Kantian genius brings about is a throwback
on thej essential order of things -  overt and covert - that Foucault had alerted us to.
(    ,
Of course, this unity which is obtained by the harmonious combination of the 
faculties is one which is invisible, though existent, to more common minds. Thus, 
the Genius -  and this is as applicable to Kant as it is to Clausewitz -  when faced 
by the immanence of chance and uncertainty and in the absence of any specific
i
determinations is able to '‘create matter’, which also entails the giving of ‘form’ 
by adjusting the imagination which is liberated from an indeterminate 
understanding. In this way, the Genius is able to cognize the slice of chaos that 
seemingly rents life and war and is able to posit a universal value. It would, 
therefore, seem that despite the free reign that the Genius gives to the Imagination
377 D eleuze, “The Idea o f  Genesis in Kant’s Esthetics”, in D esert Islands, p69
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— under the Kantian system — the turn to an ordering remains in place, though the 
act of this ordering is wholly limited to the purview of the Genius. Thus, while 
Clausewitz, understandably remains silent on the matter of the pure concept of 
war and of the immanence of chance and uncertainty that that condition entails, 
implicit in his positioning of the genius in his discussion of war, is the belief (for 
it is nothing less than that) that the faculties that the genius can marshal can create j
some kind of a comprehensible and coherent order from the chaos of chance and
uncertainty.
Clausewitz: Q. E. D.
When we began our discussion on Clausewitz and his handling of chance 
and uncertainty in war, it was suggested that the core problematic for Clausewitz 
was not simply the combating of chance and uncertainty -  manifested as the fog 
and friction of war -  rather, it was more a question of how to think when the 
condition of thought is one of chaos. It will be noted with some interest that while 
Clausewitz did not seem to make much headway in this direction, our discussion 
on his notion of the genius and his positioning of the genius in the broader outline 
of his architectonic of war signals that Clausewitz was fully aware of the 
immanence of chance and uncertainty in the context of life, war and the conduct 
of war. Given that he was operating from within a Kantian-inspired regime of 
thought and philosophy, for Clausewitz, the genius was the best, most optimal, 
instrument that he could deploy to address the unique problem posed by the
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originary anteriority of chance and uncertainty. It also allowed him to devise an 
architectonic of war that - unlike that of his predecessors - resisted any serious 
deconstruction under the relentless assault of these twin phenomena. This, as the 
history of military thought since Clausewitz demonstrates, has remained central to 
any serious consideration of war and its conduct. In a similar fashion, his 
enframing of what originally started as the pure concept of war - and in its 
modified form, Absolute War - with the rational order of politics served to bring 
war to reason and made war Real. Collectively then, these twin Clausewitzian 
features -  the rational order of politics and chance and uncertainty (in all their 
senses) mediated by the Genius -  served as an endoskeleton to his architectonic of 
war. They have also served to ensnare our imagination of war till date.
However, it is only with the emergence of NCW that this Clausewitizian 
imagination of war begins to achieve its materiality -  in Real and Virtual terms. 
As was noted at the very outset of this study, this transformation is being 
accompanied by a re-threading and re-weaving of the two principle sinews of the 
Clausewitzian imagination of war -  politics and chance/ uncertainty. In what 
follows, we will take a closer look at the phenomenon of NCW which, as a 
concept of operations, is an ambitious attempt to re-present the original
i
Clausewitzian theory of war within mobile and real-time landscapes of various ; 
hues, complexities and probabilities and, in this sense, is being touted as the 
theory of war for the 21st Century.
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Chapter Three
Machining (Network-Centric) War or...
...terminal hate, i t ’s a calculation...1
Behind the Network Paradise
In late 1957, the US military and scientific community suffered, what can 
only be called, a strategic surprise. Weighing 183 pounds, with a 96-minute 
orbital cycle around the earth, Sputnik, the world’s first artificial satellite, had 
been launched by the USSR. This event had, among others, one particular 
repercussion which is of interest to us. The launch of the Sputnik forced US 
military thinkers and scientists to consider its impact in terms of the potential 
exploitation of ‘space’ (as a so-called ‘dimension’) and the resultant geopolitical 
and strategic implications that emerged as a consequence. President Eisenhower 
was quick to realize that there was an immediate and urgent need to harness the 
scientific talent of the US and thus, in 1958, he established the ARPA (Advanced 
Research Projects Agency), which was configured to be the central research and 
development organization for the U.S. Department of Defense.3 Within the 
ARPA, it is significant to note, a special office was established to support 
research dealing with the field of computers and computer related technologies.
1 Black Sabbath, “Computer God” from Dehumanizer, 1992
2 Roger D. Launius, N A SA  C hief Historian, “Sputnik and the Dawn o f  the Space A ge”, Available at 
http://www.hq.nasa.gov/office/pao/Historv/sputnik/sputorig.html. Last accessed on July 28, 2004.
3 Hafher & Lyon, Where Wizards Stay Up Late  -  The Origins o f  the Internet, (N ew  York, N Y : Touchstone 
Books, 1998), pp 11-20.
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This was the Information Processing Techniques Office (IPTO)4. In addition to its 
pure research’ tasks, ARPA was also assigned to look into how best to utilize its 
investment in computers via the Command and Control Research (CCR) 
program.5 These were the beginnings of the ‘network-concepf in its most 
material of manifestations.
Further, in the 1960s, scientists began to come to the conclusion that some 
kinds of behaviour occurring in the natural world were patently inexplicable when 
examined in detail. Increasingly, they began to discover that “the intrinsic inter­
relationships of elements within a complex system give rise to multiple chains of 
dependencies”.6 They also discovered that the existent tools -  primarily 
mathematical -  were unable to analyze and model the behaviour of these complex 
systems. This led to a spurt of activity in what became the field of the ‘new’ 
physics -  chaos, complexity and non-linearity. Though preceded by luminaries 
like Jules-Henri Poincare who, as a USAF officer in a classic example of an 
understatement put it, “had inklings of the existence of chaos” in the late 1800s, 
it was the work done by Edward Lorenz in the field of meteorology that first 
enabled, using large computers, a detailed observation of the phenomenon.
4 Mark Buchanan, Small World -  Uncovering N a tu re’s Hidden N etw orks, (London, UK: Phoenix 
Publications, 2003), p 73. See also “ARPA and the ARPANET -  A B rief History”, Available at 
http://www.comDutermuseum.li/TestDage/99HISTORYCD-ARPA-History.HTM. Last accessed on July 28,
2004.
5 M ichael & Ronda Hauben, “Behind the Net: The Untold History o f  the ARPANET and Computer 
Science”, in N etizens: On the H istory and Impact o f  Usenet and the Internet, Net Book, Available at 
http://w w w .colum bia.edu/~rhl20/chl06.x07. Last accessed on July 28, 2004. See also “ARPA and the 
ARPANET -  A B rief History”, Available at http://www.computermuseum.li/Testpage/99HISTORYCD- 
ARPA-History.HTM. Last accessed on July 28, 2004.
6James Moffat, Complexity Theory and N etwork-Centric Warfare, Information A ge Transformation Series, 
(Washington, DC: US DoD, CCRP, 2003), p 2.
7 Glenn E. James, Maj. USAF, Chaos Theory -  The Essentials fo r  M ilitary A pplications, The Newport 
Papers, Number 10, (Newport, RI: Naval War College, 1996), p 5.
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“Lorenz was trying to make sense of the all-too-frequent discrepancies between 
what weather forecasters say and what actually happens.”8 As a result of his 
investigations, Lorenz coined the now famous phrase - ‘the butter-fly effect’ - 
which “captured the idea that through chaos the smallest of events can lead to the 
most massive of consequences.”9 In due course “the ‘butter-fly effect’ acquired a 
technical name: sensitive dependence on initial conditions.”10 The consequences 
of these investigations have had a tremendous impact on thinking about war and 
its conduct. As we shall see, these innocuous beginnings were portents of the 
emergence of a phenomenon, which would have a lasting effect on warfare and its 
conduct. In this sense, they were also the conceptual bedrock on which the 
emerging edifice of NCW stands.
But while we do so, it is also important not to lose sight of the fact that we 
can trace these seemingly radical transformations - popularly gathered under the 
rubric of NCW -  that are underway in the theory and practice of war today to 
concepts present in Clausewitz’s theory of war. Earlier, it was suggested that 
Clausewitz’s architectonic of war was mapped along what Foucault identified as 
the mathesis-taxinomia-genesis series. This was, as we have seen, based on the 
series that Kant had developed in his Critiques -  reason, understanding and the 
imagination. Further, it was suggested that between the gaps and crevices that 
accompanied particularly the taxinomial order of things, there were other hidden
8 Peter Coventry and Roger Highfield, Frontiers o f  Complexity -  The Search fo r  O rder in a Chaotic World, 
(N ew  York, NY: Ballantine Books, 1995), p 169.
9 Ibid p 170.
10 James Gleick, Chaos -  The Amazing Science o f  the Unpredictable, (London, UK: Random House, 1988), 
p 23.
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sources of order, which only -  this applying as much to Clausewitz, as to Kant -  
the Genius could discern. For the most part, however, these gaps and crevices 
were characterized by conditions of complexity that veered into chaos. The 
Genius thus was the primary instrument by which military theorists, including 
Clausewitz, dealt with this condition of complexity, non-linearity and chaos. With 
the emergence of the ‘new sciences’, however, the Genius in martial terms, begins 
to undergo a curious ‘democratization’. Buoyed by the rapid developments and 
evolutionary changes in ICTs which, in turn, are deeply informed by the theories 
of networking, complexity, and non-linearity, the hitherto ‘singular’ agency of the 
Romantic Genius is undergoing a rapid transformation into a distributed and 
decentralized capability. The power of the genius, it could be said, is being 
pushed to the edges.
Semantic Implications o f Network-Centric Warfare
Foucault teaches us that “in every society the production of discourse is at 
once controlled, selected, organized and redistributed according to a certain 
number of procedures”.11 A careful examination of such practices of any society 
and its institutions reveals the often hidden prohibitive and exclusive practices 
that govern the production of discourse and more often than not they are geared to 
establish, in Foucauldian terms, an ‘order of things’. A cautionary note is 
necessary here. The phrase ‘order of things’ invites a perspective that focuses on
11 M ichael Foucault, The Archeology o f  K nowledge and the D iscourse on Language, Trans. A. M. Sheridan
Smith, (N ew  York, NY: Tavistock Publications, 1972), p 216.
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“a totalitarian periodization, whereby from a certain moment and from a certain 
time, everyone would think in the same way, in spite of surface differences, say 
the same thing...”12 This is a flawed perspective. An investigation of discursive 
practices and formations uncovers “a level of homogeneity that has its own 
temporal articulation...and...at this level it establishes an order, hierarchies...that 
excludes a massive amorphous synchrony, given totally once and for all.”13 This 
implies that while homogeneity does exist, it is temporally specific and 
susceptible to change. In other words, it is an ‘achievement’ and not a ‘raw 
reality’. Whether this change is dramatically revolutionary or is a gradual and 
evolutionary process is open to debate, but the fact cannot be dismissed that the 
element of change remains a constant feature of discursive practices characterized 
by a “series of gaps, intertwined with one another, interplays of differences, 
distances, substitutions, transformations.”14 The issue surrounding the production 
of discourse and discursive practices that is of interest to us, given the overarching 
field of our genealogical investigation, is that of ‘exclusion’. Foucault identifies 
this as the principle of exclusion characterized by, among other things, a division 
and rejection - specifically the opposition between ‘reason and folly’.15 It is 
instructive to note that Foucault, especially in the latter stages of his career, based 
on this attempted “to develop a theory of the relation between war and power as 
well as a strategy of power”.16 Now, working from the premise that NCW is
12 Ibid p 148.
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid p 37.
15 Ibid p 217.
16 Julian Reid, “Foucault on Clausewitz: Conceptualizing the Relationship between War and Power”, m
A lternatives 28, 2003, 1-28.
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concerned not only with power, but also with its strategization or transformation, 
it will be worth our while to consider an illustrative example offered by Foucault 
in some detail.
In the Middle Ages, Foucault suggests, the phenomenon of madness was 
reflected in speech as the words of a madman stood outside common discourse.17 
By this Foucault means to say that the speech of the madman was “considered 
null and void, without truth or significance, worthless as evidence, inadmissible in 
the authentication of acts or contracts.”18 But Foucault also identifies a curious 
paradoxical situation at play here, which is attributable to the ‘form’ of the 
madman’s speech. He finds that while the madman’s speech was considered to be 
outside ‘reason’ and ‘rationality’ there was, simultaneously, a curious investure of 
some hidden truth in the madman’s words, which were often taken to be a 
signature of “rationality more rational than that of a rational man.”19 In the late 
eighteenth century, however, a superficial change appears to occur. The 
madman’s speech was no longer dismissed as meaningless. Even the silence of 
the madman ‘conveyed’ meaning. In other words, there was an increased interest 
in the ‘content’ of the madman’s speech; a prioritization of the ‘content’ over the 
‘form’ began to appear. This, Foucault contends, begins to occur within a network
17 See Foucault, M adness and Civilization -  H istory o f  Insanity in the A ge o f  Reason, for an incisive survey 




of institutions characterized by the techniques of epistemic and documentary 
‘discipline’.20
A couple of issues can be noted from Foucault’s investigation. The first is 
the change in the emphasis from ‘form’ to ‘content’. This points to the 
(re)location of ‘truth’ characterized by reason, which is increasingly found in the 
‘content’ as opposed to the ‘form’ of speech, a fact which, Foucault claims, has its 
antecedents from the Greeks of the sixth and seventh century.21 The second is the 
looming presence of institutions that ‘permits’/ authorizes/ legitimates the 
‘deciphering’ of the madman’s speech according to certain established norms. In 
other words, the activities of the doctors and psychoanalysts (collectively, the 
‘agents’ empowered to ‘listen’ to and ‘understand’ the speech/ silence of the 
madman) is ‘guided’ by the network of institutions that they are a part of. In other 
words, ‘truth’ becomes an institutional preserve.
Further, it will be appreciated that the relocation of ‘truth’ from the ‘form’ 
of speech to its ‘content’ combined with the directive/ authorizing/ legitimizing 
function of institutions marks the ‘exclusive’ nature that discursive practices have 
assumed. The quantification of the ab-normal is at once - by means of the 
techniques of classification and documentation - both individualizing and 
marginalizing. Those who conform are ‘in’ and those who do not are ‘out’. It is a
20 Foucault, D iscipline and Punish -  The Birth o f  the Prison, pp 189-194.
21 Foucault suggests that the division between ‘true’ and ‘false’ “is a historically constituted division” and 
cites the example o f  the division between Hesiod and Plato where “the highest truth no longer resided in 
what discourse was, nor in what it did: it lay in what was sa id .” (emphasis in original). See Foucault, The 
A rcheology o f  K nowledge and the Discourse on Language, p 218.
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specific technique of power and the relationality of the individual, marked by an
unusual submission, to this particular mechanism of power is reflective of the
hegemonic tendency inherent in formations and practices of discourse. It is
curious, in this connection, to note that if discursive practices are, among other
things, the grounds for the ‘conditions of possibility’, then those very grounds are
sites wherein the maximum of power is exercised in very particular and specific 
22ways. It does not take too much of an effort to observe that discursive practices, 
understood in light of the institutional operation of power relations attempt to not 
only control the ‘conditions of possibility’, but also prescribe the terms and 
conditions and thus limit the ‘conditions of possibility’ by circumscribing them 
with rules, laws, disciplines and doctrines.
Two points of interest catch our attention from Foucault’s example of the 
madman. The first is observed by Jacques Derrida, who looks closely at the issue 
of madness, a position contra reason. The other is observed by Michael Dillon 
who examines the transient nature of words and, by extension, of language. We 
will examine both these points as they influence, by means of their intense 
engagement with the question of language and discourse, not only our account of 
NCW, but of NCW itself.
Derrida, on a close reading of Foucault, identifies a ‘trap’ which, while 
Foucault is acutely aware of, fails to avoid when he purports to write ‘a history of
22 Ibid., p 216. Foucault alludes to this when he marks the site where the web comprising o f  prohibitive and 
exclusive practices prominently appears. He finds, in his investigations, that this complex web “is most 
tightly w oven .. .where the danger spots are most numerous.. .politics and sexuality.”
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madness’. The ‘trap’ is the one set by classical reason to ‘catch madness’ 23 and it 
is the trap of circularity. A history of madness (as distinct, for example, from that 
of psychiatry which purports to ‘study’ madness) should, in simple terms, lie 
outside the frame of reason (where madness lies beyond/ outside the domain of 
reason - free from all comparative and contextual links to reason), yet the 
language that attempts to express this history is itself, to use a business term, a 
‘wholly owned subsidiary’ of reason. Thus, Derrida, in his observation of this 
‘trap’ that Foucault’s project is susceptible to, is articulating the futility of 
attempting a study of madness from within the confines of reason.24 A valid 
analysis of discourse, indeed of language, then depends on perceiving this flawed 
point of debouchment that the analysis is premised on. Importantly, Derrida’s 
observation also highlights the implicit violence that is present within reason itself 
as it attempts to account for madness within its own logic by means of casting 
madness as its own anti-thesis. This is reason’s strategic maneuver and is geared 
to ‘contain’ madness within its domain manifested by our recourse to develop and
25deploy strategies to articulate that which may lie outside the domain of reason. 
The envelope of reason is thus continually being pushed outwards.
Dillon, on the other hand, observes that words are “literally 
incomplete...no word commands that of which it speaks, or what is spoken
23 Jacques Derrida, Writing and Difference, Trans. Alan Bass, (Chicago, IL: Univ. o f  Chicago Press, 1978),
P 34 -
4 Ibid. p 36.
25 Ibid.
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through it...Neither can words simply be commanded.”26 The uncanniness of 
words is evident in the fact that they speak not only by their articulations, but also 
by their silence,27 meaning that, aside from their activity of revealing, words also 
engage in acts of concealment. Words (and by extension language), therefore, 
display an inherent elusiveness and, as Dillon states, an “incorrigible
j ?28recidivism.” Thus, for example, ‘words fail us’; ‘we are rendered speechless’; 
‘we remain silent’ in more ways than one. Silence (which is both silence as 
opposed to that which is audible and the implicit silence of words which emerges 
by the very act of articulation in the form of that which remains unarticulated) 
then, like speech, is a discourse and is pregnant with meaning - comprehensible or 
otherwise. Foucault alludes to this in the silence of the madman and the parallel 
focus of institutions and their agents on this very phenomenon of silence in their 
bid to gain mastery over this (silent) discourse. Yet, in light of Dillon’s 
observations, one is left wondering whether the propensity of institutions to effect 
a totalizing control by means of discourse, discursive practices and ultimately 
words that simultaneously speak and remain silent is not as complete as, say, 
Foucault’s study of madness would suggest, albeit at a superficial level.
What Foucault’s project, supplemented by Dillon’s keen observations, 
does highlight is the continued attempt being made by institutions and practices to 
overcome these gaps and omissions in language and discourse. Of course, these
26 M ichael D illon, The Politics o f  Security -  Towards a P olitical Philosophy o f  Continental Thought,
(London, UK: Routledge, 1996), pp 113-114
27 Ibid p 114.
28 Ibid.
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attempts are both overt and covert. More often than not, these ‘colonizing’ and 
controlling attempts are masked by a seductive allusion to the provision of 
security, whereby the latent insecurity (manifested by the instability) of discourse 
are deemed to be mitigated under the shadow of institutions and their agents29 by 
means of established norms, rules, laws and doctrines. Thus we are able to 
identify the location of power and the methods of its exercise. Deleuze and 
Guattari, who observe that “(L)anguage is made not to be believed but to be 
obeyed, and to compel obedience”,30 reinforce our observation. Consequently, our 
account of the genealogy of NCW, in the context of the emergence of ICTs, now 
takes a radical turn. The control and disciplining practices that were deemed to be 
present, as shown by Foucault, suddenly achieve a magnification that entails a 
very close look at the dynamics at play in the discourse of NCW.
The Technologisation o f Discourse
In the late 1970s, the Soviet General Staff prompted by their “anxiety of 
watching a more technologically advanced United States develop new 
technologies and move to incorporate them into new military systems”31 began to 
speculate about the long-term consequences of such developments with specific 
reference to warfare and its conduct. Labeling it as a ‘military-technical
^  Foucault, The Archeology o f  K nowledge and the D iscourse on Language, p 216
30 D eleuze & Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus -  Capitalism and Schizophrenia, (London, UK: Continuum,
2003), p 76.
31 Andrew F. Krepinevich Jr., The M ilitary-Technical Revolution -  A Prelim inary Assessm ent, Center for
Strategic and Budgetary Assessm ents, (Washington, DC), 2002. pp 5-6 (o f  PDF Version). Available at
w w w .c s b a o n l i n e . o r g / 4 P u b l i c a t i o n s / A r c h i v e / R . 2 0 0 2 1 0 0 2 . M T R 7 R . 2 0 0 2 1 0 0 2 . M T R . p d f .
Last accessed on July 28, 2003. This report was first prepared in July, 1992 at the behest o f  the Office o f
N et A ssessm ent, United States Government.
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revolution’ or MTR, Soviet military thinkers focused closely on what they 
considered to be the key drivers of such a revolution. They identified informatics 
and precision-guided weaponry, employed at extended ranges, as being the 
critical factors that were changing the traditional reliance on quantity to that of 
quality.32 They further foresaw the development of even more advanced 
technologies, such as directed-energy weapons, which they speculated would be 
coupled with a highly efficient and diverse array of information processing 
technologies. The conclusions that they drew from their analysis of these 
developments and speculations were three-fold. First, they envisaged the future 
battlefield as being one where time would be increasingly compressed. Second, to 
be able to exploit this growing array of technologies -  both the destructive 
weapons-platforms and the enabling and underlying informatics -  a 
‘reconnaissance-strike complex’ (RSC) would emerge which would take the 
shape of a network in which information acquisition, analysis, fusion, 
dissemination technologies would be interlinked with very advanced and highly 
capable weapon systems and third, as a consequence of the development of this 
highly integrated network, the ability to engage a wide and diverse array of 
critical targets at extended ranges would become possible, thereby dramatically 
blurring the traditional ‘frontlines’/ ‘rearward areas’ distinction of the 
battlefield.33
32 Ibid p 17.
33 Mary C. Fitzgerald, “The Soviet Military and the N ew  Air War in the Persian G u lf’, A irpow er Journal, 
Winter 1991. Available at http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/api/fitzg.html. Last accessed  
on July 28, 2004. See also Krepinevich Jr., The M ilitary-Technical Revolution  -  A Prelim inary Assessment, 
pp 5-6 (o f  PDF Version). Available at
w w . c s b a o n l i n e . o r g / 4 P u b l i c a t i o n s / A r c h i v e / R . 2 0 0 2 1 0 0 2 .  M T R / R .2 0 0 2 1 0 0 2 . M T R . p d f .
Last accessed on July 28, 2003.
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This Soviet perspective shared many common features with what 
“Admiral William Owens (Retd.), (former) Vice Chairman of the (US) Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, later wrote on the ‘system of systems’ - a world in which the 
many kinds of sensors, from satellites to shipbome radar, from unmanned aerial 
vehicles to remotely planted acoustic devices, will provide information to any 
military user who needs it.”34 The RSC as foreseen by the Soviets and the 
‘systems of systems’ (SOS) referred to by Admiral Owens shared two common 
elements. First, in their crudest formulations, they remained highly focused on 
technology and second, and more importantly, despite their obvious technological 
bias, both the perspectives clearly foresaw that the future of military strategy was 
centrally premised on information and its integration “with systems of weaponry 
and warriors for a seamless sensor-to-shooter flow. Linking these with
35capabilities of maneuver, strike, logistics and protection” would be critical in 




Figure 2: Shrinking the O O DA  C ycle  
Source: Edward S. Sm ith, “N etw ork-C entric W arfare -  W hat’s the point?” N aval War 
C ollege R eview , W inter, 2001, pp 59-75.
34 Eliot A. Cohen, “Revolution in Military Affairs”, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 75, Issue 2, pp 37-55 March- 
April 1996.
35 Annette J. Krygiel, Behind the Wizard’s C u rta in -A n  Integration Environment fo r  a System o f  Systems, 
(Washington, DC: US DoD, CCRP, 1999), p 1.
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There are three critical issues at stake in what has been described above:
1. The systematic use of information as the generative principle of formation36 
and the centrality of this in the future-oriented speculations of war and its 
conduct evidenced by the desire to create a ‘seamless sensor-to-shooter’ flow.
2. The criticality of the role played by information, computing and 
communication technologies evidenced by the increasing emphasis being 
placed on the ‘network’. As an aside, we also note the distinct change of 
emphasis from individual and/ or collectives of weapons-platforms to the 
network on and within which these platforms are now being situated.
3. The orientation to exploit the network to possess dominant battlespace 
knowledge and to experience ‘full spectrum dominance’.
Of course, these observations, which also form the core of the RMA and NCW 
thesis, are premised on the emergence of another phenomenon: the 
technologisation of discourse.
‘Technologisation’, here used in its Heideggerian sense,37 is ‘that relation 
to the world which treats every possibility in the world as material available for
36 M ichael D illon, “Network Society, Network-Centric Warfare and the State o f  Emergency”, in Theory, 
Culture and Society, (London/ N ew  Delhi: Sage Publications), 2002. Vol. 19 (4): 71-79.
37 Personal interaction with Prof. Michael Dillon, Lancaster University, UK. August 4, 2 0 0 4 .1 would also 
like to record my acknowledgement to Prof. Dillon for the section on the ‘technologisation o f  language’,
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use and reuse for the revealing of the world’. It is the process of bringing the 
world to presence.38 Given that the world is revealed to us by language 
(understood in the widest of connotations), then it follows that language must also 
be understood as a technology, that is say, a ‘material available for use and reuse 
for the revealing of the world.’ In this way, language, it could be said, may be 
understood as being technologisized.39 The reduction of language to digitized 
code exemplifies the reduction of language into a fungible materiality whose 
ultimate value is in its utility to ‘reveal’ the world in a calculable and 
programmable manner. This attempt to reduce language by means of its 
technologisation is nothing else other than an attempt to attain mastery over 
language.40 The project of digitalization, wittingly or otherwise, assists in this. 
Coupled with the disciplinary practices of institutions, which are also engaged in 
these very kinds of reductive activities (that is to say they are, by their 
exclusionary and prohibitive practices, also engaged in a process of 
technologisation), the technologisation of language and by extension, of discourse 
has widespread and deep implications, especially in the context of NCW. But 
before we explore these implications, let us recall what NCW is.
Network-centric warfare... are military operations...enabled by the networking
of the force. Network-centric operations provide a force with access to a new,
w hich unfolded over a series o f  personal meetings and email exchanges. See also Martin Heidegger, “The 
Question Concerning Technology”, in Basic Writings, Revised and Expanded Edition, Ed. David Farrell 
Krell, (London, UK: Routledge, 2002), pp 311-341.
38 Ibid. p 322.
39 A s opposed, say, to seeing language as poeticized in the way that, for example, Heidegger, Gadamer and 
others do. See Michael Dillon, “Poststructuralism, Poetics and Complexity”, in Theory, Culture & Society, 
(London/ N ew  Delhi: Sage Publications), 2000. Vol. 17 (5): 1-26.
40 Dillon, The Politics o f  Security -  Towards a P olitica l Philosophy o f  Continental Thought, p 114.
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previously unreachable region of the information domain. The ability to operate 
in this region provides warfighters with a new type of information advantage, an 
advantage broadly characterized by significantly improved capabilities for 
sharing and accessing information. Network-centric warfare enables warfighters 
to leverage this information advantage to dramatically increase combat power 
through self-synchronization and other network-centric operations.41
From this we can deduce that NCW, where battle time plays a critical role, is 
primarily about:
1. speed of command and
2. self - synchronisation - to meet the commander's intent.42
On conducting an analysis of landmark battles and campaigns, we find that the 
issue of C2 is one of great complexity and consequently of highest importance.43 
It is, therefore, not surprising that Clausewitz had stressed that one of the primary 
displays of friction was always manifested within the C2 function.44 Martin van 
Crevald has also highlighted the complications involved in the C2 functions of a 
modern-day military organization as evidenced by the experiences of the US
41 John J. Garstka, “N etw ork Centric Warfare: An O verview  o f  Em erging Theory", Joint Staff Directorate 
for C4 Systems. Available at http://www.mors.org/publications/Dhalanx/decOO/feature.htm. Last accessed  
on July 28, 2004.
42 V ice Admiral Arthur K. Cebrowski, (Rtd.) U.S. Navy, and John J. Garstka, “Network-Centric Warfare: 
Its Origin and Future”, Proceedings o f  the Naval Institute, 124:1 (Jan. 1998): 28-35 Available at 
http://www.usni.org/Proceedings/Articles98/PROcebrowski.htm. Last accessed on July 28, 2004.
43 See Martin van Cevald, Command in War, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985), for an 
extended but specific discussion o f  the issue o f  command and control in war.
44 Alan D. Beyerchen, “Clausewitz, Nonlinearity, and the Unpredictability o f  War”, International Security, 
17:3 Winter, 1992.
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Army in Vietnam.45 Recall in this context the problem of ‘information overload’ 
that afflicted the US military organization in Vietnam.
The primary issue associated with ‘information overload’, in the context 
of C2 functions, is the virtually unlimited amounts of information that 
commanders at all levels must contend with. Coupled with this the decision­
making activities of commanders at all levels, which are set against a ‘tempo’ (of 
operations), understood in terms of ‘getting inside’ the OODA Loop of an 
adversary (alternatively, exploiting the enemy’s OODA cycle) and the need to 
maintain surprise, increase lethality and ensure survivability becomes highly 
problematic and assumes a significant importance.46 The effort to digitize the C2 
environment is geared to address precisely this problem.
Digitization of the C2 environment would, it is speculated, enable a force 
to improve its information sharing capabilities, which would, in turn, enhance the 
quality of information and shared Situation Awareness (SA).47 Collectively, it is
48hoped that these would increase the ‘mission effectiveness’ of the fighting force. 
Digitization, in this context, has a limited connotation. It specifically refers to the 
‘hardware’ and ‘software’ aspects of ICT. What remains unmentioned is the need 
to recognize the critical condition of the ‘wetware’ that this digitization project
45 Martin van Crevald, Command in War, pp 232-260.
46 Jake Thackeray, “The H oly Grail”, in The B ig Issue: Command and Com bat in the Information Age, Ed.
David Potts, Infomiation A ge Transformation series, SCSC Occasional N o. 45, (Washington, DC: US
D oD , CCRP, 2003), p 43.
47 Ibid p 48.
48 N C W  R eport to the US Congress, US DoD, July 2001.
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also entails. If information is to be disseminated widely, richly and liquidly, then 
the texture of information, as much as the content-value of information, becomes 
an important metric and under battle-conditions, even more so. The project of 
digitization in the NCW context, therefore, recognizes that the inherent 
disruptiveness of language contributes to the wide variety of textures of 
information. In other words, it is being recognized and appreciated that varying 
textures of information do not allow for a ‘seamless sensor-to-shooter’ flow. 
Recall, in this context, the technologisation of language.
As previously established, the technologisation of language, aided and 
abetted by the project of digitization, works to reduce language to (1) allow for 
gaining a mastery over it and (2) to limit the ‘conditions of possibility’ that 
language implicitly allows -  a fact which is reflected in what Dillon alludes to in 
terms of the ‘incorrigible recidivism’ of words and by extension of language. In 
the context of NCW, then, the project of digitization is oriented to bring about this 
uniformity and to establish a particular and very specific discourse, which would 
be geared to depict a ‘common perspective’ (in NCW terms, a ‘common 
operational picture’ or COP), alternatively a common world, which would be 
enmeshed within the confines of the network.49 The network, thus, would
49 See David S. Alberts, Information Age Transformation -  Getting to a 21s' Century M ilitary, Information 
A ge Transformation Series, (Washington, DC: US DoD, CCRP, 2003), p 46. In a footnote, Alberts points 
out that the COP is “not really a common picture, rather (it is) all about the consistency o f  the underlying 
data information (sic), and the ability to have ‘v iew s’ that can be tailored by participants to support their 
different roles and responsibilities.” It is significant to note that the distinction that Alberts is attempting to 
highlight is, in real terms, flawed. The consistency o f  data/  information establishes the commonality o f  the 
data/  information and the ability to ‘have v iew s’ is conditioned by the framework within which those view s 
are formed and articulated. In other words, the COP sets the ‘conditions o f  possibility’ wherein view s can 
be formed. In this sense the COP is all about a ‘common picture’.
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determine the world through the agency of its peculiar institutional and ultimately 
discursive practices. If mission effectiveness, survivability, lethality and surprise 
are to be achieved and maintained by exercising power over an adversary, then 
this exercise of power must be understood in terms of a struggle. This struggle is 
manifested in two ways. The first is the obvious struggle materialized as the 
physical combat with the adversary and the second is the not so obvious struggle 
over the power of signification.
Dillon’s insight, in this context, is revelatory. He writes, “ ...in the age of 
information, network and code...the struggle over the power of signification 
is...the struggle over power. Whoever commands the power of signification 
embodies power.”50 By establishing power over signification, in terms of creating 
a COP, the underlying objective may understood as being the attempt to 
standardize a particular texture of language and discourse. We find echoes of this 
in the world of ICT where the WYSIWYG format is gaining ground faster than 
ever. WYSIWYG (the acronym stands for ‘What You See Is What You Get’) is 
simply the establishment of a ‘common operational picture’. The critical element 
lies in identifying who or what determines what you see and how that 
determination is made. Recall, in this context, the Derridian insight of the 
strategic maneuver that reason continually engages in to contain within itself that 
which lies outside its domain. It, therefore, comes as no surprise that Admiral 
Cebrowski, who is one of the key architects of NCW, should note the significance
50 M ichael D illon, “Intelligence Incarnate: Martial Corporeality in the Digital A ge”, Body & Society ,
(London: Sage Publications) Vol. 9 (4): 123-147, 2003.
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of the migration of the global computing industry to the WINTEL (Windows- 
Intel) platform and to networked computing. Indeed, he goes further and notes 
that “information ‘content’ now can be created, distributed, and easily exploited 
across the extremely heterogeneous global computing environment”.51 The 
implications of these examples highlight the ‘world’ that the network creates and 
embodies. By ‘creating’ the world, then, the network, as we have seen, also 
establishes the very ‘conditions of possibility’. In other words, the network, by 
means of a set of discursive practices, aims to create and maintain a set of 
conditions wherein nothing outside the network should or would be possible.52
It would be an error to assume that these radical developments occur and 
are occurring only within the US military establishment. In fact, a review of 
events shows that the impetus for this radical activity first emerged within the 
commercial sector, a fact which reiterates the blurring of the distinction between 
the civilian and the military sectors and the frontline/ rearward areas of the 
battlefield. As we have seen previously, the advent of the Information Age, it is 
claimed, has altered the nature of the world. Deleuze identifies this radical 
alteration when he notes the dispersive character of capital in the Age of 
Information.53 Not surprisingly, commercial organizations, which are driven to 
protect, expand and maximize profit, have led the way in adopting and deploying
51 V ice Admiral Arthur K. Cebrowski, (Rtd.) U.S. Navy, and John J. Garstka, “Network-Centric Warfare:
Its Origin and Future”, Proceedings  o f  the Naval Institute, 124:1 (Jan. 1998): 2 8 -3 5  Available at
h ttp ://w w w .n sn i.o r g /P r o c e e d in e s /A r tic le s9 8 /P R O c e b r o w sk i.h tm . L ast accessed on  Ju ly  2 8 , 2 0 0 4 .
52 Personal interaction and exchange o f  emails with Prof. Michael Dillon, Lancaster University, UK.
August 4, 2004
53 G illes Deleuze, N egotiations, (N ew  York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1 9 9 5 ), p  181 .
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ICTs given that the shift from the traditional ‘bricks and mortar’ economy to the 
digital marketplace has changed the way value is created. Our focus on the 
particularities of value creation is not solely based on the argument that the 
dynamics of the value creation process are domain independent,54 and because of 
the increasing commonality that is emerging between the worlds of warfare and 
commerce.55 It is also based on the fact that the value creation process points to 
the rise of particular forms of organizations and consequently of discursive 
practices.
“Creation of value is at the heart of creating competitive advantage.”56 The 
concept of the value-chain, as described by Michael Porter, consists of the links 
and processes that transform raw materials (including information) into products 
that can be measured in terms of their value. Here value is understood as being the 
positive differential between the selling price and the cost of raw materials taken
C H
together with the cost of transforming them into products. Given that in today’s 
unfolding digital marketplace, the ‘tempo’ of operations has significantly 
increased, the time differential between the creation and erosion of value is
54 Alberts, Gartska, Stein, N etwork-Centric Warfare -  D eveloping and Leveraging Information Superiority , 
(W ashington, DC: US DoD, CCRP, 2003), p 26.
55 It has been suggested that ‘business is not warfare’, but this distinction remains suspect given the 
extensive cross-pollination o f  ideas, concepts and operational procedures that takes place between these 
tw o domains. Thus both commercial and military operations entail strategizing, attention to logistics, 
efficient utilization o f  resources, developing effective chains o f  command, out-maneuvering competitors 
etc. For a perspective that maintains that business and warfare are distinct see T. X. Hammes, “War Isn’t a 
Rational Business”, Proceedings o f  the Naval Institute 124:7 (July 1998): 22-25. For a comprehensive 
perspective that highlights the meshing o f  the worlds o f  technology, including that o f  business, and warfare 
see Manuel de Landa, War in the Age o f  Intelligent M achines, (N ew  York, NY: Zone Books, 1991).
56 Alberts, Gartska, Stein, Network-Centric Warfare -  D eveloping and Leveraging Information Superiority, 
(Washington, DC: US DoD, CCRP, 2003), p 29.
57 M ichael Porter, Com petitive Advantage  -  Creating and Sustaining Superior Perform ance , (N ew  York, 
NY: The Free Press, 1985), pp 33-39.
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becoming drastically reduced. This is what Admiral Cebrowski implies when he 
states that “the new dynamics of competition are based on increasing returns on 
investment, competition within and between ecosystems, and competition based
• „58on time.” This necessitates, in the words of Hamel and Prahalad, the 
“reinvention of an entirely new competitive space...[where]...the goal is not to 
predict the future but to imagine a future made possible by...creating a 
compelling view of tomorrow’s opportunities and moving preemptively to secure 
the future...”59 (emphasis in original). The resonance of this with the COP that we 
have referred to earlier is startling. What Hamel and Prahalad are alluding to (and 
in the most dynamic of global corporations, for example Microsoft Corp. and 
Google,60 we see this occurring with increasing regularity) is the virtual creation 
of multiple futures which, it could be added, are (and increasingly would be) 
enabled and ‘controlled’ by a dense network of cutting-edge technologies which 
are reflective of the distinct discursive practices that are at work within this 
emerging competitive space. Significantly, one also notes the direct relationship 
between the acts of creating (futures) and that of securing (futures), a fact attested
58 V ice Admiral Arthur K. Cebrowski, (Rtd.) U.S. Navy, and John J. Garstka, “Network-Centric Warfare: 
Its Origin and Future”, Proceedings o f  the Naval Institute, 124:1 (Jan. 1998): 28-35 Available at 
http://www.usni.org/Proceedings/Articles98/PROcebrowski.htm. Last accessed on July 28, 2004.
59 Hamel & Prahalad, Competing fo r  the Future, (N ew  Delhi: Tata M cgraw-Hill Publishing Co. Ltd.,
2002), pp xi-xii.
60 M icrosoft currently controls over 80% o f the global market share o f  client-side ‘operating system s’ and 
o f  desktop technologies (a fact which is reflected in the number o f  anti-trust law suits that have been 
brought against the corporation). M icrosoft also dominates the way people use the web, controlling more 
than 94% o f  the web browser market. See “Rivals nibble at Microsoft's IE”, July 12, 2004, BBC News, UK  
Edition. Available at http://news.bbc.co.Uk/l/hi/technologv/3886861.stm . Last accessed on July 28, 2004. 
G oogle is the global leader in search engine technologies. The ubiquitous nature o f  Google is evident in the 
fact that the word that identifies the corporation is also used as a ‘verb’. Thus, when one searches or is 
asked to search the World W ide Web, one ‘googles the w eb’. See Alfred Hermida, “Float offers insights 
into G oogle”, April 30, 2004, BBC News, UK Edition. Available at 
http://news.hhc.co.Uk/l/hi/technology/3673157.stm . Last accessed on July 28, 2004.
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to by the investigative projects of Foucault, albeit in the context of the 
‘disciplinary societies’ of the pre-information Age era.
Collectively then, the discursive practices which are evolving in the space 
of NCW, manifested by the technologisation of discourse across civil and military 
boundaries, point to a certain kind of strategizing that is occurring. This, it is 
suggested, is occurring at multiple levels and simultaneously and is contingent on 
the phenomenon of networks.
At the edge o f chaos. ..
The theories of complexity and non-linearity claim that they enable us to 
examine the workings of the natural world understood as a dynamic system. They 
“show us how dynamic systems...self-organize, how they are closely interrelated, 
and how they use feedback to regulate themselves.”61 While a detailed 
examination of these theories and their conclusions falls outside the scope of this 
study, it may be worthwhile to examine three principal concepts central to them.
1. A phenomenon or a system is considered complex if it consists of numerous 
dimensions, which is indicative of an intricate mesh of inter-twined processes
61 Pat A. Pentland, "Center o f  Gravity Analysis and Chaos Theory, or How Societies Form, Function and 
Fail." Master's Thesis. (M axwell AFB, AL: School o f  Advanced Airpower Studies, 1993-94). Quoted in 
Tom Czerwinski, Coping with the Bounds -  Speculations on Non-Linearity in M ilitary Affairs, 
(W ashington, DC: U S DoD, CCRP, 1998), p 261.
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and structures. As a consequence, a high degree of regularity in the dynamics 
of such a phenomenon or a system is discemable but up to a point.62
2. When phenomena or systems display an “asymmetrically disproportionate”63 
dynamics, which indicates that the outputs of the system or phenomenon are 
disproportionate to the inputs, they are understood as being non-linear. This is 
contra the nature of linear phenomena or systems where the outputs are
i • 64proportionate to the inputs.
3. A system or phenomenon is considered as being chaotic when it displays both 
non-linearity and when variations of ‘initial conditions’ have massive non- 
repetitive consequences on downstream effects (in other words, displaying the 
‘butter-fly effect’). This seriously impedes, and in most cases denies, the 
ability to deploy predictive tools to model the behavior of such phenomena or 
systems.
Also fundamental to the understanding of complexity and non-linearity are 
complex adaptive systems, which are said to be “the engines that drive non- 
linearity”.65 Complex adaptive systems are “dynamic systems (which) are able to 
adapt and change within, or as part of a changing environment... (it is) ...a
62 Roger Beaumont, War, Chaos and History, (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1994), p xiv. See also 
Colin S. Gray, Strategy fo r  Chaos- Revolutions in M ilitary Affairs and The Evidence o f  History, (London, 
UK: Frank Cass Publishers, 2002), p 104.
63 N . Katherine Hayles, Chaos Unbound: O rderly D isorder in Contem porary Literature and Science, (N ew  
York, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990), p 11.
64 Coventry & Highfield, Frontiers o f  Complexity -  The Search fo r  O rder in a Chaotic World, p 121.
65 Tom Czerwinski, Coping with the Bounds -  Speculations on Non-Linearity in M ilitary Affairs, 
(W ashington, DC: US D oD, CCRP, 1998), p 12.
258
system closely linked with all other related systems making up an eco-system.”66 
These systems display a number of properties that encompass, among other 
things, the three points mentioned above. Notably, they also display the properties 
of aggregation, flows (alternatively, circulation) and diversity. Simply put, the 
property of aggregation refers to the intricate behaviors resulting from the 
aggregate interactions of lesser (or smaller) agents. Thus, in a complex adaptive 
system, the sum of the parts is not equal to the whole. The property of ‘flows’ is 
best understood in terms of the ‘multiplier effect’ and ‘recycling’. The ‘multiplier 
effect’ is a “disembodied derivative” discemable at macro-levels of observation 
and to which a simple cause-effect relationship cannot be applied. In fact, at the 
micro-level, the ‘multiplier-effect’ is, for the most part, invisible. ‘Recycling’ is 
the movement and behavior of a diverse set of agents whose aggregate is greater 
than the sum of the agents. Together then, the ‘multiplier-effect’ and ‘recycling’ 
(i.e., the property of flows or circulation) underscore the adaptiveness of complex 
adaptive system. This is because of the inherent dependency of the ‘multiplier- 
effect’ and of ‘recycling’ on the agents that enable these processes. This, in turn, 
is directly related to the diversity of the agents that are present within the complex 
adaptive system. The key feature of these agents is that they are entirely novel, 
which in turn ensures that complex adaptive systems do not stagnate. They are 
constantly in a state of evolution and emergence. Moreover, these agents are 
dispensable and their dispensability remains contingent on their being able to 
maintain their evolutionary stability within the complex adaptive system. Their
66 James Moffat, Complexity Theory and Network-Centric Warfare, pp 50-51
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failure to do so ensures their removal and their replacement by a ‘different’ yet 
similar agent better adapted to achieve the evolving levels of stability.67
From this two inferences can be drawn. First, complex adaptive systems 
are open systems. They share an intricate and delicate relationship with a host of 
other systems all of which collectively constitute a particular eco-system. 
Moreover, particular eco-systems are open as well. They too share economies of 
relations with other eco-systems thus rendering a rich lattice-like texture to what 
is called the ‘global’ system. And second, the inter-relationships between agents 
within complex adaptive systems are critical in generating the inherent dynamism 
of such systems. This, in light of Lorenz’s ‘butter-fly effect’, has a cascading 
effect on the system, which not only increases the complexity and non-linearity of 
the system, but also enhances its adaptive ability to local and global 
environments. At the macro-level therefore, the global system has come to be 
conceptualized as a gigantic complex adaptive system, which is constantly 
evolving and emerging.68
It is this deep and intricate inter-twinning of the infinite relationships that 
characterize complex adaptive systems and the eco-systems of which they are a 
part of that gives a materiality to the complexity and non-linearity of the natural
67 Tom Czerwinski, C oping with the Bounds -  Speculations on N on-Linearity in M ilitary Affairs, pp 12-21. 
See also Mitchell M. Waldrop, Complexity: The Em erging Science at the Edge o f  O rder and Chaos, and 
Russell Ruthen, “Adapting to Complexity”, Scientific American, Vol. 268 Issue 1, Jan. 1993 pp 130-140.
68 N ietzsche’s words, in this context, are hauntingly reminiscent -  “And do you know what “this world” is 
to me? This world: a monster o f  energy, without beginning, without end; a sea o f  forces flowing and 
rushing together, eternally changing, eternally flooding back, with tremendous years o f  recurrence, with an 
ebb and flow  o f  its form s...” Friedrich N ietzsche, The Will to Power, Ed. & Trans. Kaufmann &
Hollingdale, (N ew  York: Vintage Books, 1968) p 550 #  1067.
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world. This, however, is not the same as identifying the natural world as being 
random.69 Thus, one can say, “complexity lies somewhere between order and 
disorder...some characteristics of systems...are neither highly ordered nor 
completely random.”70 Diagrammatically, this state of affairs can be represented 
as below:
T V « •ftS p u w K o c d tr-
FTt f l f  t fu iiib fi urn C o m p / c i u / y |  | J  t A u
StJtbh* f m e f j p r n c e  Turtxsfc-rxv
B lfU K  C *  r / O . V  
Psxrrcft.s/
t  ............
Figure 3: At the Edge o f Chaos
Source: Tom  C zerw inski, Coping with the B ounds -  Speculations on N on-L inearity in M ilitary  
A ffa irs , (W ashington, DC: US DoD, C C R P, 1998), p 40. M odified by A uthor.
Complexity and Non-Linearity in the context o f  War(fare)
As we have seen, in addition to asserting that the “logic o f war in the 
abstract, with its limitless escalation of cost and effort, contradicts human 
experience...,”71 Clausewitz also insisted that war is “not the action of a living
69 Glenn E. James, Maj. USAF, Chaos Theory -  The Essentials fo r  Military Applications, The Newport 
Papers, Number 10, (Newport, RI: Naval War College, 1996), pp 2-3.
70 George Johnson, “Researchers on Complexity Ponder What It’s All About”, New York Times, May 06, 
1997. Quoted in Tom Czerwinski, Coping with the Bounds -  Speculations on Non-Linearity in Military 
Affairs, (Washington, DC: US DoD, CCRP, 1998), p 24.
71 Alan D. Beyerchen, Clausewitz, Nonlinearity, and the Unpredictability o f War, International Security, 
17:3 Winter, 1992 pp 59-90
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force upon a lifeless mass (total nonresistance would be no war at all) but always 
the collision of two living forces.”72 For Clausewitz, war was a dynamic (and 
consequently non-linear) ‘interaction’ between two or more agents, which was 
marked by fluidity and a condition of flux. Further, Clausewitz noted the 
variability of the strength and speed of the conduct of war -  tempo of operations - 
and the expenditure of energy that such actions entailed. Recall here the 
characteristics of the complex adaptive system. We had identified the ‘interaction’ 
between the agents within a complex adaptive system as being a key feature of 
such systems. Clausewitz’s martial formulations, while bereft of the advantages 
that accrue to us in terms of our exposure to the ‘new sciences’, bear a striking 
similarity with the complex adaptive systems as we understand them today.
Another important element of Clausewitz’s theory of war, which we have 
already encountered, was the concept of Friktion regarding which he had 
famously said...
...Everything in war is simple, but the simplest thing is difficult. The difficulties 
accumulate and end by producing a kind of friction that is inconceivable...this 
friction, which cannot, as in mechanics be reduced to a few points, is everywhere 
in contact with chance, and brings about effects that cannot be measured.. ,73
This emphasis on ‘friction’ (Friktion), as we have seen, was placed by Clausewitz 
at two levels. At one level, it was recognized in context of one’s own army and in
72Clausewitz, On War, p 77.
73 Clausewitz, On War, p 119.
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the conduct of war. At another level, it was recognized at the macroscopic level of 
war itself. This latter recognition of friction - at the general level of war -  we 
suggested was indicative of Clausewitz’s recognition of the subtle and immersive 
condition of complexity and non-linearity that contextualized the 
problematization and theorization of life, war and the conduct of war.74
While examples of commanders being attentive to the friction of the 
battlefield are littered across the annals of history, one of the more recent and 
explicit instances of ‘how’ to operate in conditions of complexity and non- 
linearity -  specifically on the battlefield - is visible in the German school of 
maneuver theory. Bom out of the need to break the deathly stalemate that 
prevailed at the Western Front during World War I, German military thinkers
75developed the doctrine of infiltration tactics. This represented an almost 
philosophical solution to the problems of the stalemate imposed by trench 
warfare.76 The full implications of this doctrinal change, however, only became 
visible in the Second World War where, by combining the tactics of infiltration 
with the developing technologies of the tank and combat aircraft, the Germans
74 Barry Watts, Clausewitzian Friction and Future War, McNair Paper 52, Revised July 2000. Institute for 
National Security Studies, (Washington, DC: National Defence University, 1996), p 41 (PDF Version) 
A vailable at http://www.ndu.edu/inss/McNair/mcnair52/mcnair52.pdf. Last accessed on July 28, 2004. 
C lausew itz’s emphasis on the specific context o f  friction (i.e. on one’s own army) and its reduction has 
been criticized by John Boyd. It seems that Boyd’s primary accusation was levied on the basis o f  
Clausewitz not emphasizing on maximizing the destabilizing effects o f  friction on one’s adversaries. Boyd 
explored that option in his famed OODA (Observation, Orientation, Decision, Action) Theory. See John R. 
Boyd, P atterns o f  Conflict, Briefing, April/ June/ July 1979, Slide 24. Slide 41 in Dec. 1986 Version o f  
Briefing. Available at http://www.d-n-i.net/second level/bovd militarv.htm. Last accessed on July 28, 
2004.
75 It is interesting to note that the infiltration tactics devised by the Germans during the last stages o f  the 
First World War did produce some spectacularly positive results. However, it was too late to influence the 
course o f  the war.
76 Robert Leonhard, The A rt o f  M aneuver -  M aneuver-W arfare Theory and AirLand Battle, (N ew  York, 
NY: Ballantine Books, 1991), p 49.
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were able to pioneer a method of war that appeared to thrive on the very edge of 
chaos, i.e., the space where complexity and non-linearity hold sway.
Recognizing the destabilizing factors involved in operating within such a 
space, the German doctrinal thinkers devised and combined three operational 
conditions. The first was the technique of Auftragstaktik (literally ‘mission 
tactics’), which involved creating mission-type orders.77 This gave lower echelon 
commanders and troops the freedom and flexibility to devise the particular 
methods by which their assigned tasks could be carried out with the higher level 
commanders restricting themselves to exercising ‘directive control’ only. The 
second technique was the identification of the Schwerpunkt. “Originally this term 
identified the point along the enemy lines at which the attack would focus for a 
breakthrough... (but it also implied)...the object of focus for the efforts of all
78subordinate and supporting troops.” The third technique was the identification 
and exploitation of enemy weaknesses while avoiding their strengths, better
70
known as the ‘expanding torrent’ method. Taken together these techniques 
(commonly recognized as blitzkrieg or ‘lightning war’) were geared to exploit
77 It is pertinent to note that Auftragstaktik  was not a w holly new  concept to the doctrinal planners o f  the 
German defence establishment during the First World War. Its origins can be found in the Prussian military 
reforms beginning in 1808, follow ing Prussia's disastrous defeats by Napoleon. See H. W. Koch, A H istory  
o f  Prussia, (N ew  York, NY: Longman, 1978), pp 180-187.
78 Robert Leonhard, The A rt o f  M aneuver -  M aneuver-W arfare Theory and A ir la n d  B attle, p 51.
79 This concept found its formal articulation in the works o f  Liddell-Hart, though it must be said that 
ancient philosophers o f  war, especially Sun Tzu, also propounded this concept. See B. H. Liddell-Hart, 
Strategy, 2 nd Revised Edition, (N ew  York, NY: Meridian, 1991), p 335. Here Liddell-Hart refers to the 
exploitation o f  the “line o f  least resistance.” See also B. H. Liddell-Hart, “The Man-in-the-Dark Theory o f  
Infantry Tactics and the Expanding Torrent System o f  Attack”, Journal o f  the R oyal United Service 
Institution, Vol. LXVI, No. 461, Feb. 1921.
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what Col. John Boyd later referred to as the OODA (Observation, Orientation, 
Decision, Action) cycle of the enemy.80
Boyd’s OODA Loop was instrumental in highlighting the iterative nature 
of war “It recognize(d) that the result of actions (was) not just the direct effect on 
the adversary, but his adaptation to our actions, and his subsequent actions (or at 
least our observation of them) become part of the next input.”81 The resonance of 
this with the original formulation of Lorenz’s ‘butter-fly effect’ is not accidental. 
This sensitivity to initial conditions that was so starkly manifested in the OODA 
Loop was nothing less than the growing recognition and reaffirmation of the 
original Clausewitzian identification of the immersive context presented by 
complexity and non-linearity. Boyd’s OODA Loop, which elegantly identified 
this state of affairs, thus pointed to not simply the fact that warfare -  the conduct 
of war - was, in all respects, a complex and non-linear activity, but also that ‘war’ 
itself was a complex and non-linear phenomenon. This recognition led to radical 
changes being introduced in terms of force-structure and planning and
80 John R. Boyd, Patterns o f  Conflict, Briefing, April/ June/ July 1979, Slide 24. Slide 41 in Dec. 1986 
Version o f  Briefing. Available at http://www.d-n-i.net/second level/boyd military.htm. Last accessed on 
July 28, 2004. A significant modification to Boyd’s OODA Loop was made by Joel S. Larson. Larson’s 
model was the SCDA (Sense, Compare, Decide, Act) Cycle, which makes allowance for the function o f  
intelligence in his conception o f  “command and control as a process in which different components have 
different roles while operating as parts o f  a larger system .” See George E. Orr, Maj., Combat Operations 
C3I: Fundamentals and Interactions, (M axwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 1983), pp 23-27. See also 
Kenneth Allard, Command, Control, and the Common Defence, R evised Edition, (Washington, DC: US 
D oD , CCRP, 1996), p 155. See also Jeffrey L. Cowan, Maj. (USAF) “From Air Force Fighter Pilot to 
Marine Corps Warfighting: Colonel John Boyd, His Theories on War, and their Unexpected Legacy”, 
Master’s Thesis, United States Marine Corps Command and Staff C ollege, Marine Corps Combat 
Developm ent Command, (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps University, 1999-2000). Available at 
http://www.defense-and-societv.org/fcs/bovd thesis.htm#ex% 20summ. Last accessed on July 28, 2004.
81 Linda P. Beckerman, “The Non-Linear Dynamics o f  War”, Science A pplications International 
Corporation, April 20, 1999. Available at
http://www.belisarius.com/modem business strategy/beckerman/non linear.htm. Last accessed on July 28, 
2004.
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organizational re-orientations that would make the necessary instruments of war 
more responsive to the inherent instability of war and the battlefield.
The interesting thing to note in the original formulation of Boyd’s OODA 
Loop is the role of information. While ostensibly the OODA Loop was concerned 
with the issue of ‘directive control’, which was, in the first instance, a tactical 
decision-making model,82 a closer examination, however, suggests that the 
generative principle of the OODA Loop is ‘information’, a point which Boyd 
himself noted. The development of the theories of information and cybernetics 
confirm this. Claude Shannon’s work in the field of Information Theory, in this 
context, is illustrative. The revolutionary elements of Shannon's contribution was
84the invention of the source-encoder-channel-decoder-destination model, a 
process-flow which we find extensively used in the work of Norbert Weiner who, 
during the Second World War, worked on guided missile technology, and studied 
how sophisticated electronics used the ‘feedback principle’, which resulted in the 
development of the field of Cybernetics.85 The criticality of this, however, 
remained underestimated and the propensity for using the OODA Loop simply as 
a tactical instrument on the battlefield remained in vogue for a while. To that 
limited extent, the increasingly complex and non-linear character of war was
82 Robert Leonhard, The A rt o f  M aneuver -  M aneuver-W arfare Theory and AirLand Battle, p 49.
83 Gary A. Vincent, 1st Lt., USAF, “A New Approach to Command and Control: The Cybernetic design”, 
A irpow er Journal, Summer 1993. Available at
http://www.airDower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/api/vincent.html. Last accessed on July 28, 2004.
84 See John Robinson Pierce, An Introduction to Information Theory, 2nd R evised Edition, (N ew  York, N Y : 
Dover Publications, 1980). See also “The Significance o f  Shannon’s Work”, Available at http://cm.bell- 
labs.com/cm/ms/what/shannondav/work.html. Last accessed on July 28, 2004.
85 See Internet History -  Norbert Weiner, Available at http://livingintemet.eom/i/ii wiener.htm. Last 
accessed on July 28, 2004. See also N. Katherine Hayles, H ow We Becam e Post-Human: Virtual Bodies in 
Cybernetics, Literature and Informatics, (Chicago, IL: Univ. o f  Chicago Press, 1999), pp 84-112.
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recognized. The tendency to quantify the battlefield and of war, however,
• 1remained paramount. This paradox of the gradual recognition of the increasing 
importance and relevance of information, its constantly changing dynamics and 
the tendency to quantify information using statistical and systems-theoretic 
models was reflected in both the organizations responsible for the conduct of war 
and also in the designing of the pathways through which information would 
circulate.
At this point, two problems emerged. The first was the problem associated 
with quantifying information thus making an artifact of something that is 
inherently dynamic. The second problem related to the diagramming of the 
‘network’ through which information is expected to flow. With the problems thus 
stated, the task of fashioning adequate responses to them began to take shape. 
While the theories of complexity and non-linearity provided the context to the 
statement of the problems, the ‘network’ concept provided the organizing 
principle around which the some of the still nascent responses have emerged.
On Networks
Two parallel events catch our attention as we sift through the linear history 
of the ARPA and early network computing. The first was the assignment of Dr. 
J.C.R. Licklider to the IPTO and the second was the work of Paul Baran within
86 Martin van Crevald, Command in War, p 3 and p 240 respectively. See also S. Zuckerman, “Judgment 
and Control in M odem Warfare”, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 40. Jan. 1962. pp 196-213.
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the RAND Corporation. Licklider, with his keen perception of the sense of 
community that existed between users of the first time-sharing computer systems, 
began to think about a ‘network’ being established between the group of computer 
specialists who had gathered around at the IPTO. Licklider’s premise was that 
“men will be able to communicate more effectively through a machine than face
g y
to face.” Uncannily, he nicknamed this ‘network’ of computer specialists as the 
'Intergalactic Network'.88 Simultaneously, a group of scientists from MIT 
(Massachusetts Institute of Technology) and the British National Physical 
Laboratory were working on the dynamics of networks. Their primary motivation 
was to devise more efficient methods by which the expensive computers of the 
time could share resources. This emphasis on ‘communication’ led, by 1969, to 
the linking of four computers across the US located at the University of California 
at Los Angeles and Santa Barbara, University of Utah and Stanford University. 
This was known as the ARPANET, which was the original seed of today’s 
Internet.89
The potential threat of a surprise Soviet nuclear offensive had, 
simultaneously, spurred the US Air Force to fund, among other things, a research 
project to investigate the building of a schematic design for a national
87 J.C.R. Licklider, “The Computer as a Communication D evice” and “Man Computer Sym biosis"  in In 
M em oriam : J.C.R. L icklider 1915-1990 , (Palo Alto, CA: Systems Research Center), August 1990. 
Available at ftp://gatekeeper.research.compaQ.com/pub/DEC/SRC/research-reports/SRC-061.pdf Last
accessed on July 28, 2004.
88 Ibid.
89 Mark Buchanan, Small World -  Uncovering N ature’s  Hidden Networks, p 75.
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communications network, which could survive such an attack.90 In 1964, Paul 
Baran, working from within the RAND Corporation, published a series of papers
network which was to be built for maximum robustness and flexibility. This new 
network would have no central authority and Baran referred to this as a 
‘distributed communications network’.92 Baran recognized that the 
communications systems of the day were heavily dependent on centralized control 
centers, which made them extremely vulnerable to interdiction. Thus, an attack on 
any one of the centralized control centers would bring down the network.93 
Baran’s idea was to create a web of computers and/ or of other communication 
devices which would be linked by transmission lines and which would have no 
centralized control centers. He identified three generic types of networks as 
depicted by the figure below.
Figure 4: The Three Types of Networks 
Source: Paul Baran, “On Distributed Communications: Introduction to Distributed 
Communications Network”, RAND Memorandum RM-3420-PR, August 1964.
90 Ibid p 73. See also “U.S. Nuclear History: Nuclear Arms and Politics in the M issile A ge, 1955-1968”, 
Digital National Security Archive, Available at http://nsarchive.chadwyck.corn/nh essay.htm. Last
92 Paul Baran, “On Distributed Communications: Introduction to Distributed Communications Network”, 
R A N D  Memorandum RM -3420-PR, August 1964. Available at 
http://www.rand.org/publications/RM /RM 3420/. Last accessed on July 28, 2004.
93 Mark Buchanan, Small World -  Uncovering N atu re’s Hidden N etworks, p 74.
which addressed this problem.91 Baran’s proposal stated the principles of a new
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He noted that a centralized network could be destroyed by targeting its node while 
a decentralized network, despite being more resilient than a centralized network, 
could also be brought down by targeting a finite number of nodes. The distributed 
network, on the other hand, given the absence of nodes of critical importance, was 
the most resilient of the three network designs. This he attributed to element of 
‘redundancy’ built into the distributed network. Redundancy, in this context, 
refers to ‘the average number of links per element’ (alternatively, node).94 Baran 
summarized the future developments of networks in the following words:
We will soon be living in an era in which we cannot guarantee survivability of 
any single point. However, we can still design systems in which system 
destruction requires the enemy to pay the price of destroying n of n stations. If n 
is made sufficiently large, it can be shown that highly survivable system 
structures can be built-even in the thermonuclear era. In order to build such 
networks and systems we will have to use a large number of elements. We are 
interested in biowing how inexpensive these elements may be and still permit the 
sy s te m  to operate reliably. There is a strong relationship between element cost 
and element reliability. To design a system that must anticipate a worst-case 
destruction of both enemy attack and normal system failures, one can combine 
the failures expected by enemy attack together with the failures caused by normal 
reliability problems, provided the enemy does not brow which elements are 
inoperative. Our future systems design problem is that of building very reliable 
systems out of the described set of unreliable elements at lowest cost. In choosing 
the communications links of the future, digital links appear increasingly 
attractive by permitting low-cost switching and low-cost links.95
94 Ibid.
95 Paul Baran, “On Distributed Communications: Introduction to Distributed Communications Network”, 
R AND Memorandum RM -3420-PR, August 1964. Available at 
h ttp : //w w w .r a n d .o r g /p u b lic a t io n s /R M /R M 3 4 2 0 /. Last accessed on July 28, 2 0 0 4 .
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But Baran’s work had another rather significant result. He recognized that the 
distributed network would also need to have an ‘intelligence’ to survive a massive 
attack. He conceptualized the decentralized network as having no preset path for 
messages to travel. Instead, they would rely on computers to ‘find’ the ‘most 
optimal route’ to their destination. This, Baran contended, would be accomplished 
by each message being broken into a number of ‘blocks’ and having computers 
located at each node which would maintain a ‘routing table’. The ‘routing table’ 
would record at what speed recently sent message-blocks reached their 
destination. The computers would thus be able to ‘make intelligent decisions’ by 
rerouting messages, in their block forms, along pathways that would bypass the 
nodes that an enemy attack had destroyed. Once the message-blocks reached their 
destinations, they would be reassembled and thus the message would be 
considered transmitted.96 In net effect, what Baran was suggesting was that the 
network would be comprised of a number of unmanned digital switches, which 
would possess a ‘self-learning’ capability within a changing environment. The 
premise of Baran’s speculations and later work was starkly reminiscent of the 
complex adaptive systems that we have had occasion to examine earlier.
96 “Paul Baran and the Origins o f the Internet”, RAND Corporation. Available at
http://www.rand.org/about/historv/baran.html. Last accessed on July 28, 2004. It should be noted that it 
was Donald Davies, a scientist working independently o f  Baran at the British National Physical Laboratory, 
who realized that it was inefficient for a computer to send an entire file to another computer in an 
unintemipted stream o f data. So, he conceived the use o f  a purpose-designed network employing packet 
switching in which the stream o f bits is broken up into short messages, or 'packets,' that find their way 
individually to the destination, where they are reassembled into the original stream. The term ‘packet 
sw itching’ is said to have originated from the work done by Davies. See “Data Pioneer Donald Davies 
D ies”, Internet Society, Thurs. Nov. 15, 2001. Available at
http://www-isoc.org/int.emet/historv/davies.shtml. Last accessed on July 28, 2004 See also See “Data 
Pioneer Donald Davies D ies”, Internet Society, Thurs. Nov. 15, 2001. Available at
http://www.isoc.org/intem et/historv/davies.shtml. Available at 
http://www.rand.org/publications/RM /RM 3103/. Last accessed on July 28, 2004.
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In brief then, we find that the development of the network (characterized 
by the ARPANET and in its expanded form, the Internet) was based on two 
critical concepts. The first was to understand the issue of connectivity as being a 
lattice of links which would have no singular or critical element or node and 
wherein messages would be broken into smaller blocks or packets. The second 
was to recognize that the key to the survivability of the network depended on its 
having an integral machinic or ‘native intelligence’ which would enable the 
network to adapt to changes in the environment of the network (such as the 
breakdown or destruction of any node within the network) without compromising 
the core efficiency of the network. However, as the original ARPANET expanded 
into the Internet, a few discrepancies were found in the original formulations as 
suggested by Baran. In 1998, by sending out a large number of information- 
packets, a topology of the Internet was created and it was found that unlike 
Baran’s speculation of decentralized and distributed networks that would have no 
centralized nodes or elements, the Internet had organized itself into a ‘hierarchical 
network’ that Baran had originally dismissed in favour of the distributed 
network.97 The Internet did not seem to conform to the accepted model of random 
connectivity. The topology indicated that the Internet had yielded a connectivity
QQ
map that was, as Albert-Laszlo Barabasi called it, scale-free. Simply put, scale- 
free networks include many ‘very connected’ nodes or hubs of connectivity that
97 Mark Buchanan, Small World -  Uncovering N atu re’s Hidden N etworks, pp 80-82. The original 
‘mapping’ o f  the Internet was done by Cheswick and Birch o f  Bell Laboratories and Carnegie Mellon 
U niversity respectively.
98 W illiam J. Reed, “A  B rief Introduction to Scale Free Networks”, Dept, o f  Mathematics and Statistics, 
Univ. o f  Victoria, Canada. Available at http://www.math.uvic.ca/facultv/reed/draft 1 .pdf. Last accessed on 
July 28, 2004.
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shape the way the network operates. The ratio of very connected nodes to the 
number of nodes in the rest of the network remains constant as the network 
changes in size." Barabasi’s investigations were even more startling as they dealt 
with the World Wide Web (W3), which unlike the Internet is not hardware-based. 
The W3, which is a vast network of web-pages (essentially software) connected 
by hyper-links hosted on the hardware-based Internet, is growing at an 
exponential rate.100 From this a number of inferences can be drawn.
1. In keeping with the core intent that was first expressed by Licklider, networks 
were and remain centered around the principle of communication. This is 
applicable to the more hardware-based network, such as the Internet, and for 
the W3, which is primarily a software manifestation.
2. Networks are able to maintain their stability and monitor themselves by a 
process of self-organization and self-generation. In other words, networks 
work on the basis of an ‘insatiable need’. 101
3. Networks depend on multiple feedback loops, which are critical in 
maintaining their condition of equilibrium. In addition, the time taken by the
99 Jan Matlis, “Scale-Free Networks”, Computer World, Nov. 2002. Available at
http://www.computerworld.eom/networkingtopics/networking/storv/Q. 10801,75539,00.htm l. Last accessed  
on July 28, 2004. See also Albert-Laszlo Barabasi, Linked -  The N ew  Science o f  N etworks, (Boulder, CO: 
Perseus Books, 2002).
100 Mark Buchanan, Sm all W orld  -  Uncovering N a tu re’s  Hidden N etworks, p 84.
101 Steven Shaviro, Connected, or what it means to live in the network society, (M inneapolis, MN: Univ. o f  
M innesota Press, 2003), pp 10-11.
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feedback to loop through its ‘circuit’ is a critical factor in determining the 
effectiveness of the loop and its ‘learning capability’.
4. Networks organize themselves around ‘nodes or hubs of connectivity’, which 
are centers with a high density of links.
Consequently, we can identify a ‘new’ trinity arising in the Age of Networks -  
Speed, Sharing and Decentralization - underpinned by the ‘native intelligence’ of 
networks originally propounded by Baran.102 The conceptual foundations of 
NCW, thus, lies not so much on the hardware aspects of the network, rather, they 
are based on this trinity that we now see emerging from the rise of networks in the 
Information Age. The rise of networks also points to one other singular fact. 
Grosch’s Law, which states, that doubling the cost of a computer results in 
multiplying its computing power four-fold, has now been inverted.103 
Consequently, by ‘distributing’ (alternatively decentralizing) and sharing tasks, 
smaller computers and work-stations, organized as clusters, have been able to 
perform tasks that were limited to high-end ‘super-computers’ at a much lower 
cost than hitherto possible.104 Collectively, the implications for warfare, as 
manifested in the form of NCW, are immense.
102 This is a ‘plaY’ on the classical Clauswitzian trinity. Clausewitz defined the components o f  the trinity as 
(1) primordial violence, hatred, and enmity; (2) the play o f  chance and probability; and (3) war's element o f  
subordination to rational policy. See Clausewitz, On War, p 89. See also Bassford and Villacres, 
“Reclaim ing the Clauswitzian Trinity”, in Param eters, Journal o f  the US Army War C ollege, Autumn 
1995.
103 Martin Libicki, The Mesh and the N et -  Speculations on A rm ed Conflict in a Time o f  Free Silicon, p i 5.
104 A  good example o f  this is the PARAM Padma ‘super-computer’ designed by C-DAC o f  India. It is a 
cluster o f  62 4-way, IBM pSeries P630 nodes, interconnected through a high performance System Area
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On Netwars
‘Command’ (and Control) has always been the most complex and critical 
of military functions. It is a function “that has to be exercised, more or less 
continuously, if the army is to exist and to operate.”105 In this connection, it is 
interesting to note that the more familiar C2 designation (Command and Control), 
as we know of it today, was not used until the end of World War II.106 There are 
two possible explanations for this. “One argues that it (C2) derives from the 
proposition that ‘one commands men, while one controls machines’...the other 
explanation suggests that when a situation reaches a certain level of complexity 
(or chaos), people must concentrate on control.”107 While numerous authors and 
commentators have offered their individual perspectives on this baffling 
phenomenon, suffice it to say that the marriage between the command function 
and the control function summarizes the totality of activities that a military 
commander must engage in. It encompasses (1) Combatant Command (COCOM), 
(2) Operational Command (OPCOM) and (3) Tactical Command (TACOM).108 
The common loci that bind these three activities can be listed as under:
1. Information Acquisition
2. Information Analysis
Network. See C-DAC Official Site. Available at
http://www.cdacindia.com/html/ctsf/padma/padma500.asp. Last accessed on July 28, 2004.
105 Martin van Crevald, Command in War, p 5.
106 Alberts & Hayes, Comm and Arrangem ents fo r  Peace Operations, The Center for Advanced Concepts
and Technology, Institute for National Strategic Studies (Washington, DC: National D efence University
Press, 1996), p 6.
107 Ibid pp 6-7.





The US military experience in Vietnam, in this context, is instructive. Despite 
developing and deploying one of the most sophisticated communications and 
command and control networks, the US military command floundered. The 
problem, when analyzed, pointed to the fact that while the sophisticated networks 
operated to their peak, the benefits derived from them were poor due to, among 
other things, the centralizing tendency that was prevalent in the US military 
establishment of the day.109 Aside from the fact that the US military had deployed 
a conventionally structured force to combat a patently asymmetric enemy, the 
friction of war ensured that Murphy’s Law applied, more often than not, to the C2 
infrastructure thus resulting in mounting difficulties with communicating 
information to people at a variety of levels along the command chain. The lesson 
learnt was that when “dealing with a battlespace permeated with fog and needing 
to develop plans that must survive the worst of Murphy”110, a radically different 
methodology would have to be developed which would ensure a drastic reduction, 
if not the elimination, of the fog of war.
The emergence of low-cost computing and increasingly robust networking 
capabilities opened up a number of alternatives which has enabled the
109 Martin van Crevald, Comm and in War, p 258.
110 Alberts, Gartska, Stein, N etwork-Centric Warfare -  D eveloping and Leveraging Information
Superiority, p 72.
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reconceptualization of the C2 function. Thus, for example, while traditionally, the 
C2 function was concerned with the management of forces and assets, 
sophisticated networking capabilities have allowed for the management, in a 
decentralized manner, of the battlespace within which the management of 
information has taken precedence over all other activities. The management of the 
battlespace is an interesting development in the NCW context. It is not merely 
limited to the management of one’s own forces. It also includes the management 
of adversaries and allies in terms of their perceptions and actions. Taking the 
battlespace management concept even further, networking capabilities have also 
enabled the conceptualization of more than one battlespace within a single theatre 
of operations. These developments are based on the perception that the power 
coefficient or multiplier is positively affected by the effectiveness of linking 
mechanisms and processes.111 As a consequence, the traditional C2 function, 
which was executed within a hierarchical structure, is now being increasingly (re) 
conceptualized as a decentralized and contingent structure, which is capable of 
forming, dissipating and re-forming as per situational requirements. The 
contingent nature of the emerging networked C2 structure warrants a brief 
discussion, for it is here that the key concept of NCW is highlighted.
Given that the volume and content-richness of information on the modern- 
day battlefield has exponentially increased, proponents of NCW have contended 
that there is an overriding need to configure...
111 Ibid p 92.
277
...a set of battlespace entities and a set of interconnections that can take full 
advantage of the increased amount of information available, turn this information 
into knowledge, and generate increased combat power. In other words, leverage 
shared battlespace awareness to allocate, assign, and employ assets and then 
modify these allocations, assignments, and employments as awareness of the 
situation changes.112
The overt intent, therefore, would be to achieve battlefield results which approach 
a maximum optimal level without experiencing the travails of a centralized C2 
structure. Further, the objective would be to ensure that such achievements are 
marked by an inherent flexibility in terms of force design, deployment and 
ultimately of the intended effects of such deployments. To be able to achieve this, 
battlespace entities would be comprised of actors who, collectively and
individually, would be able to sense, decide and act. To be able to maintain
cohesion within the battlespace entity, the interconnectedness of its constituent
actors would thus be of paramount importance. However, the precise
configuration of the interconnectedness between the actors would not be 
predetermined. This indeterminacy of the interconnectedness of the elements of 
the battlespace entity would impart a very high degree of flexibility in the actions 
of the battlespace entity. The point to be noted in this conceptualization of the 
battlespace entity is its contingent nature. The individual attributes and functional 
abilities of the battlespace entity would be appropriately highlighted as per 
particular situational requirements.113
112 Ibid p 115.
113 Ibid p 116.
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Recall in this context Baran’s conceptualization of the ‘native intelligence’ 
of distributed networks. Baran had theorized that in the event of an attack on the 
network and the destruction of a number of its nodes, the network (by means of 
computers which would maintain their individual ‘routing tables’), would be able 
to direct and redirect the traffic of messages in their ‘block’ or ‘packet’ form by 
choosing the optimal flow-path. In other words, save a complete destruction 
(which, it should be noted, is hypothetically possible), the network would self- 
synchronize to contend with emergent conditions. If one understands the 
functional flexibility and the sensitivity to the external (and internal - based on the 
feedback loops) conditions of the constituent elements of a battlespace entity as 
being reflective of the ‘native intelligence’ of the network of the agents within the 
battlespace entity, the similarity between the behaviour of distributed networks 
and the battlespace entities is striking. . It is also indicative of the ‘algebra of 
need’ that is endemic in the networked phenomenon.114 One could say that the 
‘native intelligence’ of networks computes and re-computes, ad infinitum, this 
‘algebra of need’ (in terms of information acquisition, processing and 
dissemination), which sustains the integrity of the network, but not necessarily its 
structure, which co-evolves in tandem with its constantly changing environment. 
Thus, networks are able to maintain and regulate themselves. More importantly, 
in the context of the ‘algebra of need’, networks also are also able to - indeed 
compelled to - expand infinitely.
114 Steven Shaviro, Connected, or what it means to live in the network society, p 11.
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Further, it is important to note that we are not referring to a single 
battlespace entity. As conceptualized by the leading NCW theorists, there would 
be a multitude ol battlespace entities which would ‘lie dormant’ in the global 
battlespace and which, with the emergence of particular situations, would become 
active. This, of course, implies that individual battlespace entities would also be 
seamlessly interconnected between themselves, in a ‘plug-and-play’ fashion, 
which in turn would enable the gaining of a clear picture of the situational 
requirements. The operational activities of an individual battlespace entity and 
how they collectively contribute to the depiction of a comprehensive situational 
awareness are depicted in the diagram below.
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Figure 5: A ctivities o f Battlespace Entities in the context o f ‘shared aw areness’ 
Source: A lberts, G artska, Hayes, S ignori, U nderstanding Inform ation  A ge W arfare, 
(W ashington, DC: US DoD, C C R P, 2002), p 124.
From this we can infer that a collection of such battlefield entities gives rise to a 
lattice of networks which aims to cover the entire battlespace. The network that 
the proponents of NCW speak of is, thus, more a mesh of networks rather than a
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single network. The key issue, however, is not the battlespace entities per se, but 
the links between the actors of a battlespace entity and the links between 
battlespace entities, which allow for a smooth and seamless interconnection 
resulting in a heightened degree of awareness of the battlespace.115 Collectively, 
these links would be instrumental in forming a topology of the battlespace which 
would be comprehensive (in the sense of spanning the information, cognitive and 
physical domains) and, more importantly, dynamic. In other words, under optimal 
conditions, nothing would lie outside the networked battlespace. The 
pervasiveness of this is heightened even more if we factor in the emergence and 
viral spread of mobile computing and wireless networks. Indeed, the advent of 
wireless networking has created a situation where ‘total immersion’ has become 
an everyday phenomenon. In the context of war, then, the mesh of wireless 
networks exponentially increases the reach, depth and functionality of such 
networks.116
It is pertinent to note that while we have been discussing the networked 
phenomenon in the context of the battlespace, it is not limited to the military 
environment. With the explosion of information networks, we find that the nature 
of information is such that the more that is produced, the more co-relations and 
cross references can be made.117 Consequently, the application of the network
1,5 Ibid p 121.
116 Trace Gunsch, “The W ireless Road Ahead”, in M ilitary Information Technology, V ol. 8 Issue 5 July 09, 
2004.
117 Steven Shaviro, Connected, or what it means to live in the network society, p 42. In this connection, the 
work done by Norbert Wiener assumes importance. During World War II, Wiener worked on guided 
m issile technology, and studied how sophisticated electronics used the feedback principle. Wiener noted 
that the feedback principle is also a key feature o f  life forms from the simplest plants to the most complex
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phenomenon in, what is assumed to be, the purely civilian sector, especially in the 
fields of commerce and medicine, is also increasing by leaps and bounds. Indeed, 
it can be argued that the first material (in this context material is understood as 
being commercial in the sense of profit-making) manifestations of the network 
phenomenon can be found in the commercial sector.118 Given that the network 
topology that characterizes the military environment and the allegedly civilian 
sector share an astonishing similarity and the fact that the military environment 
shares the core dynamics of the civilian world (this being one of the effects of the 
Age of Information -  recall in this context Porter’s value-chain hypothesis), the 
net result is that the mesh of networks that we see emerging in the context of the 
battlefield also extends, in more ways than one, globally.
A New Strategic Commons: A Wide Angle View o f Network-centric Warfare
Consequently, “[T]oday, we are inclined to see nearly everything in terms 
of connections and networks.”119 This has led K. W. Jeter, in the novel Noir, to 
observe that the problem is not how we get onto the network, but how do we get
animals, which change their actions in response to their environment. Wiener developed this concept into 
the field o f  cybernetics. See Internet History -  Norbert Weiner, Available at
http://livingintemet.eom /i/ii wiener.htm. Last accessed on July 28, 2004. See also N. Katherine Hayles, 
H ow  We Becam e Post-Human: Virtual Bodies in Cybernetics, Literature and Informatics, pp 84-112.
118 It is arguable that the B2B (business to business) model is the original formulation o f  the networked 
phenomenon in the commercial world. This is evident i f  one notes the buyer-client relationship outside o f  
the computing context. What technology has done is to secure the links between businesses and to extend 
the links (now  in near real time) to other areas such as B2C etc. The follow ing companies are often 
mentioned as ‘role m odels’ o f  organizations that engaged in NCOs (Network-centric Operations): Boeing  
(in terms o f  cross-team collaborations), IBM and M icrosoft (in terms o f  cross-continental ‘virtual 
operations’), Dell Computers (in terms o f  ‘sense-respond’ market strategies), Wal-Mart ((in terms o f  self­
synchronization -  from the retail floor to the manufacturing and assembly site) and DMG, Inc. (in terms o f  
creating a ‘n ew ’ digital financial ‘eco-system ’ characterized by the Autobahn, its automated trading 
service). See Alberts, Gartska, Hayes, Signori, Understanding Information Age Warfare, pp 35-51.
119. Steven Shaviro, Connected, or what it means to live in the network society, p 3
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off it. Thus, being connected implies -  humans connected to machines, 
machines connected to machines, humans connected to humans, humans 
connected to environments, machines connected to environments, environments 
connected to environments...and so on. Being connected is thus no longer simply 
a question of networks of hardware or hardware-based software. Being connected 
is being enmeshed in a plethora of material and non-material networks.121 It is in 
this context that Licklider’s original conception of a ‘network for communication’ 
has taken on a global meaning. Not only does it include the network of 
communication devices (including the Internet and the W3), it also includes the 
very potentiality of events. Recall in this context our discussion on the limiting of 
the conditions of possibility by the specific procedure of the technologisation of 
language enabled by the project of digitization. The networking of events (with 
events increasingly occurring within the mesh of networks) thus pertains to all 
signs, including information. In turn, what this implies is that events and the 
grounds of their emergence share a common condition. They are networked.122
The core conceptual foundations of NCW, therefore, arises from the idea 
that if the very conditions of possibility are enmeshed within networks, then war 
may be understood as being a phenomenon whose possibility, in terms of its
120 See K. W. Jeter, Noir, (N ew  York, NY: Bantam Books, 1999).
121 N oel Schachtman, “B ig Brother Gets a Brain -  The Pentagon’s Plan for Tracking Everything that 
M oves”, W ired N ews, July 9-15, 2003. Available at
http://www.villagevoice.com /issues/0328/shachtm an.php. Last accessed on July 28, 2004. Known as the 
CTS (Combat Zones That See), it is a project being conducted under the DARPA. See also DARPA  
Solicitation, B A A  03-15. Available at http://dtsn.darpa.mil/ixo/solicitations/cts/index.htm. Last accessed on 
July 28, 2004.
*22 Brian Massumi, Movement, Affect, Sensation — P arables fo r  the Virtual, ((London, UK. Duke 
University Press, 2002), p 87.
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emergence and conduct, is immanent within this mesh of networks. To understand 
this as being a material manifestation of the limitation of war would be an error. 
Contrarily, war within such a framework displays a pervasiveness which is global 
and local. In other words, the mesh of networks not only facilitates the conduct of 
war, but it also ensures that the potentiality of the emergence of war is always at 
the threshold of actualization. This is (not so explicitly) stated by Martin Libicki 
who is regarded as one of the leading theorizers of NCW. In the context of 
strategic and tactical sensors, he writes:
...even with stealth, everything ultimately can be found. All objects have mass 
and thus gravity. Every object moving in a medium creates vortices and must 
expend energy to do so. If nothing else, objects of a certain size have to occupy 
some space for some time. A set of sensors placed sufficiently close together can, 
in theory, eventually trap everything by getting close enough. A line of sensitive 
receivers placed close together will find its line-of-sight to a beaming object cut 
if a bomber -  no matter how stealthy -  rolls past...sensors of certain minimum 
discrimination placed close enough together can, at some epsilon, catch 
anything.123
The implications of Libicki’s words are clear enough. While being limited to 
battlefield sensors, Libicki’s ruminations hold a resonance at a meta-level. Having 
previously established that the conditions of possibility are bounded by the 
network or the mesh of networks, then it is not impossible to conceive the 
possibility of conflict, manifested as war, as being present (in its potentiality) at 
every (dynamically shifting) point within the mesh of networks. In this context,
123 Martin Libicki, The Mesh and the N et -  Speculations on A rm ed Conflict in a Time o f  Free Silicon, pp 
30-31.
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Libicki s words move from the specifics of strategic and tactical battlefield 
sensors, to a wholly different register. The ability (or, in the most extreme cases, 
the desire) to ‘catch anything’ within the cross-hairs of a Grid of sensors is, within 
the conceptual framework of NCW, indicative of the emerging character of 
warfare in a networked Age. Recall, in this context, the RSC as conceptualized by 
the Soviet Military thinkers and Admiral Owens’ formulation of the SOS.124 
These early conceptualizations of networked warfare were, in retrospect, rather 
prescient about the trajectory that NCW would eventually take. As we have 
already seen the RSC and the SOS were conceptualized as being a wide ‘network’ 
of intelligence gathering, fusion, analytical and dissemination assemblages, which 
would be linked with advanced weapon systems to enable striking at a diverse 
array of targets with increasing precision. The more mature formulations of NCW 
take this a number of steps forward. In the process, firepower, weight and mass, 
which are the traditional metrics of warfare and of the instruments of war, are 
being increasingly replaced by an evolving set of ‘concepts of operations’ that 
designed to operate (primarily) at the informational and cognitive domains.
As we have seen, the two critical problems at the core of the NCW project 
were (1) how to quantify information and (2) how to optimize the design of the 
network that could guide and direct the flow of information seamlessly and in 
Real Time. It was not long before attempts were initiated address these two 
problems. It was recognized, even at the height of the Vietnam War, that the
124 A s an aside, it is interesting to note given that the formulation o f  the RSC first emanated from the 
erstwhile U SSR  with its totalitarian form o f  government, one wonders whether NCW , in its emerging form, 
is as totalitarian in its interpretation as the regime that first pioneered it.
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extreme fluidity and pace of military operations required an organizational set-up 
which would resemble a decentralized and flattened structure. This was nothing 
but a re-recognition of the salient principles of Auftragstaktik. The critical 
element, however, that aided the process of initiating the first steps to 
conceptualize war and the battlefield as a network was the unprecedented rise of 
ICTs.
The Vietnam War highlighted, among other things, the pitfalls associated 
with the tendency to centralize and the operational problems related to resource
17 Spooling. The stark lessons for global military planners were two-fold. The first 
was the recognition that the modem day military machine was a much larger and 
infinitely more complex entity than ever before and thus it required a huge 
logistical back-up,126 and the second was that to make such a large military 
machine functional, at acceptable levels of efficiency, information was a 
necessity. The last point was a paradoxical one. The US Army, in Vietnam, had
127created one of the most sophisticated military information networks and the net 
result was the emergence of a term that would begin to resonate with increasing 
frequency in the following years -  ‘information overload’, a phenomenon which 
had virtually choked the US military organization. From the 1970’s, “with the 
advent of battleworthy precision-guided munitions, the higher plateaus reached by 
electronic warfare in close association with new methods for intelligence, 
surveillance, and target acquisition, and the development of a global system for
125 Martin van Crevald, Command in War, p 258.
126 Ibid p 235.
127 Ibid p 258.
286
controlling US strategic and tactical forces”,128 a radical shift began to occur not 
only in the instruments of war, but also in the way war and its conduct were being 
(re) conceptualized. Concurrently, the dramatic rise in computing power and the 
viral spread of high-speed information networks spurred on by the Internet 
ensured the emergence of what is now known as the Information Age.
It is claimed that the advent of the Information Age has altered the nature 
of the world by:
1. changing how wealth is created
2. altering the distribution of power
3. increasing complexity
4. shrinking distance around the world
1295. compressing time
This radical alteration of the nature of the world finds its materiality in the 
changing dynamics of the global economy driven by the globalization of the 
circulation-paths of capital and labour. Simultaneously, the relentless 
technological drive led by the ubiquitous growth-rate of Information Technology 
is permeating the very home and hearth of most of the Western world and is 
moving at a fast clip in other regions of the globe. One of the major consequences 
of these seismic changes is the faster evolution and emergence of threats -  in
^  Kenneth Allard, Commcind, Control, and the Common Defence, Revised Edition, p 150.
129 Alberts, Gartska, Stein, N etwork-Centric Warfare -  D eveloping and Leveraging Information
Superiority, p 15.
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terms of their identity, nature and diversity. Threats, in the Age of Information, 
are becoming more anonymous and, therefore, more dangerous. Given this, the 
complexity and non-linearity that, as established by the ‘new sciences’, is a 
characteristic feature of the world has also increased exponentially. Since war and 
its conduct is a product of its age, naturally, its character and conduct in the 
Information Age, buoyed by the concomitant technological advances, are also 
morphing.130
The key enabler in this ‘new’ age is thus not only information, but also the 
phenomenon of ‘being in-formation’. As a consequence, it is held that the 
“...changes in technology and the integration of those changes into weapons, 
concepts, and organizations means that the role of information relative to more-
131conventional (sic) measures of military strength is likely to change...” The 
influence of information, however, is not limited to the changes that it brings 
when meshed with weapon-systems, concepts and organizations. A much deeper 
change is occurring and this is evident when we note precisely how and where the 
‘battlespace’ is being reconfigured and located. While in the Post-Industrial age, 
the battlespace was still located at the site of the Physical, in the Information Age, 
the Battlespace is located, as the diagram below shows, across three domains: the
132Physical, Cognitive and the Informational.
130 Ibid p 1.
131 Khalilzad, White, Marshall, Strategic Appraisal: The Changing Role o f  Information in Warfare, MR- 
1016-AF, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corp., 1999), p 8. Available at
http-//www rand.org/publications/MR/MRl 016/. Last A ccessed on July 28, 2004.
132 Arthur L. M oney, Asst. Sec. o f  Defence (C3I), US D oD, “Report on Network-Centric Warfare -  Sense 
o f  Report”, Submitted to the US Congress in partial fulfillment o f  Sec. 934 o f  the D efence Authorization
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The widening of the battlespace across these three domains is a signature o f the 
dramatic impact that ICTs are having on the very economics of information.133 
The figure below depicts the increasingly central role that information and 
information systems, derivatives of the rapidly evolving ICTs, are playing in the 
context of the widening battlespace.
Figure 7: The C entrality o f Inform ation and Inform ation system s.
Source: The B ig  Issue: C om m and and C om bat in the Inform ation A ge, Ed. David Potts, 
Inform ation A ge Transform ation series, SCSC O ccasional No. 45, (W ashington, DC: US
DoD, C CRP, 2003), p 54.
Act for FY 01 (Public Law 106-398), March 2001, p 5. Available at 
http://www.dod.mil/nii/NCW /ncw sense.pdf. Last accessed on July 28, 2004.
133 Evans and Wurster, “Strategy and the New Economics of Information”, Haiward Business Review , Sept- 
Oct. 1997. Vol. 75 Issue 5, pp 71-84.
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Consequently, the traditional choice between ‘information reach’ and 
information richness has, to a greater degree, collapsed due to the emergence of 
technologies that enable the distribution and sharing (collectively, extending the 
reach) of information without compromising the richness and depth of the 
information being shared.134 This development has its reciprocal effect, albeit in a 
non-linear manner, in the cognitive and physical domains in the form of 
responsiveness, adaptability and flexibility.135 The impact that this has had on 
warfare is tremendous. Thus, for example, the extension of the battlespace across 
the domains of information, cognition and the physical is indicative of the non- 
dimensional nature of the battlespace. It is non-dimensional in the sense that it is 
an increasingly cultural and creative site defined by information, perception, 
cognition and belief.136 The emerging ‘reality’ is that this reconfigured battlespace 
is the most complex battlespace of the 21st Century and, as such, it defines the 
new ‘strategic commons’.137 Taking the cue from Mahan’s concept of the ‘wide 
commons’ of the high seas,138 the new ‘strategic commons’ is the complex 
domain of information and cognition characterized by low-cost entry barriers thus 
putting it within effective reach of Non-State Actors. And given that, in this sense, 
it closely resembles a complex adaptive system, the emerging battlespace is
134 em ergence o f ‘thin client’ technology, in this context, is highly revealing.
135 Alberts, Gartska, Stein, Signouri, Understanding Information W arfare,, pp 47-49.
136 Arthur K Cebrowski, Director, OFT, “Transformation and the Changing Character o f  War”, 
Transformation Trends, Office o f  Force Transformation, US Dept, o f  Defence, June 17, 2004. pp 7-8. 
A vailable at http://www.oft.osd.mil/library/librarv files/trends 370 Transformation%20Trend_s-
17%20June% 202004% 20Issue.pdf. Last accessed on July 28, 2004.
138 Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Influence o f  Sea P ow er on History -  1660-1783, (N ew  York: Dover 
Publications, 1987), p 25. See also Paul Kennedy, The Rise and F all o f  British N aval M astery, (London:
Penguin Books, 2001), pp 1-9.
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highly complex, non-linear and co-evolving with the minutest changes that take 
place within the global networked eco-system.
The key issue concerning warfare in the Information Age is the notion of 
information superiority’. Simply put, this is the “state of ... (relative advantage) 
in the information domain that is achieved by being able to get the right 
information to the right person at the right time in the right form while denying an 
adversary the ability to do the same.”139 While this may, to some, be solely 
understood in terms of the competitive advantage gained by one force over 
another in terms of information and communication capabilities, the critical 
aspect of ‘information superiority’ has more to do with the relationship between 
information capabilities and needs. Traditionally, military organizations (across 
the various hierarchies of command) have had to strike a compromise between 
information capabilities and needs due to the limits placed by the available 
technologies.140 Increasingly, however, ICTs are allowing for the de-limiting of 
this relationship and are enabling not merely more choices, but a tailoring of such 
capabilities relative to the operational necessities and this is resulting in the 
transformation of existing organizations to adapt to the emerging conditions and 
o f the rise of new organizations which are geared to operate within such emergent 
conditions. An example of the latter is the Office of Force Transformation (OFT)
141in the US Department of Defence.
09 Alberts, Gartska, Stein, Signouri, Understanding Information Warfare, p 55.
140
141 Office o f  Force Transformation, US Department o f  Defence (http://www.oft.osd.mil/index.cfm)
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The emergence of the OFT is premised on the notion that a ‘new metric’, 
which is emerging as a result of the ‘changing character of war’,142 necessitates a 
non-linear yet deductive form of thinking. Consequently, the OFT is geared to 
provide, both the impetus and the results, of this kind of thinking in terms of the 
co-evolution of concepts, processes, organizations and technology and since like 
complex adaptive systems, change in any one of these areas necessitates change 
in all, the OFT is meant to identify, leverage and even create new underlying 
principles for the way things are done.143 From this the co-evolutionary nature of 
the OFT becomes clear. The OFT is not a standard bureaucratic organization. 
Instead, it is an organization that is network-centric, meaning that it is a dynamic 
organization which co-evolves in tandem with the ‘concepts, processes, 
organizations and technology’ that it purports to identify. In this sense, the OFT is 
truly a revolutionary organizational entity for it is one that is singularly tasked to 
undertake the ‘transformation of force’ by working “to identify and leverage new 
sources of power”.144 In this sense, the OFT is the organizational equivalent of a 
complex adaptive system and a forbearer of the network-centric organization that 
is increasingly come to characterize the Information Age.
142 Arthur K. Cebrowski, Director, OFT, “Transformation and the Changing Character o f  War”, 
Transformation Trends, Office o f  Force Transformation, US Dept, o f  Defence, June 17, 2004. Available at 
http://www.oft.osd.mil/librarv/librarv files/trends 370 Transformation/o20Tiends-
17% 20June% 202004% 20Issue.pdf. Last accessed on July 28, 2004.
143 From the website o f  The Office o f  Force Transformation. Available at 
http://www.oft.osd.m il/what is transformation.cfm Last accessed on July 28, 2004.
144 Ibid. A lso  recall in this context Foucault’s observation. He said, particularly in the context o f  discourse 
and institutions, “[this is] a general recipe for the exercise o f  power over men: the mind as a surface o f  
inscription for power, with sem iology as its tool; the submission o f  bodies through the control o f  ideas . 
M ichael Foucault, D iscipline and Punish -  The Birth o f  the Prison , p 102. The resonance o f  Foucault’s 
observations and the activities o f  the OFT are startling.
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The net result of the developments described above is the rise of the 
concept of the network’, which are the collection of links and nodes across the 
three domains mentioned above. It may be claimed that this is a patently 
mechanistic view of networks; however, it is important to note that the concept of 
networks, in this context, is akin to that of complex adaptive systems and 
therefore, networks, like complex adaptive systems, are highly sensitive to their 
ecological context, that is, their environment. This kind of thinking - one which is 
able to bypass the link / node binary usually associated with networks - is 
‘network-centric’. It is patently non-linear and structurally fluid. What makes the 
network perspective so powerful is that it reaches beyond the specifics of the 
hardware involved. Instead, the constantly evolving nature of networks points to 
the dynamic “laws of pure form”145 (alternatively, of organization). This is being 
increasingly reflected in the thinking about weapon-platforms in the Information 
Age. No longer can weapons-platforms be thought of as singular and independent 
entities, they are now linked through a lattice of nodes and links and this entails 
thinking about the network of which they are a part of rather than of the platforms 
themselves.
Given this, war and its conduct in the Information Age is now no longer 
limited to the comparative destructive potential of weapons-platforms; instead it is 
about the destructive and constructive capabilities embedded in networks and of 
networks themselves, which are complex and adapting mini-ecosystems. These 
are each linked in innumerable ways to other networks, collectively forming the
145 Mark Buchanan, Sm all Worlds -  U n covering  N ature's Hidden N etworks, p 165.
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global networked eco-system, which pulsates in accordance to its inherent 
dynamics. Given that networks are complex adapting systems, their susceptibility 
to Lorenz’s ‘butter-fly effects’ are very high. This makes the ontology of NCW 
intricately complex, inherently non-linear, patently unpredictable and highly 
dangerous, more so than the battlespace of the traditional forms of warfare of the 
last century.
Security, then, in the networked environment, is more oriented towards 
control manifested in the form of a global surveillance. “We are moving toward 
control societies that no longer operate by confining people but through 
continuous control and instant communication.”146 This, in more ways than one, 
enables the emerging networked military to be able to operate at will across the 
full spectrum of the networks that are increasingly enmeshing global society. 
Recognition of this emerging state of affairs (which may be attributed, in part, to 
the emergence of the concept of NCW) enables us to engage with the strategies 
that the concepts of NCW have spawned. As we shall see, two orders of 
strategizing are possible. The first can be understood in terms of the more 
militarily-oriented strategy and the second, which is more diffused and subtle, is a 
full spectrum strategy, which makes the assumption that the world is a 
comprehensively networked battlespace.
146 D eleuze, N egotiations, p 174.
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Two Orders o f Strategy
If we combine our recognition of the complexity and non-linearity of the 
environment, the imperceptible but relentless process of the technologisation of 
discourse that is occurring and the emergence and explosion of the ‘networked’ 
phenomenon, we are, in the context of NCW, able to discern the emergence of a 
pattern. While it would be a misnomer to call this pattern a strategy at any level, 
except perhaps in terms of technology deployment, it nevertheless allows us to 
hypothesize on the direction that the ‘practice of strategy’ may take within the 
rapidly expanding domain of NCW.
As is well known, ‘strategy’ is a contested term.147 It has and continues to
148mean different things to different people. Thus, for example, while Clausewitz 
understood strategy as being “the use of engagements for the object of war”,149 for 
Basil Liddell Hart, strategy was “the art of distributing and applying military 
means to fulfill the ends of policy.”150 The difference, in this case, is one of 
refinement, rather than in content and is symptomatic of the definitional tussles 
that have taken place in the field of strategic studies over a period of time.151
'47 LawrenCe Freedman, The Evolution o f  Nucleon Strategy, Thiid Edition, (N ew  Y oik, NY. Palgrave 
M acmillan, 2003), p xviii-xix. See also Carl H. Builder, The M asks o f  War -  American M ilitary Styles in 
Strategy an d  A nalysis, A RAND Corp. Research Study, (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1989), pp 47-56.
148 W illiam son Murray & Mark Grimsby, “Introduction: On Strategy”, in The M aking o f  Strategy: Rulers, 
States, and  War, Ed. Murray, Knox and Bernstein, (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1999), p 1.
149 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, p 128.
150 B. H. Liddell Hart, Strategy, 2nd Revised Edition, p 321.
151 See Colin S Gray M odern Strategy, pp 16-44 for a summary o f  the definitional distinctions and an 
engaging overview o f  the ‘dimensions o f  strategy’. See also Williamson Murray & Mark Grimsby,
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Clausewitz’s use of the term ‘engagement’, on a careful reading suggests that it 
comprises of a much wider field than that pertaining merely to battles. Thus, 
engagements’ could also viably include not only battles and campaigns but also 
the use o f threats -  explicit and implicit (thus including all aspects of coercion) -  
and the available instruments of power for the furtherance of state policy. 
However, to state, as some have, that “[TJhere appears to be a unity to all strategic 
experience, regardless of period, polity, or technology”152 would be to assume a 
contestable a priori position which holds that the principles of conflict and war 
have remained true throughout the history of human experience. “A cursory look 
into the development of some of the most time-honoured ideas that comprise the 
principles [of war] will find historical contexts that are completely foreign to us 
today.”153 This is reinforced by the fact that the “time we live in [is] unlike any 
other, a time when the pace of change demands that we change.. .it is a time when 
our analysis methods are becoming less and less able to shed light on the choices 
we face.”154 In short, the topology of the world, as we have traditionally viewed it, 
has changed and more importantly, the pace of change has perceptibly quickened. 
The pertinent question to ask, therefore, would be: Given the widespread changes 
that are manifesting themselves across the topology of the world, driven by
“Introduction: On Strategy”, in The Making o f  Strategy>: Rulers, States, and War, Ed. Murray, Knox and 
Bernstein, (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1999) pp 1-23.
152 Ibid p 8.
153 Robert R. Leonhard, The Principles o f  War fo r  the Information A g e , , p 9.
154 Alberts, Gartska, Stein, Signouri, Understanding Information Warfare, p xiii. See also V ice Admiral 
Cebrowski, “N ew  Rules, N ew  Era -  Pentagon Must Embrace Information A ge”, D efence N ews, Oct. 21-27, 
2002, p 28. The admiral writes, “With the dramatic change in warfare being unleashed by the transition to 
the information age, future military capabilities must be judged using new criteria... Yet the deeper more 
profound debate is about how the changing military rule sets that indicate newer sources o f  power and how  
they are brought to bear.. .A new American way o f  war has emerged -  network-centric operations.” 
Available at http://www.oft.osd.mil/library/librarv files/article 27 Defense% 20News% 20- 
% 20N ew % 20R ules-N ew % 20E ra% 20-% 2021-27% 20Q ct% 202002.htm . Last accessed on July 28, 2004 .
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technology and our relationship to it in economic, social and cultural terms, have 
the principles of war, indeed the conception of war, changed? If the answer to this 
is affirmative, then an examination of the act (or as some would contend, the art) 
of strategizing is warranted.
In what follows, two orders of strategy -  one local, the other global -  are 
examined. The first, or the local order of strategy, is discussed in military terms 
and is more commonly identified as the strategy of Full Spectrum Dominance. 
The second, or the global order of strategy, however, is more abstract and 
speculatively oriented. This is because, inter alia, it draws attention to the ‘global’ 
implications of the first order of strategy in the Age of Information.
The First Order
One of the key strategic orientations of NCW, which is 
increasingly being trumpeted as a ‘new way of war’, is geared to combat, 
contain and ultimately remove (though the possibility of removal remains 
highly suspect) the presence of the uncertainty principle within a patently 
martial condition. Yet, as we have seen, this ambition has been a constant 
thematic -  sometimes subdued and at other times highlighted -  throughout 
the history of military thought.
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The development and deployment of advanced ICTs in war - when 
considered in the more banal sense of the application and use of 
technology in the prosecution of war -  is most commonly understood as 
being an ambitious -  some say misguided — attempt to deal with the 
(operational) problems posed by the uncertainty principle. Contrarily, the 
crux of the matter was cryptically alluded to by the US Secretary of 
Defence, who on February 12, 2002, at a US Department of Defence news 
briefing, spoke of the future in the following terms. He said, “... there 
are...unknown unknowns, the ones we don't know we don't know.”155 
While his statement may have drawn ridicule from some quarters as being 
obtuse, one finds on a careful reading that not only is it a most curiously 
poeticized articulation of the uncertainty principle -  both at the global and 
local strategic levels,156 it was also a reference to how war is more a 
matter of informationalization rather than a matter of problematization.
As we have seen, the conceptual formulations of NCW hold 
‘information’ and ‘information-superiority’ as being one of the critical
155 U S D oD  N ew s Briefing - Secretary Rumsfeld and Gen. Myers, Tuesday, Feb. 12, 2002 - 11:31 a.m. 
EST. A vailable at http://www.defen.selink.mil/transcripts/2002/t02122002 t212sdv2.htm l. Last accessed on 
July 28, 2004.
156Join t Vision 2020  (JV  2020) also marks this. There is an explicit recognition o f  the presence o f  friction in 
military operations and the need to induce ‘frictional imbalance’ in ‘the enem y’. In the context o f  J V 2020, 
friction consists o f  5 elements -  (1) Effects o f  Danger and Exertion (2) Existence o f  Uncertainty and 
Chance (3) Unpredictability o f  the actions o f  others (4) Frailties o f  Human and Machines and (5) Humans. 
The last category is interesting in the context o f  NCW. See Joint Vision 2020, Chairman o f  the Joint Chiefs 
o f  Staff, Director for Strategic Plans and Policy, J5, Strategy Division, (Washington, DC: U S Govt.
Printing O ffice), June 2000. p 6 o f  PDF file. Available at http://www.dtic.mil/iointvision/ivp_ub2.htm. Last
accessed on July 28, 2004.
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competitive advantages for the military of the 21st Century.157 This is 
underscored by the recognition that the need of the hour is “to be highly 
responsive, adaptable, flexible and precise”158 in the application of force 
and, one might add, in the identification of threats. Thus, today, 
‘information’ as warfare has become equally important as ‘information’ in 
warfare.159 Information, in this context, is understood as being that which 
is “...needed to accomplish the task at hand, which includes achieving the 
level of effectiveness specified ... (and the) ... efficiency metrics that 
reflect limits on the resources to be used in achieving that level of 
effectiveness.”160 This is now being materialized in the form of digitized 
C2 systems, which are increasingly geared to exploit information, gain 
information superiority and deny an adversary the advantages of the same.
Information systems have always been central to warfare and 
critical in enhancing military effectiveness as evidenced by the use of the 
telegraph, which considerably influenced military operations during the 
American Civil War and the wireless radio, which played a significant role 
in the operations of the German Panzer divisions during the Blitzkrieg 
campaign of 1940 in France.161 The emerging digitized C2 networks and
157 See Join t Vision 2020, Chairman o f  the Joint Chiefs o f  Staff, Director for Strategic Plans and Policy, J5, 
Strategy D ivision, (Washington, DC: US Govt. Printing Office), June 2000. Available at 
http://www.dtic.mil/iointvision/ivpub2.htm. Last accessed on July 28, 2004.
158 Alberts, Gartska, Stein, Signouri, U n derstanding Inform ation W aif are, p 43.
159 B ishop and Goldman “The Strategy and Tactics o f  Information Warfare”, in N ational Security in the 
Information A ge, Ed. Emily O. Goldman, (London, UK: Frank Cass Publishers 2004), p 114.
160 Alberts, Gartska, Stein, Signouri, Understanding Information Warfare, p i 04
161 B ishop and Goldman, “The Strategy and Tactics o f  Information Warfare , in N ational Security in the 
Information Age, Ed. Emily O. Goldman, p 113.
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systems (aided by distributed computing and networking technologies, 
smaller micro-processors, wide bandwidth and the inversion of Grosch’s 
Law), on the other hand, have allowed for a degree of dynamic 
interactions, particularly at the tactical and operational levels, unheard of 
previously. With a mix of voice, data and dynamic images, a level of 
information richness and reach is being achieved which is enabling the 
instantiation of a Single Integrated Operational Picture (SIOP), which can 
be tailored for analysis and dissemination across the board.162 This is 
increasingly resulting in the obtaining of composite situational pictures at 
the various tactical, operational, theatre and grand-strategic levels as 
identified by Luttwak.163 It will be noted that while the situational picture 
may differ due to the different emphasis on the needs and requirements at 
the various levels, there however, does exist a strong continuity in the 
integrated picture that is available at all levels. This is another of the 
strategic keystones of NCW and is frequently referred to as “Shared 
Awareness”. The figure below highlights the dynamics of ‘shared 
awareness’.
162 Alberts, Gartska, Stein, Signouri, Understanding Information Warfare, p 102.
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Figure 8: Dynam ics o f Shared Awareness 
Source: A lberts, Gartska, Stein, Signouri, U nderstanding Inform ation  W arfare , 
(W ashington, DC: US DoD, C CR P, 2002), p 126.
In turn, the digitization of C2 systems resulting in the creation of a ‘shared 
awareness’, coupled with highly capable sensors/ feedback systems and 
precision-guided munitions is gradually resulting in the development of a 
military organization, which is unlike any seen before. It is an 
organization that is marked by an inherent flexibility and a peculiar 
adaptivity to the flux of the environment within which it operates.164 In 
effect, it operates much like the ‘complex adaptive system’ that we have 
had occasion to examine earlier. This is the ‘new’ face of the military and 
its rudiments are best highlighted by the figure given below.




Figure 9: Evolving Face o f the N etw ork-centric M ilitary O rganization  
Source: A lberts, Gartska, Stein, N etw ork-C entric W arfare -  D evelop ing  and  
L everaging Inform ation Superiority , (W ashington, DC: US DoD, C C R P), Oct. 2003 p
89.
Concurrently, the availability of ‘shared awareness’, by moving 
information rather than people, in turn, allows for dispersed and de­
massed forces to synchronize, integrate and collaborate on operations 
across spatial and temporal differences.165 This, in turn, results in 
exercising an enhanced degree of operational flexibility at individual 
levels and collectively gaining full spectrum dominance at a global level 
as depicted by the figure below.
165 lames Hazlett “Just-in-Time Warfare”, in Dominant Battlespace Knowledge, Ed. Stuart Johnson & 
M a r^ U ^ c W ^ T h e  Center for Advanced Concepts and Technology, Institute for National Strategic Stud.es 
(W ashington, DC: National Defence University Press, 1996), p 116.
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Figure 10: Exercising Full Spectrum  D om inance  
Source: Ralph Thiele, “Network C entric W arfare”, W aldbroel, A ugust 15, 2003. 
A vailable at http://w w w .plath.de/en/service/pdf/netw ork-centric- 
w arfare charts.pdf. Last accessed on July 28, 2004. M odified by author.
It will be noted that, at least theoretically, the creation of ‘shared 
awareness’ deployed through a networked military necessarily implies that 
the organization of C2 structures would also have to be rethought.166 
Traditionally, C2 structures were hierarchical and fully centralized. These 
C2 structures, however, were also highly linear as evidenced by the 
example of the Soviet Military Command structure of World War II and 
after.167 With the emergence of the networked phenomenon, it has now 
become possible to decentralize the C2 structure and to make it more 
adaptive to the rapidly evolving events occurring within the battlespace.168
166 In this context, it is instructive to note the research activities being conducted by the US Office o f Naval 
Research, particularly in the field of ^computational neuroscience . See US Office of Naval Reseaich, 
Science & Technology — Human Systems, Computational Neurosciences, Available at 
http://www.onr.navv.mi 1/sci tech/personnel/342/. Last accessed on July 28, 2004.
167 Alberts, Gartska, Stein, Signouri, Understanding Information Warfare, pp 169-184.
168 The GCCS -  J (Global Command and Control System - Joint) is an example of this. The “GCCS-J is the 
nation's premier system for the command and control of joint and coalition forces. It incorporates the force 
planning and readiness assessment applications required by battlefield commanders to effectively plan and
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Military units networked (either by wired or wireless technologies) with 
weapon-platforms of different capabilities and high-end (long-range and 
short-range) sensors, within a decentralized C2 system, are now 
actualizing the projections originally made by the Soviet military thinkers 
in their formulations of the RSC. The ability to engage a wide variety of 
targets over a geographically dispersed area is increasingly enabling the 
creation of a WAN (Wide Area Network) of interdiction possibilities.169
One of the consequences of these developments is that the different 
‘levels of strategy’ as identified by Luttwak and as alluded to by us earlier 
are slowly dissipating. “Historically these levels exist because of 
limitations in communications and span of control...NCW lessens these 
constraints”170 and thus allows for different modes of organization and 
operations. They also materially assist in developing certain key 
operational concepts as highlighted by the Transformation Planning Guide 
(TPG) recently approved by the US Department of Defence. Thus, the 
strategy of NCW, according to the TPG, revolves around:
execute military operations. The GCCS-J is fielded at 635 sites worldwide, all networked via the DoD's 
classified  private Intranet.” See “What is the Joint Global Command & Control Systems (GCCS-J)? 
D efence Information Systems Agency. Available at http://gccs.disa.mil/gccs/. Last accessed on July 28, 
2004. The GCCS formally replaced the WWMCCS (World Wide Military Command and Control System) 
o f  the Vietnam Era on June 30, 1997. See US DoD N ews Release “Global Command and Control System  
Fully in P lace”, Available at http://www.dod.mil/releases/1997/b07091997 bt367-97.htm l. Last accessed  
on July 28, 2004.
169 N ote the resemblance between the possibilities o f  a W AN interdiction capability with what in the 
comm ercial software project management sector is known as the Global Delivery Model (GDM ). In simple 
terms, the “GDM  is a framework for distributed project management and multi-location engagement 
team s... It provides clearly defined process guidelines emphasizing the importance o f  information flow  and 
com m unication.. .” See The Boston Group -  Delivery Model. Available at
h ttp 7 /w w w  thebnstongroup.com /services/offshore/delivervm odel.asp#. Last accessed  on July 28, 2004.
170 Alberts, Gartska, Stein, Network-Centric Warfare -  D eveloping and Leveraging Information 
Superiority, p 84.
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1. Superior Information Position
2. High Quality Shared Awareness
3. Dynamic Self-Coordination
4. Dispersed and de-massed Forces
5. Deep Sensor Reach
6. Compressed Operations and Levels of War
7. Rapid Speed of Command
8. Alter initial conditions at increased rates of change171
The implications of this become evident when we place these strategic 
concepts within an operational Grid. Within such a Grid, these concepts can 
be reduced to the principles of dominant maneuver, precision engagement, 
focused logistics and full dimension protection. The Grid referred to here 
needs some elucidation. Three kinds of networks constitute the Grid. They are 
the networks of information, sensors and engagement, which are overlaid or 
meshed with each other. Collectively therefore, the Grid enables predictive 
planning, integrated force management and the execution of time-sensitive 
missions172 and consequently defines the very boundaries of the battlespace. It 
is in this sense that battlespace is considered as war.
171 Transformation Planning Guide Approved”, DoD Update, (Washington, DC: DFI International 
Corporate Services), March 24, 2003. Available at http://www.dfi-intl.com/shared/up.dates/dod/2003-Q3- 
24D oD U pdate.pdf. Last accessed on July 28, 2004.
172 Fred P. Stein, “Observations on the Emergence o f  Network Centric Warfare”, (Vienna, VA: Evidence
B ased Research, Inc), 1998. Available at
http://www.dodcnrp.om/research/ncw/stein observations/steinncwjjtm. Last accessed on July 28, 2004.
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While the development of such a comprehensive operational Grid is 
yet in the future, the US Navy’s Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) is 
symptomatic of the architecture of the emerging Grid-based model of warfare. 
1 he diagram below depicts the emerging strategic architecture of NCW with 
the incorporation of the CEC.
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Figure 11: The Evolving A rchitecture o f the CEC  
Source: Vice Admiral Arthur K. C ebrowski, (Rtd.) U.S. N avy, and John J. G arstka, 
“N etwork-Centric W arfare: Its O rigin and Future”, P roceedings o f the Naval 
Institute, 124:1 (Jan. 1998): 28-35. M odified by author.
In simple terms, the final architecture of the CEC is expected to provide 
the US Navy with three key capabilities...
First, CEC enables multiple ships, aircraft, and land-based air-defense 
systems to develop a consistent, precise, and reliable air-track picture. 
Second, it allows combat system threat-engagement decisions to be 
coordinated among battle group units in real time. Third, CEC will 
distribute fire-control-quality targeting information, when available, 
among units in the force so that one ship or aircraft might be able to 
engage threat aircraft and missiles even if it does not have targeting data 
on its radars locally. These key capabilities will allow Navy units to
3 0 6
engage very difficult targets successfully-including low-flying, 
supersonic cruise missiles.173
The CEC thus provides an interlinking of the various individual networks 
and as a result generates a ‘comprehensive - extended-reach/ information- 
rich (C-ER/IR) operational picture which ‘captures’ the battlespace and 
which can be shared by any battlespace entity that may be a part of the 
operation. Indeed, fresh battlespace entities could be cued into or exited 
from the active battlespace without any lengthy pre or post operational 
briefing. Collectively, this allows for a much shorter engagement timeline 
thus enabling the tempo of the battle not only to be maintained but also to 
be increased, thereby dislocating (alternatively disrupting) an adversary’s 
OODA cycle.174
While the CEC is primarily a US Navy project, the strategic intent 
behind the concept of the CEC is a common thematic within the emerging 
US military posture and of the NCW project as a whole. It is conjectured 
that an ideal state of affairs would have multiple CEC-type Grids with 
multiple capabilities interlinked with each other across the globe, which 
would resemble a gigantic fishnet within which the ‘unknown unknowns’,
173 D aniel Busch, Capt., US Navy, PEO TSC and Conrad J. Grant, “Changing the Face o f  War: The Co­
operative Engagement Capability”, March 2003. Available at
h ttrW /w w w  rr.ii rn y a /d e n lo v m e n t/fa c e  o f  war.html. Last accessed on July 28,2.004. See also 
“Cooperative Engagement Successfully Demonstrated at Sea”, US D oD News Release, March 6  2 0 0 1  
A vailable at h ttp : / /w w w .d e fe n s e 1 in k .m il / re le a s e s /2 0 0 1 /b 0 3 0 6 2 0 0 1  b t0 9 7 -0 1  ,h tm j, Last accessed on July
^ V i f e  Admiral Arthur K. Cebrowski, (Rtd.) U.S. Navy, and John J. Ganstka ^etw ork-C entric Warfare: 
Its Origin and Future”, Proceedings o f  the Naval Institute 124:1 (Jan. 1998): 28-35 Available ad
httD://www.usni.orW Pmeeedinas/Artieles98/PROcebrowski.htni. Last accessed on July 28, 2004.
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as noted by Secretary Rumsfeld, would be reduced, at the very least, to 
‘known unknowns’.
A number of inferences can be drawn from the above. First, the 
development of the Grid (the CEC being the most material example) may 
be understood as being an attempt to reduce the uncertainty principle that 
has always afflicted the conduct of war. It aims to reduce the traditional 
Clauswitzian friction within one’s own forces by creating an adaptive C2 
structure thereby making the C2 functions more fluid and decentralized. 
Second, it aims to create a mesh of networks that would make the 
calculation and computation of the potentiality of the emergence of 
threats, their location and their neutralization a much easier task than 
hitherto possible. In other words, the Grid would or should be able to 
generate ‘dominant battlespace awareness’, the maintenance of which 
would result in the perpetuation of the production and retention of 
‘dominant battlespace knowledge’, an act which would deny an adversary 
the advantages of the same. Third, collectively, such an operational stance 
implies that a networked military would have to be geared to engage in 
what has been characterized as ‘JIT Warfare’ (Just-in-Time, a concept 
borrowed from advanced production and inventory planning1'5). JIT 
Warfare implies that...
175 “j i t  (Just-in-Time) manufacturing is a Japanese management philosophy applied in manufacturing. 
Essentially it involves having the right items with the right quality and quantity in the right place at the 
right tim e .. .  developed and perfected within the Toyota manufacturing plants by Tanchi Ohno m the early 
1970s.” See ‘Operations Research -  JIT Production System s’, Available at
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...in future information wars...reconnaissance, strike, and defence would 
be coordinated in battles fought as “meeting engagements” where both 
sides are on the offence...forces need no longer to be massed prior to 
attack.. .Not being able to sense where the attack is going to come from - 
because it would come from everywhere at any time — takes away the 
other side’s initiative.176
In the context of our discussion of the Grid and of JIT warfare, it is 
important to note the significance of the emergence of operational 
concepts such as ‘effects-based operations’ (EBO) and ‘swarming’. These 
complement the emerging military posture within the framework of NCW. 
Thus, for example, while “swarming is seemingly amorphous...it is a 
deliberately structured, coordinated, strategic way to strike from all 
directions by means of a sustainable pulsing of force.”177 This represents 
one of the best illustrations of how the strategy of NCW is evolving. It is 
necessary to point out that despite the cutting-edge revisionist work being 
done in the NCW area there still remains a strong residual interest in the 
popular AirLand Battle Doctrine which, despite refinements, essentially 
remains mass-oriented.178 However, as the NCW phenomenon and the 
related technologies mature, a radically ‘new’ doctrine may very soon
179replace it. This is the doctrine of the ‘battleswarm’. Eminently suited for
http://w w w .dal.ca/~ahe/ie113398/iit.html. Last accessed on July 28, 2004. See also Taiichi Ono, Toyota
P roduction  System  -  Beyond Large Scale Production , (Univ. Park, IL: Productivity Press, 1988).
176 James Hazlett, “Just-in-Time Warfare”, in Dominant Battlespace K nowledge, pp 115-116.
177 John A rquilla&  David Ronfeldt, Swarming and the Future o f  Conflict, D B-311-O SD , (Santa Monica,
CA: R A N D  Publications, 2000), p 5 o f  PDF. Available at http://www.rand.org/publications/DB/DB311/.
Last accessed on July 28, 2004.
I78lbid. p viii. .
179 It is interesting to note that the concept o f  ‘swarming’ is not a ‘new  concept in the sense that the natural
world seem s to abound with examples o f  swarming. Thus, the futuristic picture described is gained from an
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network-centiic operations, ‘battleswarms’ can be conceptualized as 
small, well-informed and lethal units, which are intricately linked to each 
other, exercising a deployment flexibility unobtainable in mass-oriented 
conventional formations, across the spectrum of battle. They would have 
an omni-dimensional operational capability and be capable of a high 
degiee of automated and synchronized actions. Given the progress evident 
in the development of UAVs (unmanned aerial vehicles), UCAVs 
(unmanned combat aerial vehicles), pilotless drones and other robotic 
instruments of war,180 it is not inconceivable that in the very near future 
‘swarm units’ would literally be ‘machinic’ entities.181 The network 
architecture that would connect these units would be highly robust, fluidly 
mobile and would display an unparalled degree of ‘native intelligence’, 
which would be instrumental in making them highly adaptive to a rapidly
observation o f  a ‘swarm o f  bees’. Other examples, such as the behaviour displayed by piranhas, fire ants, 
and fire flies, are equally applicable. Examples o f  ‘swarming’ are also present in early examples o f  war, 
such as those exhibited by the Mongols in the early 13th Century. For an extended discussion o f  swarming 
in the context o f  NCW, see John Arquilla & David Ronfeldt, Swarming and the Future o f  Conflict, DB- 
3 1 1-OSD, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Publications, 2000). Available at
http://www.rand.org/publications/DB/DB311/. Last accessed on July 28, 2004. See also H. Van Dyke 
Parunak, “Making Swarming Happen”, Alturum Institute, Paper Presented on the Conference on Swarming 
and C4ISR, T yson’s Comer, VA. Jan. 2003. Available at http://www.erim.org/~vparunak/MSH03.pdf Last 
accessed on July 28, 2004. See also Sean J. A. Edwards, Swarming on the Battlefield: Past, Present, and  
Future, M R -1100-O SD, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Publications, 2000). Available at 
http://www.rand.org/publications/M R/M R1100/. Last accessed on July 28, 2004.
180 Noah Shachtman, “Revenge o f  the Killer Drones”, in Wired News, April 1, 2004. Available at 
http://www.wired.com /news/technologv/0-1282.62893.0Q.html. Last accessed on July28, 2004. See also US 
O ffice o f  Naval Research, Science & Technology —Human Systems, Biorobotics . Available at 
http://www.onr.navv.m il/sci tech/personnel/342/ne biorobotics.asp. Last accessed on July 28, 2004. See 
also Prieditis, Dalai et al, “Smartswarms: Distributed UAVs that Think”, Lookahead D ecisions Inc., Power 
o f  Information A ge Concepts, 2004 Command and Control Research Technology Symposium, San D iego, 
CA.
181 ‘M achinic’, a term originally coined by Gilles Deleuze, refers to the overall set o f  self-organizing 
processes in the universe. See D eleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus -  Capitalism and Schizophrenia, 
Trans. Brian M assumi, (London, UK: Continuum, 2003), pp 88-90. In the context o f  this study, ‘m achinic’ 
refers to the Deleuzian concept and includes, but is not limited to, the fusion o f  the human and the machine, 
w hich is popularly known by the label o f  ‘cyborg’. I have opted for ‘m achinic’ over cyborg, as it captures 
the com posite processes and natures o f  ‘swarm units .
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evolving battlespace. 82 It is interesting and instructive to note that while 
battleswarms, as described above, may yet be futuristic, closely related 
ideas are being worked out by the US Marines and certain elements of the 
US Army.183
In the event that the doctrine of ‘battleswarms’ and similar 
concepts are actualized in an operationally deployable form two things, as 
a result, will be observable. First, a radical reorientation of the 
organization of the military will be increasingly effected. Not only will it 
involve restructuring the command chain, it will also involve changing the 
way in which traditional fighting formations are raised, organized and 
maintained. As a result, newer logistical paradigms will also have to be 
devised, as will the processes involved with their equipping and 
training.184 These changes will, as a consequence, transform not only the 
military but will also redefine the nature of tasks that the military will 
perform in the future. In this connection, it is also pertinent to point out 
that the nature of planning will also change. While traditionally planning
182 In this connection, it worth recalling Licklider’s original formulation as presented in his landmark paper 
“M an-M achine Sym biosis” (March 1960). In it, Licklider had presciently noted: . .The hope is that in not
too many years, human brains and computing machines will be coupled.. .tightly, and that the resulting 
partnership will think as no human brain has ever thought... See J.C.R. Licklider, The Computer as a 
Communication D evice” and “Man Computer Symbiosis in In Memoriam. J.C.R. L icklider 1915-1990, 
(Palo A lto, CA: Systems Research Center), August 1990. Available at
ftp://gatekeeper.research.compaq.com/pub/DEC/SRC/research-i eports/SRC-06 1 .pdf Last accessed on July 
28, 2004. A lso  quoted in Hafher & Lyon, Where Wizards Stay Up Late -  The Origins o f  the Internet, (N ew  
York, NY: Touchstone Books, 1998), p 35.
183 See Sean J. A. Edwards, Swarming on the Battlefield: Past, Present, and Future, M R-1100-O SD, (Santa 
M onica CA- R AN D  Publications, 2000). Available at http://www.rand.org/puU icMi.P2 Ts/M R/M Rl 100/. 
Last accessed on July 28, 2004. pp 65-85. Edwards identifies the US Army’s Force XXI and the A A N
( A rm y  A f te r  N e x t )  a s  r e le v a n t  e x a m p le s . _ A ..
184 John Arquilla & David Ronfeldt, Swarming and the Future o f  Conflict, pp70-72. Available at 
http://www.rand.org/publications/DB/DB311/. Last accessed on July 28, 2004
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processes have occurred at the various levels of command, under the 
changing conditions and given the fact that the ‘levels of strategy’ as 
identified by Luttwak are gradually collapsing, ‘dynamic planning’ will 
gain precedence. 85 Dynamic planning will be more oriented towards 
individual missions, organized around a common thematic -  usually 
defined by the COP - as opposed to the campaign-planning processes that 
military organizations have traditionally engaged in. This marks the 
change in the nature of the act of planning per se. It would become more 
fluid, contextual and consequently would rapidly evolve in tandem with 
evolving situations.186 It is also likely that dynamic planning processes 
would be highly automated to maintain and enhance the sensor-to-shooter 
link in a bid to retain a dominant position on the battlefield.
Second, and consequent to the above, the traditional distinction 
between strategy and tactics will increasingly collapse. We have already 
noted the emergence of concepts like JIT Warfare, where forces will 
remain deployed, ‘virtually’. In other words, across the multitude of CEC 
networks (collectively the Grid), forces will remain in a state of readiness,
187poised to engage with threats at insignificant lead times. Moreover, the 
presence of active sensors -  long and short range -  cued directly into
185 Alberts, Gartska, Stein, Network-Centric Warfare -  D eveloping and Leveraging Information
Superiority, p 75. . , TT7 , ,
186 R ecall in this context the Auftragstaktik  practiced by the German Army m the two World Wars. In 
today’s context the Israeli military uses these methods, albeit within the limits and constraints o f  available 
and deployable technologies. See Alberts, Gartska, Stein, Signouri, Understanding Information Warfare,p  
171
187 James Hazlett, “Just-in-Time Warfare”, in Dominant Battlespace K nowledge, pp 115-116.
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weapon-platforms will act as more than early-warning posts. They will be 
the new frontline. Significantly, given that the sensors and their 
associated weapon-platforms will be deployed in an omni-directional 
manner, the frontline will also be omni-dimensional and thus, 
everywhere’. On the same note, ‘swarm units’, as and when they become 
fully operational (in terms of doctrine and technology), will represent a 
disaggregated and dispersed fighting machine, which will already be in a 
(virtual) state of war. Under these conditions, the act of strategizing, 
marked by the traditional practice of marshalling and deploying the 
necessary means to further state policy, will have very little meaning. The 
implicit offensive posture of the networks in which such battlespace 
entities will be located will, as a consequence, ensure that warfare will be 
more of a ‘running battle’ or a ‘continuous engagement’ between
numerous networks rather than the traditional attrition-style engagements
188between masses of weapon-platforms. Given that the computing and 
networked power of networks will have increased exponentially (all things 
remaining constant) the perception of threats, calculating their lethality 
and devising adequate responses to them will be instantaneous or as close 
to Real-Time as possible. This draws us closer to a condition wherein
188 Samantha L. Quigley, “Transformation C hief Outlines Strategy for N ew  Battlefield”, American Forces 
Press Service, Aug. 5, 2004. Available at
httn://www H . W p l i n k  m i1 /n e w s / A u g 2 0 0 4 / n O R 0 5 2 0 Q 4  2004080504.htm l. Last accessed on August 6,
2004 In the article Admiral Cebrowski notes the inverted relationship between the ‘strategically offensive’ 
and ‘operationally defensive’ force-posturing required for the ‘new ’ battlefield. It is interesting to note that 
i f  a force is ‘strategically offensive’ in orientation then its ability to be ‘operationally defensive’ is open to 
question. M oreover, being ‘strategically offensive’ in orientation resonates loudly with the idea o f  a force
that is in a ‘virtual’ state o f  war.
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continuous and evolving tactics rather than the traditional set-piece act of 
strategizing will be the order of the day.
The Second Order
Previously, we discussed a number of devices and means by which 
the actualization of the phenomenon of NCW is occurring. The emphasis, 
as we have seen, is on collapsing time, creating common operational 
pictures (COPs) to ease the complexities involved with C2 functions, and 
attempting to alleviate the trials and tribulations resulting from the 
inherent non-linearity of our environment. Collectively, these efforts may 
be understood as being examples of pragmatic attempts (by leveraging the 
power of ICTs) being made to reduce the problems associated with the 
conduct of war.189 However, it is also possible, in an abstract sense, to 
note the emergence of another phenomenon, which has shadowed the 
emergence of NCW.
We saw how the technologisation of discourse is necessary for 
facilitating the instantiation of a COP. We also noted that when cast 
against the framework of the networked environment, with its concomitant 
paths of information-flows, the technologisation of discourse is 
instrumental in reducing the ‘textures’ of information to facilitate its flows
189 Alberts, Gartska, Stein, Network-Centric Warfare -  Developing and Leveraging Information  
Superiority, p 84.
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through the circulatory channels which have, in turn, assisted in giving 
material form to the common interfaces between the human and the 
computei. If we linger on this issue for a while, we can better appreciate 
the degree of standardization that ensues and the implications that stem 
fiom it. In the context of battlespace entities, we find that without this 
standardization, it would be impossible for these entities, especially their 
constitutive agents, to function. This would, in turn, result in the 
disintegration of the very bedrock on which the phenomenon of NCW has 
found its material manifestation. In this connection, it is important to note 
that the reference here is not specifically to the ‘richness’ of information, 
but also to the underlying dynamics of the flows of information that are 
being increasingly standardized.191 However, even in the context of the 
‘richness’ of information, the element of standardization is evident in the 
fact that there are parameters which define the ‘richness’ of the 
information and consequently, the “incorrigible recidivism” that Dillon 
marks with reference to words, and by extension to language, is missing.
190 Martin Libicki, The Mesh and the Net -  Speculations on A rm ed Conflict in a Time o f  Free Silicon, p 
129. Libicki, in this context, refers to the ‘’universal translatability’ that the impact o f  ICTs are having and 
w ill have in the future. It is interesting to note that the concept o f  ‘universal translatability’ as applicable to 
m achine-to-m achine interactions is as it is to human-to-machine and human-to-human inteiaction, 
facilitated by a mesh o f  networks. See also Vice Admiral Arthur K. Cebiowski, (Rtd.) U .S. Navy, and John 
J. Garstka, “Network-Centric Warfare; Its Origin and Future , Proceedings o f the Naval Institute, 124.1 
(Jan. 1998): 28-35 Available at http://www.usni.org/Proceedings/Aiticles98/PROcebrowski.htm. Last 
accessed on July 28, 2004. Admiral Cebrowski writes: .. .at the planning level, the elements o f  a D oD- 
w ide intranet are emerging. To assure interoperability, all elements o f  the Grids must be compliant with the 
Joint Technical Architecture and the Defense Information Infrastructure common operating environment. 
However, their full integration into a more powerful warfighting ecosystem is only partially com p lete ....” 
The admiral cites the CEC as the primary example o f  such activities.
191 See, for example, “The Semantic Web Foundations o f Net-Centric Warfare”, White Paper, McDonald  
Bradley, Inc., Jan. 2003. Available at
http://www.m cdonaldbrad1ev.com/Comps/white%20papers/The%20Semantic%20Web%20Foundations%2
0of% 20Net-CenHn% 70W arfare.pdf. Last accessed on July 28, 2004.
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We cannot, therefore, help but recognize that the instruments 
which are actively assisting the phenomenon of NCW to manifest its 
material instantiation also collectively operate as agents for a subtle but 
grand totalizing project. While being a subject of interest, the question as 
to whether it is a project driven by intentional agents or not, lies outside 
the scope of this study. Suffice it to say that this grand totalizing project is 
visible and it does draw our attention to the fact that in the urge to refine 
the conduct of war, there may have emerged a phenomenon, which has not 
only trapped us in a space in which we are being increasingly constricted 
by, among other things, the rapid advances of technology, but which has 
also changed the very nature of war.
Take, for example, the words of Libicki who, as we have seen, in 
the context of tactical and strategic sensors, wrote that “...a sufficiently 
fine web can.. .catch anything.. .”192 At one level we can understand this to 
mean that since a CEC network is a combination of three different kinds 
of networks (of sensors, information, and engagement), the possibility of 
any threat evading the mesh of a large number of CEC networks is rather 
limited. In this sense, it also inhibits the emergence of threats from within 
the mesh of networks. This implies that if threats do emerge, they will do 
so outside the mesh of networks that collectively comprises the CEC. 
Moreover, given that everything (at least hypothetically) within the mesh
192 Martin Libicki, The Mesh and the Net -  Speculations on Arm ed Conflict in a Time o f  F ree Silicon , pp 
30-31
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of nets can be targeted and neutralized, then for the threats to remain 
viable, they not only have to remain outside the mesh of networks, but 
they will also have to possess and/ or devise the ways and means by which 
they can evade them. Thus far Libicki’s words remain relevant within the 
confines of a purely military context.
Now, recall again, in this context, our discussion on the 
technologisation of discourse. Aside from the fact that it facilitates the 
instantiation of COPs, which are one of the fundamental building blocks 
of CEC networks, we have also explored how the technologisation of 
discourse results in the limiting of the ‘conditions of possibility’. If the 
technologisation of discourse is understood as occurring within and by 
means of the mesh of networks, then we can also conclude that network 
materially limit the ‘conditions of possibility’. In other words, nothing that 
is possible can or could occur outside the mesh and spread of networks. In 
this sense the emergence of potential threats is limited to the space defined 
by the mesh of networks, rather than from any space outside it. This, albeit 
at a simplistic level, also implies that the mesh of networks will be able to 
precisely calculate and prioritize the threats from the moment of their 
instantiation and will be able to counter them at a time and place of its 
choosing. There is nothing very esoteric about this. The procedure and 
processes involved would be very similar, if not the same, to those used by 
the mesh of networks to address purely military threats. The problem,
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however, lies in how the threat is determined and who or what constitutes 
the threat.
As we have seen, in the Age of Information, the technologisation 
of discourse is based on the project of digitalizing language. This suggests 
that the uncanniness of language - manifested by its rich and varied 
textures -  is now susceptible to being reduced, ultimately to a binary state, 
and stored in an easily retrievable and contextually relevant and 
presentable manner. In this connection, the most recent developments in 
the fields of bio-metrics and pattern-recognition are instructive and
1Q1relevant. The reduction of the ‘conditions of possibility’ to code 
(alternatively, language to digital code) allows for the potentiality of the 
emergence of threats to become wholly susceptible to pre-emptive 
programming which would be preventive, or at the very least, combative 
in nature. Under these conditions, the identification of threats becomes a 
matter of computation and thus predictive.
The definition of ‘effects-based operations’ (EBOs), which we 
have considered as being one of the manifestations of the strategies of 
NCW, in this context, is instructive. EBOs, it is contended, are a 
“coordinated sets of actions directed at shaping the behaviour of friends,
193 See Jain, Pankanti et al, “Biometrics -  A Grand Challenge”, To appear in Proceedings o f  International 
C onference on Pattern Recognition, Cambridge UK, August 2004. Available at nar.A
http ://b iom etrics.cse .m su .edu/b iom etricsprandchallenge.pdf. Last accessed  on A ugust 11, 2004 .
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neutrals, and foes in peace, crisis and wars.”194 The definition is 
instructive in the sense that it considers ‘friends’, ‘neutrals’ and ‘foes’ in 
the same light -  those whose behaviour in conditions of peace, crisis and 
wars must be directed. Thus, the traditional binary between ‘friend’ and 
foe is made contingent on the basis of whether an ‘entity’ behaves like a 
‘friend’ or a ‘foe’, which is understood in terms of a behaviour-pattem 
which falls within a parametric band of ‘acceptance’. In other words, the 
categories of ‘friends’ and ‘foes’ are dependent on pre-calculated contexts, 
in much the same way as the digitalization of language reduces the texture 
of language to a binary, which if considered in terms of presentation and 
re-presentation, is also context-dependent. It is significant to note that the 
only contingency that is of relevance here is that of danger and of 
‘becoming dangerous’.195 Danger here may be understood as any activity 
or action (including their potentiality) that is destabilizing. This is very 
relevant in the case of the mesh of networks.
We have already seen how networks and the mesh of networks 
behave like complex adaptive systems. Further, we have also seen how the 
presence of the individual constitutive agents within complex adaptive 
systems is contingent on their ability to maintain their individual 
equilibrium within the systems, thereby contributing to the general
194 Edward A. Smith, Effects B ased O p era tio n s- Applying Centric W m fa re in P ea ce .C ris is  and,
War, Information A ge Transformation Series, (Washington, DC: US DoD CCRP, 2003), p 108.
195 Personal discussion and exchange o f  emails with Prof. Michael Dillon, Lancaster University, Aug. 4,
2004.
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stability of the system. Consequently, if an agent within a complex 
adaptive system is unable to maintain its equilibrium, it is removed. It is 
only by doing so that the complex adaptive system can guarantee its own 
continued presence. The process is the same within the mesh of networks. 
To forestall the destabilization of the mesh of networks it must, therefore, 
continually act in a colonizing manner, seeking out spaces which are not 
covered by it and by limiting the ‘conditions of possibility’ (by 
standardizing and/ or making everything within its ambit computable) and 
thus the threats to it. In this way the mesh guarantees its own security in 
terms of its integrity and equilibrium. From the perspective of the 
constitutive elements within the mesh of networks, however, the 
ontological condition is one of continual danger. It is dangerous because, 
as we have seen, any activity that could disturb the native equilibrium of 
the mesh of networks would invite total and complete destruction.196 The 
options are few, for as Libicki puts it, ‘a sufficiently fine web can...catch 
anything’.
196 Admiral Cebrowski’s formulation, in this context is instructive He makes the point that being 
‘disconnected’ is to be in danger. Note how this formulation works both ways -  in terms o f  secunng from 
danger and  ‘interdicting’ the source o f  such a danger.. See Speech to Network Centnc Warfare 2003
bCr ^ e ± ; H 22m ddT raT / H t o v W ecch 143 CHBROWSKl% 20SPE E C H % m O % 20N ETWO
R K % 2 0 C E N T R T r % 7 n W A R F A R F o/ n 2 Q C Q N F E R E N C E d p c .  L a s t  a c c e s s e d  on July 28, 2004.
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NCW: ...and here is the beef...
This investigative overview, which has spanned across a variety of sites 
and registers, indicates that the semi-official and official documentation that 
records the emergence and dynamics of the NCW phenomenon are quite 
optimistic about the potential of NCW as being the ‘new’ way of war. There are 
valid reasons for this optimism. If the introduction of ICTs can dramatically 
enhance combat effectiveness thereby shortening the duration of war, then their 
deployment, to limit the evils of war, would seem logical and indeed welcome.197
As we have seen, the phenomenon of NCW closely analyzes the 
traditional dynamics of war and uses ICTs to dramatically quicken the associated 
processes. Thus, we see the shortening of decision-making cycles, the creation of 
seamless sensor-to-shooter links, the deployment of advanced sensors linked 
directly to vast information processing, analyzing and fusion systems as being 
material advances in the area of NCW. This, in turn, has yielded multi-faceted 
results. Thus, for example, while on the one hand, as the traditional C2 functions 
become increasingly digitized and linked in near real-time to a wide array of 
powerful sensors, thereby increasing their efficiency, on the other, it has also 
brought about a corresponding decentralization in the C2 hierarchy. Consequent 
to this, there is a growing recognition that the decentralized model of C2 systems 
is better suited to contend with the complexity, non-linearity and the rapid tempo 
that characterizes the conduct of war, a fact attested to by, among others,
197 Alberts, Gartska, Stein, Signouri, Understanding Information Warfare, p 285.
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Clausewitz. The increasing emphasis on decentralization is also bringing in its 
wake a change in the organizational dynamics of the military. This, in turn, is 
having a cascading impact on the development of military strategies and 
doctrines. It would not be a mistake, therefore, to state that the way that warfare is 
organized and conducted is also undergoing a change.
But, as we have seen, all this did not happen suddenly or in a vacuum. The 
growing recognition of the inherent complexity and non-linearity of our 
environment and the emergence and viral spread of ICTs were the results of 
frenetically creative periods within the commercial and scientific-technological 
worlds. Further, we find that the incorporation of these technologies and sciences 
into the military sphere is not a singular result of the advent of the Age of 
Information. By sifting through any account of history we can find examples of 
how science, technology and the military have found common grounds from 
where they have shared their individual insights. The same also applies to the 
world of commerce. In this way, we can identify a symbiotic relationship that
198enmeshes the military, technology, and commerce.
It is equally valid to state that the scientific-technological developments 
that have accrued over time and which are now being manifested in the Age of 
Information have also had a significant impact in the socio-economic 
(alternatively, non-military) environment. The dynamics of these changes may be 
understood in the way value is now being reconstituted. The value chain analysis
198 Manuel de Landa, War in t h e  A g e  o f  Intelligent Machines, p 5.
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ptopounded by Michael Porter, whose ideas we have examined earlier, stand 
testimony to this. The trickle-down effects of these developments have also 
affected the social world. 9 The rise of ICTs has significantly opened up the 
information-sphere, rivaling the physical and cognitive domains, which is a vast 
terrain within which we are being increasingly absorbed.200 Collectively, this has 
resulted in a meshing of worlds as a result of which the traditional divisions
between the economic and social worlds are being increasingly blurred as 
advanced ICTs collapse the common-place conceptions of time and distance. 
Indeed, ICTs have, to a large extent, re-territorialized the world that we live in.201
They have “put people and information in close electronic contact with each
909other.” As a consequence, they have also had an influential impact on our
discursive practices. Foucault has shown us the traditional role of discursive
practices in acts of power formation. This, as illustrated by Foucault, has long
been recognized by institutions which have strained to control these activities in 
their bid to monopolize power. In the Age of Information, discursive practices 
have assumed an importance which is qualitatively different from the societies 
investigated by Foucault. Language and discourse have been recognized as being 
the key pivots of the Information Age. To ensure that the project of digitalization
199 See, for example, Howard Rheingold, Smart Mobs: The Next Social Revolution, (N ew  York: Basic 
B ooks, 2003) and his Virtual Reality: The Revolutionary Technology o f  Com puter-G enerated A rtificial 
W orlds - and  H ow  It Prom ises to Transform Society, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992). See also 
Sherry Turkle, Life on the Screen: Identity in the Age o f  the Internet, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1997)
200 Manuel Castells, The Rise o f  the Network Society, The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture 
Vol. 1, (Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishers, 1996), pp 469-478.
201 Martin Libicki The Mesh and the Net -  Speculations on A rm ed Conflict in a Time o f  F ree Silicon, p 11. 
Libicki notes how the impact o f  the information revolution has “rendered large chunks o f  the W est’s 
workspace unrecognizable”. Re-territorialization is a concept deployed by Gtlles Deleuze. See D&G, ATP, 
pp 142-145.
202 Ibid. p 126.
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of all walks of life and existence is uniform, the technologisation of discourse, 
which has always lain beneath the surface, has emerged as being a critical 
factoi. The reduction of language to digital code has its resultant implications, 
the first among which is the limitations imposed on the ‘conditions of possibility’. 
These and associated changes in the socio-economic and cultural world have also 
had an impact in matters pertaining to defence and security. Consequently, if, as is 
contended by many, “war reflect[s] the relationships of individuals, the 
communities that they form, and the nations that they live in”204 then, it is valid to 
presume that the emergent principles of NCW reflects the networked nature of 
modern-day society.
As we have seen, the strategy of NCW, in the Age of Information, is 
characterized by four themes.
1. The emphasis on the network or the mesh of networks.
2. The emphasis on assemblages rather than on unitary actors
3. The emphasis on understanding military systems and the battlespace as a 
complex adaptive system which is evolutionary
2054. The emphasis on information being the critical currency
203 See “The Semantic Web Foundations o f  Net-Centric Warfare”, White Paper, M cDonald Bradley, Inc.,
h ttp W ^ w w !m cd o^ ^ ^ rad1e!v.com/compS/white0/n20paperS/The%2QSemantic%20Web%20FoundatipnS%2
0of% 20Net-Centri c% 20W arfare.pdf. Lasr accessed on July 28, 2004.
204 Martin Libicki, The Mesh and the N et -  Speculations on Arm ed Conflict in a Time o f  F ree Silicon, p 26
205 M ichael D illon, “Network Society, Network-Centric Warfare and the State o f  Emergency , m Theory, 
Culture and Society, (L ondon/N ew  Delhi: Sage Publications), 2002. Vol. 19 (4). 71-7 .
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In this connection, it is interesting to note that there has been a suggestion that
NCW is not about networks, it is more about networking.206 The ‘power’ of 
NCW, it has been contended, is derived from the complex and intricate linking of 
knowledgeable entities which results in increased combat power. This is 
misleading. At the conceptual level, NCW is all about networks. Combat power, 
in the NCW context, is wholly dependent on the network. But this is not because
weapon-platforms, sensors, and ultimately decision-making systems are being
increasingly embedded within networks - rather, it is because the network finds
certain modes of expression through such systems and platforms and their
capabilities. Recall, in this context, the ‘native intelligence’ of ‘networks’ that
Baran’s investigations helped us identify (and which we can expect to grow
exponentially, with advances in neural network programming, evolutionary
207programming, and other advances in bionic systems ). The interlinking of these
platforms and systems is the function of this native intelligence, rather than any 
conscious ‘networking’ done externally.208 Thus, the wider, deeper, richer and
denser the network is, the greater would be its combat power and resilience. This
also faithfully adheres to the principle of the ‘sum of the parts being greater than
the whole’.
206 Alberts, Gartska, Stein, Network-Centric Warfare -  D eveloping and Leveraging Information  
Superiority, p 8.
207 For exam ple, see the ‘Human Assisted Neural D evices’ Program at DARPA. “The program will create 
new  technologies for augmenting human performance through the ability to noninvasively access codes in 
the brain in real time and integrate them into peripheral device or system operations. Available at
Itttn://www.darDa.mil/dso/thrust//hosci/brainmi.htm. Last accessed on July 28, 2004.
208 See Thom as K Adams “Future Warfare and the Decline o f  Human Decision-M aking”, Parameters, 
U S Army War C ollege Quarterly, Winter 2001-02, pp. 57-71. Available at httpTZcarhsle: 
www.armv.mi l/usawc/Parametere/lHwuTter/adarnsJitm. Last accessed on July 28, 2004. Adams writes: 
“W e are faced with the prospect o f  equipment that not only does not require soldiers to operate it, but may 
be defeated i f  humans do attempt to exert control in any direct way.” Under such, admittedly futuristic 
circum stances, one wonders what element o f  ‘networking’, as a conscious and planned activity, would  
survive.
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These issues collectively point to the dissolving of the categories by which 
we have thus far understood war and its conduct. The dynamics of NCW as 
evidenced by the thematics of its strategy points to the fact that in the networked 
enviionment, which among other things, is characterized by the changing nature 
of value and the processes of value-creation, the geo-physical acquisitive intent 
that has been the traditional logic underlying wars has also undergone a 
qualitative change.209 In turn, this has also initiated, as we have seen, a change in 
how threats are perceived. The calculus that determines threats now recognizes 
them as disruptive elements which possess the ability to destabilize the network or 
mesh of networks. This calculation is based on the level of disruption that a threat 
can pose to the informative-intensive network.
As a result, we find that the phenomenon of NCW which is emerging, 
among other things, as a response to the need to make the conduct of war more 
efficient and less destructive, is simultaneously also disclosing a parallel and more 
forbidding face. Given that the material success of NCW lies in the presence of a 
plethora of highly advanced sensors interlinked with each other which are 
constantly on the lookout for signs of the emergence of thieats, it is therefore not 
surprising that we can identify the emergence of a culture of omnipresent 
danger’.210 Additionally, the technologisation of discourse, which is rapidly 
circumscribing the 4conditions of possibility , is resulting in a condition that
209 M ichael D illon “Network Society, Network-Centric Warfare and the State o f  Emergency”, in Theory,
C a/toreW Soc/eO -, (London/New Delhi: Sage Publications), 2002 Vol. 19(4): 71-79
2,0 N oel Schachttnan, “B ig Brother Gets a Brain -  The Pentagon’s Plan for Tracking Everything that
M oves”, W ired N ews, July 9-15, 2003. Available at
http.V/www.villapevoice.com /issues/0328/shachtmatnEhB. Last accessed on July 28, 2004.
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suggests that nothing outside the network or mesh of networks should be possible. 
The implicit totalizing aspects of NCW, in this, will not be missed. This, as we 
shall see, leads us to conclude that the Deleuzian observation of the radical shift 
from ‘disciplinary societies’ to ‘controlled societies’ is vindicated.211 It is also 
indicative of the transformations underway in our understanding of the 
phenomenon of war in the Age of Information.
211 G illes D eleuze, N egotiations, pp 177-182.
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Interlude
War and Clausewitz in the Age of Networks or,
... Your past is your future...212
As seen previously, the martial theorists of the Enlightenment and Early 
Romantic periods - dazzled by the promise of Reason - had been driven to 
develop ‘models’ of war and its conduct based on a calculus that was highly 
rationalistic in its design, processes and outputs. Against this backdrop, the 
Clausewitzian theory of war may be considered as being a maturation of these 
efforts. Like Kant who built an architectonic of Reason, Clausewitz built an 
architectonic of war within Reason (in the form of the State as the Political). Like 
its Kantian counterpart, the Clausewitzian architectonic thus appealed...
...to the continuity of time in order to counterbalance or dilute the violent, 
heterogeneous threshold of sensation, so as to see it in terms of degrees and thus 
make it measurable and calculable. The advantage [was] considerable. 
Henceforward everything which seemed impossible to master within the sensible, 
all that Descartes, in the example of the piece of wax, abandoned to the 
imagination (its heated liquid form, its honey-like aroma), everything becomes, 
thanks to the idea of a specific degree of sensation, an object of possible 
knowledge.213
212 B lack Sabbath, “Computer God”, in Dehumanizer, 1992
213 Juliette Simont, “Intensity, or: the ‘Encounter’”, in An Introduction to the Philosophy o f  G illes Deleuze, 
Ed. Jean Khalfa, (London: Continuum, 2003), p 32
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In this way, the vagaries of chance and force (the nature of war) were deemed 
mitigated, or at least contained, by Reason. But the Clausewitzian architectonic 
was also careful to temper this enthusiasm with the Kantian recognition that even 
Reason had to accept its limits - antinomies — by posing questions to which 
Reason, as Pure Reason, had no answers. Thus, we were able to identify the tense 
grid of chance/ uncertainty, blind natural force, and politics with and within which 
the Clausewitzian theory of war bound itself.
Of course, the key consideration remained the mitigation of chance and 
blind natural force. Clausewitz, we noted, was concerned with two principal 
issues in his problematization of War. First, with reference to the conduct of war, 
Clausewitz was concerned about Friktion which, as Watts points out, “ ...has a 
long historical lineage. It predate[d] Clausewitz by centuries and has remained a 
stubbornly recurring factor in combat outcomes right down to the 1991 (now, 
2003) Gulf War.”214 As we have seen, “[t]he concept of friction is not just a 
statement that in war things always deviate from plan, but a sophisticated sense of 
why they do so.”215 This is certainly true of Clausewitz’s concern/ interest in 
Friktion. It reflects a deeper understanding of the anterior nature of Chance and 
Uncertainty. Indeed, it could even be ventured that Clausewitz’s On War is 
nothing less than a martial account of how to organize in the face of Chance; and 
Uncertainty. Secondly, Clausewitz was also troubled by the logic of Absolute
214 Barry Watts, Clausewitzian Friction and Future War, McNair Paper Number 52 , ,  October 1996.
Available at http://www.ndu.edu/inss/McNair/mcnair52/m52cont.html Last accessed on May 19, 2007
215 Alan Beyerchen, "Clausewitz, Nonlinearity and the Unpredictability o f  War," International Security,
17:3 (Winter, 1992), pp. 59-90
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War. Indeed, we saw how Clausewitz’s concern with Absolute War was focused 
on its predilection to be in excess of Reason. Thus, he insisted on girding the 
phenomenon of War with and by the Political.
Clausewitz had suggested that though his architectonic of war did much to 
break the inflexible models and theories of war and its conduct of his 
predecessors, it remained akin to a ‘game’ of ‘cards’.216 Now, Beyerchen points 
out that “[T]his analogy suggests not only the ability to calculate probabilities, but 
knowledge of human psychology in "reading" the other players, sensing when to
217take risks, and so on.” Thus, Beyerchen concludes that...
... war is not chess; one's opponent is not always playing by the same rules, and is 
often, in the effort to win, attempting to change what rules there are. This is a 
major reason that how war is conducted can and does change its character, and 
that any war is (in Maxwell's sense) structurally unstable.218
Beyerchen, of course, ignores the fact that even Clausewitz’s analogy of ‘war as a 
game of cards’ is not structurally unstable and that the participants in a game of 
cards (or, for that matter, chess) necessarily play by rules - indeed by a commonly 
agreed upon set of rules - which each may choose to observe (or violate). Thus, 
while dissenting from the general point that Beyerchen makes - that 
Clausewitzian war is structurally unstable - this study makes the case that the 
Clausewitzian theory of war - indeed our modem theories of war and the military
216 Clausewitz, On War, pp. 85-86
217 Alan Beyerchen, "Clausewitz, Nonlinearity and the Unpredictability o f  War," International Security,
17:3 (Winter, 1992), pp. 59-90
218 Ibid.
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is as much oi a ‘game’ of cards as it is of chess.219 Note that what is being 
contested is not the specificity of the ‘game’ — cards or chess - that is being 
played. Rather, it is the ‘game’ itself that is of interest and relevance to u s .220
1 he Clausewitizian understanding of war, like Chess, is one that spreads 
across a grid and operates along and around certain critical points pertaining to j 
that grid. Primary among them are the following:
R 1 R nl B 1 K 1 [ o rI _ _ _
B1 R 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
j L i i i
. . . . M M
r ir
_
r f if f
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
R2 K n 2 B 2
. . . .
Q 2 K 2 B2 R 2
Figure 12: The G rid o f Chess 
Im age by A uthor
1. The set of red squares at the center of the board represent the ‘heartland’ of the
game of chess. A cursory appreciation of the strategy of Chess reveals that these 
four squares are critical in and for the game and controlling them, that is to say, 
denying them to an opponent allows a player to gain and retain a strategic
219 Note: One o f the principle accusations levied against Jomini was his consideration o f war as a giant 
chess game. As the following discussion will show, the same may also be said o f Clausewitz.
220 Safranski, in his philosophical biography on Nietzsche suggests that “[DJuring his final weeks in Turin, 
however, he (Nietzsche) shed the inhibitions that are necessary even for games.. .This lack o f restraint 
could no’longer be considered a “game,” because the player had forfeited his sovereignty.” See, Rugiger 
Safranski, Nietzsche: A Philosophical Biography, Trans. Shelley Frisch, (London: Granta Books, 2002), p
309
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advantage in the game. Understood in Clausewitzian terms, these four squares 
represent the center of gravity of the field of battle and as such is a location or site 
that determines the strategic direction that the battle will take. Further, it is 
interesting to note that the player that commands and controls these four central 
squares also exposes them to enemy action. Thus, the exercise of command and 
control of these four squares is both a blessing and a curse. It is the former in the 
sense that controlling them allows a player to control the game, and it is the latter 
in the sense that articulating its presence simultaneously also reveals its precise 
location and nature (more on this below) thereby opening up the possibility for it
to be attacked. It is significant to note that Clausewitz made much of the center of
22 1gravity of an army. Indeed, Clausewitz noted that the endgame of any battle 
depended on the ability of an army to destroy/ annihilate the opponent’s center of 
gravity, and pursuant to this, the schwerpunkt of an army’s efforts must be geared 
to -  so theorized Clausewitz -  ensure the annihilation of the enemy’s center of 
gravity.222 But equally, Clausewitz also emphasized that defending a center of 
gravity, historically, has shown to always have a better prospect than assaulting, 
it.223 The object(ive) of offensive operations in Clausewitzian terms thus is geared 
to target and destabilize an enemy by destroying his heartland - his center of 
gravity. The object of defensive operations, on the other hand, would be to protect ' 
this heartland from the destabilizing effects of an enemy’s offensive operations 
and to ensure the pursuit of counter-offensive operations when able. As a point of
221 Clausewitz On War, pp 485-495; pp 595-596. See also Antulio J. Echevarria II, “Clausewitz’s Center o f
Gravity: Changing our Warfighting Doctrine -  Again!” (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S.
Arm y War C ollege, 2002)
222 Clausewitz, On War, p 495
223 Ibid
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passing interest, this aspect of Clausewitz’s theory of war found its fullest 
expression during the Age of Mechanized Warfare wherein strategizing for the 
operations and counter-operations that would take place around such objectives 
took precedence over other considerations. Expressed in geopolitical terms, 
Clausewitz’s insistence on the criticality of the center of gravity bears a striking 
similarity with the controversial theories of geopolitics, the ‘heartland’ and the 
‘rimland’.224
2. Second, the grid of Chess, as mentioned above, spreads across 64 squares. Given 
this, it could be said that the conditions of possibility of the game of chess are 
bounded by the 8x8 grid within which the action, so to speak, takes place. In other 
words, the 8x8 grid of the chessboard is its grid of intelligibility, its nomos. When 
translated in Clausewitzian terms, this grid of intelligibility is that of the political 
-  a point most forcefully reiterated not only by Clausewitz, but also by most 
subsequent commentators on War and military theory. In other words, 
Clausewitz’s famous trinity of war which, as we have seen, is actually a dyad is 
held with/in a tense grid of political, but also thanatological, intelligibility. Thus, 
as in Chess, wherein the moves of the individual pieces are rendered 
understandable only within the 8x8 grid, the Clausewitzian understanding of war 
and its instruments -  politics, armies, technology, culture, economies etc - are also
224 “In D efence o f  the Heartland: Sir Halford Mackinder and His Critics a Hundred Years On”, Colin S.
Gray, C om parative Strategy, Volume 23, Number 1/January/February/March 2004; Halford J. Mackinder, 
D em ocratic  Ideals and Reality. (N ew  York: Norton and Co., 1962); N.J. Spykman, The G eography o f  
P eace  (N ew  York: Harcourt Brace, 1944); David J. Lonsdale, "Information Power: Strategy, Geopolitics 
and the Fifth Dimension." Journal o f  Strategic Studies 22.2-3 (1999): 137-157; Geoffrey Sloan, "Sir 
Halford Mackinder: The Heartland Theory Then and Now." Journal o f  Strategic Studies 22.2-3 (1999): 15-
37.
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rendered understandable in the grid of the political which, in one of its more 
common material manifestations, is the State. War and the State — like the pieces 
of a chessboard and the 8x8 gridded-space of Chess -  thus represent a distinctly 
martial universe. They are inseparable from each other. They cannot be thought of 
without each other and in this are self-limiting. Thus, Clausewitz, while tacitly 
acknowledging the anteriority of chance and uncertainty, struggled to ensure that 
chaos, uncertainty, and chance -  the features that Clausewitz suggests are critical 
in any study of war - remain within this grid and in this sense, also within the 
ambit of Reason-as-such. In this way, the taming of chance becomes the raison 
d ’etre of politics in the form of the state. Deleuze points to this when he speaks of 
the apparatus of State-science and, in sharp contrast to it, nomadic science.225
3. Thirdly, one finds on taking an even cursory look at the ‘space’ of Chess, there is 
a striking binary function that is operative within it. It is equally important for us 
to recognize, however, that this binary function is ‘reflective’ rather than being 
essential. It is the relationality that the inversion of Vision shares with Vision. 
This is evident if we look at the arrangement of the pieces on the board. As the 
figure above demonstrates the pieces labeled R1 (Rook), Knl (Knight), B1 
(Bishop), K1 (King), Q1 (Queen) are in equal measure reflected on the opposite 
side of the board - R2 (Rook), Kn2 (Knight), B2 (Bishop), K2 (King), Q2 
(Queen). Further it will be noted that each of the pieces, emphasizing their 
reflective natures, possess and exhibit identical functions. Thus, for example, R1 
and R2, which are situated on opposite sides of the board, possess and exhibit the
225 D&G, ATP, pp 361-374
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same capabilities which, in the case of the Rook (R 1/2), is the ability to move 
vertically and horizontally for an unlimited number of spaces relative to the extent 
and spread of the board. The implication of this of course is that even before the 
commencement of battle on the board, each of the players can theoretically 
identify the moves and counter-moves available to the opponent, and the 
maximum functionality of the opponent’s ‘army’. The parallels that can be drawn 
between these elements and the Clausewitzian notion of war are instructive. As in 
Chess, the point around which the Clausewitzian notion of war revolves is the 
notion of correspondence between one’s own forces and that of the enemy. This 
correspondence allows Clausewitz to suggest a ‘grammar’ or logic of (real) war. 
This grammar or logic of war allows for the plotting and planning -  collectively, 
the strategizing -  of battle and by extension of war. Of course, the Clausewitzian 
notions of the fog and friction of battle/ war do make their presence felt, but as 
mentioned earlier, these occur only within the grid of intelligibility of war which, 
in the Clausewitzian case, is the political.
4. Lastly, as we have seen, though each player in a game of chess knows the precise 
capabilities and functions of the pieces and the layout of the grid of play, the 
dexterity involved in the movement of the pieces over and above the gridded 
space is what distinguishes one player from the next. The same is equally 
applicable to the field of battle and by extension of war, where to paraphrase 
Napoleon, the Great Captains of War make their presence felt. The realm wherein 
this dexterity is displayed is, as we have also seen, that of the Genius. AVhat
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cannot, however, be denied is the fact that maneuvers, operational dexterity, 
angles of attack, modes of defence etc. cannot help but be organized in 
accordance with the laws of the grid of intelligibility (which in this case may be 
understood as the Laws of Time and Space) that gestells not only chess but also 
war. Thus, equally the Clausewitizian Genius in War remains operative in the 
gridded space of the political, that is to say, Reason. Clausewitz’s Commander 
(ideally, the Genius) therefore emerges as the Genius of Reason...the 
strategos. . .the one who commands the signs (of war).226
For Clausewitz, of course, all this was necessary, but speculative, theory. 
In NCW terms, however, theory is being increasingly actualized in practice. As 
we have seen, the foundational principle that underwrites the NCW thesis is that 
of ‘chance, uncertainty and blind natural force’ and it organizes itself in terms of a 
recognition - or of ‘sense’ understood simultaneously as an ability and a 
capability - of that what is uncertain, and as an expression, that is to say, as a 
response -  again as an ability and as a capability - in the form of an active 
engagement with the uncertain. We should be careful not to conflate this rather 
sophisticated conceptualization of ‘sense’ and ‘response’ with the implied 
reflexiveness that we find scattered throughout the Clausewitzian theory of war. 
Thus, unlike Clausewitz, who kept the Abyss of pure force, chance and 
uncertainty at bay with a variety of devices, NCW looks into it.. .co-responds with 
it...seeks to engage it...by establishing a computable economy of relations with
226 D illon in “Intelligence Incarnate: Martial Corporeality in the Digital A ge”, in Body & Society, explains 
this w ell.
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it. This is nothing less than NCW’s attempt to go beyond Reason and to ‘make the 
Abyss its own . Thus Martin Libicki — a leading and prominent NCW theorist — 
can assert, albeit in the specific context of strategic and tactical sensors, that 
“ even with stealth, everything ultimately can be found.”227
While the implications of Libicki’s words at the level of the material 
battlefield are chilling enough, they also suggest a meshing of subject-based 
desires and an inhuman desire-ability to catch anything within the cross-hairs of a 
moving/ morphing/ multi-textured Grid of response-ability and sense-ability. If 
this is the operational posture (ideally) necessary for the conception and 
prosecution of War in the Information Age, then, (to be) NCW {that is to say, to 
be martial) - without uncertainty as is the stated aim o f the NCW doctrine - is 
nothing less than to be (standing-reserve securely). Naturally, under these 
conditions, turbulence -  at some or any epsilon - is a threat for it entails a 
disturbance to be (‘standing-reserve’ securely). In this sense, the emerging 
theories and doctrines o f NCW are a signature o f a becoming -  a becoming-NCW 
- which is, paradoxically, the becoming o f being (i.e., ‘to b e ) fo r  such is the 
atrophic logic o f NCW.228
227 Martin Libicki, The Mesh and the N et -  Speculations on A rm ed Conflict in a Time o f  F ree Silicon, pp 
30-31.
228 Here entropy is used in its most general o f  understandings as an inherent tendency towards the 
dissipation o f  useful energy. See, for example, Eric Dressier, Engines o f  Creation: The Coming Era o f  
N anotechnology, (N ew  York: Anchor Books, 1987). See also Jeremy Rifkin and Ted Howard, Entropy: A 
N ew  W orld View, (N ew  York: Viking Press, 1980)
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From the perspective of the State as a strategic ensemble, this is a strategic 
maneuver of the greatest importance for it is effected at the very edge of Reason 
where strategic ensembles increasingly find themselves - as sites, locales and 
positions -  decomposing into ‘the small and the many’. Here the State, indeed the 
political, faces, in Secretary Rumsfeld’s quixotic words, ‘the unknown 
unknowns’. Thus, Hardt and Negri suggest, the State is re-discovering that the 
War of the small and the many is not a part of its exclusive preserve and under its
229control. To cope with these bounds of Reason (as the political), the State (as 
Reason) fashions, that is to say, produces -  not simply acquires or appropriates -  
a war-machine in the form of NCW. But the State’s complicity in the emergence 
of NCW is not simply limited to an act of creation or production. The State itself 
is self-organizing according to the very principles of net-centricity that underwrite
990the theory and doctrines of NCW. In this way, paradoxically, NCW as a war- 
machine, which brings with it the single greatest transformational potential for or 
on behalf of the State, also promises the transformation of the State (and by 
extension, the political) into a sub-assemblage and as an instrument of itself for, 
as we have seen, the strategic object of NCW is to organize towards a condition in 
which “[Tjotal war is surpassed, toward a form of peace more terrifying still”231 
and where Reason answers -  ideally without any antinomies -  to Reason itself.
229 M ichael Hardt & Antonio Negri, Multitude, (London: Penguin Books, 2005), pp 52-62
230 A s w e have seen the US Dept. O f D efence’s Office o f  Force Transformation is a prime example by 
w hich such a ‘transformation’ is being effected and this trahsformation is not simply limited to a distinct 
martial domam' As Admiraf Cebrowski and the other NCW  theorists have repeatedly stressed, this 
transformation rides on the back o f  the proliferating digital dependency structures that are far in excess o f  
m erelbartial domains.
231 D&G, ATP, p 421
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Recall in this context that the emerging strategic object of war - as 
indicated by Admiral Cebrowski - is not simply the re-cognition of 
transformation, but the desire-ability to exercise control in a transformational 
context, and thereby command (in) it. Against this backdrop, and in light of what 
we have seen thus far, the theories and doctrines of NCW appear disposed to pre­
empt the progressive break-up of strategic ensembles into tactical, sub-tactical, 
local and singular initiatives. Additionally, as we have also seen, being premised 
on Reason, more precisely, calculative Reason, the theories and doctrines of 
NCW highlight a contradiction with/in themselves. We have already established 
that that what ultimately serves to limit the excess of Clausewitz’s Absolute War 
is the thanato-political. We cannot, therefore, afford to ignore the fact that unlike 
Clausewitz’s Absolute War, which, while seemingly responsive to the demands of 
the political (that is to say, Reason) remains indifferent to it, NCW is in­
difference with not only Reason (as the political) but also to Thanatos by 
rendering a condition of suspended animation. This rendition is a matter of default 
or necessity for it is nothing less than NCW’s response to the performative 
contradiction that is embedded within its grammar. Thus, we should not be too 
hasty to dismiss NCW as the simple informationalization/ digitization of 
Clausewitz’s Absolute War; indeed, as this study contends, the instrumentality of 
NCW -  marked by its in-difference to Reason (the thanato-political) - is pivotal 
in our recognition of the complexity and critical immediacy that war — considered 
ontologically — impresses upon us.
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While there is a plausible, some would say, dark, argument to be made in 
favour of the technological trajectory of the NCW project as being a ‘strategy’ of
232J^e.as0Ib f°r our purposes, however, NCW - as a kehr — is also indicative of an­
other, intensive, theatre of war where/in the extensivity of NCW -  NCW as a 
digitized version of Clausewitzian War233 - unfolds. It is important to remind 
ourselves that this intimation of Intensive War comes to us in the context of a 
transformation of reason -  from the philosophical to the technological -  that is 
currently underway as our fundamental concepts of speed, time and scale collapse 
into and onto each other.234 It is also important for us to note that our recognition 
of this intimation of Intensive War is marked by a singular lack of an economy of 
relations with/in Reason; rather, it is an excendence which allows us to point to 
the always-already spectral presence of Intensive War. The invocation of the 
Levinasian term serves to reiterate that Intensive War does not arise from Reason 
(as the political and the State). Rather, it is ‘a-rising’ with/in/out-of Reason. Given 
this, the theories and doctrines of NCW -  as an expression of martial 
(in)corporeality -  may thus be understood as a posture, rather a (martial) bearing, 
that is immanently informed by Intensive War.
232 D & G  d is a p p o in t in g ly ,  s e e m  to  d ra w  su c h  a  c o n c lu s io n . S e e  D & G , ATP, p  4 2 2
233 T h e  a r g u m e n t  th a t  N C W  is  s im p ly  a  t e c h n o lo g ic a I ia c e j> I C ^ ^ ^  a n  o f t  r e p e a te d  r e f r a in
in  th e  d o m a in  o f  m i h t ^ s f u d i e s .  S e e , f o f  e x a m p le , C o lin  S. G ra y , Another B loody Century: Future War, 
S e e  a ls o  D a v id  J . L o n s d a le ,  The Nature o f  War in the Information ASe .
234 In  th is  c o n n e c t io n  V i r i l l io ’s  a c c o u n t  o f ‘s p e e d ’ a n d  w a r  is  in te re s t in g . S e e  V m l l io  &  L o tn n g e r ,  Pure  




... When the walls fa ll down...1
A Signature o f the World2
“[MJodemity”, Ansell Pearson suggests, “is haunted by the threat of the 
eternal return of the same and captivated by the promise of the arrival of the new, 
the unique and the singular, an experience of time that is ecstatic, explosive and 
aeonic...” The signature of this world is in, among other things, the “ .. .failure of 
representation, of the corrosion of identities, and of the discovery of non-human 
forces that operate under the representation of the same and the identical... 
(where)... [Identities, and matters of life and death, are simulations, masks 
produced as an optical effect of the more profound game of difference and 
repetition.”4 While Ansell Pearson’s depiction of modernity - with its ‘failures of 
representation and of the corrosion of identities’ -  may be an apt description of 
the emerging battlespace, what immediately catches our attention is his strong 
reference to the ‘non-human forces that operate under the representation of the 
same and the identical’.
1 B la c k  S a b b a th , “ C o m p u te r  G o d ”  f ro m  D e h u m a n iz e r ,  1992 .
2 T i t le  b o r ro w e d  f ro m  E r ic  A ll ie z , The Signature o f  the World: Or, What is Deleuze and Guattari’s
Philosophy, (L o n d o n :  C o n t in u u m , 2 0 0 5 )
3 K e i th  A n s e l l  P e a r s o n , V iro id  L ife : O n  M a c h in e s , T e c h n ic s  a n d  E v o lu t io n , in  D e le u z e  a n d  P h ilo s o p h y :
T h e  D i f f e r e n c e  E n g in e e r ,  (L o n d o n : R o u t le d g e , 1 9 7 7 ), p  180.
4 Ib id .,  p  181.
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Recognition of this, as we have already seen, was never far from the 
surface of the theories and doctrines on and of war. Indeed, it can be viably said 
that Clausewitz was only one in a long line of illustrious military thinkers and 
practitioners of war who attempted to contend with these ‘non-human forces’ not 
simply in operational terms, but also philosophically. The evidence marshalled 
thus far suggests that the logical, that is to say, the Reason-able, trajectory of such 
attempts in the Age of Information has only resulted in the continued subjection 
of war to, as Ansell Pearson highlights, the laws of entropy (homogeneity, 
abstract equivalence, neutralized differences, etc.).5 Nevertheless, commentators 
such as Coker, for example, claim that
...it is worth recognizing that if war still has a future for the western world.. .this 
is largely due to technology, especially the new technologies associated with the 
information revolution. It is that revolution which now offers the West the 
chance to reinvent war and fight it more imaginatively (and yes, more humanely) 
than in the past.6
This reflects a high degree of optimism in the technologization of war. However, 
this optimism is suspect because, as our review of the theories and doctrines of 
NCW shows us, the philosophical backdrop of NCW - despite being informed by 
an implicit understanding of technology in terms of an originary technicity, where 
“technology is a constitutive prosthetic of the human...a dangerous supplement 
that enjoys an originary status” - makes, what Ansell Pearson would insist is, “the 
entirely spurious claim that with the coming of computers and the arrival of robot
6 C h r i s to p h e r  C o k e r , The Future o f  War, (O x fo rd :  B la c k w e ll  P u b ., 2 0 0 4 ) , p  x.
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intelligence the planet is now entering a ‘silicon age’.”7 Spurious because, among 
other things, despite the Kehr to the inhuman, the circumspection of war by the 
political remains a potent reminder of an “anthropocentrism and overlooks the 
simple fact that the human [the central figure around which it is claimed war 
revolves] is not only a technogenesis but equally, and more importantly, a bio­
technogenesis.”8 Our analysis of the history of military thought, including the 
theories and doctrines of NCW, shows us that the circumscription of war to the 
political has been a constant thematic in most, if not all, considerations of war and 
its conduct. The impact of this has been significant as is evidenced by the 
distinctly Clausewitzian tones in which the question regarding NCW is addressed. 
Working from this premise then it is possible to reflect on the prevailing 
discussions that engage with the emergence/ advent of the ‘digital soldier’,9 and 
of the ‘digital way of war’, as a vapidly post-modern re-presentation of a process 
which, as Foucault advised us, began with the ‘making’ of the Soldier during the 
French Revolution.10
7 K e i th  A n s e l l  P e a r s o n , V iro id  L ife : O n  M a c h in e s , T e c h n ic s  a n d  E v o lu t io n , in  D e le u z e  a n d  P h ilo so p h y :
T h e  D i f f e r e n c e  E n g in e e r ,  (L o n d o n : R o u tle d g e , 1 9 7 7 ), p  181 , 182
8 Ib id . ,  p  182
9 “ F u tu re  F o rc e  W a r r io r ” , U .S . A rm y  N a tic k  S o ld ie r  R D & E  C e n te r .  A v a i la b le  a t
h t tp : / /n s r d e c .n a t ic k .a n r iv .m i l / in d e x .h tm . S e e  a ls o  M a jo r  G e n e ra l  L e s te r  M a r t in e z -L o p e z ,  “ B io te c h n o lo g y  
E n a b le r s  f o r  th e  S o ld ie r  S y s te m  o f  S y s te m s ” , in  The Bridge (T h e  N a t io n a l  A c a d e m y  o f  E n g in e e r in g ) ,  
V o lu m e  3 4 , N u m b e r  3 - F a ll  2 0 0 4  A v a i la b le  a t h t tp : / /w w w .n a e .e d u /N A E /b r id g e c o m .n s f /w e b l in k s /M K E Z -  
6 5 R J Z V ? O p e n  D o c u m e n t  L a s t  a c c e s s e d  o n  M a y  2 9 , 2 0 0 7 . N o te  a lso  th a t  th e  In d ia n  C h ie f  o f  A r m y  S ta f f , 
G e n e r a l  J o g in d e r  J a s w a n t  S in g h ’s r e c e n t  in te rv ie w  is  e v id e n c e  th a t  th in k in g  in  th e s e  te rm s  is  n o t  s im p ly  th e  
p r e s e r v e  o f  th e  te c h n o lo g ic a l ly  a d v a n c e d  U S  m il i ta ry . A m o n g  o th e r  th in g s ,  th e  G e n . n o te d :  “ A s  in  c iv i l ia n  
a n d  o th e r  s e c to rs , w e  w o u ld  lik e  to  m a k e  o p tim a l u s e  o f  IC T  ( in fo rm a tio n  a n d  c o m m u n ic a t io n  te c h n o lo g y )  
f o r  w h ic h  In d ia n  te c h  f irm s  a re  k n o w n  w o r ld w id e . W e  w ill  b e  in v e s t in g  s u b s ta n t ia l ly  to  m a k e  o u r  
o p e r a t io n s  - f ro m  w a r  z o n e s  to  c iv i l  l in e s  - d ig i ta l , w ith  s e a m le s s  c o n n e c t iv i ty  f o r  o n l in e  a c c e s s  to  
in f o rm a t io n  s y s t e m s . . . ”  S e e  “ In d ia n  A rm y  T o  In v e s t  In  F - IN S A S  ( F u tu re  In fa n t r y  S o ld ie r  a s  a  S y s te m )  
P r o g r a m m e ”  ( 4 /6 /2 0 0 7 ) ,  a t  h t tp : / /w w w .in d ia -d e fe n c e .c o m /r e p o r ts -3 2 6 9 . L a s t  a c c e s s e d  o n  J u n e  0 4 , 2 0 0 7 .
10 F o u c a u l t ,  Discipline and Punish: The Birth o f  the Prison, p p  1 3 5 -2 3 0
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Yet, we have also seen how, even Clausewitz, when confronted by chance 
and uncertainty, had hinted at a possible state or condition where(in) war breaks 
free from the bonds imposed on it by the political. Of course, Clausewitz 
discussed this tangentially by taking recourse to the categories of ‘the pure 
concept of war’, Absolute War and Real War. In the context of NCW, as pointed 
out at the outset of this study, there is also some evidence -  primarily in the form 
of carefully managed issuances of ‘policy’ statements, studies, and investigations
-  to suggest that military thinkers have begun to, if not wholly abandon, at least 
seriously interrogate the conceptual paradigms of war that have traditionally 
promoted a reasonable and rationally predictable calculus. These studies, analyses 
and projections are discussed in terms of a shift in focus from ‘nation-state threats
- to decentralised network threats’. They are often also discussed in terms of 
‘generations’ of war, with the latest being 4GW or ‘fourth generation war’. But, 
behind the esoteric phraseology that is, more often than not, used to describe this 
turn of affairs, and the claims that are made heralding a ‘new way of war’, a 
closer look shows us the NCW theorists addressing a problem analogous to the 
one Clausewitz faced when he -  situated as he was on the cusp of the 
Enlightenment and Romantic periods - attempted at a comprehensive theorization 
of war. This was the problem of chance and uncertainty -  not simply in terms of 
Friction, but also in terms of its anteriority which, as we have seen, led 
Clausewitz to complain about these twin phenomena being the most inconvenient 
of intellectual tools. The NCW theorists, of course, openly accept this; indeed, 
they make it the cornerstone of their theoretical efforts as is reflected in the QDR
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2006, which refers to a shift into ‘an era of surprise and uncertainty’. The only, 
but significant, difference between NCW and the Clausewitz projects, however, 
lies in the fact that while Clausewitz deferred addressing the inconveniences 
posed by the anteriority of chance and uncertainty (and of their presence as 
Friktion) by resorting to the figure of the Genius and by relying on the order of 
the political, the NCW theorists, backed by the fast-paced transformations in the 
ICT sectors and benefiting from the emergence of the ‘new sciences’, proactively 
confront it. For the NCW theorists, the rapidly proliferating ICT-based 
dependency-structures, present an opportunity to imagine an offensive posture 
vis-a-vis the anteriority of chance and uncertainty. In other words, what we 
increasingly find the NCW theorists doing - mostly by default rather than by 
intent - is to address the problem posed by the anteriority of chance and 
uncertainty by not defending the existent Real, but by creating it or, at least, by 
modifying the existent Real, in virtually unrecognizable ways. And, to do this, the 
NCW theorists are increasingly turning to the ‘new sciences’, and other emerging 
knowledge spaces like evolutionary biology and the genetics sciences, for 
‘concepts of operations’.
It should, therefore, not be surprising that we find ourselves confronting, 
as Ansell Pearson put it, a ‘weird point’ in history “where it is no longer possible 
to determine whether technology as an extended phenotype is an expression of the 
desire of our genes or a sign of nature’s cultural conspiracy.”11 As the traditional
" K e i t h  A n s e l l  P e a r s o n ,  V ir o id  L ife : O n  M a c h in e s , T e c h n ic s  a n d  E v o lu t io n , in  D e le u z e  a n d  P h i lo s o p h y :
T h e  D i f fe r e n c e  E n g in e e r ,  (L o n d o n : R o u t le d g e , 1 9 7 7 ), p  181
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distinctions between Zoe, bios and technos, strategy and tactics, friend and 
enemy, the hunter and the hunted collapse, and as the State grapples to discover, 
rather re-cover, different modes of being martial, we cannot help but agree with 
Ansell Pearson when he suggests that “[A] thinking of difference and repetition 
generates itself at the point in history when the most stereotypical and mechanical 
repetitions [that is to say, the eternal recurrence of the Same] appear to have taken 
over life completely...”12 Recall in this context the calls issued by Szafranski and 
other like-minded NCW theorists to change the way we think about war. This 
study contends that the theories and doctrines of NCW, which are suggestive of a 
kehr to the inhuman, are reflective of such a point in history. But this kehr is one 
which is greatly in excess of the calls for epistemic changes that Szafranski, 
among others, insist on. Thus, the critical questions remain: What does thinking 
war differently entail? How can war be thought of.. .differently?
As we begin to respond to these questions, we should not fail to recognize, 
acknowledge and/or take into account the fact that “[W]hat is monstrous about the 
activity of thought is not the truth it discovers at the end of the journey, but the 
journey itself, in which the transportation of thought outside itself is always 
Dionysian and delirious.”13 We should also remind ourselves that this ‘other’ 
thought involves an empiricism that is inextricably bound up with the creation of 
concepts, which serve only to propel thought outside and in the throwing off the
12 Ibid.
13 Ib id . ,  p 3
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chains of anthropological predicates.14 Thus, to think ‘war’ outside the 
circumscription of the political, that is to say, to not think war human(e)ly, or 
even Reason-ably, would entail not simply thinking war differently, but to think 
differently as well. Among other things, such an exercise would also entail a 
problematization of not simply war as we know it, but also, at least tacitly, a re- 
problematization of the grammar that underwrites, among other things, the Real.
In an Other theatre o f War (with Deleuze)
Let us begin by considering seriously a fundamental, yet often overlooked, 
question that Deleuze and Guattari (hereafter D&G) consistently pose in their 
individual and collective works: “what is philosophy?” At first glance, their 
answer, which holds that “philosophy is the art of forming, inventing, and 
fabricating concepts”, 15appears to be deceptively simple. Yet matters are more 
complex for the ‘forming, inventing, and fabricating of concepts’ are certainly not 
simple acts as they involve taking “note of the question, ...its moment, its 
occasion and circumstances, its landscapes and personae, its conditions and 
unknowns.”16 This is a common refrain that runs through Deleuze’s philosophical 
works. Thus, as Boundas points out...
. . .D e le u z e ’s on to lo g y  is a rigorous attem pt to  think o f  p rocess and
m etam orp hosis -  b eco m in g  -  not as a transition or transform ation  from  one
14 Ibid., p 4
15 D&G, What is Philosophy? p 2
substance to another or a movement from one point to another, but rather as an 
attempt to think of the real as a process. It presupposes, therefore, an initial 
substitution of forces for substances and things, and of (transversal) lines for 
points.17
The fundamental concepts that underwrite this Deleuzian philosophy of process 
and transformation -  events - are ‘becoming and difference’. ‘Becoming’, as 
Stagoll informs us, “ ...is the very dynamism of change, situated between 
heterogeneous terms and tending towards no particular goal.”18 Intimately 
associated with this is the thematic of ‘difference’, which “is not a difference 
established post quo between two identities... [thus]... The ontological 
primacy...Deleuze gives difference can no longer be sublated or eliminated by 
either resemblance, analogy, or the labour of the negative.”19 Based on these twin 
concepts which, we should be careful to note, are the “means by which we move 
beyond what we experience so that we can think of new possibilities”,20 Deleuze 
fashions a response to the challenge -  contra the dominant ethic of traditional 
Western philosophy -  to “create a system that contains its own aleatory or
17 See Constantin V. Boundas, “Ontology” in The Deleuze Dictionary, Ed. Adrian Parr, (Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh U niversity Press, 2005), pp 191-192.
18 C liff Stagoll, “Becom ing” in The Deleuze Dictionary, Ed. Adrian Parr, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press, 2005), p 21.
19 Constantin V. Boundas, “Ontology” in The Deleuze Dictionary, Ed. Adrian Parr, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press, 2005), pp 191-192.
20 Note: ‘C oncepts’, in the Deleuzian context, carry a somewhat different connotation. Thus, w hile  
‘becom ing’ and ‘difference’ may be viably considered as ‘concepts’, w e should also bear in mind the 
cautionary note that Boundas strikes. He note: “concepts are not processes.” See, Boundas, “What 
D ifference does D eleuze’s Difference make?” in Deleuze and Philosophy, Ed. Constantin V. Boundas, 
(Edinburgh: University o f  Edinburgh Press, 2006), p 4
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paradoxical elements, elements that are both inside and outside, ordering and 
disordering.”21
Before we go any further, however, two points o f caution must be 
highlighted. First, while Colebrook does use the word ‘system’ while referring to 
Deleuze’s philosophical work as mentioned above, she is careful to note that “any 
assemblage (such as a system) faces in two directions. It gives both some sort of 
order or consistency...but it also enables -  from that order -  the creation of 
further and more elaborate orderings.”22 Thus, though our reference to Deleuze’s 
philosophical oeuvre as a ‘system’ runs the danger of reducing his thought to 
another doxa, we should remain mindful of Colebrook’s cautionary note, which 
entreats us to reflect on the essential nomadism that Deleuze’s philosophical work 
entails. Secondly, it will be more than obvious, at least to those familiar with 
Deleuze’s work (and of his collaborative efforts with Guattari), that to compress 
and present Deleuze’s philosophy in so short a space will not simply be difficult, 
but impossible. Additionally, since the object o f this study is not to re-present the 
Deleuzian philosophical oeuvre per se, the question of attempting such a venture 
also does not arise. What this study does attempt, however, is to outline one 
possible account of the presencing of war -  that which ‘comes from elsewhere’ -  
that, this study claims, can be read from within the emerging accounts o f NCW. 
This it does by reading the NCW project, in part, with Deleuze (and Guattari) -
21 Claire C olebrook, “Introduction”, in The D eleuze D ictionary>, Ed. Adrian Parr, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
U niversity Press, 2005), p 5.
22 Ibid., p 3.
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the choice being dictated by their individual and collective attempts to ‘move 
beyond what we experience so that we can think of new possibilities’.
/. Rhizomes: A concept o f operations on planes o f immanence
Deleuze, for the most part, ruins representation by diagramming an 
ontology that commits...
...to perceive life...[as]...connection and relation, but the outcome or event of 
those relations is not detennined in advance by intrinsic properties...life is both 
that which requires some form of order and system (giving itself through 
differences that are perceived and synthesized) and that which opens the system, 
for life is just that power to differ from which concepts emerge but that can never 
be included in the extension of the concept.23 (emphasis in original)
Based, to a great extent, on this ontological insight, D&G present us with the 
concept of the Rhizome. Coleman suggests that “’Rhizome’ describes the 
connections that occur between the most disparate and the most similar of objects, 
places, and people; the strange chain of events that link people.”24 Thus, for 
D&G, the rhizome is a concept that maps -  as differentiated from the rhizome 
being a map of - processes and networkings, and the transversal movements of 
thought without any fixed points of reference. At the heart of the concept of the 
rhizome, therefore, lies a sense of movement that is perpetually de-centering, 
destabilizing which, for D&G, is a creative gesture thus leading them to say:
23 Ibid., p 5
24 Felicity J. Coleman, Rhizome, in The D eleuze D ictionary, Ed. By Adrian Parr, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh
Univ. Press, 2005), p 231
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Write, form a rhizome, increase your territory... extend the light of flight.”25 The 
critical question of course is: what does it mean to ‘write’ or ‘form’ a rhizome? 
Put differently, what are conditions of possibility of rhizomes?
D&G draw our attention to what they refer to as a ‘plane of immanence’ 
which, they assert, “is a table, a plateau, or a slice; it is a plane of consistency or, 
more accurately, the plane of immanence of concepts.”26 They also caution us to 
avoid confusing ‘concepts’ and the plane of immanence for they insist that it (the 
plane of immanence) “is neither a concept nor the concept of all concepts.”27 
D&G provide us with further clues as to the nature of this plane. The plane of 
immanence is, according to them,
fo rm less ...n e ith er  surface nor v o lu m e ...th e  horizon  o f  ev en ts , the reservoir or 
reserve o f  purely  con ceptual events: not the relative horizon  that function s as a 
lim it, w h ich  ch an ges w ith  an observer and en c lo se s  ob servab le  states o f  
a ffa ir s .. .[it i s ] . . .the ab solute horizon  that functions as a lim it, in dependent o f  any  
o b se r v e r ...it  is the in d iv is ib le  m ilieu  in  w h ich  con cep ts are distributed w ithou t 
breaking up its con tinu ity  or in teg r ity ...T h e  p lane is lik e  a desert that con cep ts  
popu late w ithout d iv id in g  u p . . .28
The plane of immanence, which D&G have variously referred to as a plateau and 
a milieu, is “vibratory, in other words a block of space-time constituted by the 
periodic repetition of the component”29... wherein exchanges between
25 D&G, A TP, p 11
26 D&G, WIP? p 35
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid., p 36
29 D&G,^77>,p313
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multiplicities at the virtual and intensive registers take place.30 Critically, D&G 
also advise us that the plane of immanence has two facets -  Nous and Physis -  
which account for “why there are always many infinite movements caught within 
each other, each folded in the others, so that the return of one instantaneously 
relaunches another in such a way that the plane of immanence is ceaselessly 
woven, like a gigantic shuttle.”31 In this way, the plane of immanence “envelopes 
and distributes, without identifying, the heterogeneities that make up the 
world...[and in this way, it necessarily entails] a positive affirmation of the
??32divergence of series.” It is also important to note that these ‘infinite movements’ 
are further characterized by their “infinite speed, such that the particles, forms and 
entities that populate it emerge only to disappear immediately, leaving behind no
■3 3
consistency, reference or any determinate consequences.”' To understand this 
condition as being chaotic or disorderly would be to not only underestimate the 
creative (and destructive) productivity of the plane of immanence, it would also 
suggest a continuing adherence to the trinitarian series that sustains most, if not 
all, philosophies of representation and transcendence -  God, World and State 
(Man). Keeping in mind this qualification, it is possible, however, to understand 
the turbulent plane of immanence as being anterior to the face of chance and 
uncertainty that is familiar and amenable to representation. Against this backdrop,
30 Bonta & Protevi, Ed., Deleuze and Geophilosophy, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh Univ. Press, 20 0 4 ), p 124. It 
is important to note that though D&G do suggest that the plane o f  immanence is also a plane o f  
consistency, it is not, as Bonta and Protevi suggest, an experimental field -  experimental in the sense that it 
is the plane where immanent and horizontal relationship may be constructed. This is inaccurate because (1) 
the plane o f  immanence is not a field per se, and (2) experimentation is not an activity that is possible 
with/in the plane o f  immanence due to its intrinsic immanent nature. See D&G, WIP, 35-60
31 D&G, WIP, p 38
32 Alberto Toscano, “Chaos”, in The Deleuze Dictionary, p 43.
33 Ibid.
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rhizomes, therefore, are moving and morphing matrices that map, or, to be 
patently Deleuzian about it, diagram, by virtue of their very emergent presence, 
the processes that characterize the ebb and flow of the infinite movements that 
populate the plane of immanence. Put differently, “the rhizome is any network of 
things brought into contact with one another...the rhizomatic network is a 
mapping of forces that move andI or immobilize bodies.”34 As such, therefore, 
while rhizomes can serve to break up, interrupt, shatter, overturn the rigid and 
binary structures of representative and transcendental models of thinking, they are 
also in-different to such transcendental modes of organization and thought.
Now, as our discussions on the history of military thought, and 
particularly that of NCW, shows us the Limit-Condition of these theories of war 
was not simply the chance and uncertainty that surfaces in the prosecution and 
conduct of war - it was also those startling interruptions, breaches, quakes, 
tremors that seemed to arrive unannounced from someplace anterior to chance 
and uncertainty, and which threatened, at every turn, to reduce the prevailing 
theories of war into incoherence. Has there been any improvement in this 
situation with the introduction of ICTs and the ‘new sciences’ in the emerging 
theorizations of war? The answer to this is a qualified yes. In the case of most of 
the NCW theorists who claim to be organizing their theories around chance and 
uncertainty, the mode of representation which has underwritten the theories of 
war in the Enlightenment and Romantic Eras - now empowered by technologies 
of stratification, hierarchical orderings based on information and communication
34 Felicity J. Coleman, “Rhizomes” in The D eleuze D ictionary, p 232
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dependency-structures - continues to hold them hostage and condemns them to 
find this anterior condition of chance and uncertainty virtually ungraspable. Thus, 
while their decidedly compromised Clausewitzian approach to NCW, riding the 
crest of the ICT wave, has progressed much in terms of achieving a fair degree of 
resilience against the vagaries of these twin disruptive phenomena when 
compared with the efforts of their illustrious predecessors, their own efforts, 
however, remain - what Deleuze refers to as - arborescent schemas as contrasted 
with the rhizomatic diagrams that D&G suggest are applicable to processes, 
networkings and transversal movements that are in play on and across the plane of 
immanence.
But this does not mean that NCW as a concept of operations does not 
provide us with an opportunity to re-problematize war. It would only entail in 
moving from an arborescent mode of problematization to a rhizomatic one. Thus, 
it is suggested, if - as we saw in the case of Clausewitz - the critical question in 
any investigation of war is about how to operate and organize in a condition of 
radical chance and uncertainty, that is to say, in decidedly aporetic conditions, 
then the rhizome is an eminently suitable tool that can be productively used to 
reflect on precisely such a question.
Rhizomes, as we have seen, serve to shatter and destabilize structures - 
particularly, rigid and binary structures. But this shattering and de-centering is not 
a negatively destructive activity. In other words, Rhizomes shatter and destabilize
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by virtue of their productive (cap)ability to form and reform across and alongside 
the surface-plane of the plane of immanence where processes unfold at infinite 
speed, and which necessarily involves destruktion, but also creation. Now, if we 
posit that Real Time (as distinct from ‘calculable Time’) is the surface condition 
of the plane of immanence, then rhizomes, it is tempting to conclude, are ‘behind 
Time’ as they are, however fleetingly, instant-frames that slow down the infinite 
speed of the unfolding processes of destrucktion and creation to a lesser (and 
slower) infinity of speed and movement thereby exposing the critical connections 
between events and occurrences, and between the most disparate and the similar. 
But, as we shall soon see, this is not necessarily the case. For the moment, 
however, it is important to bear in mind that these critical connections are not 
representations of the ‘thing-in-itself (events and occurrences). Rather, they are 
correspondences that are established between events and occurrences, which are 
impossible to organize in any hierarchical way given the infinite speed and 
movement that they entail. These ‘infinite movements’ are not stratified, layered, 
and hierarchical; rather, they are rhizomatic, that is to say, they are flat and 
distributive. This also suggests that critical to the rhizomatic concept is a notion of 
a radical multiplicity. Radical because, unlike in the mode of hierarchical 
thinking, the multiplicity implicit in the rhizome does not take as a reference a 
unity. As will be immediately evident, this mode of organizing is quite different 
from the generally hierarchical modes of organizing that we are familiar with.
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Even though, as we have seen, the NCW project is clustered around a 
strategic objective, which Admiral Cebrowski has identified for us in terms of 
‘transformation’, its operational stance, however, is increasingly reflective of a 
combative stance against what Secretary Rumsfeld poetically termed as ‘the 
unknown unknowns.’ This is, in part, due to the arborescent schema that NCW’s 
concept of operations is a part of, which is inextricably linked to the State 
(apparatus) from which, NCW (as a war machine) issues forth. Recall that in the 
case of NCW, the Ideal mesh of nets comprised of advanced sensors and mobile 
weapon-systems are imagined as being global in spread and nature. They also 
suggest infinite movement at varying speeds, which contribute, indeed guarantee, 
the intrinsic stability of the ‘system’ of nets that are so central to the NCW 
concept. Thus, it is not surprising to find that one of the core objectives of the 
NCW project is to develop and deploy a ‘common operational picture’ that will 
facilitate a Real-time ‘collective engagement capability’. A closer look, however, 
shows us that this is an illusion for equally implicit in the NCW concept of 
operations is an immobility that is equally necessary to maintain the integrity of 
the mesh of nets and to create the ‘collective consciousness’ tools as mentioned 
above. Thus, the theories and doctrines of NCW, though paying lip service to the 
multiplicity that is attributed to battlespace are grounded in a Unity that serves as 
an anterior condition to the multiplicity that the NCW theories so zealously 
highlight. In other words, unlike the multiplicity that rhizomes -  going by D&G’s 
exegesis -  presume, which bear no relation to a Unity, the multiplicity of NCW’s 
mesh of nets are active constituents of a Unity. Thus, it was asserted that the
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concept of operations that form the bedrock of the NCW concept are partial to 
being global as opposed to being fragmentary and multiple. Given this, therefore, 
while we may be tempted to wholly identify the NCW concept of operations with 
and as a rhizome, aside from acknowledging the superficial resemblance, we 
should resist this temptation. For our purposes, it is necessary for us to note that 
the core problematic associated with NCW’s concept of operations is that it 
cannot remain in the rhizomatic mode which it resembles. In other words, NCW’s 
concept of operations cannot maintain its distributive and transient parallel that is 
intrinsic to the rhizome. This is because, as we have seen, to develop and maintain 
the Unity that is the imagined condition of possibility of NCW, its emerging 
concept of operations cannot help but strategize the environment. The rhizome, 
however, is anything but arboreal. Indeed, going by D&G’s usage of the concept, 
the rhizome is the counter-point of the arboreal schema. Whereas the latter, is 
ordered hierarchically from the greater to the lesser, from the superior to the 
subordinate, and from the transcendent to the particular, the former -  as we have 
seen -  is at best an ordering-in-progress that is flat and without depth.
As we have seen, the strategic objective of NCW -  transformation -  
necessarily implies ‘movement’. In this context, it is important for us to note that 
the mobility associated with NCW’s concept of operations is teleological in the 
sense that it must contribute to the creation, maintenance and expansion of the 
arboreal scheme with its attendant hierarchies into which a defining force dictates
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the position and meaning of all else in the system.35 It is in this way that the NCW 
concept of operations promotes a suspension of animation for the defining force 
of the NCW concept of operations cannot attend to any contrary or competing 
force -  including, paradoxically, the ‘force of transformation’. Indeed, this is 
precisely how the NCW concept o f operations, when mapped against the 
chaosmos o f the plane o f immanence, strives to reduce the processes o f the plane 
o f immanence into (strategic) histories o f events and occurrences. This, the NCW 
concept of operations attempts to do by extracting the force of the processes of the 
plane of immanence thereby rendering them immobile thereby consigning them to 
be ‘standing-reserve’. Contrarily, the rhizome does something quite different. 
Instead of confining the processes of the plane of immanence, or reducing them to 
standing-reserve, the rhizome highlights the force of such processes. In other 
words, rhizomes thrive on the play of forces. In this sense, the instant-frames that 
we may read off the map that rhizomes generate are less points of immobility, 
which we are most familiar with as fixed points of reference, rather they are 
signatures of the locales where the intensity of force morphs, emerges and 
dissolves. It is for this reason that rhizomes when cast against the plane of 
immanence are not ‘behind time’. Rather, they are on time, which unfolds in and 
across the plane of immanence.
35 Thus, for example, it is stated that “Each concept in the top-level is described by a set o f  attributes and 
metrics at the second level. The attributes measure characteristics o f  the concept in terms o f  quantity (how  
much? how often? how long? etc.) and quality (how correct? how appropriate? how  complete? etc.). Each 
attribute is actually measured by a metric (or set o f  metrics) that specifies in detail what data would be 
needed to measure the attribute. “ See, N etwork Centric O perations Conceptual Fram ework (  Version 1.0), 
Prepared for John Garstka, Office o f  Force Transformation, (Vienna, VA: Prepared by Evidence Based 
Research, Inc, Nov. 2003), p 6 (o f Word File)
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The curious thing to note in our discussion of rhizomes and NCW’s 
concept of operations is the obvious disconnect that emerges between Admiral 
Cebrowski’s announcement of the strategic object of NCW — ‘transformation’, 
which can be read in its present continuous form, and the ‘transformation’ that is 
effected by the NCW concept of operations. As we have seen, the outcome of the 
employment of NCW’s concept of operations, while certainly transforming the 
force of the processes on the surface-plane of immanence, only succeeds in 
immobilizing it. As noted earlier, it is this immobilization -  which we could 
viably interpret as the extraction of movement out of transformation -  that stands 
as the conditions of possibility of what the NCW theories refer to as ‘common 
operational pictures’. Thus, NCW’s concepts of operations engage in 
transformations to immobilize.36 But, on the other hand, if we take the Admiral’s 
statement in its present continuous form -  that is to say, if we understand 
‘transformation’ as an infinite process (possibly occurring at infinite speed) - then 
we are confronted with the possibility that the Admiral’s reference to 
transformation may also be read as a reference to the seething surface-plane of 
the plane of immanence that we have had occasion to examine. If this is indeed 
the case, then we now have, but only barely -  for, as we will see, it still remains 
mediated - a glimpse of that other war that we have claimed is so inextricably 
intertwined with not only NCW but also to its martial predecessors.
36 This much is obvious from the NCW  and Force Transformation literature. See, for example, 
“Understanding Transformation”, in Transformation Trends, by Tom Hone, Asst. Dir. Office o f  Force 
Transformation, US Department o f  Defence, Jan 16, 2004. Available at 
httpi//w w w .oft.osd.mil/librarv/librarv files/document 325 Tiansformation/o20Trends- 
16%20January%202004%201ssue.pdf. Last accessed on, Jan 2008.
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if. Planes o f Immanence: Becoming-Battlespace
By suggesting the concept of the rhizome as a concept of operations, we 
have contrasted it with the more arborescent schematics of the concept of 
operations that the emerging NCW theories presume. Further, we identified the 
plane of immanence as being the condition in and on which rhizomes operate. 
This plane of immanence, which D&G variously refer to as a plateau/ plane/ 
milieu, Stagoll suggests, can be “conceived as a surface upon which all events 
occur, where events are understood as chance, productive interactions between 
forces of all kinds. As such, it represents the field of becoming, a space containing
37all of the possibilities inherent in forces.” A pertinent question to pose at this 
point would involve locating this plane of immanence. In the Deleuzian context, 
this is a difficult question to address. This is because not only does Deleuze use 
the ‘plane’ in various ways but, as is apparent from his later writings, Deleuze, 
somewhat confusingly, also refers to THE plane of Immanence, which may be 
construed as being the ‘immanent nature’ of planes of immanence, which is 
crucially in excess of any particular plane of immanence that we may identify at a 
given point in time, but which is also simultaneously immanent to all possible 
planes of immanence. Thus, any consideration of planes of immanence will need 
to be entered into with caution.
There are two active considerations of the plane of immanence at play 
here -  first in the sense of it (a plane of immanence) being infinite and second, in
37 C liff Stagoll, “Plane” in The D eleuze D ictionary, p 204
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the sense of a plane that is immanent to all planes which, while being different to 
all possible planes of immanence, is also identical to them. Thus, our question 
relating to the site and locale of planes of immanence must be addressed 
simultaneously and in these twin senses. Furthermore, planes of immanence are 
troublesome to deal with as they are not only infinite, but they are also different 
from each other. Here, of course, we should pay heed to the ‘difference’ that 
Deleuze invokes, which is different from the difference that we are more 
commonly familiar with. The key point to note is that while there are an infinite 
number of planes of immanence, this difference is not between the planes (though 
they may be manifested as such). Rather, planes of immanence are always 
‘becoming’ different thus establishing but also severing -  this happening 
infinitely and at infinite speed -  relations, economies, shared characteristics with 
and in each other. In this context, it is important to note, the movement that marks 
infinite planes of immanence is a signature of what D&G refer to as The plane of 
immanence -  the immanent plane that is immanent not only to all planes but also 
to itself.
Now, D&G tell us that “[F]rom chaos, Milieus and Rhythms are bom.”38 
In other words, planes (which D&G, infuriatingly, but not surprisingly, also 
identify as milieus) can trace their genesis to chaos. As an off-spring of chaos,
39planes “are open to chaos, which threatens them with exhaustion or intrusion.”
In this sense, therefore, planes of immanence are faced, on at least one side, by
chaos. Thus, planes of immanence reflect the intensities of the forces of the chaos 
from which it takes birth. Note that this ‘reflection’ is not unidimensional. Rather, 
it is an economy of relations which suggests that the ‘consistency’ of the plane of 
immanence is marked by the ebb and flow of intensities of force that arise from 
within the chaos that planes of immanence emerge, but also reside, on. In other 
words, the economy of relations between chaos and planes of immanence is not 
marked by a lack of intensity at any point or instant -  rather, varying intensities of 
force lend a peculiar consistency to not only the planes of immanence but also to 
their relations with chaos. It is important to note that it is this variation of 
intensities that manifests itself as the infinite speed and movement that 
characterizes planes of immanence. Additionally, planes of immanence do not, 
indeed cannot, exercise proprietary rights over particular intensities. Rather, 
intensities of force move through various planes in sudden and unexpected ways 
thereby establishing critical connections and abrupt breaks within and between 
planes -  this occurring infinitely.
While this may convey an image of disruption and pandemonium in and 
between planes of immanence, we should bear in mind D&G’s cautionary note 
regarding the ‘in-between’ that resides not only between planes of immanence, 
but also between chaos and planes of immanence. This is identified by D&G as 
‘rhythm’. If we think of chaos as a jumble of intensities of force, then ‘rhythm’ is 
the coding-machine that codes these intensities of force with-in planes of 
immanence thereby lending, however transitorily, a consistency to them. Let us
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again exercise a degree of caution here. It is tempting to understand rhythm as an 
organizing principle of planes of immanence for, as mentioned above, rhythm is 
that which lends consistency to the planes of immanence. This is not accurate for, 
as D&G advises us, “a milieu [plane/ plateau] does in fact exist by virtue of a 
periodic repetition, but one whose only effect is to produce a difference...”40 
Thus, what we have here is not a rhythm of consistency (marked by the repetition 
of the same), rather we have a consistent rhythm of difference which is the 
becoming-different that is the hallmark of planes of immanence.
Thus if we ask: Do planes of immanence display a rhythm? Is chaos 
rhythmic? - going by what D&G have to say on the matter, the answer will be a 
qualified ‘no’.41 This is because, D&G, here quoting Bachelard, suggest that “the 
link between truly active moments (rhythm) is always effected on a different plane 
from the one upon which the action is carried out. ”42 Thus, while it is accurate to 
say that planes of immanence and chaos may be shown to be rhythmic, this 
perception of rhythm always takes place elsewhere because “[RJhythm is never 
on the same plane as that which has rhythm.”43 Rhythm, as D&G claim, is the ‘in- 
between’ -  in between chaos and planes of immanence, and between planes of 
immanence themselves.
40 D&G, ATP, p 314
41 N ote that by asserting this, this study is contesting the claim made by D&G that even chaos has a 
directional tendency. See D&G, ATP, p 13
42 Ibid., p 315 (emphasis in original)
43 Ibid., p 313
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What we have established thus far, therefore, is the following: Planes of 
immanence are formless. This formlessness is a commentary on both the ‘form’ 
of a plane and on the becoming-form that takes place with-in it. Planes of 
immanence, as we have also seen, while apparently seeming to share a seamless 
co-joining with chaos, actually share a mediated relationship with chaos. Rhythm 
is the inter-mediary between planes of immanence and chaos. As such, Rhythm is 
the periodicities (of difference) that intensities create which, in turn, ‘reflect’ on 
the surface-plane of the planes of immanence. These periodicities of intensities 
are what is consistent in planes of immanence. Further, we have seen that planes 
of immanence are immanent to themselves. In other words, planes of immanence, 
which are perpetually in-difference - individually and collectively -  with each 
other, are also, by virtue of this becoming-different (which is a connectivity 
between relations and not identities) -  individually and collectively - ‘in’ each 
other.
Our review of battlespace in the NCW context when cast against this 
backdrop brings to light a number of startling correspondences, which warrant our 
attention. Let us begin by recalling that the battlespace that the NCW theories 
discuss, as a net assessment, is an enlargement and magnification of the 
‘battlefield’ of classical military theory. This enlargement and magnification has 
ensured that the battlespace has spilled over the traditional battlefield, that is to 
say, it is in excess of the latter. This is not surprising because, as we have seen, 
whereas the traditional battlefield was largely grounded in the Physical domain,
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the battlespace of the NCW theories is said to extend across the Physical, 
Cognitive and Informational domains. This, as we have asserted elsewhere in this 
study, is the ‘space’ of war in NCW terms.
Battlespace, in NCW terms, is a fluid ecology. In other words, constant 
movement occurring at the speed of light is the key characteristic of battlespace. 
In and on battlespace, threats are always decentered, diffused and in­
distinguishable, that is to say, becoming-distinguishable. Thus, as we have seen, 
the evolving operational stance of NCW is said to be akin to a ‘swift elusive 
sword’ with compact and efficient logistical tails. Battlespace also invokes 
intensities. Indeed, it is suggested that intensities constitute battlespace and in this 
way they provide consistency to battlespace. The theories and doctrines of NCW 
are much concerned about these intensities, for they, like D&G, see intensities as 
instances of the connectivity between relations as compared to those between 
identities. As we have seen, the theory of ‘effects-based operations’ is grounded 
in such an understanding of battlespace. Further, like in the case of planes of 
immanence, battlespace also exhibits a rhythm -  a tempo of operations - which, in 
the context of planes of immanence, is the inter-mediary between them and chaos. 
We have also seen how rhythm is the vibratory expression of the intensities of 
force. The same can be said to be applicable in the case of battlespace in which 
case, the tempo of operations which, in the NCW context, relate to not only the 
‘directed’ flow of events and processes as mobilized by a strategic ensemble -  in 
the manner in which the EBO theory suggests -  but also to the free flow of events
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and processes that are pure expressions of force intensities. What this means, 
therefore, is that the tempo of operations that the NCW refer to also ‘reflect’ 
(thereby giving us an intimation of) an anterior condition that, like in the case of 
planes of immanence, is chaos.
NCW’s battlespace, however, is crippled by its association with the State- 
centric NCW theories and doctrines. Thus we find that the desire-ability to slow 
down the infinite speed of infinite movements by various ICT-driven modes of 
representation extracts from battlespace the intensity that gives it its consistency 
in the first place. Thus, we find NCW theorists speaking of maximum mobility in 
limited space where the latter is a function of and restricted to the spread of nets 
and meshes that are so critical to the theories and doctrines of NCW. This might 
seem to be in contradiction with what was previously stated - the theories and 
doctrines of NCW are cognizant of intensities (of force) as being connections 
between relations rather than being between identities. This contradiction is, 
however, deceptive because while it is true that NCW theories see connections as 
being relations which may or may not be influenced -  as is the case in effects- 
based operations -  this only holds true if the ‘system’ in which such relations are 
conceptualized is considered to be a closed system. In other words, NCW 
theorists begin from the premise that their operational space, that is to say, 
battlespace, is not open ended, as is the case with planes of immanence - rather it 
is a closed space which allows for the theoretical possibility of perfect 
calculability. Thus, in a manner reminiscent of Clausewitz, the NCW theorists (at
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least thus far) while not avoiding or deferring the problem posed by infinite speed 
and movements (which may be viably considered as being contributory to the 
chance and uncertainty that Clausewitz complained about), respond to it by 
creating and deploying finer nets and meshes that serve to increase the resolution 
of that what they map thereby slowing, optimally bringing to a standstill, the 
infinite speed and movements of intensities.
Let us be clear about the matter regarding NCW’s battlespace. In our 
discussion on Clausewitz and his architectonic on war, we discovered that the 
principle philosophical question that bedeviled Clausewitz was how to organize in 
the face of chance and uncertainty. We further saw how Clausewitz deftly 
relegated the problems posed by the anteriority of chance and uncertainty by 
affirming Friktion that made its presence felt on the battlefield. The task of 
dealing with this, of course, was assigned by Clausewitz to not only meticulous 
planning, but also to the Genius and the underlying rational order of politics that 
he girded the phenomenon of war with. Riding on the back of the rapidly 
proliferating ICTs and the ‘new sciences’, the theories and doctrines of NCW 
have visualized the battlespace as not only the space of battle, but also as the 
condition of possibility of war itself. It is, therefore, not surprising that the NCW 
theories extend the battlespace across the Physical, Cognitive and Informational 
domains. To say that the NCW theories underestimate the vagaries of chance and 
uncertainty would also be a mistake. Indeed, as we have seen, the NCW theories 
organize themselves around chance and uncertainty. But the mode of this
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organization is not liberating. Rather, it is constrictive. In other words, despite the 
fact that the emerging ICTs and the ‘new sciences’ have done much to break 
down the mode of representation associated with the Real and in its place have 
resorted to creating new and varied ‘realities’ which now, more than ever, have 
begun to account for chance and uncertainty, the logic of NCW, as we have seen, 
tends to organize these disruptive phenomena in what can only be described as a 
closed system. This is most evident in the NCW version of battlespace. The 
implicit promise of NCW thus is to exhaust chance and uncertainty and of their 
ability to interrupt, disrupt and overturn -  which is how the NCW theories 
understand threats-in-being -  by exhausting them of the intensity of their force. 
As we have already seen, this is attempted by the very concept of operations that 
NCW presumes.
Thus we find, yet again, that behind the shadow of the comprehensive and 
totalizing battlespace that the NCW theories swear by, there lurks another 
battlespace. It is not possible to understand this battlespace if we begin from a 
position that presumes the NCW’s concept of operations. However, when 
considered in light of rhizomes, which we have earlier posited as being an 
alternative to the NCW concept of operations, then an open ended battlespace 
marked by infinite movements at infinite speeds reveals itself as not simply being 
the site of new battles but also, albeit in hidden and mysterious ways, informing 
the battles that lend a consistency to the Clausewitzian notion of war.
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We have now had two opportunities whereby we have gained an 
intimation of an other war. Before we embark on a discussion on this other war, a 
brief look at some typical modes of organization that D&G tell us is productive in 
this condition is warranted.
Hi. Assemblages and apparatuses o f battle
Rhizomes, we had noted, instead of confining the processes of the plane of 
immanence, or reducing them to stand(ing)-reserve, highlight the force of such 
processes. In other words, rhizomes thrive on the play of forces. Further, we noted 
that the instant-frames that we may read off the map that rhizomes generate are 
not points of immobility, rather they are signatures of locales where the intensity 
of force morphs, emerges and dissolves. It will be obvious from our discussion on 
rhizomes (and from D&G’s extensive discussions on the same) that the intensities 
of the forces of processes that are ‘reflected’ on the plane of immanence are maps 
without any tangible consistency. In other words, rhizomes, when perceived as 
outcomes, that is to say, as maps, are without any density. This is because, as we 
have already seen, rhizomes are just the signatures of the intensities that forces 
and their related processes display. In this sense, they are a-systemic. In other 
words, the intensities of forces that rhizomes map cannot be considered to be a 
system of any kind given the infinite movement and infinite speed that 
characterizes the agitation of forces. Given this, therefore, the pertinent question
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to pose would be the following: How is organization possible in a condition of 
movement and intensity?
D&G devise the ‘assemblage’ as a direct response to this question. Bonta 
and Protevi describe an ‘assemblage’ as “an intensive network...displaying 
‘consistency’ or emergent effects by tapping into the ability of self-ordering 
forces of heterogeneous material to mesh together.”44 To clarify matters and to 
bring them in line with the requirements of this study, let us briefly examine what 
is implied in Bonta and Protevi’s use of the terms ‘emergence’ and consistency’. 
Drawing on the work by Thompson and Varela, Bonta and Protevi suggest that 
emergence may be described as the “mutual constitution of local-to-global or 
‘upward’ causality that produces focused systematic behavior and the global-to- 
local or ‘downward’ causality that constrains the local interactions of 
components.”45 Intimately related to this is the notion of consistency, which may 
be understood as the progressive congealing of intensive and far-from-equilibrium 
forces and processes towards a stage of equilibrium.46 Thus, when considered in 
the context of the turbulence of the surface-plane of the plane of immanence, 
emergence and consistency may be understood as being the engines that drive the 
processes of becoming. The critical issue about emergence, in particular, is the 
phase-state changes that are in motion as matter moves from a more diffused state 
to one that is amenable to being stratified and systematized. We should also note 
that as such phase-state changes take place, what varies is the consistency that
44 Bonta and Protevi, D eleuze and Geophilosophy: A Guide and Glossary, p 54
45 Ibid., p 32
46 Ibid., p 16
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each phase-state involves. This is where matters get complicated. It is tempting to 
limit the notion of consistency not only to a single matter or substance that may 
be undergoing a phase-state change, but also to a homogeneous state which is at a 
ready-state equilibrium. By presuming this, however, we run the risk of ignoring 
the intensive morphogenetic processes that -  as processes -  constitute even the 
most elementary atoms and particles.47 Let us examine these matters in a little 
more detail.
Dupreel, D&G observed, proposed a theory of ‘consolidation’ in which 
“he demonstrated that life went not from a center to an exteriority, but from an 
exterior to an interior, or rather from a discrete and fuzzy aggregate to its 
consolidation.” D&G draw our attention to three implications that result from 
Dupreel’s theory, which are critical in the consideration of consistency.
First, that there is no b eg in n in g  from  w h ich  a linear seq u en ce  w o u ld  derive, but 
rather d en sifica tion s, in ten sifica tion s, re in forcem en ts, in jection s, sh ow erin g , like  
so  m an y  intercalary e v e n ts . . .S e c o n d .. .there m ust be an arrangem ent o f  in tervals, 
a d istribution o f  in eq u alities, such  that it is so m etim es n ecessary  to . . .  
con so lid a te . Third, there is a su p erim position  o f  d isparate rhythm s, an 
articu lation  from  w ith in  o f  an interrhythm icity, w ith  no im p osition  o f  m eter or 
cad en ce .49
Thus, D&G suggest, consistency “...produces consolidated aggregates, of 
succession as well as of coexistence, by means of the three factors... intercalcated
47 D&G, ATP, p 335
48 Ibid., p 328
49 Ibid., pp 328-329
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elements, intervals, and articulations of superposition.”50 Implicit in this is a 
process, rather multiple processes, which involves a coding of the elements which 
results in the consolidation of aggregates. The process of coding, however, is not 
a simple one for it involves an infinite set of heterogeneities that aggregate and 
disperse simultaneously. This is the phenomenon of emergence, which is marked 
not only by the heterogeneity of its processes, but also by the heterogeneities of 
relations that it establishes. Thus, the processes of emergence whose outcomes is 
the establishment of consistencies do not necessarily result in the formation of 
rigid structures, though it should be mentioned that the processes of emergence 
when over-coded have a proclivity to very quickly transform the normally 
heterogeneous into a homogeneous condition. As will soon see, this is intimately 
related to the emergence of structures and of apparatuses.
Against this background, therefore, assemblages, which we have already 
identified as being an ‘intensive network that display a consistency by meshing 
together heterogeneous materials’, may be understood in two broad senses. First, 
an assemblage may be understood as being as a contingent arrangement or 
aggregation of heterogeneous elements that share intensive connections with each 
other. In this form, assemblages are on the verge of becoming structures. What 
prevents them from consolidating into such rigid entities is the force of the 
intensities that come together as an aggregate. Given that this aggregation is 
purely contingent, the structural outline of the assemblage is therefore not 
guaranteed. Put differently, it could be said that an assemblage in the above sense
50 Ibid., p 329
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is the failure of the culmination of a becoming-structure process. Thus, whatever 
consistency that is developed in such assemblages are equally transient and 
disperse as the assemblage de-constructs only to reform as another assemblage 
with a very different set of intensities and levels of consistency. In the second 
instance, however, an assemblage may be considered as being a singular process 
that is unidirectional in the sense that it follows a linear path towards the 
establishment of a structure. In this scenario, assemblages begin to acquire 
consistencies that resist dispersion by exhausting the intensity of the force of the 
elements that aggregate as an assemblage. In this latter form, assemblages become 
apparatuses which overcode and channel the force of aggregating elements. In the 
process, the intensive relations between the aggregating elements are exteriorized, 
that is to say, they are calcified and hardened thus eventually resisting -  though 
not always successfully -  the free flow of forces and their intensities.
In the NCW context, the doctrine of swarming, or that of battleswarms, 
closely approximates assemblages. Recall that ‘swarming’ on the battlefield is 
“seemingly amorphous, but it is a deliberately structured, coordinated, strategic 
way to strike from all directions, by means of a sustainable pulsing of force...It 
will work best -  perhaps it will only work -  if it is designed mainly around the 
deployment of myriad, small, dispersed, networked maneuver units.”51 What is 
interesting about the doctrine of swarming is the direct reference that is made to 
the ‘making of assemblages’, comprising of sensors and mobile weapon-platforms 
that are designed not only to strike an adversary, but to also form part of a sensory
51 Arquilla & Ronfeldt, Swarming and the Future o f  Conflict, p vii (o f PDF version)
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• • 52organization. The critical point to note is that given the dispersed nature of 
threats that are perceived to be the ‘new face of threats’, swarms are, ideally, 
contingent organizations that take form based on the threat that is meant to be 
dealt with. In other words, working from the presumption that threats are multi­
varied, the forms that battleswarms assume are not fixed -  rather, they are 
configured to respond to the particular threats that their forms are designed to 
meet and quell. But this does not imply that there is a ‘bank’ or a ‘database’ of 
forms that swarms can draw from. What is critical to note is that threats, in no 
small measure, co-constitute the swarms that combat them. It is in this sense that 
battleswarms come to closely resemble assemblages. Indeed, as such, at least 
superficially, battleswarms fulfill most of the general features of assemblages.
Thus, for example, when configured to meet a threat, battleswarms display 
a consistency which is defined by the aggregation of the constituent elements -  
sensors and weapons - of the battleswarm in question. Secondly, particular 
configurations of battleswarms are just that -  particularities. In other words, 
particular formations of battleswarms are specific to the threats that they address 
and, in a general sense, such forms and formations are never repeated. In this 
sense, the structures of battleswarms are contingent on the threats that they 
respond to. As and when the threats are mitigated, the assemblage of sensors and 
weapons that constitute the battleswarm disperse only to re-assemble differently 
when responding to another threat. In this connection, it is also interesting to note 
that like the assemblages that we have examined above, battleswarms also display
52 Arquilla & Ronfeldt, Swarming and the Future o f  Conflict, p 22 (o f PDF version)
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an interior intensive relation — based on capabilities - that holds its constituent 
units in a loose network. This is distinct shift in the way militaries are historically 
organized and as such reflect the innovative organizational potentials that the 
theories and doctrines of NCW have brought about. Thus, Edwards can write, 
“[A] doctrine based on swarming calls for ...radical changes in equipment and 
organization.”53
The interesting thing about battleswarms (as assemblages) is that unlike 
those assemblages that morph into apparatuses by densifying the nascent 
consistencies that hold assemblages in a tenuous network, battleswarms only 
reaffirm their fragmentary and dispersed natures. But equally, and this is again a 
signature of the paradox that afflicts the theories and doctrines of NCW, the 
objective of battleswarms is to reduce this heterogeneity into a homogeneous 
ecology which involves the liquidation of a multiplicity of singular threats. It 
needs to be reiterated that the fragmentary posture adopted by battleswarms is 
only possible in ecologies that become homogeneous. Thus, while battleswarms 
operate as assemblages, they can only do so in closed systems or at least by 
presuming that their operational ecologies will increasingly become homogeneous 
or closed in short order. There is a link that can be drawn between this tendency 
of battleswarms (in the NCW context) and the State from which it issues forth and 
it warrants a brief examination.
53 Sean Edwards, Swarming on the Battlefield, p 66
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As we have seen above, an increase in the degree of consistency coupled 
with a closure from and to the transversal flow of forces and their intensities, 
results in assemblages quickly morphing into rigid structures by eliminating the 
intensive differences that marks the heterogeneous elements that constitute it. 
Apparatuses are formed in this manner. The key point to note is that such 
apparatuses carry within themselves a function of capture or coding, which serves 
to reduce the heterogeneity of assemblages into homogenous elements which are 
then amenable to being organized and categorized. In other words, the radical 
mobility that characterizes the heterogeneity of elements that constitute 
assemblages is, in the context of apparatuses, rendered immobile thereby allowing 
for them to be channeled into a centralized organism or system.54 In this sense, 
apparatuses are by default those entities “....whereby alien and rogue semiotics 
and...assemblages are captured and overcoded, engulfed by a transcendent force 
that striates all reality: space, time, body, culture, nature.”55
Now, D&G, while insisting that “there has always been a State, quite 
perfect, quite complete,”56 also assert that “the State has always been in a relation 
with the outside and is inconceivable independent of that relationship.”57 The 
exercise of this relationship, of course, is effected by striation which D&G refer to 
as one of the fundamental tasks of States and going by their exegesis on the State 
it would seem that States are unable to resist this function of coding and striating.
54 Bonta and Protevi, D eleuze and Geophilosophy: A Guide and G lossary, p 52
55 Ibid., p 52. See also D&G, ATP, pp 310-350
56 D&G, ATP, p 360
57 Ibid.
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Thus, it is not surprising that D&G identify the State as an apparatus. However, 
D&G, following the work of Clastres, also assert that they “do not see how the 
State can be explained by what it presupposes”.58 And, what is this 
presupposition? As mentioned above, it is the inconceivability of the 
independence of the State apparatus to ‘the outside’. Indeed, they also insist that 
“[T]he state seems to rise up in a single stroke, in an imperial form, and does not 
depend on progressive factors. Its on-the-spot emergence is like a stroke of 
genius, the birth of Athena.”59 Naturally, we need to query D&G about this 
startling claim. Thus, for example, we need to ask: If the State did indeed arise in 
a single stroke, did it do so as an apparatus? In other words, can apparatuses 
emerge on-the-spot? If we go by our discussion on assemblages and apparatuses 
then we must conclude that the on-the-spot emergence of apparatuses is, to say 
the least, mystifying, unless of course the processes by which apparatuses assume 
a materiality remain hidden and all that is discemable is the immediate, indeed 
magical, emergence of apparatuses. But this still ignores the processes by which 
apparatuses are formed. Thus, we must remain skeptical of the claims made by 
D&G about the ‘magical’ emergence of the State. This, as we will see has a 
significant impact on how D&G discuss, among other things, war-machines and 
war and their relation to the State.
For the moment, however, we should not fail to acknowledge the 
advantages that have accrued to our project of attempting to read the emerging
58 Ibid., p 359
59 Ibid.
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theories and doctrines of NCW with D&G. D&G show us how by adopting a 
stance that prioritizes connection and relation, and one which recognizes that 
outcomes (events) of those relations are not determined in advance by intrinsic 
properties, we are able to, at the very least, attempt a re-problematization of war. 
We have also seen how war, as a consequence is able to move beyond the 
purview of the political and finds a place in a multiverse characterized by forces, 
intensities, flows and networks.
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Interlude
One False Step: On War and war-machines or,
... What you believe is fantasy...60
At the outset, let us remind ourselves that for Deleuze, violence - which he 
clarifies in the context of transcendental faculties - is that which “forces it 
[faculties] to be exercised, of that which it is forced to grasp and which it alone is 
able to grasp, yet also that of the ungraspable (from the point of view of its 
empirical exercise).”61 In this way, violence emerges as a fundamental condition 
of thought for Deleuze. Thus, he notes, “[TJhought is primarily trespass and 
violence, the enemy... [thus]... The conditions of a true critique and a true creation 
are the same: the destruction of an image of thought which presupposes itself and 
the genesis of the act of thinking in thought itself.”62 As such, violence is not 
simply in excess of all forms of apparatuses, strata and machines, it is their 
condition of possibility.
Now, D&G, based on their reading of Dumezil’s work on Indo-European 
mythology,63 observe that...
60 Black Sabbath, “Computer God” in Dehumanizer, 1992
61 D eleuze, Difference and Repetition, p 143.
62 Ibid., p 139
63 See Georges Dumezil, Mitra-Varuna: An Essay on Two Indo-European Representations o f  Sovereignty, 
Trans. Derek Coltman, (N ew  York: Zone Books, 1990)
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...political sovereignty, or domination, has two heads: the magician-king and the 
jurist-priest. Rex and flamen, raj and Brahman, Romulus and Numa, Varuna and 
Mitra, the despot and the legislator, the binder and the organizer. Undoubtedly, 
these two poles stand in opposition term by term...But their opposition is only 
relative; they function as a pair...as though they expressed a division of the One 
or constituted in themselves a sovereign unity.. .”64
They then go on to suggest...
...lacking a mythology of conflict...The two together exhaust the field of 
function. They are the principal elements of a State apparatus that proceeds by a 
One-Two, distributes binary distinctions...It is a double articulation that makes 
the State apparatus into a stratum.65 (emphasis in original)
D&G then begin to draw their diagram of the State apparatus by contrasting it to 
not simply the war machine, but also (often in an implicit key) to ‘war’ which, as 
they note, “is not contained within this apparatus.”66 They assert...
Either, the State has at its disposal a violence that is not channeled through war -  
either it uses police officers and jailers in place of warriors, has no anns and no 
need of them, operates by immediate, magical capture, seizes and binds, 
preventing all combat -  or, the State acquires an army, but in a way that 
presupposes a juridical integration of war and the organization of a military 
function. As for the war-machine in itself, it seems to be irreducible to the State 
apparatus, to be outside its sovereignty and prior to its law...67 (emphasis in 
original)





It is necessary to pay close attention to D&G’s words for our interest lies not 
simply in the war-machine that D&G describe and the economy of relations that it 
shares with the State apparatus, but also in their assertion that the activity of the 
State (apparatus) that we generally construe as war, is not war, but a violence 
(police power and military power) for, in their words, war “comes from 
elsewhere.”68 To all intents and purposes, therefore, for D&G, war - like the war- 
machine - is (1) outside law (that is to say, from or located outside the ambit of 
the juridical network that the State apparatus produces); thus, (2) outside the 
sovereignty of the State apparatus; and, in the last instance, (3) irreducible to the 
State apparatus.69 To the extent that the State apparatus makes the war-machine its 
own, it does so by capturing/ ensnaring/ seducing/ stratifying war with/in its 
thanato-juridical networks, which serve, rather strive, to integrate the war- 
machine (and by extension, war) to the State apparatus. Then, of course, there is 
the curious case of police power. Let us consider these matters a little further.
D&G further suggest that a State (apparatus) exhibits, among other things, 
the following features: (1) It lacks a mythology of conflict, which we should be 
careful to note, does not, and should not, suggest the lack o f  a mythologizing  
(cap)ability and, (2) driven by two principle elements -  represented, for example, 
by Mitra and Varuna -  State apparatuses exhibit/betray a One-Two distribution/ 
movement. It is instructive to note that without denying the generally 
anthropocentric organizing principles of the more common ‘mythologies of
68 Ibid.
69 Ibid. Recall in this context the original question posed by this study: What i f  the relation o f  war to the 
political is like that o f the uncircumscribed to the field o f  its circumscription? See pp, 16-17 above.
381
conflict (that is to say, our strategic histories), it is possible to contextualize 
these strategic histories against the One-Two movement that D&G ascribe to the 
State apparatus. Indeed, D&G’s points of reference - “Rex and flamen, raj and 
Brahman, Romulus and Numa, Varuna and Mitra, the despot and the legislator, 
the binder and the organizer” -  allow us to chart the progression of these strategic  
histories.
We should also remind ourselves that D&G make these observations in 
the context of ‘political sovereignty or domination’. Thus, the emphasis that they 
lay on the Absolute binary distribution of the State apparatus -  ‘Either, the 
State...or, the State...’ -  may tempt us to dedicate our attention to what they 
suggest is the singular expression of the State (apparatus) brought into focus by its 
One-Two distribution/ movement - either ‘pure’ police power or ‘pure’ military 
power. Now, from what D&G suggest, it would appear that the State apparatus’ 
expression of violence is pendulum-like -  swinging from police power to military 
power and back -  and  is relative to the contingent present. This directly 
corresponds to the One-Two distribution that D&G draw our attention to. There 
is, however, another possibility. As the One, that is to say, as the (sovereign) 
Unity, the State apparatus may also be said to express itself in a third way, which 
is fundamentally indistinguishable from either military power or police power. To 
appreciate the significance of the indistinguishability between military and police 
power -  the third expression of violence of the state apparatus - it will be 
beneficial to cast an eye on the etymological backdrop of a word that D&G
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associate with the State — “stratum”. Etymologically, the word “stratum” suggests
a...
"horizontal layer," 1599, from Mod.L., special use of L. stratum "thing spread 
out, coverlet, pavement," from neut. pp. of stemere "to spread out, lay down, 
stretch out," from PIE *stre-to- "to stretch, extend," from base *stere- "to spread, 
extend, stretch out".70
Note also the close relationship ‘stratum’ shares with ‘structure’, which since...
”c.l440, [has been identified as an] "action or process of building or 
construction," from L. structura "a fitting together, adjustment, building," from 
structus, pp. of struere "to pile, build, assemble," related to strues "heap," from 
PIE *stere- "to spread, extend, stretch out" (cf. Skt. stmoti "strews, throws 
down;" Avestan star- "to spread out, stretch out;" Gk. stomymi "strew," stroma 
"bedding, mattress," stemon "breast, breastbone;"71
Based on this admittedly cursory etymological overview, D&G’s use of the word 
‘stratum’ is significantly instructive. It is clear that D&G -  by referring to the 
binary distributions of the State (apparatus) - want to draw our attention to a 
becoming-structure (becoming-State apparatus) by a One-Two movement. At the 
heart of the matter is the question of ‘movement’ and it is important to recognize 
that it is not the more qualified movement-as-direction, rather, it is movement-as- 
‘distribution’, as is reflected in the PIE roots of ‘stratum’ -  ‘to spread, expand’. 
Thus, it could be said that the ‘movement’ of the State (apparatus), which is
70 Online Etym ology Dictionary — available at
http://www.etvmonline.com/index.plin7search—stratum&searchmode=Tione
7'Online Etym ology Dictionary — available at
h t tp : / /w w w .e ty m o n lin e .c o m /in d e x .p h p 7 s e a rc h —st ra tu m & s e a rc h m o d e ^ m o n e
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Mitra’s and Varuna’s movement, is an ‘expansive’ one and that, as such, it lends 
to the consistency of the State as an apparatus/ structure to form a stratum. But 
can such a consistency be achieved and maintained when the pendulum of force 
(expressed as military and police power) swings violently from one extreme to 
another? To respond to this question, we must first address the issue of whether 
the movement of the State apparatus is indeed as abrupt and binary as D&G’s 
‘binary distribution’ suggests.
It is important to recognize that the way in which D&G present their 
diagram of the State apparatus, the ‘phase’ wherein the State apparatus expresses 
‘pure’ police power or ‘pure’ military power may be considered as being ‘end- 
states’, that is to say, they are -  in their individual ways -  the maximal 
expressions of the State apparatus. Thus, we cannot fault D&G when they overtly 
suggest that the State apparatus can only express either military power or police 
power. Perhaps this goes some way to explain an assertion by D&G, which we 
have had occasion to note earlier. In the context of war-machines, D&G noted 
that the...
worldwide war machine, which in a way reissues from the States, displays two 
successive figures.. .the first that of fascism, which makes war an unlimited 
movement with no other aim than itself, and the second...the war machine 
reforms smooth space that now claims to control, to surround the entire earth.72
72 D&G, ATP, p 421 See also p 19 above.
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This corresponds directly with the elements of the One-Two movement that D&G 
allude to. Thus, in keeping with the ‘unlimited movement’ of the State apparatus 
(“which makes war” and which D&G say is ‘fascism’) and its reformation of 
smooth space, military and police power represent the essential ‘movement’ of the 
State apparatus itself. But matters are more deceptive and complex. D&G suggest 
that the twin movement of the State apparatus (expressed in terms of military and 
police power) are successive, that is to say, they follow each other. Further, 
D&G’s words also suggest that the first movement of the State apparatus is that of 
military power which, D&G assert, is the signature of the appropriation of war by 
the State apparatus and of its enmeshing by means of its juridical networks. Only 
after this does the State apparatus express itself in terms of police power, which 
reforms smooth space by striating it. In other words, it would appear that the State 
apparatus first ‘captures’ space by exercising military power, which it then
73reforms using police power. The question, therefore, arises whether the State 
apparatus can express itself in both ways simultaneously and non-sequentially? 
Indeed, in the Age (and context) of Network-centric Warfare, would it not be 
more appropriate to discuss the expression of the State solely in its originary 
terms as the One Unity, that is to say, in terms of the in-distinguishability of the 
State apparatus’s police and military powers?
73 In this context, one is immediately reminded o f  the Einzatzgruppen that followed the Wehrmacht into 
battle, particularly on the Eastern Front. As the ‘military war’ was being waged on the edges o f  the 
frontlines by the Wehrmacht, in the rearward areas, the Einzatzgruppen was engaged in what was, more 
often than not, the grisly task o f  striating the smooth space that had been produced by the military power o f  
the Wehrmacht. See, for example, Christopher R. Browning, Ordinary Men: R eserve P olice Battalion 101 
and the F inal Solution in Poland, (N ew  York: Harper Perennial, 1998), For an equally graphic but partisan 
and ultimately skewed account see, Daniel Jonah Goldhagen, Hitler's Willing Executioners: Ordinary 
Germans and the H olocaust, (New York: Vintage Books, 1997)
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Recall, in this context, that it was Foucault who, among others, alerted us 
to the violence that a State apparatus expresses by means of, among other things, 
its juridical networks.74 While this is certainly true of military power, but when 
compared to police power, we find that the latter shares an immediacy with the 
juridical networks which is not the case with the former. The critical point to note, 
however, is that either way the expression of the State apparatus, in the form of 
juridical networks, is always-already violent. The significant qualification within 
this expression of violence lies in precisely how the expression of police power 
provides, indeed contextualizes, the possibility of a State apparatus’ expression of 
military power. In this way, it could be said that unlike the more common 
thematic of International Relations, the telos of military power does not lie in 
peace - rather, it lies in the affirmation of the originary violence of the State 
apparatus expressed as police power. In other words, the State apparatus’ 
expression of military power only serves to reinforce its expression of police 
power. What this would suggest is that unlike the war that the State apparatus 
manages to integrate (from the outside, or the ‘elsewhere’) with/in its juridical 
networks, the ecology o f police power is local to the State apparatus. It is pre­
integrated and thus, it “seizes and binds, preventing all combat...captures by 
magic.. .has no arms and no need of them.. .”75 If one can indeed ascribe a telos to 
police power, it would be nothing less than an unconditional (re)affirmation of 
itself in the form of what D&G perceptively identify as a ‘terrifying peace.’ Thus, 
when the State apparatus violently -  this economy of relations from State-side
74 See, for example, Foucault, Society M ust be D efended  and Security, Territory and Population.
75 D&G, ATP, p 352
386
being an expression of violence as military power - attempts to integrate/ enframe, 
gestell ‘that which comes from elsewhere’ with/in itself, it wages war, but it does 
so only to affirm the originary violent expression of the State apparatus.76
We have already established that the State apparatus, which D&G refer to 
in originary terms as ‘the One...Unity’, expresses pure violence which, when 
referring to the One...Unity, remains unqualified as either police or military 
power. In other words, police power and military power, when expressed by the 
State, only serve as qualifications (or aspects) of the essential ontological 
expression of the State apparatus -  violence. Put differently, we could say that the 
State apparatus -  as a stratum -  expresses a violence that is (1) not only different 
from that of war, but (2) is one wherein military and police power are 
indistinguishable from one another. The State apparatus, expressing its originary 
violence as both police and military power, thus ‘expands’, that is to say, it moves 
laterally, but imperially, by making war to capture ‘space’ -  smooth space - which 
it then reforms as ‘striated space’ by the exercising of police power. From D&G’s 
statements on the matter we know that military power is the result of the 
integration of war by juridical networks. This suggests that war, like an 
unwelcome intruder, who ‘comes from elsewhere’, somehow comes in contact 
with the State apparatus which, in a combative (but defensive) mode, attempts to 
reduce the force of war by containing it (by first capturing it) within juridical
76 Recall in this context that it was Michel Foucault who alerted us to the ‘disciplining’ power o f  the State. 
D eleuze also alludes to this, though he updates Foucault’s insight, by referring to the emergence o f  ‘control 
societies’. See, Gilles Deleuze, “Postscript to the Societies o f  Control”, This essay first appeared in L'Autre 
journal, no. 1 (M ay 1990). Available at http://www.watsoninstitute.org/infopeace/vy2k/deleuze- 
societies.cfm . Last accessed on Jan., 2008.
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networks. On the other hand, it could also mean that the originary expression of 
the State apparatus — as an assemblage of juridical networks - is always-already 
violent and offensively-oriented. Note that in the latter case, the State apparatus 
aggressively, or more accurately, in an offensive mode, reaches out in/to war and 
seeks to tame it, to enframe it, to ge-stell it - by integrating it.
The above discussion makes it clear that the State apparatus, which is not 
simply bom as, but which also lives as violence exhibits an originary violence 
that is pre qualification. It is important to correlate this to the war that the State 
apparatus comes in contact with. Reid, in this context, provides a valuable insight. 
He notes:
The value of Dumezil to Deleuze is twofold. First, Dumezil demonstrates that the 
attempt to strategise a relation between the state and the war machine is a 
manoeuvre found repeatedly in the mythological representations of sovereignty 
dating back to the earliest records of Indo-European civilisation. Second, he 
demonstrates that in spite of this attempt of the state to strategise a relation 
between itself and the war machine, the latter remains in a ‘milieu of exteriority’, 
located outside of the state apparatus and possessing the metamorphic power 
which Deleuze argues accrues to alterity.77
Taking care so as to avoid falling into the banality of assessing the validity of 
Dumezil’s ‘colonial’ account of pre-Vedic and Vedic mythologies, which in itself 
is highly problematic, let us focus instead on the ‘milieu of exteriority’ wherein,
77 Julian Reid, “D eleuze’s War Machine: Nomadism against the State”, Millennium: Journal o f  
In ternational’Studies, Volume 32, Number 1, 1 February 2003, pp. 57-85. See also Georges Dumezil, The 
D estiny o f  the W arrior (Chicago and London: University o f  Chicago Press, 1969). See also D&G, ATP, pp
351-354.
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as Reid points out, D&G locates the war machine. It is also necessary to forewarn 
ourselves that our approach, in this context, will be unconventional — an ‘indirect
5 78approach - and will entail looking closely at how Deleuze (and Guattari) are 
able to posit what appears to be a radically in-human approach to the question of 
war, war machines and State apparatuses.
Recall that D&G suggest that that the One-Two movement of the State 
(military power and police power) leads in once sense to Fascism (more 
commonly as instances of micro-fascism), while on the other it leads to 'unlimited 
movement'. Now, this is where matters really get complicated. The One-Two 
movement that D&G associate with the State apparatus is an ‘unlimited 
movement’ itself for if it were otherwise it would signal the atrophying of the 
State apparatus. Thus, we are forced to ask: Is this unlimited movement creatively 
unlimited, or is it the movement associated with the eternal recurrance of the 
Same - in which case, it is no different from the fascism that D&G refer to. Why 
is this question being posed here? Because, (1) perpetual war - the condition of 
fascism that D&G refer to - is unlimited movement and (2) unlimited movement 
which, paradoxically, is only possible in smooth space, leads to the condition of 
terrifying peace where the State ends up as one of the appendages of the war- 
machine which, while admittedly is a supra-state condition, is also a condition 
which cannot be wholly outside the circumscription of the State (that is why the 
State ends up as being an appendage, that is, a part of the whole). Either way, it
78 Curiously, Liddell Hart premised his account o f  military theory on in-direct-ness and advocated a 
‘strategy o f  indirect approach’. See Basil Liddell Hart, Strategy’, Second Revised Edition, Part IV
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ends up being a fascistic condition, which while being ‘in excess’ of the State, yet 
remains grounded in and with it. All this is in accordance with what D&G 
suggests, but then, if this argument holds, we need to recognize that the ‘war- 
machine’ is not a creative creature, rather it is a fascistic creature -  in both its 
guises -  as military AND police power. And, secondly, we need to recognize the 
urgency to investigate the originary status of D&G’s war-machine.
But before we get into the business of interrogating the war-machine, let 
us clear up one small matter -  D&G would like us to believe that the consequence 
of the war-machine running amuck is that the State becomes an appendage to the 
war-machine...the prelude to the era of terrifying peace...more terrifying that 
‘total war’. The way D&G put it, it would suggest that prior to the war-machine 
making the State its appendage, the State (as an apparatus) had only one form of 
violence at its disposal -  police power. It is only AFTER the State comes in 
contact with its Other, that is to say, only after the State comes in contact with the 
Nomad, does it begin to understand that ‘other’ violence embodied in war. But 
then again, D&G state, that the State moves in a One-Two step -  police power 
AND military power. So, we would assume that this One-Two movement is only 
possible AFTER the State comes in contact with the Nomad and AFTER it has 
appropriated the ‘war’ that the Nomad brings with it. And, how does the State 
acquire this military power? It does so by enmeshing ‘war’ (that which is 
introduced to the State by the Nomad) within its thanato-politico-juridical 
networks, which we should not forget are the sinews of its police power. So,
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where does this leave the war-machine, which is ‘irreducible to the State 
apparatus... outside its sovereignty and prior to its law’? The follow-up question 
to this, of course, is related to ‘War’ itself, which, if we are to believe D&G, is the 
endemic condition of ‘the nomad’ whom the state seeks to ‘territorialize’.
To pose a workable response to these questions, we will need to take a 
step back and look at D&G’s explanation of what the war-machine is. In simple 
terms, the war-machine is an abstract machine, that is to say, it is an assemblage 
that, while fluid, also displays a peculiar kind of a coherence to it, albeit a 
coherence that is very different from that which the State as an apparatus exhibits, 
which is grounded in Reason. But in light of what has been discussed, the two 
questions that we have posed above may be presented as follows: Firstly, is or is 
not the war-machine an assemblage of a completely different order from that of
7Qthe State? D&G would like us to believe so. What we have seen thus far, 
however, suggests that in this instance D&G arguments regarding the war 
machine may be misleading for, as we have seen, the war machine does not 
populate a milieu exterior to the State; rather, the war-machine emerges out of the 
State to populate the milieu of exteriority as the prelude to the mapping of the 
exterior as the interior. D&G of course suggest that what does emerge out of the 
State is not the war-machine but the ‘institution of war’, that is to say the 
Military.80 But the fallacy of this assertion stands exposed when we consider the 
second question which relates to ‘war-as-such’.
79 D&G, ATP, p 230
80 Ibid., p 418
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D&G suggest that ‘the nomad’ is the originary expression of ‘war’ -  that 
which comes from elsewhere’. But this is D&G being disingenuous. Why? 
Because the co-relation between the Nomad and the State is clear. The Nomad is 
the Other of the State. The Nomad is the signature of that what is always-already 
in Resistance to the State. But it is curious, is it not, that while the Nomad is the 
Other of the State by virtue of its being the Outsider to the State, it actually 
achieves its status as the Outsider in relation to the State. In this way, the State (1) 
can appropriate the Nomad because, among other things, it knows its Other, (2) it 
(the State) recognizes the power of the Nomad (that is, the force behind the power 
of resistance), which it seeks to incorporate within itself by means of the war- 
machine, and (3) as a consequence, that what the State appropriates is not the war 
that comes from elsewhere, but a war which, we should be careful to note, now in 
a revised form, comes from the relation that the State shares with its Other, the 
Nomad. In this way, the Nomad-State relation which provides much of the 
justificatory arguments that D&G use to place the war machine, indeed war, in a 
milieu of exteriority vis-a-vis the State fails to exhibit the relations between war
and the political that we originally referred to at the outset of the study as the
81relation “of the uncircumscribed to the field of its potential circumscription.” 
Thus, while not wholly dismissing D&G’s thesis on the Nomad, we need to retain 
a degree of skepticism about the co-relation that they draw between the Nomad 
and the war that comes from elsewhere. As we will see in the following section, 
D&G’s thesis on war and Nomads does work, but only if a variation is made in 
understanding the operability of the Nomad.
81 Land, The Thirst fo r  A nnihilation,?  130
392
For the moment, however, we should not ignore the contradictions that 
have arisen in the context of how D&G locate war and the war machine in a 
milieu of exteriority. Nevertheless, we should also not overlook the fact that how 
by abandoning the grammar of the Real that underwrites the classic Clausewitzian 
martial paradigm with which we are so familiar, Deleuze (and Guattari) lead us - 
via the ‘ruin of representation’ - to a multiverse where/in the possibility of 
thinking war differently and thinking differently significantly present an instance 
of becoming-different.
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..and when the walls fa ll down..
In the first chapter of this study, we had occasion to critique Hallward’s 
critique of Deleuze’s (and implicitly, of D&G’s) philosophical posture. As will be 
recollected, our rebuttal of Hall ward was sharp and brusque. But this should not 
blind us to the contradictions that we have found residing within D&G’s 
philosophical system - of which at least one has been examined by us in the 
context of war machines and war. Yet, as will become apparent as this section of 
the study progresses, we will continue to use some of the words that D&G have 
coined, the concepts that they have created, and we will continue to clone the 
essential nomadism that has distinguished Deleuze’s (and Guattari’s) 
philosophical work -  albeit at slight curve.
Now, Mullarkey tells us that ‘Deleuze’s concept of the virtual and actual 
(which are as critical to his philosophical oeuvre as are the concepts of 
‘becoming’ and ‘difference’ that we have seen above) is an example of a 
decisional thought with its own mixte -  different/ citation, which (disjoins the 
virtual and actual’.82 Indeed, with specific reference to D&G’s writings on the 
plane of immanence, Laruelle insists that “[T]he plane itself is, syntactically and 
reflectively, what qualifies pure immanence such that it becomes ‘the property of 
the plane, of a universal, etc...Deleuze’s continual invention of anti-dualistic 
terms...[do] not conceal the arbitrary decision to denounce transcendence as
82 John Mullarkey, P o st-C o n tin en ta l P h ilosoph y: An O utline, (London: Continuum, 2006), p 143
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theological.”83 Thus, as Mullarkey puts it, “[T]he plane of immanence, in its very 
syntax of being ‘to’ something (even ‘to itself), gives it away as an ‘axis of 
transcendence.”84 While we, in light of our discussion thus far, cannot say that we 
have been exposed to a direct reference to such a contradiction in D&G’s 
philosophy, we have, however, noted that even when cast against a sophisticated 
backdrop involving rhizomes, chaosmos, immanence, assemblages and 
apparatuses underwritten by (a)periodic difference and repetition, D&G’s 
discussion on war machines and war have seemed fractured and disjointed and, as 
a net assessment, frankly contradictory.
Let us now briefly look at particularly that contradiction that we find at 
play in D&G’s exegesis on war machines and war. D&G claimed that war 
machines, like war, ‘comes from elsewhere’ -  that is to say, from outside the state 
apparatus. But, as we have seen, this is not the case. Even if we think in terms of 
the free flow of forces, the loose consistency of assemblages and progressively 
calcifying apparatuses (and the corresponding networks that they individually and 
collectively give rise to), we find that D&G, though claiming an absolute 
exteriority on behalf of war machines and war, draw the motive forces animating 
war machines and war from an originary locus within networks of forces that are 
being progressively arranged and re-arranged densely. The consequence of this 
we found most starkly highlighted in how the violence that the State -  as an 




this sense, a particular expression) of violence, rather than violence being an 
expression of the State. The implications, as we have seen in the context of our 
discussion above, are immense. Thus, for example, we were able to see how when 
D&G suggest that the ‘nomad’ is the originary expression of ‘war’ -  that which 
comes from elsewhere’ — this expression of war, despite its apparent exteriority, 
remains ensconced with/in an interiority - in the State - for it is only in the context 
of the state (apparatus) that the nomad attains or is able to express the infinite 
speed and movement of nomadism. Additionally, we have no clarity on the matter 
regarding whether nomadism ‘recognizes’ or even finds relevant the State- 
apparatus at all, and if it does, how does this ‘recognition’ take place and what is 
the ‘relevancy’ that is established between the nomad and the State apparatus. 
Note that this does not contradict the infinite speed and movement that D&G refer 
to in the context of the plane of immanence or, for that matter, of the nomad. But 
we should certainly make note of the point that nomadism is the condition of the 
plane of immanence (where we understand ‘condition’ in all its senses), and as 
such, is also immanent in itself. Thus, to say that the speed and movement of the 
Nomad is discemable in the context of the State apparatus (specifically in D&G’s 
allusion to war) is to restrict and circumscribe the infinite speed and movement of 
the Nomad, and by extension, of the planes of immanence by the stasis that the 
State apparatus exhibits. It will be recalled that we had discussed planes of 
immanence in two senses -  as particular planes of immanence and THE plane of 
immanence. Thus, unless the assertion is made that THE plane of immanence 
somehow -  even if only under particular and specific conditions/ circumstances -
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loses its immanence in apparatus-like structures - an assertion that would mortally 
affect the viability of the entire Deleuzian project — it is difficult to understand 
precisely how the Nomad’s speed and movement can be reduced to the State 
apparatus.
Recall also that even before we reached this point, we had already asked a 
critical question of D&G. We had asked whether the war machine (which we 
know, going by what D&G tell us, is an assemblage) is of a different ‘order’ than 
the State apparatus. We asked this because -  again going by what D&G have 
described -  we have seen how apparatuses emerge as assemblages calcify. It is 
not important at this stage to reflect on why and how assemblages calcify. We 
will come to that a little later. The point that we are trying to make here is a much 
simpler one. What we are suggesting is that apparatuses necessarily emerge from 
assemblages and while there may be an unlimited number of assemblages and 
resulting apparatuses, the sequence of emergence is always led by the emergence 
of assemblages. Apparatuses have their own expression and this expression is 
necessarily violent for, as we have seen, it is only by the expression of violence 
that (state) apparatuses can expand imperially, that is to say, they can organize 
smooth space by striating it. Thus, unless D&G are referring to at least two kinds 
of war (which they are certainly not), the war, which according to them comes 
from elsewhere, actually comes from the state apparatus and not elsewhere. The 
consequence of this for D&G, of course, is that despite their, one assumes, best 
efforts, they are unable to talk about ‘war’ -  that which comes from elsewhere.
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But, in the wider context of Deleuze’s (and D&G’s) project, the 
fundamental problem, if we follow Mullarkey’s exegesis on Laruelle’s work, is 
not necessarily in the arguments that D&G offer — rather, it is in the syntax that 
D&G use to describe what ultimately is their ‘project’ of immanence for it, 
inadvertently, involves a decisionism that forces immanence into transcendent 
forms. Thus, “Deleuze fools himself into thinking that empiricism goes beyond 
transcendence when in fact it is simply another form of it, perhaps the most 
dangerous form because of its self-misunderstanding.”85 Indeed, there is another 
issue that is at play in Deleuze’s work, which we should make a note of. As 
Mullarkey advises us, “Deleuze posits his plane of immanence as a virtual reality 
positioned below another world, that of the actual molar realities. It is the actual 
that is subordinate to the virtual. Despite thinking of immanence in its purest form 
possible...he still proposes a two-world ontology when explaining these ideas.”86 
It is therefore not surprising that our engagement with D&G in the context of war 
and war machines reveals a number of layers which are not strata, but which are 
arranged hierarchically across the Real, the Actual, and the Virtual. These we 
identified as chaos, planes of immanence, rhizomes, assemblages and apparatuses/ 
structures. Additionally, we found that these layers are also ordered -  particularly 
in terms of their density, which is nothing but a signature of movement and its 
increasingly diminishing presence as we move from the state or condition of the 
undifferentiated movement at infinite speed of chaos into the structured (limited) 
motion endemic to the suspended animation of the stage that the theories and
85 Ibid., p 144
86 Ibid., p 8 - Emphasis in original.
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doctrines of NCW claim as their (ideal) operative ecology. None of this, however, 
should de-value the intention with which D&G articulate their project and thus, 
their insistence on immanence is not contested. Instead, what is being suggested is 
that by strictly following a metaphysical approach to the problem of immanence, 
which Laruelle suggests is implicit in Deleuze’s philosophical project, we need to 
seriously re-consider if and how a philosophy of immanence can work at all? 
From the perspective of this study, this question is of critical importance because 
though we have profited by reading the history of military thought and the 
evolution of the NCW theories with Deleuze (and Guattari), his philosophy of 
immanence nevertheless falters when it considers the question of war-as-such. 
Naturally, we would be moved to ask: how then is it possible to not simply talk 
about immanence, but to assert war as/in immanence?
What we need, therefore, is an unproblematic start-point, which Laruelle 
identifies as the “vision-in-one, which is described as “the ‘being-given which is 
without-givenness’ -  a givenness without a ‘background’ of givenness (in case 
any theological interpretation is suspected).”87 Thus, as Mullarkey tells us, 
Laruelle’s starting point is the Real, which is a thought without any conditions at 
all.88 As a consequence, Laruelle achieves ‘escape velocity’ in this regard by 
suggesting the non-philosophical as being absolutely self-sufficient. For our 
purposes this is eminently suitable because to respond to the question of war and
87 Ibid., p 145 - Emphasis and parenthesis in original.
88 Ibid.’ p 144
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immanence - as posed above - with any form of ‘logic’ would only serve to 
detract from immanence and to transform it into a schematic of transcendence.
One such account of the ‘vision-in-One’ is found in a patently non- 
philosophical (for it is held to be either spiritual and/ or religious) text, namely, 
the Bhagavad-Gita (hereafter Gita). In it, on the eve of the Battle of Kurukshetra, 
Krishna and Arjuna discuss precisely such a vision-in-One...
With numerous mouths and eyes, with numerous wonderous sights, with 
numerous celestial ornaments, with numerous celestial weapons uplifted;
Wearing celestial garlands and apparel, anointed with celestial-scented unguents, 
the All-wonderful Resplendent, Boundless, and All-formed.
There...the son of Pandu then saw the whole universe resting in one, with its 
manifold divisions.89
When considered in the context of not simply the philosophies that have 
underwritten the theories of war and combat since the classical age, but also in the 
context of D&G’s sophisticated account of immanence, this vision-in-One is 
“heretical, Gnostic knowledge, a science in the pure sense, an experience of the 
Real. And though one might regard this Real as an abstraction, we cannot [be] 
accuse[d] of not accounting for this abstraction....” for we, following Laruelle, 
unambiguously claim to abstract the Real or the One.90 The One is an abstract-
89 BG, Chap. XI, #10, 11, 13, pp 246-247
90 John Mullarkey, Post-Continental Philosophy: An Outline, p 145.
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without-an-operation-of-abstraction.91 Now, if it is asked, “why is the experience 
of the Real an experience of the One...why is it a vision-in-One?” Mullarkey 
provides us with the necessary response -  “Because of Immanence. The One is 
highly non-relational...The One is indifferent to all. It is not immanent to 
anything, but immanent in itself. Hence, the experience or vision-in-One cannot 
be intentional or representational in any way.”92
This then is the vision-in-One with which we will begin to outline an 
account of Intensive War. It should be reiterated that what we are attempting to do 
here is not to posit a theory of war. Rather, we are seeking the possibility to 
articulate the intensiveness of war that we claim is always-already present in the 
more common theorizations of what can be broadly gathered under the rubric of 
Clausewitzian (or extensive) war.
Thus,
i. ‘Intensive War is first and foremost, an immanence, which specifically means a 
condition that carries “with it the events or singularities that are merely actualized 
in subjects and objects.”93 It is, as the Gita puts it, the/a beginning, middle and 
end. In other words, it Is...always becoming.94 Further, “this is never bom, nor 
does it die. It is not that, not having been, it again comes into being.. .It is not that
91 Ibid.
92 Ibid. Emphasis in original
93 D eleuze, Pure Immanence: Essays on A Life, p 29
94 BG, Chap II, #28, p 45
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having been, It again ceases to be. This is unborn, eternal, changeless, ever- 
Itself... Given this, events and singularities — such as NCW and other theories 
of war and combat, the State, anthropos and Thanatos — can be said to be in­
formed by Intensive War - infinitely and indefinitely — without beginning, middle 
or end. Thus, Intensive War (unlike in the case of Clausewitzian (or extensive) 
War where battlespace is a distinct and independently identifiable space or 
domain) is Battlespace. As we have seen, the theories and doctrines of NCW, 
marked by their spillage over and across the Physical, Cognitive and 
Informational domains veer close to this. Yet, as we have also seen, despite the 
distinct possibility of the NCW theories to account for a ‘full spectrum’ 
battlespace, this accounting is always-already limited for it presumes a ‘closed 
system’ or, in D&G’s terms, the complete striation of smooth space.
Intensive War -  as battlespace -  is an onto-force-plane. It would be 
inaccurate -  indeed, unnecessary -  to attribute chaos to Intensive War. Rather, it 
would be more productive to understand Intensive War as indistinguishable 
intensities of force across infinite magnitudes. Thus, Intensive War is marked by 
infinite movement at infinite speed, though it is often mistaken to be a condition 
of tranquility. This tranquility is, of course, a function of infinite movement at 
infinite speeds. It is important to also note that events and singularities are 
always-already embedded in Intensive War though this always-already 
embeddedness is in terms of their potentialities rather than in terms of their 
physicalities. We have avoided using the word ‘actuality’ in this context because
95 Ibid., Chap II, #20, p 40
402
the embedded potential of events and singularities are both Actual and Real. 
Further, Intensive War/ battlespace is characterized by crests and troughs as the 
diagram below highlights.
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Figure 13: In tensive Wart B attlespace/ O nto-force-plane 
Im age by A uthor
These mark the ebb and flow of intensities of force. It is important for us not to
(mis)understand ‘trough’ to mean or indicate a reduction of any sort. It is not a
subtraction or a division of any kind. Additionally, we should note that ‘trough’
(in this specific context) is not the opposite of ‘crest’. We should also note that
this invigorating intensive force that crests and troughs is Lila, the ‘flux’ of which
is recognized by its intensity, which is disruptive, destructive, deconstructive and
in this sense, creative. Force, therefore, is intensity, which is ‘sensed’ both as a
Rhythm and as Texture, and which can only be rhizomatically drawn in terms of a
‘differential geometry’ of Becoming-X. Note that the crests and troughs of onto-
force-planes are the signatures of Rhythm and Texture, that is to say, they are a-
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periodic signatures of intensities-in/as-flux. Battlespace, thus outlined, is at first 
glance very far removed from the ‘space’ of battle that we are more familiar with. 
Indeed, when compared to the descriptions and accounts of battlespace that we 
find articulated, suggested and affirmed by the theories of war (past, present and 
emerging), the above-outlined battlespace, to use Hallward’s phrase, is simply 
‘out of this world’.
Thus, when, on the eve o f the Battle o f Kurukshetra, Arjuna threw down 
his weapons and fe ll into despair at not only the sight o f  the large and well 
equipped Kaurava Army, but more so at beholding the distinguished array o f 
Kaurava commanders who ranged from Bhishma, his grandfather, to 
Dronacharya, his teacher/ guru, to his relatives and friends, Krishna’s discussion 
o f precisely such an expansive and intensive battlespace may have certainly 
seemed incongruous and, from Arjuna’s perspective, rather less-than-helpful. 
And, what were the principal reasons for Arjuna’s despair? As a military 
commander and warrior o f the first order (after all, Krishna himself refers to 
Arjuna as ‘the scorcher o f enemies ’), undoubtedly, victoiy and defeat would have 
been o f concern to him. But Arjuna was also afflicted by a moral resignation that 
resulted from his knowing that by engaging in battle, he would be stained with the 
blood o f countless individuals including o f those near and dear to him. Krishna’s 
rejoinder to him is sharp, immediate — “He who takes the self to be the slayer, 
and he who takes It to be the slain neither o f  these he knows. It does not slay, nor
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is it slain. 96 Thus, Krishna insisted on discussing this ‘out o f the world’ 
battlespace, by saying, “....Knowing this one attains the highest intelligence and 
will have accomplished all one’s duties, O descendent o f Bharata. ”97 Note how, 
in one stroke, among other things, Krishna moves the discussion that began with 
Arjuna ’s primarily anthropocentric concerns onto a non-human level.
Now, despite the long and detailed discussion between Krishna and 
Arjuna, the latter remained in doubt. It could be said that Arjuna was unable to 
envision the vision-in-One that Krishna was attempting to describe. It is at this 
point that Krishna shares with Arjuna the vision-in-One or that which in the Gita 
is referred to as the Vishwarupa by saying: “See now, O Gudakesa, in this My 
body, the whole universe centered in one -  including the moving and the
98unmoving -  and all else that thou desirest to see. ” And, Arjuna saw the 
following:
“...boundless form on every side with manifold arms, stomachs, mouths, and eyes; 
neither the end nor the middle, nor also the beginning...
Krishna reaffirms this vision-in-One by stating:
“lam  the mighty world-destroying Time, here made manifest for the purpose of infolding 
the world... ”100
96 Ibid., Chap. II, #19, p 39
97 Ibid., Chap. II, #20, p 335-336
98 Ibid., Chap. XI, #  7, p 244
99 Ibid., C h a p  XI, #16, p 249
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But even earlier, Krishna had asserted.
At the approach of (Brahma’s) day, all manifestations proceed from the unmanifested 
state; at the approach of night, they merge verily into that alone, which is called the 
unmanifested. ”W1
To be sure, Krishna also said that
‘'All the worlds, O Arjuna, including the realm of Brahma, are subject to return, but after 
attaining Me, O son of Kunti, there is no rebirth. ”102
We need to addresses a couple of issues at this point. First, Krishna refers to a 
movement between that which is manifested and the unmanifested. In the context 
of Intensive War, which we have also identified as onto-force-planes, the question 
of emergence, which is the movement between the unmanifested and the 
manifested, needs to be addressed. Secondly, Krishna also curiously suggests that 
this movement between the manifested and the unmanifested is not necessarily 
eternal, that is to say, caught in an ‘infinite loop’. In the context of this study, the 
implication of this last issue also needs to be addressed.
Thus,
100 Ibid., Chap IX, #32, p 259
101 Ibid., Chap VIII, #18, p 18 - Parenthesis m onginal
102 Ibid., Chap. VIII, #16, p 188
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Intensity is the fluctuations (movements) of the immanent relations in and of 
force. As such, intensity has magnitudinal and qualitative properties. Intensities 
are particular confluence of forces. In this sense, intensities are always instants — 
events as signatures in Time. Thus, it is more appropriate to refer to intensities as 
instant-intensities. As such, instant-intensities exhibit (1) an intensiveness, which 
is always in-difference with/ from the combinatorial intensiveness that constitute 
instant-intensities, and (2) movement (understood as varying intensivenesses). 
Thus, instant-intensities are dynamic and always in flux. Working from the 
premise that instant-intensities are expressions of force, they can also be said to be 
always-already becoming. We have already stated that the intensiveness of 
instant-intensities varies. In other words, instant-intensities, among other things, 
carry with/in them the potential of attaining and exhibiting a stable equilibrium. 
This may be understood as a signature of an impending condition of entropy, but 
only under the specific condition which involves the extraction (alternatively, 
freezing or densification) of the intensity of the constituting forces of instant- 
intensities. As such, therefore, they are potentially co-constituents of, what in the 
context of this study is referred to as, ‘fields of correspondence’. While we will 
examine these ‘fields of correspondence’ in more detail later, for the moment, we 
should note that ‘fields of correspondence’ allow us to draw vectors which 
connect a diverse set of instant-intensities which, particularly under NCW 
conditions, can quickly become ‘total conditions of possibility’. The diagram 
below depicts such a freezing of the instant-intensity.
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Im age by Author
To better understand how these ‘fields of correspondence’ are developed, we must 
first, briefly, examine a process endemic to instant-intensities: excendence. It is 
asserted that instant-intensities of force are always in ‘excendence’. Borrowing 
the term from Levinas, in the context of Intensive War, it means simply: ‘a-rising’ 
without departure.103 In this sense, excendence may be understood as the 
becoming-intensive of instant-intensities and, as such, is an expression of force in 
terms of flows. In other words, excendence is characterized by the flow of forces 
and as such, the outcomes of excendence are the crests and troughs that we have 
referred to above. Note that this becoming-intensive is both the aggregation of 
intensity and its dispersal. The diagram below attempts a depiction of instant- 
intensities in excendence.
103 See Emmanuel Levinas, On Escape (De Vevasion), Intro. & Annotated, Jaques Rolland, Trans. Bettina 
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Figure 15: Instant-intensity in Excendence  
Im age by A uthor
Intensities of force create assemblages, which are differential expressions of 
‘formations and de-formations’ made manifest by the process of excendence. 
Assemblages are creative in the sense that not only do they directly, at infinite 
speed, express a specific event - a singularity - they also in-form non-local events 
at infinite speed and at indefinite locales. In the latter sense, assemblages possess 
a specific quality - Bharata, i.e., ‘being able to carry.’104 Thus, assemblages 
‘carry’ events as a becoming - locally and non-locally. Assemblages are volatile 
because they are transient aggregations of instant-intensities. Note that the 
aggregation referred to here is a function (and an expression) of instant- 
intensities. Instant-intensities, as we have mentioned above, exhibit degrees and
104 The Sanskrit word Bharata has several meanings. There could be two etymologies for this epithet: (1) It 
may come from the Sanskrit root ‘b h r\ which means “to b ea r /to  c a n y ’’. As Agni was believed to carry 
the offerings of the Vedic fi re-sacrifices to the Heavens, he was given the title o f Bharata, as the bearer of 
sacrifical oblations. (2) It may come as a linguistic derivative of the term Bharata. The term Bharata again 
refers to Agni or to the fire-priests of the Vedic Age, and is again derived from the same root ‘bhr’, but here 
under the sense o f “to maintain The root ‘bhr’ is linguistically cognate with the English verb "to bear" 
and Latin "fero". See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Etymology o f India. Last Accessed on August 13, 2006.
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magnitudes of intensiveness. This further suggests that instant-intensities, at some 
point seem to reach a point or state or phase where they are stable. But we should 
be careful to qualify this assertion. This stability should not be construed as being 
a stable state or condition’. Rather, this state or condition is better understood in 
terms of the proximal location of the instant-intensity to a state or condition of 
entropy. Note that when at this location instant-intensities acquire a density. This, 
however, must be qualified. This increasingly densifying condition of the instant- 
intensity is always-already in a state of withdrawal from this proximal location 
because, as we have mentioned above, of the processes of excendence that are 
continually at work with/in instant-intensities. Assemblages are the aggregations 
of instant-intensities when the latter are in this proximal condition to entropy, 
which is also why assemblages cannot persist, rather they are always forming and 
de-forming.
Regardless, however, when instant-intensities aggregate as assemblages, 
there is, as mentioned above, a densification of intensity that takes place. Thus, 
the movement that marks intensities slows (however imperceptibly). It is at this 
stage that instant-intensities are prone to being ‘frozen’ or ‘enframed’. Enframing, 
thus, is the slowing down of the infinite speed and movement of instant- 
intensities. Assemblages therefore, may be considered as becoming-enframings, 
but which, given their open-endedness, that is to say, their transience, never 
become enframings. However, a collection of enframings in close proximity to 
each other are able to channel the instant-intensities into an infinite loop, thereby
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consigning them to achieve stable states or phases. As a consequence, 
correspondences are established between such enframings, which are dependent 
on the closed circuit via which instant-intensities are forced to flow. Note that 
instant-intensities, when ensconced within such closed circuits, lose their ‘instant’ 
nature. Thus, intensities atrophy, that is to say, they deteriorate or more 
accurately, they become inert, particularly in terms of their being both instant and 
intense. In other words, instant-intensities, under such conditions are no longer in 
Time, rather they are o/T im e and in this way, they attain a very high degree of 
stability. This, in turn, enables the establishment of ‘fields of correspondences’, 
which also allow for ‘truth values’ to be assigned and established. The diagram 
below highlights the establishment of such a ‘field of correspondence’.
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Figure 16: Fields o f C orrespondence 
Im age by Author
Arjuna can, thus, be said to be caught up in such a closed loop and thus may also 
be said to be situated within a number o
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being a prince, an heir to a State, a husband, a father, a sibling, a student, a 
warrior, a comrade etc. It is therefore not surprising that he would ask o f 
Krishna...
Of what avail is dominion to us, of what avail are pleasures and even life, if 
these, O Govinda! for whose sake it is desired that empire, enjoyment, and 
pleasure should be ours, themselves stand here in battle, having renounced life 
and wealth — teachers, uncles, sons, and also grandfathers, maternal uncles, 
fathers-in-law, grandsons, brothers-in-law, besides other kinsmen. ”105
Thus, he concluded...
“Even though these were to kill me, O slayer o f Madhu, I  could not wish to kill 
them -  not even for the sake of dominion over the three worlds, how much less 
for the sake of the earth!106
Therefore, Arjuna said...
“Verily, if the sons of Dhrtarastra, weapons in hand, were to slay me, unresisting 
and unarmed in battle, that would be better for me.
Arjuna caught in the fe ld s  o f correspondence, could only assess the situation 
from the perspective o f the truth-values that the fields o f correspondence
105 BG, Chap. I, # 32-34, p 19
106 Ibid., Chap. I, # 35, p 20
107 Ibid, Chap. I, # 46, p 25
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establish. Thus, to him, the need to fight his ‘kin ’for dominion over earth seemed 
pointless, indeed, disastrous for, as Arjuna put it, “[W]hat pleasure indeed could 
be ours, O Janardhana, from killing these sons o f Dhrtarastra? Sin only could 
take hold o f us by the slaying o f these felons. ”108 It is interesting to note that 
Krishna does not contradict or contest the Real that Arjuna was appealing to. 
Indeed, he agrees with him by saying. “Thou hast been mourning for them who 
should not be mourned for. Yet thou speakest words o f wisdom... ’’l09Nevertheless, 
Krishna also insisted on drawing Arjuna’s attention to think alongside the Real 
(quite like how, as we have seen, Laruelle insisted on). Thus, Krishna said, “It is 
not that I  have never existed, nor thou nor these kings. Nor is it that we shall 
cease to exist in the future. ”110 Additionally, Krishna also suggests: “Notions o f 
heat and cold, o f pain and pleasure are born, O son o f Kunti, only o f the contact 
o f the sense with their objects. They have a beginning and an end. They are 
impermanent in their nature. Bear them patiently, O descendent o f Bharata. ”11] 
Arjuna, o f course, misses the point that Krishna makes, which is that o f the 
unmanifested -  manifested -  unmanifested movement that can be said to include 
the Real (of the fields o f correspondences) but which is, crucially, not limited to 
this Real. Thus, what Krishna urges Arjuna to do is to abandon the limited 
battlespace projected by and within the fields o f correspondence that he resides 
within and to engage with the wider, more fluid and every changing (to the point
108 Ibid, Chap. I, # 36, p 20
109Ibid, Chap. I ,#  11,p 34
110 Ibid.,Chap. II, # 12, p 35. 
1,1 Ibid.,Chap. II .,#  14, p 36
o f seeming still) battlespace o f Intensive War, characterized by the movement 
from the unmanifested to the manifested to the unmanifested.
In NCW terms, the full-spectrum battlespace is posited as being a pre­
condition for the achievement of dominant battlespace knowledge. But this in 
itself is premised on the understanding that the battlespace is a closed system, 
which allows for the exercise of dominance therein. The curious thing about this 
full-spectrum battlespace and the domination thereof is that it is premised on a 
transcendent location with relation to the battlespace -  the so-called God’s eye 
view of the battlespace. The question to pose to the emerging theories and 
doctrines of NCW, therefore, would be: How does the ‘battlespace’ of NCW 
account for the flux of forces?
Clearly, the premise of NCW is to take on only one part of the 
unmanifested -  manifested -  unmanifested series. In other words, the NCW 
theories and doctrines -  if we borrow Secretary Rumsfeld’s turn of phrase -  are 
only concerned with making ‘known’ the unknowns. Put in another way, it could 
be said that the NCW theories and doctrines are concerned with the manifestation 
of the unmanifested and most importantly, to maintain the manifested as the 
manifested by exhausting and consigning the manifested into a locale and 
condition of ‘standing-reserve’. In this way, the propensity of the NCW theories 
and doctrines is to establish fields of correspondence (which, it will be observed, 
are critically dependent on an ethic of representation) and to erect -  by means of
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meshes of networks — closed systems, which are, as D&G advised us in the 
context of apparatuses, violent, expansive and imperial. It is also interesting to 
note that the default operational posture of such a martial bearing is ‘to be pre­
emptive’. It is for this reason that D&G advised us that apparatuses (State- 
apparatuses) reach into the milieu of exteriority to capture war and make it its 
own.
iii. We have already noted that the only way by which the theories and doctrines of 
NCW can establish fields of correspondences is by extracting the intensity of 
force, alternatively, by exhausting the intensity of instant-intensities, and by 
consigning that what remains to stand-reserve. But this in itself is premised on the 
possibility to do so. In other words, there is an underlying assumption that not 
only it is possible to irrevocably exhaust the intensities of forces, but additionally, 
it is also possible to exhaust the intensity of the forces in and of the onto-force- 
planes.
The question thus stands as to whether it is indeed possible to (1) account for 
the infinite number of onto-force-planes and (2) to exhaust the intensity of these 
planes in perpetuity. From the point of view of the theories and doctrines of 
NCW, these two issues can only be successfully addressed if, and only if, there is 
an exact overlap between fields of correspondences and the infinite number of 
onto-force-planes. If such an overlap can be realized, then it is indeed possible to 
reduce the infinite onto-force-planes to a discrete and finite singularity (while
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accommodating and accounting for diversity in this singularity). Yet there is a 
problem in positing this and it is this which irrevocably fractures the NCW’s 
concept of operations.
Previously, it was asserted that Intensity is the fluctuations (movements) of the 
immanent relations in and of force. These fluctuations may also be understood as 
the intensive differences of forces with/in instant-intensities. Thus, when it is said 
that instant-intensities are always-already in excendence, it also is suggested that 
the force of excendence is that of difference. It is important to reiterate that this 
difference is not simply the extrinsic difference that is discemable when forces 
come in contact with each other. Rather, in the first instance, this difference is 
intensive, occurring within instant-intensities which, after all, are becoming- 
particular configurations of force-flows. In other words, instant-intensities while 
being generative, are simultaneously de-generative, that is to say, re-generative 
for they are constantly becoming-x. The process that drives this becoming, of 
course, is excendence and the force of which is difference.
Now, we have stated that when instant-intensities are exhausted of their 
intensity, the remainder is susceptible to being enframed, which leads to the 
establishment of fields of correspondence. But this presupposes that while the 
extraction or exhaustion of intensity is taking place, there is no play of forces that 
either adds to or subtracts from or re-arranges the distribution of forces in an 
instant-intensity. In other words, it is suggested that while an instant-intensity is in
4 1 6
the process of being made to stand-reserve, the instant-intensity (with its steadily 
diminishing intensity) is considered immobile. But, this as we have already seen 
is not true for, as we have seen, the motive force of instant-intensity is an 
intensive difference which is always-already at play with/in instant-intensities. In 
this sense, therefore, instant-intensities cannot be constituents of fields of 
correspondences which, we should not forget, were stated to be instances of 
intensities that are standing-reserve. Thus, the NCW project of (1) exhausting 
instant-intensities and thus, (2) potentially overlapping infinite onto-force-planes 
with meshes and nets of calculability (which only serve to reduce instant- 
intensities to mere instances) to enable the establishment of fields of 
correspondences is ill-fated. This is because the very process of enframing (or as 
Heidegger would put it, gestelling) is subverted by the intensive differences 
implicit in instant-intensities. Note that this subversion is also the reason why, as 
we mentioned earlier, assemblages cannot persist, rather they are always forming 
and de-forming. Thus, as the NCW concept of operations strives to create a total 
and comprehensive battlespace, its very raw materials serve to subvert the project 
thereby collapsing the edifice that the theories and doctrines of NCW attempt to 
erect. It is interesting to note that it is precisely this that serves to de-construct not 
only the classical theories of war, but also the Clausewitzian theory of war and, as 
mentioned above, the theories and doctrines of NCW. It is precisely against this 
subversion that Clausewitz devised his defensive maneuver of the architectonic 
and the NCW theories and doctrines deploy their meshes and nets of calculability.
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Given the above, let us return momentarily to the war that D&G advised 
us comes from elsewhere in relation to the State apparatus. The State apparatus, in 
the context of the vision-in-One that we have outlined above, is analogous to a 
field of correspondence. Now, when D&G tell us that ‘war’ comes from a milieu 
of exteriority, they are implicitly suggesting that the State apparatus has definite 
boundaries beyond which this other war resides. Further, D&G advise us that this 
exteriority is ‘invaded’ by the State apparatus by appropriating the war machine, 
which D&G tell us is an assemblage. Two issues stand out when we correlate this 
formulation of D&G’s to the vision-in-One that we have articulated above. First, 
assemblages in the context of the vision-in-One are unstable. This is because, as 
we have mentioned above, they are constantly forming and de-forming in keeping 
with the processes of excendence that are continually operational with/in such 
assemblages. Thus, to suggest that assemblages are open to capture and a focused 
redeployment would be to underestimate the nomadism that marks assemblages 
and the instant-intensities that constitute them. Thus, it is suggested that 
assemblages continually elude capture. Secondly, and more damagingly, unlike 
the calcified apparatuses that D&G refer to, the fields of correspondences are also 
inherently unstable -  though they may present us with the illusion (it is this which 
Krishna alludes to as maya in the Gita) that they are prone to be stable and thus 
capturable.
As we have already seen, even before fields of correspondences can be 
stabilized, there is a profoundly subversive tacticity that is at play with/ in them.
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This is the function of the intensive differences that lend instant-intensities their 
intensity. Thus, while instant-intensities may seem to be aggregating into fields of 
correspondences, their disaggregating movement simultaneously serves to de­
construct such fields. Now, it is posited that Intensive War is the differential play 
of infinite intensities of infinite magnitude. Thus, unlike in the case of D&G’s war 
and war machines, which they claim come from elsewhere, Intensive War is 
always-already with/ in. In other words, it is not the case that Intensive War is 
reached into and appropriated like how D&G advise is the case with the ‘war’ that 
comes from elsewhere. Rather, Intensive War, being immanent in itself, is also 
immanent in any and all formations o f instant-intensities, including assemblages 
and fields o f correspondences.
As the ‘line of flight’ in and on which this study had begun its journey 
(de)materializes into and onto other lines of flight, let us return to the original 
question posed at the start of this study -  what if, like the uncircumscribed, war is 
‘absolutely’ immanent, which is to say that not only is it immanent to particular 
circumscriptions but, more importantly, it is immanent in itself?
It should be evident - even given the brief overview of Intensive War that 
has been presented above - that Intensive War operates across a number of 
registers which, while accounting for the common-parlance understanding of the 
conflict between nation-states, also is immanent in them. Indeed, Intensive War, 
as described above, can be said to be immanent in and on an infinite number of
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registers. It is this vision-in-One’ of war, this study argues, that lurks with/in the 
more traditional theorizations of war, and includes, indeed is made more 
discemable, by the emerging theories and doctrines of NCW. Thus, our discussion 
on Intensive War, which we have unfolded alongside not only the traditional 
theories of war and NCW, but also alongside Krishna’s discussion with Arjuna on 
the eve of the battle of Kurukshetra, is centered on the multifarious nature of 
existence and the decrying of a rigid and singular enframing of the world.112 This, 
as Krishna consistently pointed out in the Gita, is the signature of the ontological 
condition of war and he exhorted Arjuna to conduct himself accordingly, that is, 
as a warrior. In this connection, it is important to mention -  though we have not 
addressed it in this study -  that Krishna highlighted ‘stillness in action’ as being 
the mark of the yogi (active man, which is also the mark of the warrior) as 
opposed to the dull inertia of non-activity of the tamasic (inert) individual or even
113the frenetic activeness of the rajasic (passionate) individual. According to 
Krishna, the essence of action is associated with a constancy which, while 
optimally remaining impervious to the vagaries of superficial sensory impulses 
generated by illusory fields of correspondences, is nevertheless creatively 
informed (overtly or otherwise) by the direct and rhizomatic experience of 
Intensive War, thereby necessitating the need to harmonize with the eternal flux 
of forces of the universe114 while waging war. In other words, the martial bearing 
that Intensive War evokes necessitates ‘reading’ events by ‘unfolding’ with and, 
more importantly, as events, thus appearing to act with lightening speed and with
all the necessary and available resources.115 Thus, when considered in the context 
of Intensive War, strategic ensembles like the State or even D&G’s war machines 
fragment into tactical initiatives or what we have thus far referred to as instant- 
intensities.
Thus, in the last instance, it could be said...
MOm.
That is infinite, and this is infinite. The infinite proceeds from the infinite...taking 
the infinite o f the infinite, it remains as the infinite alone...
Om!
Shanti! Shanti! Shanti! ”116
This infinite is...
Intensive War!
115 For example, see Krishna’s advice to Yudhishtira on how to neutralize Dronacharya in D rona Parva  
(Section C X C l/o f  the Mahabharata. Essentially, Krishna advocated not only the use o f ‘asymmetric 
m eans’, (which, in this particular case, is an excellent example o f  (dis) information warfare) but he also 
recommended the marshalling and deployment o f  every resource available. This, curiously, approximates 
the Blitzkrieg method o f  war. See William, S. Lind, Maneuver Warfare Handbook, W estview  Special 
Studies in Military Affairs, (Boulder: CO: W estview Press Inc., 1985).
116 Isa  Upanishad, from The Eight Upanishads (Vol. 1) with Commentary o f  Sankaracharya, Trans. Swami 
Gambhirananda, (Calcutta, India: Advaita Ashiama, 1957) Epigraph
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Postscript
On H ow  Not to Read this Thesis or,
... onward all you crystal soldiers ..J
This thesis may well have been not written for it is not about something, 
or some idea, or some event that has either happened or that is about to happen. 
On the other hand, the inevitability of this thesis was always-already beyond any 
doubt for, like a self-fulfilling prophecy, its genesis can be diagrammed with/in 
the motive forces whose fleetingly contingent confluence it attempts to highlight. 
Thus, this thesis is not, indeed cannot be, a program, or a doctrine, or even a 
theory of war. Any thesis that attempts to posit or explicate a theory or a doctrine 
of war should, optimally, be a clear periodisable movement in thought that details 
how a logical and sequential coming together of constituting factors and events -  
ranging from the conflictual forces that lend a material consistency to the 
phenomenon of war, to the assembling of machines of war, and finally of their 
deployment on the field of battle -  takes place. This thesis is decidedly not such a 
candidate. Thus, to look for such an account or theorization of war, in the context 
of this thesis, would be an effort in vain. Indeed, as the scattered observations that 
run wildly through this thesis suggest, the very study of war, particularly in the 
context of a university setting -  civil and military -  is itself veering close to an 
effort in futility. Much of the blame for this -  if at all blame can be ascribed for 
the prevailing state of affairs in the study of war -  can be attributed to the 
1 B la c k  S a b b a th , “ C o m p u te r  G o d ” fro m  D e h u m a n iz e r , 1992
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philosophy of representation that haunts the annals of western philosophical 
thought. This, as we have seen, constrained even the singularly brilliant 
Clausewitz who retreated from the potentiality of losing the phenomenon of war 
to the vagaries of what he considered to be primordial chance and uncertainty.
We have also seen how the history of military thought (including the 
NCW theories) has always had a significant sub-text to it. This, among other 
things, deals with the presence of chance and uncertainty, or more accurately, 
with the anteriority of chance and uncertainty which, in many instances and in a 
wide array of forms, has threatened to reduce the painstaking and often ambitious 
attempts to theorize war into incoherence. Thus, we read the classical 
theorizations of war (including that of Clausewitz) as evolving and organizing 
themselves as defensive manoeuvres geared to keep at bay these twin disruptive 
phenomena. With the emergence of the NCW theories, backed by a proliferating 
ICT-based dependency structure, it is now becoming possible to read this sub-text 
with more clarity and, as this thesis argues, from a different stance. In this way, 
the possibility to recover the hoary vitalism implicit in the concept of war -  such 
as the one that Heraclitus insisted on -  now presents itself. Disappointingly, 
however, as we have seen, the NCW theories themselves remain tainted by their 
fractured reading and interpretations of Clausewitz within a sedentary framework 
of reason that gives priority to forms and their representations. Thus, they not 
only under-estimate the gravity of the Clausewitzian project, they also condemn
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themselves, in the final analysis, to being repetitive expositions that discuss the 
informationalization of war.
The call that issues forth from this thesis is, therefore, a two-fold one. 
First, it urges an abandonment of the project of theorizing war which, as we have 
seen, is a project that remains indebted to a peculiar mode of representational 
philosophy that privileges transcendent figures and ossifies them as icons and 
strategic ensembles. This is notwithstanding the fact that these iconic strategic 
ensembles when they do -  as they must - come in contact with chance and 
uncertainty (which only humour us by seeming to be amenable to being captured 
and restrained by orders of reason) collapse and disintegrate. Thus, secondly, this 
thesis urges the recognition of the opportunity (but also the challenge) afforded by 
the emerging ‘new sciences’ on the one hand and the rapidly proliferating ICTs 
on the other, to effect a transformation in the relations that we share with war. 
This necessarily involves abandoning the locus of transcendence that we assume 
when theorizing war-as-such. It also involves experiencing cognitive shifts on our 
part as we problematize war with varying intensities. In other words, this thesis 
avoids asking the traditional question of war-studies: what is war? Rather, it asks, 
how war comes to be? Thus, this two-fold call is that of a siren that signals, to 
paraphrase Mullarkey’s words, ‘the challenge of renewal and of acknowledging 
the possibility that art, technology and even matter itself, at the level of its own 
subject-matter, in its own actuality, might be capable of forcing new (non) 
philosophical thoughts onto us by implicating us in a contingent and indefinite
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9 2process . Undoubtedly, it is tempting to understand this as being an activity that 
may lend us newer insights into what we commonly understand as war. To 
succumb to this temptation would, however, be unfortunate. It would be 
unfortunate because not only would we not be calling war into question instead, 
we would be attempting to apply any insights that we gain which, while certainly 
being novel, would nevertheless be an affirmation of a pivotal anthropocentrism 
that brands our common-place understanding of war.
No! What is necessary is to jettison this anthropocentrism (or, for that 
matter, any kind of centering) and to ask again: How is war possible? By posing 
the question in this way, we are thus able to recover at least the possibility of war 
being freed from the circumscriptions of the reasonable order of the political and 
of the thanatological. There is also no mistaking the fact that for us to engage in 
this kind of thinking we would have to call forth a violence that is simultaneous 
with thinking-as-such for our mode of thinking will be, if not warlike, at least 
combative. But this is not the combat between fixed positions; rather, it a fluid 
condition where the displacements and replacements of concepts in the form of 
transient tactical initiatives are the order of the day. In this way we will be better 
able to appreciate the signature of the multiplicity and relativity that afflicts 
transcendence, which “depends on one’s frame of immanence. And that frame, 
the place where one takes a stand, is never permanent.”
2 John Mullarkey, Post-Continental Philosophy: An Outline, p 193
3 Ibid.
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What then would be an appropriate way to read this thesis? Perhaps, 
Nietzsche’s words best suggest a possible response...
...It is absolutely unnecessary, and not even desirable, for you to argue in...favour 
[of this thesis]; on the contrary, a dose of curiosity, as if...looking at an alien 
plant with ironic distance would strike...as an incomparably more intelligent 
attitude...4
XXX
4 N ietzsche, in a letter to Carl Fuchs, July 29, 1888. Quoted as the epigraph in Rudiger Saffanski,
N ietzsche: A Philosophical Biography.
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